# Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Hi everyone. `[00:00:00]` 大家好。 > All right time to wake up how do we have slides. 好的，该起床了，我们怎么有幻灯片。 > We do have a clicker. 我们确实有一个按键。 > Yes. 是 > How many is a lot of people here. 这里有多少人。 > How many of you are going to make some kind of a start up after this event when this is done because you raise your hand please keep my humor humor. 你们中有多少人会在这件事结束后做一些开始，因为你们举手请保持我的幽默。 > OK. 好的 > One two three four. 1 2 3 4 > How many of you are going to be one of those 15 startups every year that hits a hundred million in revenue and deserves vesi funding more than 15. 你们中有多少人会成为这 15 家初创公司中的一家，这些公司每年的收入将达到 1 亿美元，应该得到超过 15 家公司的资助。 > That\'s awesome is a really good class. 那是一门很棒的课。 > Laughter. 笑声。 > `[00:00:38]` I made something which a lot of people don\'t understand is that these two companies that I have Focker software and Stack Exchange and tell you that sort of just in chronological order to try to explain it. `[00:00:38]` 我做了一件很多人都不明白的事情，那就是我有 Focker 软件和 Stack Exchange 的两家公司，告诉你，这只是按时间顺序来解释的。 > And there\'s all kinds of interesting lessons in there. 里面有各种各样有趣的课程。 > I think four different ways to create a startup and to bootstrap a startup or take funding. 我认为有四种不同的方式来创建一个创业公司和启动一个创业公司或者接受资金。 > Almost every talk that I\'ve heard today has assumed that you\'re going to be getting money from overseas and there isn\'t enough money in all of your in California to fund all your companies. 我今天听到的几乎每一次谈话都假定你将从海外获得资金，而你在加州的所有资金都不足以为你的所有公司提供资金。 > `[00:01:11]` And so if you all kind of bang your heads against that door some of them are going to get bloodied. `[00:01:11]` 如果你们的头撞在那扇门上，他们中的一些人就会血流成河。 > I\'m sorry I\'m really bad with metaphors. 对不起，我对隐喻的理解很差。 > This is the very first Greek office. 这是第一个希腊办事处。 > Michael Pryor and I started fuck Creek software in the year 2000 after we\'ve been working together at a company called Juno Online Services which is a free ISP and I never wanted to start a company. 2000 年，迈克尔·普赖尔和我一起在一家名为 Juno Online Services 的公司工作，这是一家免费的 ISP，我从未想过要创办一家公司。 > `[00:01:35]` It wasn\'t my lifetime goal I was already in my mid 30s by the time I started Greek. `[00:01:35]` 当我开始学希腊语的时候，我已经 30 多岁了，这不是我一生的目标。 > And how does that make me now. 那我现在是怎么。 > `[00:01:45]` The point point was that I couldn\'t find a cool place to work. `[00:01:45]` 重点是我找不到一个很酷的工作地方。 > I couldn\'t find a place where I wanted to work as a programmer. 我找不到一个我想做程序员的地方。 > And I finally gave up on and decided that if I was going to have a career that I found enjoyable as a programmer I would have to build my own workplace. 最后，我放弃了，决定如果我想拥有一份我觉得很享受的职业，作为一名程序员，我将不得不建立我自己的工作场所。 > And of course the irony is that I don\'t get the program anymore but. 当然，讽刺的是我已经不懂这个程序了，但是。 > `[00:02:03]` The very beginning of Fire Creek we rented this office and that was my desk and I literally took home everything of the company in my knapsack at work at the at the end of the day for what I wanted to have a place to go to work and it was me and Michael and we hired a couple of people very quickly. `[00:02:03]` 从 Fire Creek 一开始，我们就租了这间办公室，那是我的办公桌，我把公司的所有东西都装在我的背包里，在一天结束的时候，为了我想要去的地方工作，我和迈克尔很快就雇佣了几个人。 > Now we had the reason we knew we could start a business even though I\'m kind of a scaredy cat and not an entrepreneurial type was that I had seen a whole bunch of other businesses in those days so this was the first dotcom boom and this was sort of a period much like today when people were starting all kinds of idiotic businesses to sell grilled cheese sandwiches and whatever crazy you know Instagram for squirrels. 现在我们知道我们可以创业，尽管我有点胆小，而不是一个企业家，因为我在那个时候见过很多其他的生意，所以这是第一次互联网热潮，这段时期就像今天人们开始做各种各样的白痴生意，卖烤奶酪三明治。不管你对松鼠的 Instagram 知道些什么。 > Except it was called something else in those days. 只不过在那些日子里它被称为别的东西。 > And all these idiotic companies or what you could do is you can look at them and say wow if I did that company and I just didn\'t do these two stupid things. 所有这些愚蠢的公司，或者你能做的是，你可以看着他们说，哇，如果我做了那家公司，而我没有做这两件蠢事。 > But I did them in a smart way then that would definitely be a better business than this one right. 但我用一种聪明的方式做了，那肯定比这次更好。 > So for me the model was a company called Ask digital which is a consulting company that filled Granz Greenspan created which collapsed after they took vesi but everything did really. 所以对我来说，模型是一家名为 Ask Digital 的公司，它是一家填充 Granz Greenspan 的咨询公司，在他们服用 Vesi 之后就崩溃了，但一切都是真的。 > `[00:03:14]` And we were gonna make two tweaks on the digital model so he had this model that was like we\'re going to open source software and then consulting based on the open source software and my tweak was it was going to be proprietary software and consulting based on the proprietary software. `[00:03:14]` 我们要对数字模型做两次调整，所以他有了这个模型，就像我们要开放源码软件，然后基于开源软件进行咨询，我的调整是，它将是专有软件，而咨询是基于专有软件的。 > And then you have another source of revenue. 然后你就有了另一个收入来源。 > What\'s the theory. 理论是什么？ > We were both wrong. 我们都错了。 > It doesn\'t matter what my theory was. 不管我的理论是什么。 > You know we worked on it for about 15 minutes before we effectively pivoted to something else. 你知道，我们花了大约 15 分钟的时间才能有效地转到其他的东西上。 > But the most important part of our business model is we weren\'t going to spend any money until we had some consulting revenue. 但我们的商业模式中最重要的部分是，在获得咨询收入之前，我们不会花任何钱。 > And so this was a time in the late 90s when there was absolutely unlimited demand for anybody who could put together you know left if you could type a left less then integrate and then sign to make email on the keyboard then you could build about two hundred dollars an hour and if you could actually make an ACL page that was like double that. 这是 90 年代末的一个时期，人们对任何一个人的需求都是无限的-你知道，如果你可以输入左键，然后进行整合，然后在键盘上签名发送电子邮件，那么你可以每小时建大约 200 美元，如果你真的可以制作一个 ACL 页面的话，大概是这个数字的两倍。 > `[00:04:06]` And there was sort of essentially infinite demand. `[00:04:06]` 实际上有无限的需求。 > There was a company called Science which fortunately is now completely gone. 有一家名为“科学”的公司，幸运的是，现在它已经完全消失了。 > But in those days they had they hired thousands of computer science students and stuff like that to build web pages for people and Scient used to brag that they only accepted 10 percent of the clients that wanted to hire them. 但在那些日子里，他们雇佣了成千上万的计算机科学专业的学生和诸如此类的东西来为人们建立网页，而山特曾经吹嘘说，他们只接受了 10%的想雇用他们的客户。 > So if you wanted a site to build your Web site you had to apply and then you had to get approved by the sign board of whatever. 因此，如果你想要一个网站来建立你的网站，你必须申请，然后你必须得到任何标志板的批准。 > So there was just way too much demand and we thought you know we\'ll just take some of that overflow of all that demand build some Web sites for some people make a few hundred dollars an hour you know with two or three of us and build up enough money in the bank to basically bootstrap the business. 所以我们的需求太大了，我们认为我们会利用这些需求中的一些溢出，为一些人建立一些网站，你知道，每小时和我们两、三个人一起赚几百美元，然后在银行里积累足够的钱，基本上可以启动这个业务。 > `[00:04:48]` And the truth is that that worked for us we had about two months of consulting consulting and I think we might have accumulated 250000 dollars in the bank or something like that. `[00:04:48]` 事实是，我们进行了大约两个月的咨询，我想我们可能已经在银行里积累了 250000 美元或者诸如此类的东西。 > And that was really really. 那真是真的。 > So we started in September 2000 in this very office. 因此，我们于 2000 年 9 月在这个办公室开始工作。 > We the consulting market the dot dot com crash occurred in November of 2000. 我们咨询市场的网点崩溃发生在 2000 年 11 月. > `[00:05:11]` I know the exact month because in that month if you look at all of these consulting companies are Scient Razorfish Viant March 1st there was a whole bunch of them and if you looked in November 2000 their billings went down by 90 percent in one month. `[00:05:11]` 我知道确切的月份，因为在那个月里，如果你看看所有这些咨询公司都是山达拉佐鱼公司，三月一日，有一大堆这样的公司，如果你在 2000 年 11 月看，他们的账单在一个月内下降了 90%。 > And they didn\'t know it because they thought that this was just an unusual lengthening of the sales cycle meaning it was taking longer to close deals. 他们不知道这一点，因为他们认为这只是销售周期不寻常的延长，这意味着完成交易需要更长的时间。 > They didn\'t realize that this market has completely collapsed and they didn\'t really decide that the consulting market was gone and never coming back until April of 2001. 他们没有意识到这个市场已经完全崩溃了，他们也没有真正决定咨询市场已经消失，直到 2001 年 4 月才回来。 > And in the meantime they had these big armies of consultants and they burned through every penny that they had in the bank paying these armies of consultants to do nothing because they had no clients they had no clients because everybody got scared that the dot com crash was going to happen and stopped hiring consultants to save money. 与此同时，他们有一大批顾问，他们把银行里的每一分钱都花光了，让这些顾问大军什么也不做，因为他们没有客户，因为每个人都担心网络崩溃会发生，并停止雇佣顾问来省钱。 > So. 所以 > Consulting market crashed we did accumulate a little bit of money and we luckily hadn\'t hired very many people so we didn\'t waste all that money just keeping people employed when we had no money. 咨询市场崩溃了，我们确实积累了一点钱，幸运的是，我们没有雇佣很多人，所以我们没有浪费所有的钱，只是在我们没有钱的时候让人们继续工作。 > We did not we had hired a couple of people. 我们没有-我们雇了几个人。 > We let them go. 我们放了他们。 > So it was just me and Michael for a long time as the cofounders and we moved into this building which conveniently My grandmother owned and I was in charge of managing it so I just sort of moved in and continued to pay her rent for a while. 所以很长一段时间里，只有我和迈克尔作为共同创始人搬进了这栋大楼，这是我祖母拥有的，我负责管理它，所以我就搬了进来，继续支付她的租金一段时间。 > `[00:06:31]` This was our office downstairs and we continue to sort of build a business really really slowly and because there was no consulting business what we started selling was fog bugs the only thing we could find which is a bug tracking software written internally in VB script. `[00:06:31]` 这是我们楼下的办公室，我们继续慢慢地建立一家企业，因为没有咨询业务，我们开始销售的是迷雾 bug，我们唯一能找到的就是用 VB 脚本内部编写的 bug 跟踪软件。 > And we started selling you know five weeks version1.0 and you know like the first day we sold it there\'s like 2000 dollars somebody bought a site license from Brazil or something. 我们开始销售，你知道，五个星期，版本 1.0，你知道，就像第一天，我们在那里卖了大约 2000 美元，有人从巴西买了一个网站许可证之类的东西。 > And it was awesome. 太棒了。 > And in fact what we were noticing is I think of the first first few months we were making somewhere around five thousand dollars a month I think is the right number. 事实上，我们注意到的是，我想到了最初的几个月，我们每个月的收入在 5000 美元左右，我认为这是正确的数字。 > And that was kind of enough to eat. 那就够吃了。 > And you know eventually we paid my grandmother for all the rent that we were consuming. 最终我们付了我祖母所有的房租。 > And as time elapsed. 随着时间的流逝。 > The neat thing was that this number was going up every single month and it was going up very slowly but it was going up and it was in a really really bad market. 最妙的是，这个数字每一个月都在上升，而且增长非常缓慢，但它一直在上升，而且在一个非常糟糕的市场上。 > But we were selling software and it just got better and better and better because we worked on it and our revenue went up to hit fifteen thousand dollars. 但是我们在销售软件，它变得越来越好，因为我们致力于它，我们的收入增加到一万五千美元。 > We could afford to pay Michael a salary and I had some savings in the bank. 我们付得起迈克尔的薪水，我在银行里存了一些钱。 > So fifteen thousand dollars a month is I always just automatically calculate 10000 hours per person that needs a salary and all our overhead expenses including the rent was five thousand dollars. 所以每月一万五千美元，我总是自动计算每个人 10000 小时的工资，我们所有的间接费用，包括房租，都是五千美元。 > So we then hit 25000 I started taking a salary. 所以我们达到了 25000，我开始拿薪水。 > And when we hit 35000 we hired a third guy who came on to start answering phones and doing some tech support and helping us with some of the some of the coding tasks that we had. 当我们达到 35000 的时候，我们雇佣了第三个人，他开始接电话，做一些技术支持，帮助我们完成一些编码任务。 > And at some point we built it all and we got actually got an office. 在某一时刻，我们建造了这一切，我们实际上得到了一间办公室。 > This was guessing about 2003 so like several years on it was a really long slog before we got our first legit office and we built it out really nicely and we were we were always obsessed about giving programmers air on chairs and 30 inch monitors in private offices with doors closed. 这大概是在 2003 年，所以就像几年前，在我们第一个合法的办公室之前，这是一个非常漫长的过程，我们把它建得很好，我们总是痴迷于让程序员们坐在椅子上呼吸空气，让 30 英寸的显示器在私人办公室里关上门。 > `[00:08:23]` And when we built this office I think we had room first time we took this office for seven people there were seven desks. `[00:08:23]` 当我们建造这间办公室的时候，我想我们第一次有房间了，我们第一次把这间办公室给七个人，一共有七张桌子。 > And eventually we doubled the space that we had there and we made room for I think 12 people or something like that and it\'s getting bigger and bigger we all eat lunch together at this big table. 最后，我们把那里的空间扩大了一倍，我们为 12 个人或诸如此类的人腾出了空间，这样的空间越来越大，我们都在这张大桌子上一起吃午餐。 > These are a lot of summer interns we took summer interns every summer and that\'s how we did it got our recruiting pipeline and again just continue to grow and this is the last time I remember getting the company together for an all company picture. 这是很多暑期实习生，我们每年夏天都去做暑期实习生，我们就是这么做的，得到了我们的招聘渠道，而且还在继续增长，这是我最后一次把公司召集在一起拍一张全公司的照片。 > But I think we\'re now at let\'s say 40 45 people. 但我想我们现在有 4045 个人。 > `[00:09:01]` So that\'s one that\'s one kind of company and that\'s that\'s Fog Creek. `[00:09:01]` 那是一种公司，那是雾溪。 > Fuck Rick continue to do well we continue to sort of try to launch new products every single year. 他妈的里克继续做得很好，我们每年都会尝试推出新产品。 > We had this idea that bug tracking was not really the be all and end all of products and we launched a bunch of stuff. 我们有这样的想法，即错误跟踪并不是所有产品的全部和最终，我们推出了一堆东西。 > We had a bunch of summer interns launch a remote desktop product called co-pilot that did pretty well that actually more than paid for itself and now earns a sort of a nice dividend PHOG Bogues was obviously the big bread winner and is now a very large product. 我们有一群暑期实习生推出了一款名为“副驾驶”的远程桌面产品，它做得非常好，实际上比自己付出的还要多，现在赚到了不错的红利，菲格·博格斯显然是个大赢家，现在已经是一个非常大的产品了。 > And we launched a bunch other stuff so it worked some of it didn\'t work. 我们推出了一些其他的东西，所以其中一些不起作用。 > There was we launched a job board for the Indian programmers market and made 50 rupees total ever selling one job listing is a worst product we ever did. 在那里，我们为印度程序员市场推出了一个招聘板，总共卖出了 50 卢比，这是我们做过的最糟糕的产品。 > And then what I wanted to do this thing I wanted to kill experts extant exchange which you all probably know about. 然后我想要做的这件事，我想杀死专家，现存的交流，你们可能都知道。 > Does anybody know Stack Overflow. 有人知道堆栈溢出。 > No one heard of that stack overflow thing. 没人听说过堆栈溢出的事。 > So the goal there was to kill experts exchange because they were evil. 因此，他们的目标是杀死专家，因为他们是邪恶的。 > What was cool about stack overflow is you could explain it simply and everybody understood what you were talking about. 堆栈溢出的酷之处在于，您可以简单地解释它，并且每个人都理解您在说什么。 > You didn\'t have to go into any detail of how it work. 你不需要详细说明它是如何工作的。 > And I couldn\'t find anybody internally that wanted to work on that. 我在内部找不到任何想要做这件事的人。 > So I got together with Jeff Atwood who\'s another blogger called known as Coding Horror and said you know will you join. 所以我和杰夫·阿特伍德在一起，他是另一位名叫“编码恐怖”的博主，他说你知道你会加入。 > Will you join us. 你愿意加入我们吗。 > This will be sort of a 50/50 Fog Creek. 这将是一种 50/50 雾溪。 > Jeff Atwood joint production to do stack overflow and I thought I thought of this as sort of a side bet like Let\'s get Jeff working on this. 杰夫阿特伍德联合生产做堆栈溢出，我认为这是一种边赌，让我们让杰夫工作这一点。 > I\'ll help him when I can. 我会尽我所能帮助他。 > If this thing takes off awesome if doesn\'t take off doesn\'t matter but hopefully I can get rid of this experts exchange problem. 如果这个东西起飞了，如果不起飞的话，那就不重要了，但希望我能摆脱这个专家交流的问题。 > But But Stack Overflow did really well. 但是 Stack Overflow 做得很好。 > As it turns out the growth isn\'t credible unlike the other speakers I\'m perfectly happy to number the numbers on my Y-axis. 事实证明，增长是不可信的，不像其他发言者，我非常乐意在我的 Y 轴上对数字进行编号。 > `[00:11:03]` Even tell you the growth year was insane. `[00:11:03]` 甚至告诉你生长的年份是疯狂的。 > `[00:11:10]` From day one we saw this like literally every single week we had more visitors in the week before. `[00:11:10]` 从第一天起，我们几乎每一个星期都会看到更多的访客。 > At the beginning I think it was the numbers were crazy. 一开始我觉得是数字太疯狂了。 > We started out with 30000 daily visitors and that\'s about the same number as people as I would get on ONJ on software blog post. 我们一开始每天有 30000 名访客，这与我在 ONJ 上的软件博客帖子中的人数大致相同。 > `[00:11:23]` So I knew that that was the yourselfer audience coming initially and over time and that took ten years to build that audience by the way writing a blog. `[00:11:23]` 所以我知道这是你自己的听众，最初和时间的推移，通过写博客的方式，花了十年的时间才建立起这样的观众。 > And you would look at the Google Analytics every single week and just get a little bit higher. 你可以每周看一次谷歌分析，然后再高一点。 > Of course it went down on the weekends and it would just go a little bit higher and at some point it was growing by more than a Jaun software like every week and then it was growing by drawing software every day and it just grew faster and faster and eventually encompassed the universe. 当然，在周末它会下降，它只会稍微高一点，在某个时候，它比 Jaun 软件每周都有更多的增长，然后它通过每天绘制软件来增长，它只是增长得更快，最终覆盖了整个宇宙。 > Now we at one point when we were around 6 million on here does it so this measure is global unique monthly visitors that measures people that just visit your site once a month and place a cookie. 现在，我们在一个地方，当我们在这里大约 600 万，所以这个措施是全球唯一的每月访问者，衡量的人，只是访问你的网站每月一次，并放置一个曲奇。 > And all we do is count the cookies on google analytics so there\'s maybe two users on to maybe one person on two computers. 我们所做的就是计算 Google 分析中的 cookie，这样可能有两个用户，或者两台计算机上的一个人。 > `[00:12:12]` The other thing about Google Analytics is that the cookie is placed on your domain and we have four domains. `[00:12:12]` Google Analytics 的另一件事是，cookie 放在您的域上，我们有四个域。 > So we have to break it down and we may have dealt we maybe double counting people that visit two of our sites and if they go to two different domains but I think that\'s okay personally. 因此，我们必须分解它，我们可能已经处理了，我们可能会重复计算访问我们的两个站点的人，如果他们访问两个不同的域，但我认为\个人来说是可以的。 > And when we hit about 6 million users we had a meeting with folks in developer relations at Microsoft and we said hey how many developers do you think they\'re on the world they said 16 million. 当我们接触到大约 600 万用户时，我们与微软的开发人员举行了一次会议，我们说，嘿，你认为他们在世界上有多少开发人员，他们说有 1600 万。 > They said 9 million. 他们说有 900 万。 > And we\'re like okay we got two thirds of the developers in the world and then we hit 9 million and then we had 10 and now we hit 20 million an at about 25 million of the world\'s 9 million software developers and how you need that number. 我们可以说，我们有世界上三分之二的开发者，然后我们达到了 900 万，然后我们有了 10 个，现在我们达到了 2000 万，在全世界 900 万软件开发人员中，大约有 2500 万，以及你是如何需要这个数字的。 > `[00:12:50]` So so there\'s two kinds of businesses here that are completely different actually. `[00:12:50]` 所以这里有两种完全不同的生意。 > `[00:12:57]` There is two ways you can build a business and everybody up until now today. `[00:12:57]` 到今天为止，有两种方法可以建立企业和每个人。 > And from Zuck onward has been talking about the get big fast business and stack exchange is indeed a get big fast business. 从赛克开始，他就一直在谈论快速交易，而堆栈交换确实是一项快速交易。 > It\'s growing Saxony\'s dotcom domain is growing and it\'s working. 它正在增长，萨克森州的互联网领域正在增长，而且正在发挥作用。 > `[00:13:16]` Work is it the stack exchange com domain is now growing at 350 percent year over year which is I don\'t know the fastest thing in the world but it\'s pretty friggin steady as you saw from that chart. `[00:13:16]` 工作-堆栈交换 COM 域现在以每年 350%的速度增长，也就是说，我不知道世界上最快的东西，但是它非常稳定，就像你从图表中看到的那样。 > So it\'s early. 所以现在还早。 > Sure thanks Jessica. 当然谢谢杰西卡。 > `[00:13:33]` I wrote a blog post on unshorn software a long time ago in the middle to the early 2000s we don\'t have anything else to do because you know the economy is collapsing and it was called strategy letter 1 because I was very self important and pompous then unlike today of course. `[00:13:33]` 很久以前，我写了一篇关于 UnShn 软件的博客文章，在本世纪初到本世纪初，我们没有别的事可做，因为你知道经济正在崩溃，它被称为战略信 1，因为我当时非常重要，不像今天。 > Thank you. 谢谢。 > And I was writing about how there\'s two kinds of companies that get big fat fast companies like Amazon. 我还在写两种公司是如何得到像亚马逊这样的快速增长的大公司的。 > And then there\'s organic growth companies and I had just read the story of Ben and Jerry\'s so they were an example of an ice cream company and I kind of compared and contrasted these two different ways of growing company. 然后是有机成长型公司，我刚刚读过本和杰瑞的故事，所以他们是冰淇淋公司的一个例子，我比较和对比了这两种不同的成长方式。 > And what\'s interesting of course is that Stack Exchange and fall Creek have kind of exactly the same characteristics that he\'s seen as a big Fast Company and Rick software is an organic growth company. 有趣的是，Stack Exchange 和 Fall Creek 有着与他被视为一家大型快速公司的完全相同的特性，而 Rick 软件则是一家有机成长的公司。 > `[00:14:18]` So first of all how do you decide which kind of company you should be. `[00:14:18]` 那么首先，你该如何决定你应该成为什么样的公司呢？ > It\'s not like you get to choose like how many of you want to get big fast you hand. 这不是说你可以选择有多少人想快速变大-你的手。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > Okay. 好的。 > You have to look at the actual market that you\'re in and there\'s two kinds of markets get big fast business is when you\'re in therefore there is some kind of a land grab. 你必须看看你所处的实际市场，而有两种市场是快速发展的，当你进入市场时，就会有某种形式的土地抢夺。 > `[00:14:36]` There is an attempt to capture uncaptured territory before anybody else does the same thing. `[00:14:36]` 有人企图在其他人做同样的事情之前占领未被占领的领土。 > OK so Uber isn\'t that category. 优步不是那个类别。 > Amazon was certainly in that category. 亚马逊当然也属于这一类。 > Ben and Jerry\'s was not because Ben Jerry\'s was just ice cream you can\'t capture the entire ice cream market. 本和杰里不是因为本杰瑞只是冰淇淋，你不能占领整个冰淇淋市场。 > There already is an icecream market right. 已经有了冰淇淋市场的权利。 > This is Trenton New. 这是特伦顿新城。 > New technology trying to landgrab virgin territory in an organic growth business. 新技术试图在一个有机增长企业中占有处女地。 > You already have a million competitors and all you\'re doing is trying to claw them away one at a time patiently from from your competitors. 你已经有了一百万的竞争对手，而你所做的一切就是试着一次地把他们从你的竞争对手那里夺走。 > The reason you try to get big fast and you go for a land grab is because there are network effects. 你试着快速获取土地的原因是因为有网络效应。 > So you all know what network effects are the idea of network effect is the more users you have the more valuable your network is. 所以大家都知道什么是网络效应，网络效应的概念是，你拥有的用户越多，你的网络就越有价值。 > And so a network of let\'s say if Facebook had 10000 users that\'s not very valuable. 因此，如果 facebook 有 10000 用户，那么这个网络就不太值钱了。 > And in fact it would be extremely difficult. 事实上，这将是非常困难的。 > Facebook was a classic land grab because nobody\'s going to be on there if they can\'t communicate with their friends. Facebook 是一种典型的抢占土地的行为，因为如果他们不能与朋友沟通，就没有人会出现在 Facebook 上。 > `[00:15:32]` The same reason I can\'t get anybody to use KIC because there\'s nobody else on there. `[00:15:32]` 同样的原因，我不能让任何人使用 KIC，因为那里没有其他人。 > I mean there\'s like 10 million people on there but it doesn\'t really help. 我的意思是，那里有大约 1000 万人，但这并没有多大帮助。 > It\'s not enough. 这还不够。 > `[00:15:41]` I need I need a billion and a network effect says basically the value is increasing as you get more and more people on there because you know the value is a function of and squared right. `[00:15:41]` 我需要 10 亿，一个网络效应说，随着越来越多的人在那里，这个值基本上在增加，因为你知道这个值是一个正确的函数和平方。 > You\'re all computer scientists. 你们都是电脑科学家。 > The other thing about get big fast is that network effect creates Lockean. 快速增长的另一件事是网络效应创造了 Lockean。 > Nobody\'s going to leave Facebook for something that\'s 20 percent better or 50 percent better or even a hundred percent better because their grandma is still looking for the pictures of the puppy. 没有人会离开 Facebook 去寻找比这更好 20%、50%甚至 100%更好的东西，因为他们的奶奶还在寻找小狗的照片。 > And she likes the pictures of the puppy that you upload and if you stop putting them on Facebook she\'s going to call you laughter. 她喜欢你上传的小狗的照片，如果你不再把它们放到 Facebook 上，她就会叫你笑。 > Doesn\'t matter if the other thing is like more technologically innovative and cool now that an organic growth company you don\'t have these things. 如果另一件事在技术上更创新、更酷，那就无所谓了，因为一家有机成长型公司没有这些东西。 > And so you don\'t really care about that and you don\'t need to go for a land grab in a land grab won\'t help you because you\'re not grabbing virgin territory. 所以你不关心这个，你也不需要去抢土地，抢地对你没有帮助，因为你不是在抢处女地。 > So that\'s what get big fast means you need to be really big in order to create real value. 这就是快速变大的原因，这意味着为了创造真正的价值，你需要变得很大。 > And with organic growth you\'re in there for the long haul. 随着有机的增长，你将在那里度过漫长的一段时间。 > It took us 10 years to build fog bugs into a respectable business. 我们花了 10 年的时间才把迷雾虫打造成一家体面的企业。 > And the reason is that there are a million bug trackers out there. 原因是那里有一百万个 bug 追踪器。 > `[00:16:48]` And so with organic growth business you unless you have infinite money because you were born rich or something you need to break even right away and you find a way to break even right away and we did that by consulting by essentially you know sort of sorting ourselves out for a couple months to raise a little bit of cash and you want to start getting money from clients on day one and you want to start kind of obsessing about a need to make this business survive. `[00:16:48]` 因此，对于有机增长业务，除非你有无限的钱，因为你生来富有，或者你需要马上实现收支平衡，你找到了一种立即实现收支平衡的方法。从客户的第一天，你想开始有点困扰的需要，使这一业务生存。 > So I can be there to slowly pry away customers 1 1 dead customer at a time from my end. 这样，我就可以慢慢地从我的终点开始，逐个撬开顾客，11000 个死去的顾客。 > One thing about an organic growth business is you don\'t go in here unless you have a product that\'s valuable. 有机增长企业的一件事是，除非你有一种有价值的产品，否则你不会进入这里。 > Even with one customer. 即使只有一个顾客。 > So the ideal business is something with a first person that downloads it and starts using it already getting value out of this thing. 因此，理想的业务是有第一个人下载它并开始使用它，它已经从这个东西中获得了价值。 > `[00:17:31]` You run your business completely differently. `[00:17:31]` 你的经营方式完全不同。 > So when you when you\'re trying to get big fast. 所以当你试图快速变大的时候。 > If you have a problem that can be solved with money. 如果你有一个可以用金钱解决的问题。 > Money is cheap which sounds weird but in this environment it\'s if you have a successful Get Big Fast business it\'s very easy to raise money. 钱很便宜，这听起来很奇怪，但在这种环境下，如果你成功地获得了“快速大生意”，就很容易筹集资金。 > There\'s a lot of capitalists that are looking for places to put their money and so you use that need to try to solve problems even if it\'s a very expensive way of solving them. 很多资本家都在寻找投资的地方，所以你可以用这种方法来解决问题，即使这是一种非常昂贵的解决问题的方法。 > But in an organic growth company you\'re trying to survive. 但在一家有机成长型公司，你正在努力生存。 > You\'re just trying to stay around for as long as you possibly can. 你只是想尽可能长时间地呆在这里。 > So you you try to be frugal and cheap about everything that you do. 所以你试着在你所做的每件事上变得节俭和廉价。 > Similarly when you\'re trying to get big fast you put up a little signs all over the office that say Move fast and break break stuff. 同样地，当你试图快速变大的时候，你会在办公室里贴上一小块牌子，上面写着“快速移动”和“打碎东西”。 > And the idea is to make lots of mistakes. 我们的想法是犯很多错误。 > It doesn\'t matter you\'ve got to be moving fast you can\'t be scared in any way you just got to be running down the hill with an organic growth business. 这不重要，你必须快速行动，你不能害怕，你只需要跑下山，有一个有机的增长业务。 > Those mistakes can kill you. 那些错误会害死你的。 > And when they kill you you don\'t have any way to come back. 当他们杀了你就没有办法回来了。 > The thing that scared us at Falls Creek all the time is that if we ran out of money in the bank we would have to close. 一直以来，Falls Creek 令我们感到害怕的是，如果银行里的钱用完了，我们就得关门。 > We did not have a source of a million dollars to stick into the business to survive one more month. 我们没有一百万美元的资金可以继续经营下去才能再活一个月。 > So you\'re much much more careful in an organic growth business because you have to be because this is your only business and that means that they get big fast business you have a tiny teeny weeny very very very small chance of of it becoming a 10 billion dollar business. 所以你在有机增长业务中要小心得多，因为你必须这么做，因为这是你唯一的生意，这意味着他们得到了巨大的、快速的生意，你有很小的机会把它变成 100 亿美元的生意。 > `[00:18:50]` And I just made up the number 10 billion but you know really really big business. `[00:18:50]` 我刚刚创造了 100 亿，但你知道很大的生意。 > And if you consider that you know of all the why or let\'s say you all apply to white hominum and you all get in. 如果你认为你知道所有的原因，或者说你们都申请了白人同性恋，你们都会加入。 > I\'m sure that\'s not in the cards. 我肯定那不是卡上的。 > You know two of you actually of all the people in this room that apply to Y Combinator and the 60 70 80 at are not going to get in you know maybe two or three of them have a chance of being a 10 million dollar business and that\'s being really really optimistic it\'s actually less than that. 你们知道，你们中的两个人，实际上，在这间屋子里所有申请 Y 组合的人中，有 607080 人是不会进入的，你知道，也许他们中的两三个人有机会成为一家一千万美元的公司，而且他们中的两个人真的很乐观。 > So your chances of you making a ten dollar 10 billion dollar business this way by starting out trying to get big fast are vanishingly small I\'m afraid and some people like those odds. 所以，你以这样的方式做 100 亿美元的生意，试图快速获得更大的成功的机会是微不足道的，我担心，有些人喜欢这种可能性。 > So good for them. 对他们太好了。 > Some people incidentally all the people that make 10 billion dollars couldn\'t care less. 有些人顺便说一句，所有赚了 100 亿美元的人都不在乎。 > They\'re doing it because they\'re scratchiness. 他们这么做是因为他们身上没有抓痕。 > They\'re trying to solve some problem that they have in then monitor maniacally focused on that it\'s never because they want to make them deadline. 他们试图解决一些他们在其中的问题，然后疯狂地关注这个问题，因为他们不想让他们的最后期限到来。 > Now with an organic growth company though if you\'re just reasonably smart and you pay attention and you never make a terrible mistake then you\'re gonna make a nice 10 million dollar business. 现在有了一家有机成长型公司，如果你相当聪明，而且你注意到了，你永远不会犯一个可怕的错误，那么你就会有一个好的 1000 万美元的生意。 > And the number means 10 million means 10 revenue a year. 这个数字意味着每年 10，000，000 美元的收入。 > And at some point that\'s just gonna be a million to operate it 9 million it can go in your pocket if you own it and you have a really good chance of being able to build that in five to 10 years an organic growth business is not that hard as a lot of businesses like that. 在某种程度上，如果你拥有它，你就有机会在 5 到 10 年内建立起一个有机增长的企业，一个有机增长的企业并不像很多这样的企业那么难，从某种意义上说，运营它的话，900 万美元就可以进入你的口袋，如果你拥有它，你就有很好的机会建立它。 > When I used to write a column for Inc magazine and I always wanted to write something about voices and my editor always said nobody nobody. 当我曾经为 Inc 杂志写专栏的时候，我总是想写一些关于声音的东西，我的编辑总是说没有人。 > No entrepreneur takes money from that it. 没有任何企业家会从中获得金钱。 > At such a now a world of people that get investments from overseas is such a tiny sliver of entrepreneurship that if we write about that in pages of our magazine we get hate mail because nobody cares. 在这样一个世界上，从海外获得投资的人是如此微小的创业精神，如果我们在杂志上写到这一点，我们就会收到仇恨邮件，因为没人在乎。 > It doesn\'t apply to their businesses the millions of businesses out there that are making somebody you know around a million dollars. 它不适用于他们的企业，也不适用于那些让你认识的人赚了大约一百万美元的数百万家企业。 > `[00:20:38]` So again that\'s those are the two models are you bootstrapping or are you takingB.S. `[00:20:38]` 这两种模式是你自己的，还是你的 B.S。 > And again there are millions of organic growth companies and they\'re very very small number of get big fast companies. 还有数以百万计的有机成长型公司，他们是数量很少的快速成长的大公司。 > I wrote a few hundred. 我写了几百封信。 > But that\'s like the entire universe of companies in the world is this like one every decade or so from Silicon Valley. 但这就像世界上所有的公司，就像硅谷每隔十年就有一家这样的公司。 > `[00:20:57]` And not being able to decide is what\'s really going to kill you. `[00:20:57]` 而不能做出决定才是真正要杀你的。 > So let me see if I can sort of finish a little bit of the story about about PHOG Oregon stack exchange with stack exchange. 所以让我看看我能不能完成一个关于 Phog 俄勒冈州堆栈交换和堆栈交换的故事。 > Again we decided that it was a landgrab type of business and we spent a few years working on it just everyday working from home and being frugal and all that kind of stuff just to see where we get. 再一次，我们决定这是一种抢占土地的生意，我们花了几年的时间在这上面工作，每天在家工作，节俭等等，只是为了看看我们能得到什么。 > Now one thing I don\'t know if anybody mentioned here but if you are actually trying to raise money you\'re always delaying as much as possible the actual raising of money because as your company becomes more and more valuable over time let\'s say your company now is worth a million dollars for next year can be worth 10 million dollars in order if you sell shares you\'re actually going to have to sell fewer shares to get the same amount of cash into your bank account. 现在，我不知道这里是否有人提到过，但如果你真的试图筹集资金，你总是尽可能推迟实际的筹资，因为随着时间的推移，你的公司变得越来越有价值，假设你的公司现在价值 100 万美元，明年的价值可以达到 1000 万美元。必须卖出更少的股票才能把同样数量的现金存入你的银行账户。 > So at any given time you always want to be raising the minimum amount of money you need to barely survive as a general general rule. 因此，在任何特定的时间，你总是希望筹集到最低限度的资金，作为一个普遍的规则，你几乎无法生存。 > And if you can delay the raising of money the very very first time then your life is much better because you have to do less when you want to raise money and it\'s easier to raise money when you have a nice story about how successful you\'ve been on your own. 如果你第一次就能推迟筹集资金，那么你的生活就会好得多，因为当你想筹集资金时，你必须少做一些事情，如果你有一个很好的故事，说明你自己是多么成功，那就更容易筹集资金。 > So stock exchange was sort of technically bootstrapped for two years. 所以证券交易所在技术上有两年的经验。 > It was called Stack Overflow then and there were only three people working on full time and an awful lot of people from our community volunteering and helping out. 当时叫做 Stack 溢出，当时只有三个人全职工作，我们社区有很多人做志愿者和帮忙。 > But it was really three full time hours that we\'re working mostly without pay from home. 但实际上是三个全天候的工作时间，我们主要是在家里无偿工作。 > We built the servers are we. 我们建造的服务器就是我们。 > Jeff would built the service himself with his hands and he optimized them to make them really really fast. Jeff 会亲自动手构建这项服务，并对其进行了优化，使其变得非常快速。 > You put in a lot of RAM and he got really good SSD drives and all kind of stuff. 你投入了很多内存，他得到了非常好的 SSD 驱动器和诸如此类的东西。 > We used a compiled language which is unheard of which actually allowed us to run this gigantic site on a very small number of web servers. 我们使用了一种编译语言，这是闻所未闻的，它实际上允许我们在极少数的 Web 服务器上运行这个庞大的站点。 > It was remarkably small I mean for the longest time we had three boxes on on the on the rack. 它非常小，我的意思是，在最长的时间里，我们在架子上有三个盒子。 > And now we don\'t but I think we could probably fit on rack for four Stack Exchange right now which is a top 100 Web site in terms of traffic. 现在我们没有了，但是我认为我们现在可能适合四层栈交换，这是一个流量排名前 100 的网站。 > So you know we were sort of we worked on trying to save money on the servers. 所以你知道我们在努力节省服务器上的钱。 > We were reasonably frugal people were working from home there was no office. 我们相当节俭，人们在家工作，没有办公室。 > But we realized after a couple of years that this was a get big fast business. 但几年后，我们意识到这是一项快速发展的大生意。 > And I\'ll tell you why. 我来告诉你为什么。 > If it\'s not obvious with a question and answer website there are network there are very strong network effects. 如果问答网站不明显，就会有很强的网络效果。 > You go to the site where you\'re most likely get an answer. 你去你最有可能得到答案的网站。 > And we dominate for programmers and pretty much anything related to programmers including system administrators and school administrators and Sequel. 我们主宰着程序员，几乎所有与程序员有关的东西，包括系统管理员、学校管理员和续集。 > Sequel query writers and all those things that are close to programmers we dominate in math. 续集查询作者和所有那些接近程序员的东西，我们在数学上占主导地位。 > We have two math sites the research and not research and we have about 90 categories where we don\'t quite dominate in most of them meaning somewhere else is another Web site out there. 我们有两个数学网站，研究，而不是研究，我们有大约 90 个类别，我们在其中大多数并不占主导地位，这意味着其他地方是另一个网站。 > It\'s a better place to get answers to your questions about whatever it may be. 它是一个更好的地方，以获得答案，你的问题，无论是什么。 > So a good example of that is Apple. 苹果就是一个很好的例子。 > We have Apple Duffe vaccines ICOM it\'s a pretty good site I would guesstimate that it has maybe 20 percent of the market for question and answers about Apple products. 我们有苹果杜夫疫苗，ICOM，这是一个很好的网站，我猜想它大概有 20%的市场是关于苹果产品的问题和答案。 > It\'s a much better site but there is more traffic on Apple\'s own site and on other forums about Apple. 这是一个更好的网站，但在苹果自己的网站和其他有关苹果的论坛上有更多的流量。 > So that\'s it. 就这样了。 > That\'s the landgrab that we\'re trying to get because none of those other sites yet have the magical up vote down vote badges karma reputation all the comments all the nice stuff that Stack Exchange has that makes it work as a Q and A platform. 这就是我们想要得到的土地，因为其他网站中没有一个拥有神奇的向上投票，徽章，业力，声誉，所有的评论，所有的好东西，这些东西使得它成为一个 Q 和 A 平台。 > And it\'s not like people can\'t figure this out and there\'s not a single person that builds a Cuney site anymore that doesn\'t have an up vote in the down vote button. 这并不是说人们无法理解这一点，也没有一个人建立了一个 Cuney 网站，在“向下投票”按钮中没有“向上投票”。 > That\'s not so hard to figure out. 这并不难搞清楚。 > So that\'s the landgrab is we need to take all the traffic away we know we can take traffic away from an old boring forum because those suck and it\'s a terrible place to get your questions answered. 这就是我们需要把所有的交通都带走，我们知道我们可以把交通从一个旧的无聊的论坛上带走，因为这些都很烂，而且这是一个让你的问题得到回答的糟糕的地方。 > And what we have is ten times better than that and we can displace those. 我们所拥有的比这好十倍，我们可以取代那些。 > But if somebody else builds a stack exchange kind of work like with up votes and down votes in some category let\'s say physical anthropology that we don\'t have a site in then they\'re going to take that market and they\'re going to have that network effect. 但是，如果其他人建立了一种堆栈交换方式，比如在某些类别中使用向上投票和向下投票的方式-比如说物理人类学-我们在那里没有网站，那么他们就会占领这个市场，他们就会产生这种网络效应。 > So this is obviously a land grab and we needed to move as fast as absolutely possible to capture as much as possible of this territory before it got divided up by other people. 因此，这显然是一次土地掠夺，我们需要尽可能快地采取行动，在这块领土被其他人瓜分之前，尽可能多地占领它。 > And that\'s why we raised. 这就是为什么我们提出。 > That\'s why we raised money. 这就是我们筹集资金的原因。 > But this time when we were raising money it was like falling off a log is the easiest thing in the world. 但这一次，当我们筹集资金时，它就像从原木上掉下来一样，是世界上最简单的事情。 > I only talked to VCR that I actually wanted to invest in the company. 我只和录像机谈过我真的想投资这家公司。 > I didn\'t go knocking on every single door. 我没有去敲每一扇门。 > I spent exactly two weeks on the fundraising and that was done and that\'s all. 我花了整整两周的时间来筹集资金，然后就完成了，仅此而已。 > That\'s all it took. 这就够了。 > And I was able to raise from my number one choice ofE.S. 我可以从我的第一选择 E.S。 > which was Union Square Ventures. 联合广场风投公司。 > Like I say it took about two weeks to put together. 就像我说的，花了大约两周的时间。 > It was very very easy. 很简单。 > And that was because of you know 10 years of work building Fog Creek and getting a reputation. 这是因为你知道 10 年的工作，建造雾溪，并获得了声誉。 > And two years of work building Stack Exchange and getting all that momentum. 两年的工作建立了 Stack Exchange 并获得了所有的动力。 > So anything you can do to boost bootstrap anything you can do to defer the moment where you need to go raise some money from somebody so that you\'re in a better position is going to make it so much easier to raise money under under under far better terms that\'s really really worth doing. 所以，你能做的任何事情都能促进你的成功，任何你能做的事情，在你需要从某人那里筹到一些钱，以便你处于一个更好的地位的时候，都会使你在更好的条件下筹集资金变得更加容易，这是非常值得去做的。 > `[00:25:55]` The other the other part of that story actually is I have four minutes left to go. `[00:25:55]` 故事的另一部分实际上是我还有四分钟的时间。 > `[00:26:00]` The other part of that story is another product the Fox we started doing now I had to move over to stack and stack exchange is now 75 employees and we\'re just we\'re building a 30000 square foot office in Manhattan which is with a kitchen everything is going to be fancy and expensive and it\'s going to cost us like cost like five million dollars to build out with the landlords paying some of that. `[00:26:00]` 故事的另一部分是福克斯公司现在开始做的另一件产品，我不得不搬到堆叠，现在我们有 75 名员工，我们只是在曼哈顿建了一间 30000 平方英尺的办公室，那里有一间厨房，一切都很花哨和昂贵，这将花费我们大约五百万美元来建造房子，房东们会付一部分钱。 > So we\'re doing like these amazing big things. 所以我们就像这些了不起的大事一样。 > It\'s Stack Exchange. 这是堆栈交换。 > We have a lot of employees. 我们有很多员工。 > We have an office in Denver we have an office in London. 我们在丹佛有一个办事处，在伦敦有一个办事处。 > We have like I said something that\'s a 50 minute million global users if you allow me to double count some of them. 就像我说的那样，如果你允许我对其中一些用户进行双重统计的话，那就是全球 5 千万用户。 > We\'re top 100 websites so that took a lot of work. 我们是排名前 100 的网站，所以这需要做大量的工作。 > I became CEO eventually a stack exchange and it became a full time job. 我最终成为了首席执行官，成为了一份全职工作。 > And it turns out you can\'t be CEO of two companies at once because of the IP problem if you invent something it\'s you know both companies would claim to own it. 事实证明，由于知识产权问题，你不可能同时成为两家公司的首席执行官，如果你发明了某种东西，你知道，两家公司都会声称拥有它。 > So. 所以 > So I only work for Stack Exchange although I\'m still on the board of Creegan I did my Tozan every once in a while. 所以我只为 StackExchange 工作，虽然我还在 Creegan 董事会工作，但我偶尔也会做一次 Tozan。 > And what they started working on a Greek thuggery by the way is now let\'s say 45 employees and it\'s a cash machine that just because fog bugs is like a mint money every month and we\'re kind of like a kibbutz. 顺便说一句，他们开始研究希腊的杀人事件，现在假设有 45 名员工，这是一台自动取款机，仅仅因为雾虫每月都像薄荷币，而我们就像个集体农场。 > And so at the end of the year in July we take all the profit and divide it up among the employees based on seniority. 因此，在今年 7 月底，我们拿走了所有的利润，并根据资历将其分配给员工。 > So whatever money is left in the business at the end of the year goes to the employees depending on how long they\'ve been there. 因此，不管年底企业剩下多少钱，都要视员工在公司工作的时间而定。 > We don\'t dividend it out to shareholders. 我们不把它分给股东。 > We just pay it in bonuses to the employees. 我们只是向员工发放奖金。 > So if you\'ve been a factory employee for several years you\'re probably doubling your salary on that on that profit share. 因此，如果你已经在工厂工作了几年，那么你的工资就可能是这个利润的两倍。 > So this is the thing that Minns cash because we\'re not really. 所以这就是明斯的现金，因为我们不是真的。 > It\'s not that you know we keep selling the product in a long after we\'ve written it. 这并不是说我们写完产品后很久就一直在卖。 > Though we are still working on that one. 虽然我们还在研究这个问题。 > We recently Fogg launched a new product called Trello. 我们最近推出了一款名为 Trello 的新产品。 > This launched about a year ago and that\'s actually a Get Big Fast landgrab business as well. 这是大约一年前推出的，实际上，这也是一项快速抢夺土地的业务。 > Trello is online kind of organization software yellow logo. Trello 是一种在线的组织软件黄色标志。 > Check it out. 去看看。 > It\'s really awesome. 真的很棒。 > And in the years since we launched we went from zero to I think about 800000 users and it\'s doing great. 在我们推出后的几年里，我们的用户数量从零上升到了 800000，而且它做得很好。 > It said it needs a dev team of about 10 people. 它说，它需要一个大约 10 人的开发团队。 > What we have to work on every stupid mobile platform under the sun so we got somebody working on iPhone and somebody working on Android and somebody working on a Windows Surface. 我们必须在太阳底下的每个愚蠢的移动平台上工作，所以我们让一些人在 iPhone 上工作，有人在 Android 上工作，有人在 Windows Surface 上工作。 > And. 和 > `[00:28:17]` No no that was my idea. `[00:28:17]` 不，那是我的主意。 > `[00:28:20]` And the web app and adding new features all the time and we don\'t actually understand exactly how we\'re gonna make money off of Trello we\'re not quite sure about that because we thought free was a really good price if we wanted to reduce friction so we could get big really really fast and get all those wonderful network effects and have this massive land grab we\'re Trello takes over the world of project management. `[00:28:20]` 网络应用和不断添加新功能-我们并不完全理解我们如何从 Trello 赚到钱-我们不太确定这一点，因为我们认为如果我们想要减少摩擦，那么我们就可以得到一个非常好的价格，这样我们就可以获得巨大的、非常快的网络效果，并且拥有这种大规模的土地占用，我们将 Trello 接管了整个项目管理的世界。 > And eventually you know as everybody here has said we\'ll figure out some way to make money on that. 最终，你知道，正如在座的每个人都说的，我们会想出办法来赚钱的。 > In the meantime I\'ve got ten employees working on that and impactful a service that I\'ve got to add a new server to every couple of weeks. 同时，我有 10 名员工在做这方面的工作，并影响到一项服务，我需要每隔几周就添加一台新服务器。 > And that costs money. 这要花钱。 > But we have this lovely cash cow a fog bugs it\'s sort of spewing out extra money. 但是我们有一只可爱的摇钱树，一只迷雾的虫子-它好像是在吐额外的钱。 > So we asked the shareholders of Fog Creek which is the employees we said hey can we use your bonus that we would have paid you in profit share and just plow that back into Trello and you\'re never gonna see it again. 所以我们问 FogCreek 的股东，也就是我们说过的员工，嘿，我们能用你的奖金吗？我们本来可以付给你利润份额，然后再把钱投回特雷洛，你就再也见不到了。 > And they said yes and. 他们答应了。 > We didn\'t have to go go to a VCR and we didn\'t have to go to an outside vesi and by the time if we ever get to the point where we just need a hold data center in Oregon somewhere in order to run Trella which will happen and we do need Veazey at that point at that point we\'re going in with traction with an established team with a product has already proven itself and you can take an investment on a very very good terms even if you want to and so at that point I imagine you wouldn\'t give up any control of the company. 我们不需要去录像机，我们也不需要去外面的 VISI，到那时，我们需要在俄勒冈州的某个地方建立一个保持数据中心，以便运行 Trella，而我们需要 Veazey，在那个时候，我们需要一个已经建立起来的团队。一个产品已经证明了自己，你可以非常好的条件进行投资，即使你愿意，所以我想你不会放弃对公司的任何控制。 > Even now I think we raised money we wouldn\'t give up any control you\'d probably still continue to have an absolute control over the board at that stage and you wouldn\'t take very much dilution because because the valuation would be so high even though we don\'t actually make any money. 即使现在我认为我们筹集到了资金，我们也不会放弃任何控制权-在那个阶段，你可能仍然对董事会拥有绝对的控制权，而且你也不会接受太多的稀释，因为即使我们实际上没有赚到任何钱，估值也会很高。 > So I\'m sort out of time but this is the important part of what I\'ve been trying to spew here at about a million words per minute. 所以我已经没有时间了，但这是我试图以每分钟一百万字的速度在这里吐出来的重要部分。 > This is normally a two hour speech. 这通常是两个小时的演讲。 > You have to decide if you\'re going to be a slow growth company or get big fast company because any time you try to straddle those two lines painful things happen to you. 你必须决定你是一家成长缓慢的公司，还是一家快速发展的大公司，因为每当你试图跨越这两条线时，痛苦的事情就会发生在你身上。 > I\'m traumatized absolute traumatized because Juno Online Services where I work for years was actually competing against AOL and AOL was just going all out sending everybody these damn floppy disks so that everybody would sign up for AOL because it was a land grab. 我受到了极大的创伤，因为我工作了多年的 Juno 在线服务公司实际上是在与 AOL 竞争，而 AOL 正全力向所有人发送这些该死的软盘，这样每个人都会注册 AOL，因为这是一次抢夺土地的行为。 > There was a land grab going on and AOL had instant messenger and instant messenger had network effects and AOL had lock in. 抢夺土地，AOL 有即时通讯，即时通讯有网络效果，AOL 有锁定。 > Because once you had your Lacewell email address you never wanted to move to somewhere else because you\'d have to tell 400 people about your new email address. 因为一旦你有了 Lacewell 电子邮件地址，你就不会想搬到其他地方，因为你必须告诉 400 人你的新电子邮件地址。 > So AOL was building this remarkable landgrab business with all kinds of network effects and Lokken and stuff like that. 所以 AOL 建立了一项了不起的土地抢占业务，包括各种网络效应和 Lokken 之类的东西。 > And you had every single one of those things but was kind of growing in a more bootstrapping way because they were afraid to spend the money on the little stupid little floppy disks. 你拥有所有这些东西，但却以一种更有创意的方式成长，因为他们害怕把钱花在那些愚蠢的小软盘上。 > And now Juno is a dial up ISP and I don\'t even know what AOL is anymore. 现在 Juno 是一个拨号的 ISP，我甚至不知道 AOL 是什么了。 > `[00:30:59]` But laughter but for a while AOL is a lot bigger. `[00:30:59]` 但是笑声，但在一段时间内，AOL 要大得多。 > `[00:31:03]` So I was traumatized by that kind of failure to commit to one mode of bootstrapping or the other mode of getting really big fast. `[00:31:03]` 所以我受到了那种失败的创伤，因为我没有致力于一种引导方式，或者另一种快速增长的方式。 > And I think you should decide what you want to do. 我认为你应该决定你想做什么。 > You can really control your own destiny if you\'re willing to take a few more years and bootstrap with a small kind of reliable business and use that to build your next stage which is your facebook Netscape Groupon for squirrels. 如果你愿意再花几年的时间来开创一家可靠的小公司，然后用它来建立你的下一个阶段，那就是你的 Facebook、网景、松鼠 Groupon，你就能真正掌控自己的命运。 > Thank you very much. 非常感谢