# Patrick Collison > `[00:00:04]` Now onto the first speaker Our first speaker is Patrick Collison and he is the CEO and co-founder of stright which was started in 2010. `[00:00:04]` 现在，我们的第一位发言者是 Patrick Collison，他是 stright 公司的首席执行官和联合创始人，该公司成立于 2010 年。 > Stripe is an online online payments company that makes it easy to process transactions from anywhere. Stripe 是一家在线支付公司，它可以方便地处理来自任何地方的交易。 > Patrick and his brother John originally from Limerick in Ireland and moved over to San Francisco to start their company. 帕特里克和他的兄弟约翰最初来自爱尔兰的利默里克，后来搬到旧金山开始他们的公司。 > So please welcome Patrick. 所以请欢迎帕特里克。 > Applause. 掌声。 > Warning. 警告。 > `[00:00:45]` As you just mentioned. `[00:00:45]` 正如你刚才提到的。 > I grew up in an American island. 我在一个美国岛长大。 > And so it\'s kind of funny being back here in London because London was pretty formative in sort of getting me into technology. 所以回到伦敦很有趣，因为伦敦在让我进入科技方面相当成熟。 > We used often come here during the summer holidays and money to basically spend my days at Foyle\'s and Waterstone\'s reading their computer books. 我们经常在暑假和金钱期间来到这里，主要是在 Foyle‘s 和 Waterstone 的电脑书籍上度过我的日子。 > I didn\'t buy them because they\'re really expensive. 我没有买它们，因为它们真的很贵。 > But as I read them in the the bookshop all day. 但是当我整天在书店里读到它们的时候。 > And then it was it was in 2007 actually that London sort of was part of me falling into startups that I had basically taken a. 然后是在 2007 年，实际上，伦敦是我的一部分，我加入了创业公司，我基本上是这样做的。 > `[00:01:23]` Taking a gap year from college and John and I had to try to start this company together and we decided to apply to Y Combinator and Polygram suggested that we go and meet these two really promising British entrepreneurs. `[00:01:23]` 从大学开始的间隔年，约翰和我不得不一起创办这家公司，我们决定申请 Y Combinator，Polygram 建议我们去见这两位非常有前途的英国企业家。 > Harge and Coover you\'re a tiger. 哈吉和库弗你是只老虎。 > And so we flew over the day and met the near Piccadilly Circus and decided basically there and then on the spot that we should. 于是我们飞了一天，遇到了皮卡迪利广场附近的人，然后在那里决定了我们应该去的地方。 > Work together. 一起工作。 > So it\'s good to be back here. 所以回到这里很好。 > Once we decided to work with Hajim cool we sort of moved out to San Francisco immediately and you know when I was based in the Bay Area I ended up attending Startup School a couple of times there. 一旦我们决定和 Hajim 酷一起工作，我们马上就搬到了旧金山，你知道，当我在海湾地区工作时，我在那里上过几次创业学校。 > `[00:02:03]` And I think like most other attendees in the audience I felt a sort of a not insignificant amount of imposter syndrome right in that the people up there on stage giving the talks and talking about their startups and everything else. `[00:02:03]` 和大多数其他听众一样，我觉得我感觉到了一种相当程度的冒名顶替综合症，那就是台上的人们在演讲，谈论他们的创业和其他一切。 > And it kind of feel felt like they were they were cut from a different cloth. 感觉好像是从不同的布上剪下来的。 > And so if you take anything away from this talk you should at least at least take the sort of proof by existence that they\'re not giving my presence. 所以，如果你从这个演讲中拿走了什么，你至少应该拿出这样的证据来证明他们并没有给我出现。 > `[00:02:31]` There\'s a lot that\'s kind of strange about startups. `[00:02:31]` 创业公司有很多奇怪的地方。 > I remember somebody telling me really not that long ago that Airbnb was doing super well. 我记得不久前有人告诉我 Airbnb 做得很好。 > They were now making over ten thousand dollars a week. 他们现在每周挣一万多美元。 > Now I have no idea whatsoever what these revenue numbers are today or any metric about them but I\'m sure they\'re making more than ten thousand dollars an hour. 现在，我完全不知道这些收入数字是什么，也不知道关于它们的任何衡量标准，但我确信，它们每小时的收入超过一万美元。 > And I wouldn\'t expect them making 10x that. 我可不指望他们能赚到 10 倍。 > Maybe they\'ll soon be making ten thousand dollars a minute. 也许他们很快就能赚到一万美元一分钟了。 > And that\'s just so strange right. 这太奇怪了，对吧。 > And that kind of where else in the world you of see growth rates like this and sort of changes of this magnitude on sort of such a short time horizon. 在这个世界上，你还可以看到像这样的增长率，在如此短的时间范围内出现如此巨大的变化。 > And I think it\'s it\'s very foreign to almost everybody. 我认为这对几乎每个人来说都是非常陌生的。 > I think startups are a strange first of a couple of other reasons. 我认为创业是其他几个原因中的一个奇怪的开始。 > And you know the companies that take off are usually pretty counterintuitive because otherwise somebody would already have done it. 你知道，那些起飞的公司通常都是违反直觉的，因为否则就会有人这么做了。 > And then compounding that you have the fact that the really good companies often want to be poorly understood because he it can be pretty helpful to be kind of underestimated and uncomprehended. 更重要的是，你有这样一个事实：真正的好公司往往想要被理解得很差，因为他被低估和不被理解是很有帮助的。 > But really I think the biggest reason that startups are hard to understand is fairly prosaic and were quite new phenomenon and very few people still get to see them up close especially during kind of the early days and the first couple orders of magnitude. 但实际上，我认为创业公司难以理解的最大原因是相当平淡无奇的，而且是非常新的现象，而且很少有人能近距离地看到它们，尤其是在早期和最初几个数量级的时期。 > And then what people do tell the stories they tend to kind of get them wrong. 然后人们所讲的故事，他们往往会搞错。 > They focus on sort of the rocketships and frantically trying to buy more server capacity and less about sort of the late night arguments and wondering if your idea could ever possibly work and trying to figure out why you\'re purportedly amazing product just isn\'t growing. 他们把注意力集中在火箭上，疯狂地试图购买更多的服务器容量，而不是深夜的争论，想知道你的想法是否可行，并试图找出为什么你所谓的惊人的产品只是没有增长。 > And the thing is even the really successful startups go through this phase. 问题是，即使是真正成功的初创企业也经历了这个阶段。 > Like most people don\'t know this but drink that famous summer when Facebook moved out to Palo Alto. 像大多数人一样，当 Facebook 搬到 PaloAlto 的时候，大家都不知道这一点，但是喝了那个著名的夏天。 > There were other people living in that same house who were working on different startup ideas like Facebook. 还有一些人住在同一栋房子里，他们在研究不同的创业理念，比如 Facebook。 > The most successful technology company started in the 21st century. 最成功的科技公司始于 21 世纪。 > The right to pass IBM in market cap. 有权通过 IBM 的市值。 > And that summer it wasn\'t sort of so obvious there was the most promising thing that people were certain they should they should go pursue that. 而那年夏天，并不是很明显，最有希望的事情是，人们确信他们应该去追求这个目标。 > Even six months into the company\'s history. 甚至在公司成立六个月后。 > The stripe is obviously very different to both Facebook and urban bee and I definitely can\'t compare ourselves to them. 这条纹显然与 Facebook 和城市蜜蜂非常不同，我绝对不能将自己与他们相比。 > But now that we\'ve gone through at least a small bit of growth I want to sort of try to describe how it actually works and felt from our perspective. 但是现在我们至少经历了一点成长，我想试着从我们的角度来描述它是如何运作和感觉的。 > So in October 2009 John and I were walking home from dinner in San Francisco. 所以在 2009 年 10 月，约翰和我在旧金山吃完晚饭步行回家。 > We\'d been kicking around this idea of starting an online payments company. 我们一直在考虑创建一家在线支付公司的想法。 > We\'re sort of fascinated by developer tools and internet infrastructure and other online companies handling payments just seemed to be sort of complete dinosaurs. 我们对开发工具、互联网基础设施和其他处理支付的在线公司有点着迷，这似乎是完全的恐龙。 > And as the web sort of spread around the world and more deeply into our lives with mobile devices it seemed obvious there should be some kind of universal Peanut\'s platform for the Internet. 随着网络在世界各地的传播，并通过移动设备深入到我们的生活中，似乎很明显，应该有某种通用的花生互联网平台。 > `[00:05:19]` It would be really easy to transact online. `[00:05:19]` 网上交易真的很容易。 > And so John turned to me and we\'re just walking along and he said let\'s just do it. 于是约翰转向我，我们只是走在一起，他说，我们就这么做吧。 > It won\'t be that hard and they won\'t take that long. 不会那么难的，他们也不会花那么长时间。 > He actually said that. 他其实是这么说的。 > And I said Alridge will give it a shot to backtrack a little bit here. 我说艾里奇会给它一个机会让它在这里回溯一点。 > So you see these slides work like I mentioned Johns my co-founder it\'s right. 你看，这些幻灯片就像我提到的约翰，我的联合创始人，它是对的。 > And he\'s also my brother. 他也是我弟弟。 > And so people often ask me about how this works out in practice. 所以人们经常问我这在实践中是如何运作的。 > And so for the record starting a company with your brother turns out to be a very good idea and that John\'s not only one of the more brilliant people I know but he\'s also someone with whom I I\'ve literally decades of experience building things. 因此，正式地说，与你的兄弟创办一家公司是一个非常好的主意，约翰不仅是我认识的最聪明的人之一，而且他也是一个我和他一起工作了几十年经验的人。 > And. 和 > You know when when companies go through sort of these these super high growth periods is often said of all kinds of co-founder tension and arguments and it\'s very common that there\'s co-founder departures and so forth. 你知道，当公司经历这种超高速增长时期时，人们常说到各种共同创始人的紧张和争论，而共同创始人的离职等等，这是非常普遍的现象。 > And again John and I have had all these arguments we just got to have them in three or four in five say it\'s October 2009 and we decide to work on this online payments company. 再一次，约翰和我有过所有这些争论，我们只需要让他们在三四分之一的时间，比方说是 2009 年 10 月，我们就决定在这家在线支付公司工作。 > We decided to call it an awesome name slash dev slash payments. 我们决定叫它一个很棒的名字，斜杠，开发，削减付款。 > So the idea was that the API should be just as straightforward as anything else in dev that. 因此，我们的想法是，API 应该像开发中的其他任何东西一样简单明了。 > `[00:06:33]` It\'s great. `[00:06:33]` 太棒了。 > You know we\'re better at producing the naming things at least but everyone else have been treating online payments as something that you know finance people should care about and targeted their products. 你知道，至少我们更善于制作点名的东西，但其他人都把在线支付当作人们应该关心并瞄准自己产品的东西。 > CFO foes in business people and their site looks like this. 首席财务官的敌人在商界人士和他们的网站看起来像这样。 > No actually I took the screenshot this morning because a lot of sites haven\'t changed and we thought the internet was moving in a different direction and so we decided to target makers the people actually creating things. 不，实际上，我今天早上拍了截图，因为很多网站都没有改变，我们认为互联网正朝着不同的方向发展，所以我们决定把目标对准那些真正创造东西的人。 > Basically we thought that payments on the Internet was a technology problem and in particular that sort of it was much more that you could do for users. 基本上，我们认为互联网上的支付是一个技术问题，尤其是这类问题，你可以为用户做更多的事情。 > There was much of value that you could create than just because of a basic electrical outlets. 有很多的价值，你可以创造，不只是因为一个基本的插座。 > To the credit card networks. 信用卡网络。 > `[00:07:14]` And so we wanted to build a completely new stack for anyone starting a business online. `[00:07:14]` 所以我们想为任何在网上创业的人建立一个全新的堆栈。 > And so we worked nights and weekends. 所以我们晚上和周末都工作。 > We were at university in the States at the time I was at MIT and John was just up the road from me at Harvard and so we\'d code together in the evenings between writing or doing problems and writing papers and all the usual stuff. 当我在麻省理工学院的时候，我们在美国的大学里，约翰就在哈佛大学的路上，所以我们在晚上一起写或写问题，写论文和所有平常的东西。 > January rolls around January 2010 which in Boston is of course unbelievably freezing. 2010 年 1 月前后转，这在波士顿当然是令人难以置信的寒冷。 > And so John and I decide to go somewhere else to work for the month and we\'d read a few blog posts that described when as IRAs as a really great place to get things done because it\'s cheap it\'s warm it\'s friendly. 因此，约翰和我决定去其他地方工作一个月，我们读了一些博客文章，把 IRAs 描述为一个非常好的地方来完成工作，因为它很便宜，很温暖，很友好。 > `[00:07:49]` There\'s Wi-Fi everywhere. `[00:07:49]` 到处都是 Wi-Fi。 > Nobody has dinner until really late. 直到很晚才能吃晚饭。 > Bars are open to 5:00a.m. 酒吧营业时间是早上 5 点。 > and nothing starts before noon. 中午之前什么都不会开始。 > So like basically it\'s an entire city on a programers schedule. 从根本上说，这是一座整座城市，都在编剧的日程安排中。 > So John and I went there and we worked nonstop for three weeks. 所以约翰和我去了那里，我们不停地工作了三个星期。 > I\'ve still never seen any of the tourist attractions in the city. 我还没见过这个城市的任何旅游景点。 > We just coated in cafes all day and then stopped for dinner at around 11 o\'clock. 我们在咖啡馆里穿了一整天的衣服，然后在 11 点左右停下来吃晚饭。 > So really I can\'t emphasize this enough. 所以我怎么强调都不为过。 > If you want to get something done think up on his IRAs. 如果你想做点什么，想想他的 IRAS。 > And then on January 9th slashed sluff payments got its first production user. 然后，在 1 月 9 日，削减垃圾支付得到了它的第一个生产用户。 > And now this was only a couple weeks after we\'d started working on it but we really wanted to have production users shaping the product as early as possible. 现在，这仅仅是我们开始工作的几个星期后，但我们真的想让生产用户尽快塑造产品。 > FUSA was a friend of ours and here\'s a screenshot of what their payments looked like at the time. Fusa 是我们的朋友，这里是他们当时付款的截图。 > And as you can see we\'re also definitely designers. 正如你所看到的，我们也绝对是设计师。 > But okay. 但是好吧。 > Now when user laughter. 现在当用户大笑。 > There\'s this story at Amazon about how they celebrated when they got their first buyer who wasn\'t any of their moms. 亚马逊有这样一个故事：当第一个买家不是他们的妈妈时，他们是如何庆祝的。 > And so in our case the user wasn\'t our mom but he was a good friend. 因此，在我们的例子中，用户不是我们的妈妈，但他是一个好朋友。 > `[00:08:52]` And so you know we weren\'t out of the woods. `[00:08:52]` 所以你知道我们并没有脱离险境。 > And so this is. 所以这就是。 > Every two or three months and. 每两三个月。 > Then we went back to school and we continued to work on debt payments and spare time. 然后我们回到了学校，我们继续努力偿还债务和业余时间。 > There was one cafe I worked out of so much that I think I\'m so Facebook friends with most of the Breece does. 有一家咖啡馆是我工作得如此之多，以至于我觉得我和布里斯的大多数人都是脸书上的朋友。 > Strike. 罢工。 > `[00:09:08]` You as a slightly unusual company right. `[00:09:08]` 你是个有点不寻常的人，对吧。 > We\'re about technology but also I\'d finance you sort of spanned these two industries and the technology side requires obviously you know really good reliability and Kirei eyes and a good product. 我们是关于技术的，但我也会资助你跨越这两个行业，而技术方面显然需要很好的可靠性和 Kirei 眼睛和一个好的产品。 > And all these things. 还有所有这些事。 > But the payment side requires working with banks and credit card companies and generally handling sort of a slew of finance industry issues that we definitely have hadn\'t previously encountered until to a lot of meetings where I just sat down with somebody like. 但在支付方面，需要与银行和信用卡公司合作，通常需要处理一系列金融业问题，这些问题我们以前肯定从未遇到过，直到很多会议上，我才与像这样的人坐下来。 > Payments you know how does it work. 你知道它是怎么工作的。 > And programmers often and I think it is unfortunate to have looked down on people who are learning to code in order to do a startup you know the sort of high I want to learn rails for my web startup crowd. 程序员经常-我认为很不幸的是-看不起那些为了创业而学习代码的人-你知道，我想为我的网络创业人群学习 Rails。 > But actually a lot of sympathy for them because we were that budget and finance. 但事实上，我们对他们非常同情，因为我们是那样的预算和财政。 > And. 和 > So summer came around and we\'re now six or seven months in and we moved out to Palo Alto. 所以夏天来临了，我们已经过了六七个月，我们搬到了帕洛阿尔托。 > We hadn\'t yet decided to take leave from school. 我们还没有决定离开学校。 > And here I briefly want to mention that sort of speaking as somebody who moved from the British Isles to theU.S. 在这里，我想简单地提一下，作为一个从不列颠群岛搬到美国的人所说的话。 > for a startup and I highly recommend this path in that the visa pains are just as bad as everyone talks about but. 对于一家初创公司，我强烈推荐这条路，因为签证的痛苦和大家谈论的一样糟糕，但是。 > I think it\'s still a net worth it and there\'s a lot of discussion about whether you need to be in the valley or not or whether you can start a company other places. 我认为它仍然是一个净值，并有很多讨论，你是否需要在山谷，或你是否可以在其他地方开办公司。 > But from my perspective at least I think that kind of misses the point a little bit in that it is definitely empirically we see it we see it be the case everyday that it\'s possible to create an amazing company outside of the valley. 但至少从我的角度来看，我认为这种观点有点漏洞百出，因为从经验上看，我们每天都能在山谷之外创建一家令人惊叹的公司。 > But really the question is you know place maximizes your chance of success and at least again speaking as somebody who\'s made this move. 但真正的问题是，你知道地方最大限度地增加了你的成功机会，至少是作为一个做出这一举动的人。 > I think I think about it does that. 我想就是这样。 > Bring me back to Paul Balto. 带我去见保罗·巴尔托。 > We\'ve found a tiny bungalow in the living room and the kitchen became the office and it was really hot but we didn\'t have any air conditioning. 我们在客厅里找到了一间小平房，厨房变成了办公室，天气很热，但我们没有空调。 > And so John took to sleeping in the garden most nights. 所以约翰大多数晚上都睡在花园里。 > And I couldn\'t find a photo of that. 我找不到那张照片。 > And by and large we just kept on writing code. 总的来说，我们只是继续编写代码。 > That\'s mostly what the early days of starting a software company looks like. 这主要是软件公司成立初期的样子。 > Because anything that isn\'t trash or talking to your users is probably a waste of time. 因为任何不是垃圾或与用户交谈的东西都可能是浪费时间。 > Here\'s a chart of our transaction volume. 这是我们交易量的图表。 > Over the first six months. 在前六个月里。 > And so you know that that\'s not a technical error. 所以你知道这不是技术上的错误。 > The numbers just really aren\'t all that big. 数字真的没那么大。 > If you look really close but sure it\'s high enough resolution and you sort of see a weekly line at the bottom. 如果你看起来真的很近，但确定它足够高的分辨率，你会看到每周的底线在底部。 > But I\'m not Riggleman very much so around this time we had our first person join. 但是我不是瑞格曼，所以这一次我们有了第一个加入的人。 > Me now based in Silicon Valley we have access to all the global talent. 我现在硅谷，我们可以接触到所有的全球人才。 > That\'s one of the best parts about it. 这是它最好的部分之一。 > And so of course we hired Dara Butley who is a friend of mine from college who also grew up in Limerick in Ireland and. 当然，我们雇佣了达拉·布特利，他是我大学里的朋友，也是在爱尔兰的利默里克长大的。 > We also raised our first real investment from PeterT.O and up to then we hadn\'t told many people about debt payments and those we had told he\'d reactivate telling us there were kind of crazy. 我们还从 PeterT.O 筹集了我们的第一笔真正的投资，到那时为止，我们还没有告诉很多人偿还债务的事情，而那些我们告诉他会重新启动的人告诉我们，这是一种疯狂的行为。 > But luckily Peter Taylor is crazy. 但幸运的是彼得·泰勒疯了。 > And so it was really helpful to get him on board. 所以让他上船真的很有帮助。 > Soon after that he was into our first office that looks something like this and Prezi actually been a house and it had this wonderful fireplace and so we stretched some of the workplace fire codes but generally we were just still working non-stop and we heard someone else. 在那之后不久，他进入了我们的第一间办公室，看起来像这样，而 Prezi 实际上是一栋房子，那里有一个很棒的壁炉，所以我们伸展了一些工作场所的防火代码，但总的来说，我们还在不停地工作，我们听到了其他人的声音。 > His name was Greg. 他叫格雷格。 > I remember sort of he came out to spend a weekend with us before he decided whether we\'re going to join or not it was a weekend long interview and I remember him asking the sort of you know what our work schedule was like and whether we took weekends off and at the time we didn\'t take weekends off. 我记得在他决定我们是否要参加之前，他出来和我们共度了一个周末-这是一个周末长的面试。我记得他问过，你知道我们的工作日程是什么样子的，我们是否周末休息，而在我们没有休周末假的时候。 > Obviously working all the time but I sort of didn\'t want to scare him away right. 很明显，我一直在工作，但我不想把他吓跑。 > And so I said something like Well you know we usually work at the weekend. 所以我说了这样的话，你知道，我们通常在周末工作。 > We don\'t expect other people to. 我们不希望别人这么做。 > We believe in work life balance whatever we sort of cut me off because I just want make sure they\'re on the same page and working all the time so we need to fit in. 我们相信工作和生活之间的平衡，因为我只想确保他们在同一页上工作，所以我们需要适应。 > We did decide to change our name. 我们确实决定改名。 > I can\'t even begin to list the problem is the payments had somehow it turned out that not everyone immediately got the depth of fast analogy and we said we\'d start to get mail with names like this and stuff. 我甚至不能开始列出问题在于，如果事实证明不是每个人都立即得到了快速类比的深度，我们就会开始收到像这样的名字之类的邮件。 > And then there is. 然后就有了。 > And then there is the kind of inconvenient fact that Amazon did indeed an online payments product called Amazon Deathday. 还有一个令人不快的事实，那就是亚马逊确实开发了一款名为“亚马逊死亡日”的在线支付产品。 > So we figured it just wasn\'t going to work out. 所以我们觉得这是不可能的。 > We brainstormed names and you know we really couldn\'t think of a good one. 我们集思广益，你知道我们真的想不出一个好名字。 > And so it eventually came down to choosing between stripe and Page Daemon and we couldn\'t figure out which of these was a better name and so we decided that if we couldn\'t make up our minds by I think it was December 15th 2011 we just default stripe and December 15th came along and we couldn\'t we couldn\'t choose between them and so strike twice. 所以我们最终还是选择了条纹和页面守护进程，我们不知道哪一个名字更好，所以我们决定如果我们不能下定决心的话，我想是 2011 年 12 月 15 日，我们只是默认了条纹，12 月 15 日出现了，我们无法在两者之间做出选择，所以我们决定，如果我们不能做出决定的话，那就是 2011 年 12 月 15 日，我们只能选择两次。 > And I actually read them a few months after that. 几个月后我就读到了。 > This is apparently how Apple came up with its name. 很明显，这就是苹果想出名字的方式。 > They couldn\'t think of a word and so there was the same like deadline day strategy. 他们一个字都想不出来，所以有着同样的截止日期策略。 > Anyway. 不管怎么说。 > So we reached the end of our first year and we\'re now going to four people. 所以我们到了第一年的最后一年，现在我们要找四个人。 > A couple of white startups that started had started using Stripe. 几家刚起步的白色初创公司已经开始使用 Stripe。 > So that was good. 那就太好了。 > And here\'s our transaction volume looked like at the end of the first year. 这是我们第一年年底的交易量。 > So again still that is definitely quite a lot of work to do. 因此，这仍然是相当多的工作要做。 > We spent January of 2011 our one year anniversary in Rio de Janeiro and this is becoming a tradition. 2011 年 1 月，我们在里约热内卢度过了一周年纪念，这正成为一种传统。 > And Rio is anybody who\'s been there knows as when most beautiful cities in the world. 里约是任何一个曾经去过那里的人，就像世界上最美丽的城市一样。 > And again we just took full advantage of it. 我们又一次充分利用了它。 > We were still in invite only private data this time and which meant there was indeed a fairly obvious way to grow faster namely launching and a friend refers to invite only private Boeta as like the baby blanket of startups. 这一次我们仍然只邀请私人数据，这意味着确实有一种增长更快的方式，也就是启动，而一位朋友指的是只邀请私人的 Boeta，就像初创公司的婴儿毯一样。 > And I think that\'s about right. 我认为这是正确的。 > But I will say that the private beta period was really helpful to stripe. 但我要说的是，私人测试期确实对条纹很有帮助。 > Over a pullback I had saying that you should start out by making 100 users really happy rather than many more than that. 在退步过程中，我曾说过，你应该从让 100 个用户真正高兴开始，而不是让更多的用户感到高兴。 > Only a little bit happy. 只是有点高兴。 > And so we really took this to heart and took advantage of our small number of users in order to listen as closely as we could to them. 所以我们真的把这件事牢记在心，利用我们为数不多的用户，尽可能地倾听他们的声音。 > So not long after we launched the first version of stripe to a handful of people we had a Piedra duty as so we\'d get a call if the site was ever down. 所以不久之后，我们推出了第一个版本的条纹对少数人，我们有一个皮德拉的责任，因为我们会接到一个电话，如果网站曾经被关闭。 > Pretty standard. 相当标准。 > But then we realized that anytime anyone got an error of any sort. 但后来我们意识到，任何时候任何人都会犯任何错误。 > That\'s a pretty bad experience for them and it would make them really happy if we proactively reach out to them and fix the issue. 这对他们来说是一次非常糟糕的经历，如果我们主动接触他们并解决这个问题，他们会很高兴的。 > So we changed our code so that anytime anyone got any error it would e-mail everyone at the company and then if they didn\'t immediately react. 因此，我们更改了代码，以便任何人有任何错误时，都会给公司的每个人发电子邮件，如果他们没有立即做出反应的话。 > Would also phone everyone and just go and fix it and I know what I really mean that like we said we\'d get out of bed if we had to. 也会打电话给每个人，去修理它，我明白我的意思，就像我们说的，如果我们必须的话，我们会起床的。 > We\'re basically never without a laptop and a means to tether. 我们基本上从来没有笔记本电脑和拴住的手段。 > Here\'s a photo of Gregg fixing one of these is on our way to watch a movie. 这是格雷格修的照片，其中一张正在我们去看电影的路上。 > I think he still feels bitter about this user causing him to miss Twilight Breaking Dawn laughter. 我认为他仍然对这个用户感到痛苦，这让他错过了“暮光之城”破晓“的笑声。 > `[00:15:48]` We also realized that good thing Greg is out here. `[00:15:48]` 我们也意识到格雷格在这里是件好事。 > `[00:15:51]` We also realize that ending with an engineer is basically the best support experience possible right in that it\'s kind of frustrating have to go and like file a ticket or send an e-mail and you wonder do they actually enter the e-mails like this. `[00:15:51]` 我们还意识到，以工程师为结尾基本上是最好的支持体验，因为它会让人感到沮丧，比如提交一张罚单或发一封电子邮件，而你想知道他们是否真的像这样输入了电子邮件。 > We just added an open chatroom to our Web site where anyone could jump in and start asking questions. 我们刚刚在我们的网站上添加了一个开放的聊天室，任何人都可以跳进来问题。 > And so this ended up being much more productive for us too because you know we could ask clarifying questions and really figure out what the underlying issue was rather I to guess based on the user\'s initial description. 因此，这对我们来说也是更有效率的，因为你知道，我们可以问一些澄清的问题，并真正地找出根本的问题是什么，我可以根据用户的初步描述来猜测。 > It was it was kind of good product developing for us. 对我们来说，这是一种很好的产品开发。 > And then we thought of course why stop there. 然后我们想到了为什么停在那里。 > And isn\'t it bad if somebody asks a question in our chat room and you know nobody\'s around to answer us. 如果有人在我们的聊天室问一个问题，而你知道周围没有人回答我们，那不是很糟糕吗？ > And so we hooked that up to our other paging system so that if anyone didn\'t get an answer within 30 seconds it would just phone everyone. 所以我们把它连接到另一个寻呼系统上，如果 30 秒内没有人得到答案，它只会给每个人打电话。 > And so you know our responsiveness at 3am improves substantially or quality of life deteriorated a bit. 所以你知道，我们在凌晨 3 点的反应能力有了很大的提高，或者生活质量有了一点下降。 > So you know those stright wasn\'t yet available to everyone. 所以你知道那些东西还不是每个人都能用的。 > We really tried to sort of turn up the dial on our users feedback and to force ourselves to really sensitive to sort of what they actually wanted into what their experience was like. 我们真的试着打开用户反馈上的刻度盘，迫使我们自己对他们真正想要的东西非常敏感，让他们的体验变成什么样。 > We had our users talking to us every waking hour. 我们让我们的用户在醒着的时候和我们交谈。 > And thanks to this innovation also during our sleep. 多亏了这一创新，我们睡觉的时候也是如此。 > And. 和 > The other thing that kept us in data was the fact that we weren\'t just building sort of a thin software layer that we thought that sort of stripe should encompass everything from the API request to how the money ended up in your bank account and you wanted to build it defines the complete experience. 另一件让我们保持数据的事实是，我们不只是在构建一个薄薄的软件层，我们认为这类条带应该涵盖从 API 请求到资金如何进入您的银行账户的所有内容，而您想要构建它定义了完整的体验。 > And we want to be to do that scale. 我们想要达到这样的规模。 > AndA.W. 还有。 > US and EU and so forth I think are really interesting innovations for this reason. 出于这个原因，我认为美国和欧盟等都是非常有趣的创新。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And that easy YouTube works really well for someone with like a startup or a side project or whatever. 这个简单的 YouTube 非常适合那些像创业公司或者附带项目之类的人。 > But you can also be Netflix or Zynga or indeed Amazon itself and you can still run your systems on YouTube. 但你也可以是 Netflix 或 Zynga，甚至亚马逊本身，你也可以在 YouTube 上运行你的系统。 > So we wanted to build that. 所以我们想建造它。 > But you know the the infrastructure for Internet commerce. 但你知道互联网商业的基础设施。 > Something as easy to start with protest something that would work for the largest companies in the world. 这件事很容易从抗议开始，这对世界上最大的公司是有好处的。 > So that meant working with really good banks. 所以这意味着要和非常好的银行合作。 > But the problem is that banks and startups are kind of the business equivalent of oil and water. 但问题是，银行和初创企业在某种程度上相当于石油和水。 > They just they really don\'t mix very well and it\'s quite hard to combine them. 他们只是-他们真的不能很好地混合-而且很难把他们结合起来。 > Into in theU.S. 进入美国。 > the best in the business was Wells Fargo the largest bank there by market cap. 业务中最好的是富国银行(WellsFargo)，按市值计算，富国银行是那里最大的银行。 > But honestly it was pretty hard to get them to listen to us or even to return our e-mails or calls. 但老实说，很难让他们听我们的话，甚至很难回复我们的电子邮件或电话。 > I mean they price thug or some kind of strange like 4 1 9 scam right with Tiger instead of making money faster on the Internet from the comfort during home. 我的意思是，他们给暴徒定价，或者其他一些奇怪的东西，比如玩老虎的 419 骗局，而不是在家里舒适地在网上赚更快的钱。 > And so we asked a friend and I guess now a partner at ricey Jeff Raulston to help out. 所以我们请了一位朋友，我想现在是里奇的合伙人杰夫·拉斯顿来帮忙。 > Since he Prezi negotiated with record labels and we figured that if you could convince a record label to work with a startup you could basically talk anyone into anything. 因为他和唱片公司进行了谈判，我们认为，如果你能说服唱片公司与一家初创公司合作，你基本上可以说服任何人做任何事情。 > And here\'s a picture of him on a conference call with Dara. 这是他和达拉在电话会议上的照片。 > And you might wonder why is he on the floor and he\'s on the floor because he\'s upstairs in our office in the upstairs had no furniture and he\'s upstairs because our office was also flooded at the time. 你可能会想，为什么他躺在地板上，而他却躺在地板上，因为他在我们楼上的办公室里，在楼上没有家具，而他在楼上，因为当时我们的办公室也被淹了。 > So this is a long story but this is just as a side note like a good example of what a startup often feels like where you\'re negotiating with your bank while your office is slowly filling with water. 因此，这是一个很长的故事，但这只是一个副词，就像一个很好的例子，说明当你的办公室慢慢充满水的时候，你与银行谈判时的感觉。 > But thanks to the help of JAF and others we eventually did convince Wells Fargo to become one of our backhands. 但多亏了日航和其他人的帮助，我们最终说服了富国银行成为我们的反手之一。 > And this meant moving all of our systems work on top of their platform and it was a few weeks of superintends work and this was the night of our first successful transaction. 这意味着把我们所有的系统都转移到他们的平台上，这是几个星期的监督工作，这是我们第一个成功交易的夜晚。 > With John. 和约翰在一起。 > After that all nighter and. 在那之后一整晚。 > I want to show this stuff because I feel it in general. 我想展示这些东西，因为我总体上感觉到了。 > This is the sort of unglamorous part of a startup that people don\'t get to see all that much of right and that you really want something to work and lots of others think it\'s a bad idea and it\'s really hard and everything takes longer than you\'d like. 这是一家创业公司中那种平淡无奇的部分，人们看不出这么多正确的东西，而且你真的想要一些东西去工作，很多人认为这是个坏主意，它真的很难，每件事都比你想要的要花更长的时间。 > And you end up with like many late night discussions and sort of soul searching debates and there\'s no obvious end in sight and you\'re kind of constantly wondering whether it\'s actually a good idea or Amasia just go get a job at Google or something or you think maybe it is definitely a good idea. 最后，你会像很多深夜讨论和灵魂探索的辩论一样，看不到明显的结局，你总是在想这到底是个好主意，或者阿马西亚只是去谷歌找份工作，或者你认为这绝对是个好主意。 > But this kind of self-doubt. 但这种自我怀疑。 > Maybe I\'m just not the one to pull it off. 也许我不是那个成功的人。 > And the thing is like it doesn\'t really go away. 事情就像它并没有真正消失。 > And no matter how successful you become you\'ll still have lots of doubts right. 不管你有多成功，你还是会有很多疑问的。 > Greg LeMond was the first American to win the Tour de France. 格雷格·莱蒙德是第一位赢得环法自行车赛冠军的美国人。 > And I\'ve always liked his quote about it doesn\'t get easier. 我一直很喜欢他的话。 > And you just go faster. 你就跑得更快。 > So in our case we eventually sort of got the pieces in place. 因此，在我们的例子中，我们最终得到了一些零碎的东西。 > And we got to the point where a race launch we launched on the twenty ninth of September in 2011. 我们已经到了 2011 年 9 月 29 日启动比赛的时候了。 > And so we\'ll soon celebrate our third birthday. 所以我们很快就要庆祝我们的三岁生日了。 > And. 和 > At that point stripey but in production use for I guess around 19 months or so and we\'ve been working on it fulltime for a year and three months. 在这一点上，条纹，但在生产中使用，我想大约 19 个月左右，我们已经为它全职工作了一年零三个月。 > We\'re 10 people and we launched fit other names in a tweet. 我们是 10 个人，我们在推特上发布了 FIT 其他名字。 > And by the end of the first year of our transaction volume looked like. 到了第一年年底，我们的交易量就像。 > And so it was kind of promising but launching finitely isn\'t a panacea. 因此，这是有希望的，但有限的推出并不是一种灵丹妙药。 > But the signs were promising and we kept going and eventually after a couple years stripes starts then she started to become an overnight success. 但迹象是有希望的，我们继续前进，最终在几年后，条纹开始，然后她开始一夜之间的成功。 > And so it started school at the end of 2012. 所以它在 2012 年底开始上学。 > I showed this charge of our transaction volume up to that point and then back in November of last year. 我向大家展示了我们的交易量，直到那个时候，然后在去年 11 月。 > So I guess a year after that we tweeted this updated version so the blue part on the right is that of what had happened subsequently. 所以我想一年后，我们在推特上更新了这个版本，所以右边的蓝色部分是后来发生的事情。 > And here it really don\'t mean to kind of focus on the picture numbers right on that but mostly on this here. 在这里，它并不意味着把注意力集中在图片的数字上，而主要集中在这里。 > It just takes so long for these things. 这些事情花了这么长时间。 > I mean even if you\'re onto something. 我是说即使你发现了什么。 > It takes a really long time for these things to start to work. 这些东西要花很长时间才能开始工作。 > We\'re 16 people on this day three years ago and we\'re now 150 people. 三年前的今天，我们是 16 个人，现在是 150 人。 > This is a photo from our all hands meeting just two days ago. 这是两天前我们全体会议的照片。 > And. 和 > Thousands of companies using Stripe this week like the Guardian and Virgin and Ted and Reddit Salesforce Udacity. 本周，成千上万家使用 Stripe 的公司，如“卫报”、“维珍”、“泰德”和“Reddit Salesforce Udacity”。 > But you know part of what\'s funny about doing it is that there\'s tons of companies that you know. 但你知道，这么做的一部分有趣之处在于，你知道有很多公司。 > People might not be as familiar with that are doing really cool things like form labs. 人们可能对此并不熟悉，因为他们正在做一些很酷的事情，比如表单实验室。 > The first high resolution desktop 3D printer and Larry Lessig used stripe to do a crowdfunding campaign back a couple of weeks ago maybe. 也许几周前，第一台高分辨率桌面 3D 打印机和拉里·莱西格(LarryLessig)用条纹进行了一次众筹活动。 > But you guys saw this made one thing they\'re trying to create a new pact to reduce the importance of money inU.S. 但是你们看到了这件事，他们试图创造一个新的契约来降低金钱在美国的重要性。 > politics. 政治。 > `[00:22:03]` My heroine recently is Borro my doggy is Airblue and B for dogs right here in London. `[00:22:03]` 我最近的女主角是博罗，我的狗是 AirBlue，B 是伦敦这里的狗。 > And so when I was a call that the Thomas Soyer fence painting strategy with four dogs and. 所以当我呼吁托马斯·索耶用四只狗作画策略的时候。 > `[00:22:18]` Then no one here ever looked at the history of of container shipping. `[00:22:18]` 那么这里没有人看过集装箱运输的历史。 > And it was a bit of context for a trim dog walking. 这是一个修剪过的狗散步的背景。 > The shipping container. 集装箱。 > The most mundane thing in the world and it\'s actually only about 60 years old before shipping containers in the early 1950s. 这是世界上最平凡的事情，实际上，在 20 世纪 50 年代早期，在集装箱装运之前，它只有大约 60 年的历史了。 > Transportation costs accounted for about 25 percent on average of the final cost of a physical product. 运输成本在实物产品的最终成本中约占 25%。 > And transportation costs amounted to 10 percent of the value ofU.S. 运输成本相当于美国价值的 10%。 > imports. 进口品。 > And so you think about that right. 所以你要好好想想。 > And if your product is a margin of 20 percent on average just transporting it to another market cuts your profit in half. 如果你的产品平均利润率为 20%，仅仅把它运到另一个市场，你的利润就会减少一半。 > And so unsurprisingly manufacturing tended to happen pretty close to our goods were sold. 因此，毫不奇怪的是，制造业往往发生在与我们的商品销售相当近的地方。 > To them then the shipping container invented in the mid 50s essentially eliminated the cost of shipping physical goods and reduce the cost of loading and unloading ships by about 95 percent. 对他们来说，50 年代中期发明的集装箱基本上消除了运输实物货物的成本，使装卸船舶的成本降低了大约 95%。 > And it\'s now to the point where there is actually quoting from aU.S. 现在已经到了引用美国的地步了。 > government report. 政府报告。 > And it\'s better to assume that moving goods is essentially costless. 更好的假设是货物运输基本上是无成本的。 > So this technological breakthrough you the elimination of friction and sort of abstraction over geography played an enormous role in enabling the rise of Singapore and South Korea Japan Taiwan China and various other manufacturing hubs. 因此，这一技术突破-消除摩擦和对地理的抽象-对新加坡和韩国、日本、中国台湾和其他各种制造业中心的崛起起到了巨大的推动作用。 > And so my point here is that a good technology doesn\'t just sort of monetize itself. 因此，我的观点是，一个好的技术并不仅仅是一种赚钱的方式。 > But in addition facilitates further structural changes in the shipping container basically reshape the world\'s economy. 但除此之外，还推动了航运集装箱结构的进一步变化，基本上重塑了世界经济。 > So we sometimes describe how we\'re doing with stripe as building economic infrastructure for the Internet. 因此，我们有时会描述我们是如何为互联网建设经济基础设施的。 > I\'m very flashy and but for most of human history we\'ve sort of had to transact with people beside us. 我非常浮华，但在人类历史的大部分时间里，我们不得不与身边的人打交道。 > And now thanks to the Internet there\'s the potential for that to no longer be true with a new way to abstract or replace anybody you can in principle build a global business. 现在，由于互联网的存在，用一种新的方式抽象或取代任何你原则上可以建立全球业务的人，这种可能性就不再存在了。 > But you know the Internet has already done a lot to sort of revolutionize how we communicate and how we collaborate and we share we\'ve only sort of started to explore how it can change what we create and how we transact and what kinds of businesses are possible. 但你知道，互联网已经为我们的交流方式和协作方式带来了很大的变革，我们只是开始探索它如何改变我们的创造和交易方式，以及什么样的业务是可能的。 > You know the other companies whose founders are speaking today are are good examples. 你知道，其他创始人今天发言的公司就是很好的例子。 > And so with stripe we want to turn Internet payments into a ubiquitous utility. 因此，带着条纹，我们想把互联网支付变成一种无处不在的公共事业。 > Stuart Butterfield in a really good blog post a couple months ago called innovation the some of the changes across the system. 斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德在几个月前发表的一篇很好的博客文章中称创新是整个系统的一些变化。 > And so we want our innovation to be more commerce and the Internet no more people starting businesses and those businesses operating more efficiently and more flexibly. 因此，我们希望我们的创新是更多的商业和互联网，而不是更多的创业人员和那些更有效率和更灵活运作的企业。 > We want to increase the GDP of the Internet. 我们想增加互联网的国内生产总值。 > But it still is super early days. 但现在还太早。 > And in reality the vast majority of the time we\'re really not thinking about those problems were trying to figure out how to decrease the load on some database or some server has exploded somewhere or we\'re trying to get some particular design just right. 而在现实中，我们实际上并没有考虑这些问题，而是试图找出如何减少某个数据库或服务器的负载，或者我们试图得到一些正确的设计。 > Or you know we\'re wondering if some new product is actually a good idea or an otter. 或者你知道我们在想新产品到底是个好主意还是水獭。 > I mean it\'s all the usual stuff. 我是说这是所有平常的事情。 > We\'re having debates that overflow G mails thread. 我们的辩论充斥着 G 邮件线。 > And you become a completely new thread. 你就变成了一个全新的线索。 > But honestly. 但说实话。 > That\'s how it goes at a startup. 创业就是这样的。 > And you know speaking now for years in I\'m not sure I\'d want to be any different. 你知道，多年以来，我都不确定我是否想要与众不同。 > Thank you. 谢谢。