# Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014 > `[00:00:00]` Hi everyone. `[00:00:00]` 大家好。 > Good afternoon. 下午好 > My name\'s Aaron Harris. 我叫亚伦？哈里斯。 > I\'m a partner at Y Combinator and before I was a partner at Y C I founded a company called tutor\'s spree that went through Y Combinator in the winter of 2011 and today it\'s my honor to introduce someone who doesn\'t really need very much of an introduction but I\'ll do it anyway. 我是 Y Combinator 的合伙人，在我成为 YC 的合伙人之前，我创建了一家名为“家庭教师狂潮”的公司，在 2011 年冬天经历了 YCombinator。今天，我很荣幸地介绍一位不太需要介绍的人，但我还是会这么做的。 > Fred Wilson has been investing in technology for close to 30 years and in that time he\'s founded two separate DC firms the first one flat iron partners was founded in 2000 in 1996 and the second Union Square Ventures was founded in 2004. 弗雷德·威尔逊(FredWilson)近 30 年来一直投资于技术领域，在此期间，他成立了两家独立的直流电公司，第一家平板钢铁合作伙伴成立于 2000 年，第二家联合广场创业公司(Second Union Square Ventures)成立于 2004 年。 > Without a doubt Fred is one of the best known investors on the East Coast and he\'s one of the premier consumer technology investors in the world. 毫无疑问，弗雷德是东海岸最知名的投资者之一，也是世界上主要的消费技术投资者之一。 > He\'s also created through his blog AVC a lively community which is home to wide ranging discussions about finance technology government and his taste in music. 他还通过自己的博客 AVC 创建了一个活跃的社区，围绕金融、科技、政府以及他对音乐的品味展开了广泛的讨论。 > You all join me in welcoming Fred Wilson. 你们跟我一起欢迎弗雷德·威尔逊。 > `[00:01:09]` So that was obviously eye right. `[00:01:09]` 那显然是右眼。 > I think so. 我也这么想。 > So that was a great talk by Shannah. 这是 Shannah 的一次很棒的演讲。 > You know what I love about Shana. 你知道我喜欢 Shana 的什么吗。 > She has opinions and she\'s not afraid to share them. 她有自己的观点，她不怕与人分享。 > And that\'s what makes great investors. 这就是伟大投资者的原因。 > I think investors need conviction and she\'s got conviction. 我认为投资者需要信心，她也有信心。 > `[00:01:26]` What would seem like if you were waffling on each of your investment decisions you\'d never really reach anything. `[00:01:26]` 如果你在每一个投资决策上喋喋不休，你就什么都不会真正达成。 > `[00:01:31]` There\'s a lot of people in the venture business who hedge and follow and you know try to figure out what the hot thing is and don\'t have like a like a you know kind of their own opinions. `[00:01:31]` 许多从事风险投资的人都在对冲和跟踪，你知道，试着找出什么是最热门的东西，而不是像你知道的那样，他们有自己的观点。 > I don\'t buy I don\'t agree with I probably don\'t agree with half of what Shannah said. 我不买，我不同意，我可能不同意尚纳所说的一半。 > But like we argue about these things but I appreciate that. 但就像我们为这些事情争吵但我很感激。 > Like she\'s probably write a bunch of places where I\'m wrong. 好像她写了一大堆我错的地方。 > I might be right in a few places where she\'s wrong but that\'s okay. 我可能是对的，在一些地方，她错了，但没关系。 > That\'s why I think investors need to have that. 这就是为什么我认为投资者需要这样做。 > And entrepreneurs sometimes get annoyed because they walk into a meeting and they\'re meeting with you and they\'re like chicest just not buying this at all you know. 企业家有时会生气，因为他们走进一个会议，和你见面，他们就像最聪明的人，只是你知道，他们根本不买这个。 > But you know better than I think pitching to someone who is just like you know next to nothing and they are pretty awful. 但是你比我想象的更清楚，向一个你几乎一无所知的人投球，他们是相当糟糕的。 > `[00:02:17]` You know it\'s interesting I guess if all the investors agreed with each other prices would rise infinitely and no deals would actually get done. `[00:02:17]` 你知道这很有趣，我想如果所有的投资者都同意对方的价格会无止境地上涨，而没有真正的交易完成。 > At the end of the day know sitting in the room with an investor with someone who comes to you with a patch you know what\'s going to make you decide that you believe in what they\'re doing versus saying you know it this isn\'t really going to work. 一天结束时，你要知道，和一个投资者坐在房间里，和一个带着补丁来找你的人在一起，你知道这会让你决定你相信他们在做什么，而不是说你知道，这不太管用。 > What are you looking for. 你找什么呢? > `[00:02:36]` Well we have opinions. `[00:02:36]` 我们有意见。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > So it sort of goes back to what you\'re saying much it we have certain opinions about what\'s interesting to us so we come into the meeting with a preconceived notion about what we\'re looking for. 所以它可以追溯到你说的很多，我们对我们感兴趣的东西有一定的看法，所以我们进入会议时，对我们要寻找的东西有一个先入为主的概念。 > What\'s exciting to us what\'s not exciting to us. 什么对我们来说是令人兴奋的，什么对我们来说是不令人兴奋的。 > So part of it is is just that that entrepreneur is connecting to some preconceived notion that we already have. 因此，部分原因在于企业家正与我们已有的一些先入为主的观念联系在一起。 > I mean I remember back when Brad and I were raising the first USV funded 2003. 我是说，我还记得我和布拉德在 2003 年筹集第一个 USV 的时候。 > He said to me why isn\'t there a Google for jobs instead of having to go to Hot Jobs or Craigslist or monster like why can\'t you just go to someplace and search and just have every job posting on the entire internet like filtered for you. 他对我说，为什么没有谷歌来招聘工作，而不是去“热门乔布斯”、“Craigslist”或者其他怪物-为什么你不能去某个地方搜索-就像过滤掉你在整个互联网上发布的每一份工作一样。 > `[00:03:21]` And I was like a good idea. `[00:03:21]` 我是个好主意。 > `[00:03:23]` And then and then one day I was with my friend John motel\'s blog and he he mentioned this company had launched called indeed and I was like Brad that\'s the thing you\'ve been looking for. `[00:03:23]` 然后有一天，我和我的朋友约翰·莫特的博客在一起，他提到这家公司发起了真正的呼叫，而我就像布拉德，那就是你一直在寻找的东西。 > And we called them up we\'re like let us invest. 我们打电话给他们，我们就像让我们投资一样。 > Though no one talked to these CEOs to call on them keep calling them and eventually you know at five times the valuation that we originally thought we were going to pay we did get to invest. 虽然没有人和这些首席执行官谈过，请他们继续打电话给他们，但最终你知道，我们原本以为我们要支付的估值是原来的 5 倍，但我们确实得到了投资。 > `[00:03:47]` So that\'s interesting. `[00:03:47]` 那很有趣。 > I mean that\'s that\'s an example of a specific idea you had in mind a specific company that you want to see for. 我的意思是，这是一个你想要看到的特定公司的一个具体想法的例子。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > Is that typical of how you make investments or is it more thematic. 这是典型的投资方式还是更有主题性。 > `[00:03:57]` No that\'s rare. `[00:03:57]` 不，那很少见。 > Like we\'re entrepreneurs the ones who generally come up with the great ideas and we react to them. 就像我们是企业家，通常会想出伟大的想法，并对他们做出反应。 > So it\'s generally more sort of thematic. 所以它一般都是主题性的。 > That we just have certain ideas about what\'s coming and given that that\'s coming. 我们只是对将要发生的事情有明确的想法，并且考虑到这一点即将到来。 > This should happen and boy so we should look for that thing. 这是应该发生的，孩子，所以我们应该寻找那东西。 > And sometimes these ideas are sort of half baked and not fully formed and then an entrepreneur comes in and you\'re like yeah yeah that\'s what it was thinking about but they\'ve kind of crystallized it way more because they obviously thought way more about like when you\'re when you\'re building a company you\'re doing one thing like you become obsessed about that one thing and you get really deep into it and you generally understand that opportunity better than an investor will. 有时候，这些想法是半生不熟的，没有完全形成，然后一个企业家出现了，你就像它在想的那样，但它们更多地结晶了它，因为很明显，当你创建一家公司的时候，你会做一件事，你会对这件事很着迷，而你会变得很深。这样你就能更好地理解这个机会，而不是投资者的意愿。 > `[00:04:50]` So this is actually something pretty interesting that you\'re touching on which is something we talk about a lot. `[00:04:50]` 事实上，这是一件非常有趣的事情，你正在谈论它，这是我们经常谈论的事情。 > When we look at applications which is the ability of the founder to communicate his ideas or her ideas clearly and well it\'s so critical because there are a lot of people who probably have thought about these things very deeply. 当我们研究应用程序时，即创始人能够清晰、良好地交流他或她的想法，这是非常关键的，因为很多人可能已经非常深刻地思考过这些事情。 > What do you think it is that that drives certain people to be able to communicate that. 你认为是什么驱使某些人能够沟通。 > Or what do you react to in terms of that communication and that clarity that that stands out. 或者，你对这种沟通和清晰性的反应是什么？ > Well you know this is. 你知道这是。 > `[00:05:18]` I think this is true of a lot of investors. `[00:05:18]` 我认为很多投资者都是这样的。 > I like it when somebody can explain something very crisply and very simply and so in they and they get you to the sort of nugget of what they\'re doing right away. 我喜欢有人能非常简洁地解释一些事情，所以他们会让你了解他们现在正在做的事情。 > I mean not not by rushing into it by but by just kind of simplifying it and making it easy to understand. 我的意思是，不是仓促地去做，而是把它简化一下，让它更容易理解。 > And I think that some people are born with that gift. 我认为有些人天生就有这种天赋。 > `[00:05:51]` Other people I think can develop it. `[00:05:51]` 我认为其他人可以发展它。 > I have worked on that myself over the years and I\'ve found that I\'ve gotten better and better and better at that and I do that a lot of times for our portfolio companies when it\'s the next round or maybe the decided they want to sell and so we get involved in helping them do that. 这些年来，我一直在做这方面的工作，我发现我在这方面做得越来越好了，我经常为我们的投资组合公司做这件事，而这是下一轮的时候，或者是他们决定出售的时候，所以我们参与了帮助他们做到这一点。 > And I have found that I\'ve gotten good at. 我发现我很擅长。 > `[00:06:13]` Positioning the opportunity quickly in a way that\'s very hopefully attractive to the person on the other end of the phone or whatever. `[00:06:13]` 快速定位机会的方式非常有希望对电话另一端的人有吸引力。 > But that\'s that\'s really really important skill is to be able to explain what you\'re doing. 但真正重要的技能是能够解释你在做什么。 > And I think without buzz words. 我认为没有空话。 > Because it\'s so easy to fall back on buzz words or three letter acronyms CRM or something like that and people\'s eyes tend to glaze over. 因为它很容易回到热门词或三个字母缩写，客户关系管理或类似的东西，人们的眼睛往往呆滞。 > I think it\'s it\'s another temptation. 我认为这是另一种诱惑。 > People have sometimes is to say I\'m the x for x you know I\'m you know ETSI for electronics or I\'m uber for helicopters or whatever. 人们有时会说，我是 x 的 x，你知道我是电子设备的 ETSI，或者直升机的 ETSI。 > And and you know that\'s a really good in some ways a really great technique. 从某些方面来说，这是一种非常好的技术，一种非常棒的技术。 > But it also sometimes trivializes what you\'re doing. 但有时它也会使你所做的事情变得琐碎。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > So but but I think being able to communicate crisply and clearly is really important. 所以，我认为能够清晰、清晰地交流是非常重要的。 > `[00:07:09]` It\'s interesting that you mention the vest for that thing. `[00:07:09]` 你提到那件事的背心很有趣。 > When we when we applied to Y Combinator was judiciary we pitched ourselves as the Air B and B for tutor\'s. 当我们申请 YCombinator 是司法机构时，我们把自己定位为 B 级和 B 级导师。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And part of the reason we did that was it allowed us to pack a lot of information into a very short sentence. 我们这么做的部分原因是它允许我们把很多信息打包成一个很短的句子。 > Turns out we were totally wrong. 结果我们完全错了。 > We were not the urban bee for tutor\'s it was it was not the right way to look at the business. 我们不是家庭教师的城市蜜蜂，这不是看待企业的正确方式。 > `[00:07:28]` When you say when you came in and said we\'re air B and B for tutor\'s. `[00:07:28]` 当你说当你进来的时候，你说我们是导师的 B 和 B 空气。 > `[00:07:31]` Great. `[00:07:31]` 太好了。 > That\'s interesting. 这很有趣。 > Yeah. 嗯 > No he he was into that is like who Airblue and I mean this is this is so he responds well to that he did it he did in that case. 不，他喜欢这个，我的意思是，这是他的反应很好，他做了，在那种情况下。 > `[00:07:41]` It was interesting I think that he was looking at us as a founding team and then thinking about what could happen next in the company and air being Betis four years ago was certainly growing quickly. `[00:07:41]` 有趣的是，我认为他把我们看作是一个创始团队，然后想一想公司接下来会发生什么，而四年前的贝蒂斯公司肯定在迅速发展。 > Had already turned them down. 已经拒绝了他们。 > `[00:07:53]` Thank you for that. `[00:07:53]` 谢谢你。 > But they were certainly Helfgot an open wound right here. 但他们肯定是赫尔夫格特身上的伤口。 > You want to pour some money on it. 你想花点钱在上面。 > I mean you\'ve got to bring it. 我是说你得带上它。 > I\'m not here to stay out of it. 我不是来这里不插手的。 > But you know it\'s funny. 但你知道这很有趣。 > I think what you just said about. 我想你刚才说的。 > You said. 你说过。 > Something about. 是关于。 > `[00:08:09]` The the team was good and the potential of what they could do with the idea. `[00:08:09]` 球队很好，他们可以用这个想法做些什么。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > I think that\'s what seed investors are good at. 我认为这正是种子投资者所擅长的。 > Yes seed investors are really good at connecting to the potential of the team and the potential of the big idea and not getting caught up in much more than that. 是的，种子投资者非常善于将团队的潜力和大创意的潜力联系起来，而且不会被更多的东西所吸引。 > We we sometimes invest in seed rounds but usually those are seed rounds for companies that have already shipped a product. 我们有时对种子轮进行投资，但通常是那些已经交付产品的公司的种子轮。 > I think we this is a criticism or maybe just an observation of USV. 我认为我们这是对 USV 的批评，或者仅仅是对 USV 的观察。 > We\'re actually not very good at the thing you just said that seat investors do. 事实上，我们并不擅长你刚才所说的坐位投资者所做的事情。 > I think we\'re very good at. 我觉得我们很擅长。 > Evaluating a team once they\'ve created a product. 一旦一个团队创建了一个产品，他们就会对其进行评估。 > So I see Zach Sims just walked in back there and when Zack and Ryan chip code academy you know we were able to say oh fuck that\'s a maze like we need to invest in this right. 所以我看到扎克·西姆斯刚刚走到后面，当扎克和瑞安芯片代码学院，你知道，我们可以说，哦，操，这是一个迷宫，我们需要投资在这个权利。 > We also knew Zack and Ryan we knew how great they were because we were hanging around Columbia University trying to find interesting teams coming out of there. 我们也认识扎克和瑞安，我们知道他们是多么伟大，因为我们在哥伦比亚大学附近徘徊，试图寻找出有趣的球队。 > But so it was the potential of the team on top of something that they already shipped into the market right. 但是，这是团队的潜力，在他们已经进入市场的东西之上，是正确的。 > And I think that\'s what we\'re good at. 我认为这是我们擅长的。 > And I think that great seed investors don\'t need to see. 我认为伟大的种子投资者不需要看到。 > The product they they somehow can recognize the potential in the people that they are going to create that product. 产品，他们可以在某种程度上认识到人们的潜力，他们要创造的产品。 > `[00:09:33]` And I think we would find that hard to do now Codecademy is a pretty interesting example of that because when they launched it old and working on it for a few weeks it launched. `[00:09:33]` 我想我们会发现现在很难做到这一点，科德罗米是一个非常有趣的例子，因为当他们推出旧的，工作了几个星期，它启动了。 > I mean it\'s an unduly nailed it. 我的意思是，这是一个不适当的钉死它。 > They know the traction is huge immediately right. 他们知道牵引力很大，对不对。 > So when you compare that against other you know Chenowith saying you know do something different. 所以，当你拿它和其他人比较的时候，你知道，切诺，说你知道，做一些不同的事情。 > `[00:09:51]` I think they were the first people to do in browser you know like writing code in browser as a way to teach coding. `[00:09:51]` 我认为他们是第一个在浏览器中做的人，你知道的，就像在浏览器中写代码，作为教编码的一种方式。 > I think so. 我也这么想。 > Is that right. 对不对。 > We the first yes. 我们是第一个是的。 > He claims that they were. 他声称他们是。 > So I don\'t know who to believe everything he says. 所以我不知道谁能相信他说的一切。 > But that was a unique tweak on the idea of how do you teach someone to code. 但这是一个独特的想法，你如何教别人编码。 > And so that. 就这样。 > That I think was was part of why they kind of just took off because it was inviting to people. 我认为这也是他们之所以起飞的原因之一，因为它吸引了很多人。 > Oh I can do this. 哦我能做到的。 > So when you\'re looking at that sort of take off moment. 所以当你看到这样的起飞时刻。 > `[00:10:28]` What metrics are you looking at is there a specific set of things you\'re analyzing or is it just a general momentum somewhere. `[00:10:28]` 你在看什么指标，你正在分析的是一组特定的东西，还是某个地方的总动量。 > `[00:10:33]` We don\'t have like a number of people always say to be how many how many monthly active users do I need before you\'re going to invest in my company. `[00:10:33]` 我们没有像很多人常说的那样，在你投资我的公司之前，我需要多少个每月活跃的用户。 > Was like I have no idea. 就好像我不知道。 > It\'s more sort of it\'s it\'s more sort of. 更多的，更多的。 > Based on. 基于。 > The market. 市场。 > The product. 产品。 > What you would expect for a product like that. 你对这种产品的期望。 > Certain things that are you know super viral you\'d want to see much larger numbers things that are more utilities smaller numbers but you know the right kinds of engagement might might be more important niche services that have sort of high value niches maybe it\'s even smaller numbers but just so it\'s a we don\'t have a formula. 有些东西，你知道，超级病毒，你想看到更大的数字，更多的公用事业，更小的数字，但你知道正确的类型可能是更重要的利基服务，具有高价值的利基，也许它是更小的数字，但就这样，它是一个我们没有公式。 > We don\'t like an algorithm or anything like that. 我们不喜欢算法之类的东西。 > We\'ve toyed around with my partner Albert is enamored of this idea. 我们和我的搭档艾伯特玩过，对这个想法很着迷。 > Moneyball for EVC. 给 EVC 的钱球。 > Could we create an algorithm and just set centrally like crawl the Internet and run algorithms and then I\'ll just tell us what companies to invest in. 我们能不能创建一个算法，集中设置，比如爬行互联网，运行算法，然后我就告诉我们该投资哪些公司。 > I don\'t think it\'s that simple. 我觉得没那么简单。 > I think it\'s a little bit more art than science. 我认为这比科学更像是艺术。 > `[00:11:48]` What\'s most likely to trick you on that decision. `[00:11:48]` 那个决定最有可能欺骗你的是什么？ > `[00:11:58]` Well a good example is turntable. `[00:11:58]` 转盘就是一个很好的例子。 > It\'s a turntable was a monster right at the gate. 那是个转盘，就在门口是个怪物。 > It ended up not working. 结果不起作用了。 > And so their problem was that they did churn problem. 所以他们的问题是他们确实制造了问题。 > But their. 但是他们的。 > Acquisition was so high in the early days that you couldn\'t really see the churn unless you really knew how to look for it. 收购在早期是如此之高，除非你真的知道如何去寻找它，否则你无法真正看到它。 > But over time the churn revealed itself and. 但随着时间的推移，搅动者暴露了自己。 > Then it just could never get beyond that. 那它就是无法超越它。 > And I think that the churn was related to the fact that the that a lot of people listen to music in a very passive sort of way like they take a software engineer or they go into work they put on their music they put on their headphones and grinding when they don\'t actually want to be like in a room engaging with people around the music right. 我认为这与很多人以一种非常被动的方式听音乐有关，就像他们带着一个软件工程师，或者他们开始工作，他们戴上他们的音乐，戴上耳机，当他们真的不想和周围的人在一起的时候，他们会磨蹭。 > So it was too intense. 所以太紧张了。 > And people just had they like I got to get off of this I got to go back to Pinda or whatever else I\'m listening to. 人们就像我一样，离开这一切，我要回到平达或者其他我正在听的东西。 > So that was what I think cause. 所以这就是我认为的原因。 > But so we got Hedvig on that one. 但我们得到了海德维格的支持。 > `[00:12:58]` Would you make the same kind of bet again. `[00:12:58]` 你会再下一次同样的赌注吗？ > There is a huge amount of momentum behind that. 这背后有巨大的动力。 > `[00:13:02]` I think the real well you know but also the soaped. `[00:13:02]` 我认为真正的好，你知道，但也肥皂。 > Let\'s unpack that a little bit more. 让我们再把它打开一点。 > I\'d known Billy for six years and I know Seth for close to. 我认识比利六年了，我也认识赛斯近了。 > Well 15 to 20 years. 15 到 20 年。 > So was a team meeting really well and they had this super hot property. 所以球队的会议真的很好，他们拥有这个超级火爆的场地。 > And so it was kind of a combination. 所以这是一种组合。 > I\'ve been looking to invest in one of these projects for a long time because I always had recognized his talent. 很长一段时间以来，我一直想投资其中一个项目，因为我一直认同他的才能。 > So it was kind of it was like the perfect storm of. 所以它就像是一场完美的风暴。 > I liked the people. 我喜欢那些人。 > There\'s a. 有一个。 > There\'s a product centric entrepeneur here who I\'ve always respect and wanted to work with. 这里有一个以产品为中心的企业家，我一直很尊敬他，也想和他一起工作。 > And now if they Dave Neil what they\'ve hit it. 现在，如果他们，戴夫尼尔，他们击中了它。 > So maybe the fact that the people side of the equation was. 所以也许这个方程的人的一面是。 > Was so strong for me meant that I was willing to kind of maybe not. 对我来说是如此的强大意味着我可能不愿意。 > Be as. 像你一样。 > Diligent in the analysis of the phenomena. 勤于分析现象。 > `[00:14:00]` When you\'ve made that decision right when you\'ve made the decision to invest in a company is really calling me a B round. `[00:14:00]` 当你决定投资一家公司的时候，当你做出这个决定的时候，你真的叫我 B 回合。 > What are you expecting people to go and do once they have your money in their bank. 一旦他们把你的钱存入银行，你期望人们去做什么？ > `[00:14:12]` Well at its core I think doing a startup is building business. `[00:14:12]` 我认为创业的核心是做生意。 > So I think that what I would want them to do is get on with the building of a business and wrote a blog post today about the metaphore of going up a flight of stairs and step one is building the product and getting the product market fit step in. 所以我想他们要做的是继续做生意，今天写了一篇博客文章，关于上楼的比喻，第一步是建立产品，让产品市场适应市场。 > That\'s. 那.。 > Generally what I think of seed money for. 一般来说，我认为种子钱是为了什么。 > And then. 然后 > Getting you know getting a series a done so that you can go beyond the founding team which might be two or three or four people and go out and build sort of a 10 or 12 or 14 person team to really. 让你知道一个系列的完成，这样你就可以超越创始团队，可能是两三个或四个人，出去建立一个 10 人或 12 人或 14 人的团队。 > You know get you know all of the aspects of the business going really create sustainable growth and really continue invest in product and then once you\'ve proven you can do that series B would be around building full blown business scaling the team taking the market becoming the dominant product in the market and then Series C get to profitability. 你知道，让你知道业务的各个方面，真正创造可持续增长，并真正继续投资于产品。然后，一旦你证明了你的能力，B 系列就是建立全面的业务，扩大团队，让市场成为市场上的主导产品，然后 C 系列获得盈利能力。 > And then after that take the company public sell it to a secondary. 在那之后，公司上市，把它卖给二级市场。 > So each of those steps along the way is ultimately in furtherance of building a company building a real business. 因此，这些步骤中的每一步最终都是为了推动建立一家公司，建立一家真正的企业。 > And so I see it sort of as a as a just a march through those those parts and I want to see people commit to making the investments in the business that are required to make all those things happen. 因此，我认为这只是一次跨越这些部分的游行，我希望看到人们致力于在企业中进行投资，这是实现所有这些事情所必需的。 > So it\'s it\'s usually about you know continue to invest in product and build out a team get to a business model execute their business model get revenues get customers. 所以，通常情况下，你要知道，继续投资于产品，建立一个团队，建立一个商业模式，执行他们的商业模式，获得收入，得到客户。 > Continue to build the team and. 继续建立团队。 > If the entrepreneur either gets unfocused and. 如果企业家要么注意力不集中。 > Like. 喜欢 > Starts. 开始吧。 > Lighting up a whole bunch of side projects or is reluctant to build a team or there\'s some. 点亮大量的附带项目，或者不愿意建立一个团队，或者有一些。 > Kind of classic red flag you get some times when you start to see that there for whatever reason not really kind of committed to. 这是一种典型的红旗，有时你会发现，不管出于什么原因，你都没有真正的承诺。 > That. 那，那个 > Sort of grinding away on the business that I think has got to do. 在我看来必须要做的事情上磨磨抹角。 > `[00:16:28]` You\'ve been watching companies raise money and spend money for 30 years. `[00:16:28]` 30 年来，你一直在看公司筹集资金和花钱。 > `[00:16:33]` There\'s been a lot of talk about how starting a startup is easier than ever Alexa\'s mentioned all you all you need to do now is open your laptop to be less cost or have gone down remarkably. ‘ > But see brands are getting larger and larger. 但看到的是，品牌正变得越来越大。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > So many things going on there. 那里发生了很多事情。 > `[00:16:50]` I think it\'s just a function that there\'s a lot of demand from investors. `[00:16:50]` 我认为这只是投资者大量需求的一个函数。 > You know everything from angel investor seed investors sees in lots of other types to put money into startups. 你知道从天使投资者，种子投资者看到了很多其他类型的投资创业。 > And so I think entrepreneurs are in a. 所以我认为企业家们。 > You know in a in a market in a sellers market where they can raise a lot of capital and. 你知道，在卖方市场上，他们可以筹集大量资金。 > A lot of entrepreneurs are choosing to do that because they equate capital with runway and run away with increasing the probability of success. 许多企业家之所以选择这样做，是因为他们把资本等同于跑道，跑掉了，增加了成功的可能性。 > But I think that\'s a little bit of a trap because I think that with a limited amount of money to too little money will kill you and too much money will kill you with a limited amount of money. 但我认为这是个小陷阱，因为我认为用有限的钱到太少的钱会杀死你，而太多的钱会用有限的钱杀死你。 > If it\'s sufficient it focuses you and constrains all of the possible things you might do and makes you and your cofounders. 如果它足够的话，它会集中你的注意力，约束你可能做的所有可能的事情，让你和你的共同创始人。 > Make the hard decisions about do we do this or do we do this we can\'t do both. 做出艰难的决定，我们是这样做，还是我们这样做，我们不能两者兼而有之。 > We have to pick one let\'s do this. 我们得选一个让我们这么做。 > It forces you into this kind of process about optimizing the most important things and doing the things that are going to get you to where you want to go. 它迫使你进入这样的过程，优化最重要的事情，做那些能把你带到你想去的地方的事情。 > And I really really like that. 我真的很喜欢。 > So I I I think that. 所以我觉得。 > The market is. 市场是。 > At a stage right now where you wish you could go out and do it two and a half million dollars seed. 就在现在这个阶段，你希望你能出去，做个 250 万美元的种子。 > I\'m generally I would generally advise founders not to do that given the low interest rate environment. 一般来说，考虑到低利率环境，我建议创始人不要这么做。 > `[00:18:21]` The fact that doesn\'t seem to be ending any time soon where rent growth and inflation are you can reasonably assume that that kind of capital interaction is going to go on for quite some time. `[00:18:21]` 在租金增长和通货膨胀的情况下，这一事实似乎不会很快结束，你可以合理地假设这种资本互动将持续相当一段时间。 > So as an investor looking a little bit later. 因此，作为一名投资者，看上去有点晚了。 > Are you at all worried that the traditional size of the rounds and the prices that you pay for rounds are just going to get to a place where it doesn\'t make sense for you anymore. 你担心的是，传统的轮大小和价格只会到达一个对你来说不再有意义的地方吗？。 > Well I mean. 我是说。 > If you look at that know we\'ve beenU.S. 如果你看看这个，你就会知道我们是美国的。 > vs 10 years old this year and if you look at the prices we were paying for seeds and series A\'s in 2004 2005 2006. 与今年 10 岁的孩子相比，如果你看一下我们在 2004 年、2005 年、2006 年为种子和 A 系列支付的价格。 > That was here and then in 2007 8 2000. 那是在这里，然后在 2007 年，2000 年。 > `[00:18:59]` 2007 2008 2009 that was here and then in 2010 2011 2012 it was here and now it\'s like here right. `[00:18:59]` 2007，2008，2009，在这里，然后在 2010 年，2011 年，2012 年，它在这里，现在它就像在这里。 > So it just keeps going up and. 所以它一直在上升。 > You know we have reacted to that by. 你知道我们已经对此做出了反应。 > I think making some changes. 我想做些改变。 > We become more willing to invest in places like Iowa and Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and Berlin and. 我们更愿意在爱荷华州、匹兹堡、费城和柏林等地投资。 > `[00:19:31]` Other parts of Europe. `[00:19:31]` 欧洲其他地区。 > `[00:19:33]` And so that\'s going to where the supply demand equation is not quite as in favor of entrepreneurs as as it is in Silicon Valley in New York. `[00:19:33]` 这样的话，供给需求方程就不会像纽约硅谷那样更有利于企业家了。 > And increasingly other parts the United States so. 而且越来越多的美国其他地区也是如此。 > `[00:19:48]` That\'s one thing we\'ve done. `[00:19:48]` 那是我们做过的一件事。 > We\'ve got a little bit more picky. 我们有点挑剔。 > OK. 好的 > `[00:19:52]` If we\'re going to pay those prices then damn well be you know you know risk reward equation that were we\'re happy with so maybe we want to see a little bit more traction or want a really up super high quality team. `[00:19:52]` 如果我们要支付这些价格，那么你应该知道风险回报方程，我们对此很满意，所以也许我们希望看到更多的吸引力，或者想要一支非常优秀的团队。 > `[00:20:07]` So that\'s how we\'ve managed it. `[00:20:07]` 所以我们就是这样管理它的。 > I guess it could get to the point where we think we\'re not going to make money but we don\'t see any hints maybe maybe even series have been mispriced for 25 years. 我想它可能会达到这样的程度，我们认为我们不会赚钱，但我们看不到任何迹象，也许即使是系列剧已经被错误定价了 25 年。 > And maybe the market\'s finally starting to price them correctly. 也许市场终于开始正确定价了。 > `[00:20:21]` When you think about the seed investment is basically a very long long option. `[00:20:21]` 当你想到种子投资基本上是一个很长的选择。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > Where it\'s EDAR worth a hundred a thousand acts or it\'s worth nothing. 在那里，EDAR 值十万件，或者什么都不值钱。 > You could argue it\'s worth a lot more than people paid for it in the past and maybe that is what we see. 你可以说它的价值远远超过过去人们为此付出的代价，也许这就是我们所看到的。 > `[00:20:37]` Yeah. `[00:20:37]` 是的。 > That might be because the success rates of startups is going up and therefore I mean when an investor is pricing an investment. 这可能是因为初创企业的成功率正在上升，因此我的意思是，当投资者在定价一项投资时。 > `[00:20:50]` Unfortunately the entrepreneur is paying for the fact that a number of the investors investments are not going to work out right. `[00:20:50]` 不幸的是，这位企业家正在为这样一个事实买单，那就是，许多投资者的投资不会得到正确的结果。 > So I mean what we want. 所以我说的是我们想要的。 > We understand that a third of the things we invest in are not going to work at all a third of the things we invest in are going to kind of work but not not particularly well and and it\'s the final third that actually produce all the returns. 我们知道，我们所投资的东西中有三分之一根本不起作用-我们投资的三分之一会有某种效果，但效果并不特别好-最后三分之一的投资才能产生全部回报。 > And so the entrepreneur who is taking money from us who\'s in that group that\'s producing all the returns is actually paying a little bit for the failure rates right because we\'re thinking about it you know what\'s the blended return on our portfolio. 因此，从我们这个群体中获得全部回报的企业家，实际上为我们的失败率付出了一点代价，因为我们正在考虑这个问题，你知道，我们投资组合的混合回报率是多少？。 > Well if failure rates go down because of things like why see that increase the probability of success. 好吧，如果失败率下降是因为为什么要看到这会增加成功的概率。 > And I I absolutely believe that while he does that. 我绝对相信当他这么做的时候。 > `[00:21:36]` Then maybe that\'s part of why pricing has gone up given that the world is so connected now. `[00:21:36]` 那么，考虑到当今世界是如此的紧密相连，这也许是定价上升的原因之一。 > `[00:21:44]` We have the internet. `[00:21:44]` 我们有互联网。 > Thank you internet and people out on the Internet or watching us now. 谢谢大家现在上网或收看我们的节目。 > `[00:21:50]` Investors are finding deals all over the place. `[00:21:50]` 投资者到处都在寻找交易。 > You\'re funny you mention Philadelphia Berlin all over the place. 你很有趣，你到处都提到了费城，柏林。 > Given that seem that there would be parity in prices where ever you are it shouldn\'t matter that your location is Silicon Valley or New York or Berlin it\'s not yet. 考虑到无论你身在何处，价格似乎都是平价的，所以你的地理位置在硅谷、纽约或柏林并不重要。 > `[00:22:05]` Not yet. `[00:22:05]` 还没有。 > Angel List maybe has the potential to change that. 天使名单也许有可能改变这种状况。 > I mean if we really end up with a a. 我是说如果我们真的得到了一个。 > Nasdaq like market for for seed and series A and Series B investments then then that would would happen. 纳斯达克喜欢种子市场和 A、B 系列投资，然后就会发生这种情况。 > But still a lot of investing particularly seed investing is local and people want to be able to meet the entrepreneur and hear the pitch in. 但是，很多投资，特别是种子投资，都是本地的，人们希望能够与企业家见面，倾听他们的心声。 > And possibly join a board or at least be on an advisory board or spend some time on a regular basis with the entrepreneur. 也有可能加入董事会，或者至少加入咨询委员会，或者定期与企业家在一起度过一段时间。 > And so that means that entrepreneurs who are in places where there is a lot of capital like Silicon Valley and New York to a slightly lesser extent but there\'s a lot of capital here. 因此，这意味着，那些身处资金充裕的地方的企业家，比如硅谷和纽约，其规模略小一些，但这里有大量的资本。 > You are in a better situation than than entrepeneurs were parts of the world where there isn\'t much of that money. 你现在的处境比那些没有多少钱的世界上的企业家要好。 > So. 所以 > So I think also investors may have a higher comfort factor with startups that are in. 因此，我认为，投资者在初创公司上市时也可能会有更高的舒适度。 > Regions that have a lot of startup density. 有大量启动密度的区域。 > I\'m not entirely sure why that would be the case but I think that probably. 我不完全确定为什么会这样，但我认为可能是这样。 > `[00:23:12]` Is new. `[00:23:12]` 是新的。 > I think there\'s something of an environmental aspect to that when you\'re around other people who are doing startups and are talking about technology I think it\'s beneficial. 我认为，当你和那些正在创业、谈论科技的人在一起的时候，这是一个环境方面的问题，我认为这是有益的。 > I know that when I left finance to work in startups at which point by the way I applied for the USV Analyst Program and was summarily rejected without even an interview. 我知道，当我离开金融公司在初创企业工作时，顺便说一句，我申请了 USV 分析师计划，甚至在没有面试的情况下被草率地拒绝了。 > No interview. 没有面试。 > Wow. 哇 > Yeah. 嗯 > So thank you. 所以谢谢你。 > I guess it\'s worked out pretty well. 我想这件事做得很好。 > You know but but this is part of why why he thinks that. 但这也是他为什么这么想的原因之一。 > We\'ll find great startups wherever they are. 无论他们在哪里，我们都能找到伟大的创业公司。 > We want that to come to Silicon Valley. 我们希望硅谷也能实现这一目标。 > So we\'ll see how things are done there and then go back. 所以我们会看看事情是怎么做的，然后再回去。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > We went out to New York. 我们去了纽约。 > All right. 好的 > Whatever is best for your business right. 不管对你的生意有什么好处。 > That\'s kind of where you should be. 那是你该去的地方。 > `[00:23:53]` I think that\'s right or whatever is best for you. `[00:23:53]` 我认为那是对的，或者任何对你最好的。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > I know some entrepreneurs want to build their companies in a place where they want to raise their families or whatever. 我知道一些企业家想要在一个他们想要抚养他们的家庭或其他什么的地方建立他们的公司。 > You know that could be Silicon Valley that could be New York. 你知道，那可能是硅谷，可能是纽约。 > That could be Boston it could be Boulder a beatnik you know. 那可能是波士顿，可能是博尔德，你知道的。 > `[00:24:09]` So I do agree that you should do a startup in the place that\'s best for you. `[00:24:09]` 所以我同意你应该在对你最有利的地方开办一家公司。 > But I also think maybe you should do it in. 但我也觉得也许你应该这么做。 > There\'s. 有\。 > Probably at least. 可能至少。 > A dozen geographies around the world that have enough startup density and investor density that. 世界各地有十几个地区拥有足够的创业密度和投资者密度。 > Would be a decent place to build a company. 是建立公司的好地方。 > I would say you pick pick one of those. 我会说你选了其中一个。 > You don\'t go to a. 你不能去。 > You know. 你知道 > Some. 一些。 > Out of the way place that it will be hard to recruit management right even if there\'s cheap housing. 即使有廉价的住房，也很难招聘到合适的管理人员。 > Yeah I mean you know it\'s really really hard to recruit people to know. 是的，我的意思是，你知道，招募人才是非常困难的。 > If you were doing a startup in Bozeman Montana you\'d think you\'d you. 如果你在蒙大拿州博兹曼做一家创业公司，你会认为你有。 > I mean I don\'t mean to pick on Boesman. 我的意思是我不是故意去找博斯曼的。 > It\'s a wonderful place. 那是个很棒的地方。 > `[00:24:58]` But you know I just think you\'d have a hard time recruiting the really high quality talent there. `[00:24:58]` 但是你知道，我只是觉得你很难在那里招聘到真正的高质量人才。 > Either you\'re gonna find it locally or you\'re kind of stuck. 要么你会在当地找到它要么你会被困住。 > I was just in Israel a couple of weeks ago in Tel Aviv and. 几周前我在以色列特拉维夫。 > `[00:25:12]` Dega and I was I was struck by how vibrant the scene was there. `[00:25:12]` 德加和我被那里的景象是多么的生机勃勃而震惊。 > I knew that there was great technology that I knew there were great investors. 我知道有伟大的技术，我知道有伟大的投资者。 > But it seems like some of what\'s going on in San Francisco and in New York is starting to seep out there. 但在旧金山和纽约发生的一些事情似乎已经开始蔓延开来。 > `[00:25:25]` Oh I think it\'s well I mean you know Israel has been a startup hub for a long time. `[00:25:25]` 哦，我认为这很好，我是说，你知道以色列已经成为一个很长时间的创业中心了。 > They had a little bit of a a period where they would be a little bit of what happened in Boston although I think that. 他们有一段时间，他们会对在波士顿发生的事情有一点了解，尽管我认为是这样的。 > Israel has bounced back stronger in some ways than Boston. 以色列在某些方面比波士顿的反弹更强劲。 > But what happened was there was a transition from sort of more infrastructure and enterprise stuff to more consumer stuff. 但是发生的事情是，从更多的基础设施和企业产品过渡到更多的消费者产品。 > Really around the time we started USV was when it kind of really started to happen and. 就在我们开始使用 USV 的时候，它真的开始出现了。 > Entrepreneurs and Deasy\'s in both Israel and Boston I think struggled to make that transition as quickly as entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley and New York. 我认为，以色列和波士顿的企业家和迪西(Deasy)们，要想像硅谷和纽约的企业家那样，尽快实现这一转变，实在是举步维艰。 > It was easy for you. 对你来说很容易。 > New York was easy to make that transition because it always had a bent that way to begin with. 纽约很容易实现这一转变，因为它一开始就有这样的倾向。 > But Silicon Valley I was always impressed by how quickly they made that transition. 但硅谷总是给我留下深刻印象的是，他们这么快就完成了这一转变。 > And I think that Israel went through a little bit of a period where they struggled but they got they got their mojo back. 我认为以色列经历了一段时间的挣扎，但他们找回了自己的魔力。 > And because you know they\'ve been doing startups in Israel particularly in Tel Aviv for 20 or 30 years now. 因为你知道，他们已经在以色列，特别是特拉维夫开办了二三十年的初创公司。 > At least. 至少 > They have a lot of repeat entrepreneurs and a lot of talent and a lot of knowledge about how to do these kinds of things. 他们有很多重复创业的人，有很多人才，也有很多关于如何做这些事情的知识。 > So you take you take a team to Silicon Valley to kind of see how things are done there what the people in Israel know how to do a startup. 所以你带着一个团队去硅谷看看那里是怎么做的，以色列人知道如何创业。 > So they had the culture there. 所以他们有那里的文化。 > And it\'s it\'s it\'s a great place. 那是个很棒的地方。 > `[00:26:54]` And unfortunately don\'t have much more I\'m left. `[00:26:54]` 不幸的是，我已经没有更多的了。 > I do want to turn back to New York one last time because it\'s where we are and it\'s where we want to be finding more companies. 我确实想最后一次回到纽约，因为这是我们现在所在的地方，也是我们想要找到更多公司的地方。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > You know I\'m curious over the next over the next few years. 你知道我对未来几年很好奇。 > Looking back the last few years what\'s happened. 回顾过去几年所发生的事情。 > What do you see coming in New York that particularly interests you. 你认为在纽约你特别感兴趣的是什么？ > `[00:27:12]` Well the big observation is that enterprise SAS type business models seem to be thriving in New York right now. `[00:27:12]` 最大的观察是，企业 SAS 类型的商业模式现在似乎在纽约蓬勃发展。 > We have a few in our portfolio but they\'re there they\'re everywhere I look I\'m seeing really good SAS enterprise companies getting built here and that was definitely not what the vibe was in New York in 2009 2010. 我们的投资组合中有一些，但它们在那里，我看到的到处都是它们，我看到企业公司在这里建设得非常好，而这绝对不是 2009 年到 2010 年在纽约出现的那种氛围。 > Now I think it\'s a balance. 现在我认为这是一种平衡。 > We\'ve still got lots of good consumer stuff going on but now I think we\'ve got an equally strong B2B SAS type of. 我们仍然有许多好的消费者的东西正在进行，但现在我认为我们有一个同样强大的 B2B SAS 类型。 > Startup environment here and that\'s really good for New York because you know it. 这里的启动环境对纽约来说真的很好，因为你知道的。 > You know you need to have both kinds of companies I think they\'re. 你知道你需要两种公司，我认为他们都是。 > You know terrible for these CEOs to have both kinds of companies in their portfolio. 你知道，对于这些 CEO 来说，在他们的投资组合中有两种类型的公司是很糟糕的。 > And I think that you know the talent pool here in New York can work in both. 我想你知道纽约的人才库在这两种情况下都可以发挥作用。 > `[00:28:11]` So that probably the big biggest change and then also just so much more capital here. `[00:28:11]` 所以，这可能是最大的变化，也就是更多的资本。 > Yeah which is great for New York. 是的，这对纽约来说很好。 > Yes. 是 > Well Fred thank you so much for joining us today at. 那么，弗雷德，非常感谢你今天来到我们这里。