# Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Hi everyone. `[00:00:00]` 大家好。 > So believe this year I can\'t believe we have this team of people in the back helping. 所以相信今年我不能相信我们有一队人在背后帮忙。 > There\'s real chairs. 有真正的椅子。 > Look how many seats there are. 看看有多少个座位。 > `[00:00:12]` This is so exciting. `[00:00:12]` 这太令人兴奋了。 > I\'m Jessica Livingston. 我是杰西卡·利文斯顿。 > I\'m one of the founders of Y Combinator and it\'s been more than seven years since we started ricey. 我是 Y Combinator 的创始人之一，自从我们创办 ricey 以来已经有 7 年多了。 > And in that time we\'ve funded 467 startups so I\'ve seen a lot of pattern. 在这段时间里，我们资助了 467 家初创公司，所以我看到了很多模式。 > I was a little nervous back there so thanks. 我刚才有点紧张所以谢谢。 > There\'s a talk I always want to give at the beginning of each batch warning everyone about stuff that I know is probably going to happen to them. 我总是想在每一批开始的时候做一次演讲，警告每个人我知道可能会发生在他们身上的事情。 > I finally wrote down my thoughts and I\'m going to share it with you today. 我终于写下了我的想法，今天我将和你分享。 > So we all know that lots of smart and talented people start startups on the left side. 所以我们都知道很多聪明有才华的人都是从左边开始创业的。 > There you see huge numbers of startups getting started. 在这里，你可以看到大量的初创企业正在起步。 > And yet if you look at the other side a few years later there\'s actually only a handful of startups that are big successes. 然而，如果你看另一面，几年后，实际上只有少数几家初创企业取得了巨大的成功。 > What\'s happening in the middle there that\'s causing such failure. 在中间发生了什么，导致了这样的失败。 > It\'s like there\'s a tunnel full of monsters that kill them along the way. 就像在路上有一条满是怪物的隧道一样。 > And I just want to thank Mineau monsters for providing me these fabulous cartoon monsters. 我只想感谢米诺怪物为我提供了这些神奇的卡通怪物。 > So I\'m gonna tell you about these monsters today so you can know how to avoid them in general. 所以我今天要告诉你关于这些怪物的事，这样你就可以知道如何避开它们了。 > Your best weapon against these monsters is determination and even though we usually use one word for it determination is really two separate things. 你对付这些怪物的最好武器是决心，即使我们通常用一个词来形容它，决心实际上是两件事。 > It\'s resilience and drive resilience keeps you from being pushed backwards and drive makes you go forwards. 它的弹性和驾驶弹性，防止你被推后，驱动使你前进。 > One reason you need resilience in a startup is that you\'re going to get rejected a lot. 你在创业中需要弹性的一个原因是你会被很多人拒绝。 > Even the most famous startups had a surprising amount of rejection early on. 即使是最著名的初创公司也在一开始就遭到了令人惊讶的拒绝。 > Everyone you encounter will have doubts about what you are doing whether it\'s investors potential employees reporters your family and friends. 你遇到的每个人都会怀疑你在做什么，不管是投资者、潜在雇员、记者、家人和朋友。 > What you don\'t realize until you start a startup is how much external validation you\'ve gotten for the conservative choices you\'ve made in the past. 除非你创业，否则你不会意识到的是，你在过去所做的保守选择中得到了多少外部验证。 > You go to college and everyone says great you graduate and get a job at Google and everyone says Great. 你上了大学，每个人都说你很棒，你毕业后在谷歌找到了一份工作，每个人都说你很棒。 > Well what do you think happens when you quit your job to start a company to rent out air beds. 那么，当你辞去工作，开始一家公司出租空气床时，你认为会发生什么呢？ > This is air Beinn BS Web site. 这是 AIR Beinn BS 网站。 > When they first launched in 2007. 当他们在 2007 年第一次发射的时候。 > I mean look up there were they explain what they do it says to designers create a new way to connect the idea say conference I\'ve never even heard of that conference. 我的意思是，看看那里，他们解释了他们做了什么，对设计师说，创造一种新的方式来连接这个想法，比如说会议，我从来没有听说过那个会议。 > And over on the left it says Lyster air bed. 左边写着 Lyster 空气床。 > `[00:02:57]` Beds. `[00:02:57]` 床。 > I mean it\'s unbelievable. 我是说这太难以置信了。 > `[00:02:59]` This is not the sort of thing that you get a lot of external validation for. `[00:02:59]` 这不是你得到大量外部验证的那种东西。 > Almost everyone is more impressed when you get a job at Google than if you make a Web site for people to rent out air beds for conferences. 当你在谷歌找到一份工作时，几乎每个人都会给人留下更深刻的印象。 > And yet this is one of the most successful startups. 然而，这是最成功的创业公司之一。 > So even if you\'re Airbnb Inbee you\'re gonna start out looking like an ugly duckling to most people. 所以，即使你是 Airbnb In 蜜蜂，对大多数人来说，你也会看起来像只丑小鸭。 > Here are the Airbnb Inbee founders when they did Y C back in early 2009. 这里是 Airbnb In 蜜蜂的创始人，他们在 2009 年初做 YC 的时候。 > And at this point they\'d already endured tons of rejection. 在这一点上，他们已经忍受了大量的拒绝。 > You should check out Brian\'s talk from the 2010 Startup School it\'s a very inspirational story but by the time they came to us they had maxed out their credit cards. 你应该看看布莱恩在 2010 年创业学校的演讲，这是一个非常鼓舞人心的故事，但当他们来找我们的时候，他们已经用完了他们的信用卡。 > They were eating leftover Captain McCain\'s cereal. 他们在吃麦肯上尉的麦片。 > They were at the end of their rope and everyone thought their idea was crazy. 他们处于困境中，每个人都认为他们的想法是疯狂的。 > And I actually didn't. 其实我没有。 > But they knew they were on to something. 但他们知道他们发现了什么。 > And during Lycee they made some key changes to their site. 在 Lycee 的时候，他们对他们的网站做了一些关键的改动。 > They talk to users. 他们和用户交谈。 > They set their goals and they measured everything and the graph started to go up. 他们设定了他们的目标，他们测量了一切，图表开始上升。 > Remember the new ideas usually seem crazy at first but if you have a good idea and you execute well everyone will see it eventually. 记住，新的想法通常一开始看起来很疯狂，但是如果你有一个好主意，并且执行得很好，每个人最终都会看到它。 > We funded Eric Makowski about two years ago when he was working on impulse the predecessor to the Pebble Watch. 大约两年前，我们资助了埃里克·马科夫斯基(EricMakowski)，当时他是“卵石观察”(PebbleWatch)的前身。 > Eric was a single founder and these watches there have something in common. 埃里克是一个单一的创始人，这些手表有一些共同之处。 > That terrifies investors. 这让投资者感到害怕。 > Their hardware. 他们的硬件。 > Poor Eric had a really hard time getting funding no one wanted to fund the hardware company. 可怜的埃里克很难获得资金，没有人愿意资助这家硬件公司。 > He met with more than like 30 investors who all said things like I love the idea but I can\'t fund a hardware company. 他会见了 30 多名投资者，他们都说我喜欢这个主意，但我不能为一家硬件公司提供资金。 > Some claim they just didn\'t fund hardware companies as a rule. 一些人声称，他们只是不按惯例为硬件公司提供资金。 > Others said that there are too many capital expenses upfront. 另一些人则表示，前期的资本支出太多了。 > They all said no when he showed them the concept but he\'d been building the pebble based on all this user feedback from impulse and he felt strongly that people wanted this product. 当他向他们展示这个概念时，他们都拒绝了，但是他一直在根据用户的这些冲动反馈来建造鹅卵石，他强烈地觉得人们想要这个产品。 > So I remember he talked to Paul and they agreed he should just give up investors and put it on Kickstarter. 所以我记得他和保罗谈过，他们同意他应该放弃投资者，把它放到 Kickstarter 上。 > His original goal was to raise a hundred thousand dollars to make a thousand watches and instead of a hundred thousand dollars pebble raised ten point two million dollars in 30 days the largest amount of money ever on Kickstarter. 他最初的目标是筹集 10 万美元来制作一千块手表，而不是 10 万美元，鹅卵石在 30 天内筹集了 1，020 万美元，这是 Kickstart 有史以来最大的一笔钱。 > Even a Y Combinator got rejected when we first started. 我们刚开始的时候连一个 Y 组合器都被拒绝了。 > This here is our first batch. 这是我们的第一批。 > Sitting at dinner in Cambridge Massachusetts back in 0 5. 坐在马萨诸塞州剑桥的晚餐上。 > Now there are lots of organizations doing what we do. 现在有很多组织在做我们做的事情。 > But trust me when we first started people thought we were crazy or just stupid. 但相信我，当我们刚开始的时候，人们认为我们疯了或者只是愚蠢。 > Even our own lawyers tried to talk us out of it. 甚至连我们自己的律师也试图说服我们放弃。 > But eight teams of founders took a chance on Y Combinator and moved to Cambridge and got their twelve thousand dollars per team. 但是有八个团队的创始人抓住了 YCombinator 的机会，搬到了剑桥，每个团队得到了 1.2 万美元。 > And I think they tell you they had a really great experience. 我想他们告诉你他们有很棒的经历。 > We too knew we were onto something interesting. 我们也知道我们在做一些有趣的事情。 > So we focused on making something that a few people loved and we just expanded slowly from there. 所以我们专注于制作一些人们喜欢的东西，然后我们慢慢地扩展到那里。 > But it was a slow process when we came out to Silicon Valley in the winter of 06. 但是当我们在 06 年冬天来到硅谷的时候，这是一个缓慢的过程。 > We hardly knew anyone so we decided we\'d focus on meeting new investors to convince them to come to demo day. 我们几乎不认识任何人，所以我们决定集中精力与新投资者会面，说服他们来演示一天。 > `[00:06:35]` I got an introduction to theNo.1 angel investor in the valley Ron Conaway and let me show you how he tried different brushes off so we get the introduction. `[00:06:35]` 我得到了第一位天使投资人罗恩·科纳韦的介绍，让我向你们展示他是如何尝试不同的画笔的，所以我们来介绍一下。 > And Ron says is this in Boston. 罗恩说这是在波士顿。 > I stick to local and I said no we\'re in Mountain View and we\'d love to have you come to demo day and he said. 我坚持当地，我说不，我们在山景城，我们希望你来演示一天，他说。 > So is this a chance to invest in your incubator. 所以这是一个投资于你的孵化器的机会。 > And I replied No we\'re not asking you to invest in us. 我回答：不，我们不是要你投资我们。 > We\'re asking you to invest in individual startups and he said. 我们要求你投资于个别初创企业，他说。 > Off to circle back to you. 回到你身边。 > I\'m jammed up. 我被堵住了。 > We\'ve got the jammed up right now from Long car waves so embarrassing. 我们现在被汽车长波堵住了，太让人尴尬了。 > Oh my gosh. 我的天啊。 > But it all worked out in the end. 但最终都成功了。 > Here\'s Ron. 罗恩来了。 > `[00:07:23]` A year later speaking to the winter 07 batch of founders he did wind up coming into demo day and he was impressed with what he saw. `[00:07:23]` 一年后，当他对 07 年冬季的一批创始人讲话时，他终于进入了演示的一天，他对他所看到的印象深刻。 > Remember if you execute well eventually you\'ll win people over. 记住，如果你最终执行得很好，你就会赢得别人的支持。 > And by the way I should also point out that there\'s David Wu Sanco who\'s speaking later today and there\'s Harge to Garh. 顺便说一句，我还应该指出，今天晚些时候有大卫·吴桑科(David Wu Sanco)发言，还有哈吉(Harge To Garh)。 > Is now partner NYC. 现在是纽约的合伙人。 > It was their batch. 是他们的批次。 > Remember there were two components to determination resilience and drive. 记住，决心、弹性和动力有两个要素。 > We\'ve talked about why you need resilience because everyone will be down on you but you need drive to overcome the sheer variety of problems they\'ll face in a startup. 我们已经讨论过为什么你需要弹性，因为每个人都会对你不满，但你需要动力来克服他们在创业中将面临的各种问题。 > Some of them are painfully specific like a lawsuit or a deal blowing up and some are demoralizing only vague like no one\'s visiting your site and you can\'t figure out why there\'s no playbook you can consult when these problems come up. 其中一些是令人痛苦的具体细节，比如诉讼或交易破裂；另一些则是令人沮丧的，就像没有人访问你的网站一样，你无法弄清楚为什么当这些问题出现时，你没有可以参考的剧本。 > You have to improvise and sometimes you have to do things that seem kind of abnormal. 你必须随机应变，有时你不得不做一些看似不正常的事情。 > This is a picture of a job. 这是一张工作的照片。 > Sorry. 抱歉的 > He\'s the founder of ælla cart you Lockheart lets restaurant customers order and pay through a tablet. 他是“手推车”的创始人，洛克哈特公司让餐厅顾客通过平板电脑订购和付款。 > He was a grad student atM.I.T. 他是麻省理工学院的研究生。 > when he started the company and he was so committed that he got a job as a waiter to learn what restaurants were like. 当他创办这家公司时，他非常投入，于是找到了一份服务生的工作，来了解餐馆是什么样的。 > You see that air duct up there over his head that looks like a halo. 你看到他头顶上的风管看起来像个光环。 > This is an example of a good founder. 这是一个很好的创始人的例子。 > Here are the Carlson brothers who founded stripe. 这是创建条纹的卡尔森兄弟。 > Patrick speaking right after me today actually they do payment processing online. 帕特里克今天跟在我后面，实际上他们在网上做支付处理。 > When these guys got started they were a pair of young programmers then no idea how to make deals with banks and credit card companies. 当这些家伙开始的时候，他们是一对年轻的程序员，然后不知道如何与银行和信用卡公司做交易。 > So I asked Patrick how did you even convince these big companies to work with you. 所以我问帕特里克，你是怎么说服这些大公司和你合作的。 > And one Trickey told me that worked was he started with a phone call and then people would pay attention to their arguments without being distracted by their youth. 一位小精灵告诉我，他一开始打电话就成功了，然后人们就会注意到他们的论点，而不会被他们的青春分心。 > And by the time they met in person and the companies could tell how young they are they were already impressed. 当他们面对面见面的时候，公司就可以知道他们有多年轻了，他们已经印象深刻了。 > We funded the Lockard Tron guys back in the summer of 0 9. 我们早在 09 年夏天就资助了洛克德·特龙。 > That\'s them actually at their Y see interview a year afterwards. 这就是他们在 Y-见一年后的采访-的实际情况。 > They were still figuring out their idea. 他们还在想他们的主意。 > They lived with the we pay guys and one day The Weepies were having a party for their investors. 他们和我们付钱的人住在一起，有一天，Weepies 一家为他们的投资者举办了一个聚会。 > And by that point the lock at trons were working on a product to lock your door with the iPhone. 到那时，Trons 的锁正在开发一种产品，可以用 iPhone 锁住你的门。 > They were able to impress one of the investors with their prototype and he asked to have 40 installed at some startup offices he owned. 他们能够用他们的原型给一位投资者留下深刻的印象，他要求在他拥有的一些创业办公室安装 40 台。 > The founders were totally psyched. 创始人们都很兴奋。 > But the commercial locks they needed to use cost five hundred bucks a pop. 但是他们需要使用的商业锁一次要花五百美元。 > They didn\'t have twenty thousand dollars to fulfill that order. 他们没有两万美元来完成那项订单。 > So they went around to local locksmiths and scrapyards buying broken locks for ten bucks apiece. 于是他们到当地的锁匠和废品场去买破锁，每人十块钱。 > They fixed them themselves and were able to deliver on that order. 他们自己修好了，并能够交付这份订单。 > Fast forward a few years later and these guys were ready to launch the newest version of the lock Tron and they decided to go on Kickstarter and guess what. 快进几年后，这些家伙准备推出最新版本的锁 Tron，他们决定去 Kickstarter 和猜猜什么。 > A day after lock Itron submit did their campaign. 一天后，伊特恩提交了他们的战役。 > Kickstarter changed their policy about hardware companies and rejected them. Kickstarter 改变了他们对硬件公司的政策，并拒绝了他们。 > But the lock Itron guys decided to build their own Kickstarter and they did it in less than a week. 但是锁具公司的人决定建造他们自己的 Kickstarter，他们在不到一周的时间里就完成了。 > They wondered if anyone would even come. 他们想知道是否有人会来。 > And not only did people come but they\'ve already sold close to 2 million dollars worth of Lockard trons that way. 而且，不仅人们来了，而且他们已经以这种方式卖出了价值近 200 万美元的洛克德手枪。 > So let me give you just one last example. 让我给你们最后一个例子。 > Whoops. 哇哦。 > There we go. 开始吧。 > Improvising. 即兴发挥。 > These are the justin tv founders when they first got started and they were having a lot of scaling issues and one weekend their whole video system went down. 这些都是贾斯汀电视的创始人，他们刚开始的时候，他们有很多缩放的问题，有一个周末，他们的整个视频系统都崩溃了。 > `[00:11:17]` Kyle was in charge of it but no one knew where Kyle was and Kyle wasn\'t picking up his cell phone. 凯尔负责这件事，但没人知道凯尔在哪里，凯尔也没有拿起他的手机。 > `[00:11:25]` This was like a video so it was pretty critical that this get fixed immediately. `[00:11:25]` 这就像一段视频，所以非常关键的是，这件事必须马上解决。 > So Michael seeable called Kyle\'s friends and found out that he was in Lake Lake Tahoe and got the address. 于是 Michael Seable 打电话给凯尔的朋友，发现他在 Tahoe 湖，并得到了地址。 > So here\'s a problem for you. 所以这对你来说是个问题。 > You know the address of where someone is and he\'s not answering his phone. 你知道某人的地址，他不接电话。 > How do you get a message to him immediately. 你怎么马上给他留言。 > `[00:11:47]` Michael went on to yelp and looked for a pizza place near the house and called them up and said I want to have a pizza delivered but never mind about the pizza. 迈克尔接着叫了起来，在房子附近找了个比萨饼店，打电话给他们，说我要送披萨，但不要管披萨的事。 > Just send the delivery guy over and say these four words. 派送货员过来说这四个字。 > The site is down. 网站已经关闭了。 > So the pizza place was like really confused by this and they send the pizza guy without a pizza. 所以比萨饼店对此感到很困惑，他们送披萨的人没有比萨饼。 > Kyle answers the door to the delivery guys like the site is down. 凯尔给送货员开门，就像网站掉了一样。 > Kyle\'s like. 凯尔就像。 > Oh no. 哦，不 > And he fixed the site. 他修复了网站。 > It was down for less than one hour from start to finish. 从开始到结束都不到一个小时。 > `[00:12:32]` All right. `[00:12:32]` 好的。 > So now we\'re going to move on to another monster co-founder disputes. 因此，现在我们将继续讨论另一个怪物联合创始人争端。 > I think people underestimate how critical founder relationships are to the success of a startup. 我认为人们低估了创始人关系对创业成功的重要性。 > Unfortunately I\'ve seen more founder breakups than I care to even count. 不幸的是，我看到了更多的创始人分手，甚至比我想数的还要多。 > And when it happens it can crush a startup. 当这种情况发生时，它可能会粉碎一家初创公司。 > Be very careful when you decide to start a startup with someone. 当你决定和别人一起创业时，要非常小心。 > Do you know them well. 你了解他们吗。 > Have you worked with them or gone to school with them. 你和他们一起工作过还是和他们一起去过学校。 > Don\'t just slap yourself together with someone just because they\'re available and seem good enough. 不要仅仅因为某人有空而且看起来很好就和他们在一起。 > You\'ll probably regret it. 你可能会后悔的。 > And if you start seeing red flags do something about it don\'t think it\'ll just go away. 如果你开始看到危险信号，不要以为它会消失。 > It\'s a red flag when you find yourself worrying whether your co-founder is trustworthy or whether he or she works hard enough or is competent when founders break up for whatever reason. 当你发现自己在担心你的联合创始人是否值得信任，或者他(她)工作是否足够努力，或者当创始人因任何原因分手时是否胜任，这都是一个危险信号。 > It\'s a blow to the startups productivity and morale. 这对初创企业的生产力和士气都是一个打击。 > If there\'s three and one leaves it\'s not so bad. 如果有三个，一个离开，那就没那么糟了。 > But if there\'s two and one leaves it\'s hard because now you\'re a single founder. 但如果有两个人离开，那就很难了，因为现在你是一个单一的创始人了。 > Now we come to the investor monster. 现在我们来看看投资者怪物。 > Investors tend to have a herd mentality. 投资者往往有从众的心态。 > They like you. 他们喜欢你。 > If other investors like you. 如果其他投资者喜欢你。 > So if no one likes you until others do. 所以如果没有人喜欢你，直到别人喜欢。 > What happens when you talk to the first ones. 当你和第一批人交谈时会发生什么。 > No one likes you. 没人喜欢你。 > It\'s like the catch 22 of not being able to get a job because you don\'t have enough experience. 这就像因为你没有足够的经验而找不到工作的第 22 条。 > You\'re except you\'re really starting off in a hole and you have to work your way out of it. 除了你真的是从一个洞里开始，你必须努力摆脱它。 > You have to meet with lots of investors and hear things like I\'d be interested once you get some more traction or who else is investing. 你必须与许多投资者见面，一旦你获得更多的吸引力，或者是其他人在投资，你就会听到像我这样的事情。 > If you work hard enough you may be able to find a few people who are excited enough about you and the idea to fund you even though you don\'t have other investors yet. 如果你工作得足够努力，你可能会找到一些人，他们对你和为你提供资金的想法非常兴奋，即使你还没有其他投资者。 > Then when you have a few investors you can start to make that herd mentality work for you instead of against you. 然后，当你有几个投资者时，你就可以开始让这种从众心态对你起作用，而不是对你不利。 > Fundraising is hard and slow until it\'s fast and easy. 筹款是艰难而缓慢的，直到它变得又快又容易。 > But working to convince those first few investors can be really demoralizing. 但是，努力说服那些最初的几个投资者确实会让人士气低落。 > It\'s a grind. 这是一场磨难。 > Investors also like to drag their feet left to their own devices. 投资者也喜欢把脚拖到自己的设备上。 > They\'ll just keep delaying there\'s no downside for them to delay whereas delay will kill you because while you\'re fundraising your company will grind to a halt. 他们只会继续拖延，这对他们来说没有坏处，而拖延会让你丧命，因为当你筹集资金的时候，你的公司就会陷入困境。 > And by the way there are some really good investors who aren\'t like this. 顺便说一句，有些真正好的投资者并不是这样的。 > I\'m just talking about the median investor but it blows my mind how many successful startups had a hard time fundraising at first. 我只是在谈论中位投资者，但让我惊讶的是，有多少成功的初创企业一开始很难筹集资金。 > If you remember one piece of advice about investors it\'s that you\'ve got to create some type of competitive situation. 如果你还记得一条关于投资者的建议，那就是你必须创造某种竞争环境。 > I\'ll give you what is always stuck in my mind as the most amazing example of this. 我会给你一个永远萦绕在我脑海中的东西，作为这方面最令人惊奇的例子。 > One of the founders of one of our more successful startups. 我们最成功的创业公司之一的创始人之一。 > Had a longstanding relationship with aV.C. 和 AV.C 有着长期的关系。 > So when the founder started the company and did we see this Fisi kept in touch for three months not really doing anything except kind of keeping a benevolent eye on the founder. 因此，当创始人创办公司时，我们看到菲西保持了三个月的联系，除了对创始人保持一种仁慈的关注之外，什么也没做。 > The Veazey attended Demo Day but didn\'t invest. 维西参加了演示日，但没有投资。 > After a few months the startup gets a term sheet from a procedure Veazey. 几个月后，这家初创公司从一家程序公司获得了一份学期表。 > And for those of you in the audience who don\'t know a term sheet is an offer to invest in your company. 对于那些不知道学期单的听众来说，他们愿意投资于你的公司。 > When the first Veazey heard about this he shifted into panic mode. 当第一个维西听说这件事时，他就进入了恐慌的状态。 > He faxed the founder a term sheet from his firm with the valuation blank and just said in whatever valuation you want and Worryin. 他传真给创始人一份来自他公司的条款单，上面写着“你想要的任何估价”和“烦恼”。 > And there are worse things investors can do than just delay. 而且，投资者还有比拖延更糟糕的事情可以做。 > Sometimes they say yes and then change their mind. 有时他们说是，然后改变主意。 > It\'s not a deal until the money is in the bank. 在钱存到银行之前，这不是交易。 > And we\'ve seen some founders learn that the hard way. 我们看到一些创办人通过艰难的方式学会了这一点。 > I could tell you a lot of horror stories to frighten you. 我可以给你讲很多恐怖故事来吓唬你。 > But just remember that fundraisings a bitch. 但别忘了募捐是个贱人。 > `[00:16:34]` Why see founders raise money under really good circumstances. `[00:16:34]` 为什么看到创始人在非常好的环境下筹集资金。 > And even for them it\'s a bitch. 即使对他们来说也是个婊子。 > `[00:16:42]` Sardis where one of the reasons fundraising can be so damaging to your company is that it\'s a distraction. `[00:16:42]` 萨戴斯，筹款会对你的公司造成很大损害的原因之一就是它分散了你的注意力。 > We warn everyone early on and why see that there\'s no need to be very careful about distractions and no one is stupid enough to play video games all day but the kind of distractions founders fall for are things that seem like a reasonable way to spend their time. 我们很早就警告每个人，为什么我们会发现没有必要对分心非常小心，也没有人会愚蠢到整天玩电子游戏，但创业者喜欢的那种分心行为似乎是一种合理的打发时间的方式。 > We tell people that during Y C there\'s three things that they should be focusing on. 我们告诉人们，在 YC 期间，他们应该关注三件事情。 > Writing code talking to users and exercising and maybe that\'s a little bit extreme but the point is early on. 写代码，和用户交谈，锻炼-也许这有点极端，但问题还在早期。 > Nothing else for your startup matters. 对你的创业来说没什么大不了的了。 > You need to figure out how to make something people want and do it well. 你需要弄清楚如何使人们想要的东西，并把它做好。 > Don\'t spend all your time networking don\'t hire an army of interns just build stuff and talk to users. 不要把你所有的时间都花在人际关系上，不要雇佣一支实习生大军，只需要制作东西和用户交谈。 > And by the way fundraising is a distraction but it\'s a necessary ones. 顺便说一句，筹款是分散注意力的，但这是必要的。 > Just try to spend as little time on it as possible. 尽量少花点时间在上面。 > One thing that isn\'t necessary and is a bad distraction is talking to corporate development people or corp dev. 有一件事是不必要的，也是一件令人分心的事情，那就是与公司开发人员或公司开发人员交谈。 > These are people at big companies who buy startups so you get a call from a corp dev person and they want to learn more about what you\'re doing and explore possible ways of working together. 这些人都是大公司的人，他们会买下创业公司，这样你就会接到一个公司开发人员的电话，他们想了解更多关于你们正在做什么的事情，并探索可能的合作方式。 > The founders thanks. 创始人谢谢。 > Oh boy. 哦天啊。 > This important company wants to work with me. 这家重要的公司想和我合作。 > I should at least take the meeting and I hate to sound harsh but what these meetings are really for is a way for them to see if they want to do anH.R. 我至少应该参加这次会议，我讨厌听起来很刺耳，但这些会议的真正目的是让他们看看他们是否想做 H.R。 > acquisition. 购置。 > And anH.R. 和 H.R。 > acquisition means they\'re essentially trying to hire you. 收购意味着他们实际上是想雇佣你。 > And there\'s such a dangerous distraction that I\'ve given them their own little monster. 还有一个危险的分心，我给他们自己的小怪物。 > There\'s nothing wrong withH.R. H.R 没什么问题。 > acquisitions if that\'s what you want to do. 如果这是你想做的话。 > But most founders don\'t start startups just to get a job at a big company for what essentially is a nice hiring bonus. 但大多数创始人并不是仅仅为了在一家大公司找到一份工作而创办初创企业，这实际上是一笔不错的招聘奖金。 > Talking to corp people early on isn\'t just a waste of time. 早早与公司员工交谈并不是浪费时间。 > It\'s uniquely demoralizing. 这是唯一令人沮丧的。 > And I see the cycle happen over and over. 我看到循环一次又一次地发生。 > The founders go to meet with the corp dev people and think the meeting was great. 创办人去见公司的开发人员，认为会议很棒。 > They\'re so friendly and enthusiastic and the founders delude themselves into thinking that their startup is going to be the one that gets bought for ten million dollars after only five months they start to think OK yeah we\'d kind of like to get acquired and they start to not work on their startup anymore and they lose momentum then they get the offer and it\'s essentially what they would have gotten if they\'d walked in off the street and gotten a job. 他们是如此友好和热情，创始人们自欺欺人，以为他们的创业公司在短短 5 个月后就会以 1000 万美元被收购，他们开始认为好吧，是的，我们有点想被收购，他们开始不再为他们的初创公司工作，他们失去了动力，然后他们得到了这个机会，这基本上就是他们想要的。如果他们从街上走进来找工作的话。 > But by then they\'ve gotten so accustomed to the idea of selling that they take it. 但到那时，他们已经习惯了销售的想法，于是就接受了。 > So going down the corpse Evros seriously can deflate your ambitions. 所以把尸体放下来会让你的野心灰飞烟灭。 > OK now we come to the fiercest monster of all the difficulty of making something people want. 好了，现在我们来到了最凶猛的怪物，所有的困难，使一些人想要的东西。 > It\'s so hard that most startups aren\'t able to do it. 这太难了，以至于大多数初创公司都做不到。 > You\'re trying to figure out something that\'s never been done before. 你想找出以前从未做过的事。 > Not making something people want is the biggest cause of failure we see early on with the second biggest being found or disputes in order to make something people want. 不制造人们想要的东西是我们早期看到的最大的失败原因，我们发现了第二大原因，或者是为了让人们想要的东西而发生争执。 > Being brilliant and determined is not enough. 有才华和决心是不够的。 > You have to be able to talk to our users and adjust your idea accordingly. 你必须能够与我们的用户交谈，并相应地调整你的想法。 > Ordinarily you have to change your idea quite a lot even if you start out with a reasonably good one. 通常情况下，你必须改变你的想法，即使你从一个相当好的开始。 > Remember this Web site Air Bed and Breakfast was a rather narrower idea when they first launched. 记住，这个网站“空气床”和“早餐”在他们第一次推出的时候是一个比较狭窄的想法。 > They started out as a site that let people rent out air beds to travellers for conferences. 他们最初是一个网站，让人们把空气床租给旅行者参加会议。 > Then they changed to renting out air beds. 然后他们又换了个空床出租。 > Then they changed to renting out a room or a couch. 然后他们换了一个房间或沙发。 > But the host had to be there to make breakfast. 但是主人必须在那里做早餐。 > Then they finally realized that there was all this pent up demand to rent out entire places. 然后，他们终于意识到，所有这些压抑的需求出租整个地方。 > This evolution shows that you may begin with kind of a general vision of what your startup is doing but you often have to try several different approaches to get it right. 这一演变表明，你可能从一种对你的创业所做的事情的总体设想开始，但你经常需要尝试几种不同的方法才能使之正确。 > And sometimes you have to totally change your idea or order head which lets you order takeout on your cell phone was the founders 6th idea. 有时候，你必须完全改变你的想法或订单头，让你在手机上订购外卖，这是创始人的第六个想法。 > We funded them for the first thing I think they presented on demo day with the third and it wasn\'t until order ahead that they hit on their big idea. 我们资助了他们的第一件事，我认为他们展示了第三天的演示，直到订单提前，他们才想到了他们的伟大想法。 > Even if you don\'t need to change the overall idea much you still tend to have to do lots of refinement and one of the best examples of this is Dropbox. 即使你不需要改变总体观念，你仍然需要做很多改进，其中一个最好的例子就是 Dropbox。 > Here\'s a photo of Drew Housden during Lycee in the summer of 0 7. 这是 07 年夏天莱西的德鲁？豪斯顿的照片。 > He had a rash were working on something that was obviously necessary but the reason it was hard to predict early on whether they\'d succeed is that there were lots of people doing this. 他的皮疹正在做一些显然是必要的事情，但很难预测他们是否会成功的原因是有很多人这么做。 > The way to win in this world was to execute well and it didn\'t happen overnight. 在这个世界上获胜的方法是执行好，而这不是一夜之间发生的。 > They had to get 1001 details right. 他们必须得到 1001 个细节正确。 > There were a lot of unglamorous schleps between that photograph and this one. 那张照片和这张照片之间有很多平淡无奇的杂乱无章的地方。 > Looks good between starting the company and being on the cover of Forbes. 在创办公司和登上“福布斯”封面之间看上去不错。 > You\'re going to have some dramatic ups and downs in a startup. 你将在一家初创公司中经历一些戏剧性的起起落落。 > You don\'t have the damping that you\'d have as part of a larger organization circumstances just kind of fooling you about the process is often described as a rollercoaster because your up one minute and down the next. 在更大的组织环境中，你没有足够的阻尼，只是在某种程度上愚弄你的过程，通常被描述为过山车，因为你一分钟上一分钟，下一分钟下来。 > Lots of rollercoaster stories that I know involve fundraising. 很多我知道的过山车故事都和筹款有关。 > And one of the most extreme ones happened to some people we funded in their previous startup. 其中最极端的一件事发生在我们在上一次创业时资助的一些人身上。 > It was based in Houston and they got a term sheet from a top tier Risi in Silicon Valley and one of the conditions was that they base their company in the valley. 该公司总部设在休斯顿，他们从硅谷的一家顶级企业 Risi 那里得到了一份学期表，条件之一是他们将公司设在硅谷。 > So they said fine. 所以他们说没问题。 > They sold their houses. 他们卖掉了房子。 > They they moved their families into corporate housing in Houston until they found places in the valley. 他们把家人搬到休斯敦的公寓楼里，直到他们在山谷里找到了住处。 > The documents were already signed and the money was scheduled to be wired on Friday and they were going to start working on Monday. 这些文件已经签署，这笔钱预定在周五电汇，他们将在周一开始工作。 > Out of the VCR is office. 录像机外面是办公室。 > So Friday comes around and for some reason the money was not wired. 所以星期五来了，由于某种原因，钱没有汇过来。 > So they call the you to ask if they should still come out and the like. 所以他们打电话给你，问他们是否还应该出来等等。 > Absolutely. 绝对一点儿没错 > So they get into their minivan and they drive from Houston to Silicon Valley and they stop in Vegas to celebrate. 于是他们上了自己的小货车，从休斯顿开车到硅谷，然后在拉斯维加斯停下来庆祝。 > This is the part of the rollercoaster. 这是过山车的一部分。 > So on my. 所以我的。 > They set up all their stuff in the conference room with a refund all six of their team there and by that Wednesday the money was still not wired so they had a board meeting planned for that day and they decide to invite theV.C. 他们把所有的东西都安排在会议室里，他们的六个团队都得到了退款。到了那个星期三，这笔钱还没有汇入，所以他们计划在那一天召开董事会会议，并决定邀请 V.C。 > And in this meeting the CEO talked about how sign up numbers had gone down temporarily because they had changed the way they measured them. 在这次会议上，这位首席执行官谈到了注册人数是如何暂时下降的，因为他们改变了测量数据的方式。 > I think you know how this story story\'s going to turn out theV.C. 我想你知道这个故事的结局。 > had actually gotten buyer\'s remorse and he used this as an excuse to break the deal. 实际上，他得到了买家的悔恨，并以此为借口破坏了这笔交易。 > Remember they had signed all the documents sold their homes moved to Silicon Valley and were just waiting to get the 7 million dollars wired to them. 还记得他们签了所有的文件，卖了房子，搬到了硅谷，只是在等着把 700 万美元汇给他们。 > And instead theV.C. 取而代之的是 V.C。 > bales he kicks them out of their conference room. 他把他们踢出会议室。 > The founders had to call their wives back in Houston and go back with their tails between their legs and they had to lay everyone off. 创始人们不得不把妻子们叫回休斯敦，两腿夹着尾巴回去，他们不得不解雇所有人。 > Can you imagine just a few days before they were celebrating in Vegas and now they have nothing incidentally to get to a story this extreme we had. 你能想象几天前，他们在拉斯维加斯庆祝，现在他们没有任何附带的事情，我们有这么极端的故事。 > Here\'s an example of a startup we didn\'t fund because I don\'t think a would probably do this to a startup. 这里是一个我们没有资助的初创公司的例子，因为我不认为一个人可能会这样对待一家初创公司。 > We funded. 我们资助了。 > Now let me just tell you about the other half of the rollercoaster. 现在让我告诉你过山车的另一半。 > We funded the code Kaddoumi team in the summer of 2011. 我们在 2011 年夏天资助了代码 Kaddoumi 团队。 > Their original idea didn\'t work and they kept exploring new ones. 他们原来的想法行不通，他们一直在探索新的想法。 > It wasn\'t until late July that they started working on their idea for teaching people to code online. 直到 7 月底，他们才开始研究教人们在线编码的想法。 > They launched just three days before Demo Day and in those three days they got over 200000 users. 他们在演示日前三天发布，在这三天里，他们获得了超过 200000 的用户。 > I mean they only launched so they could get up on demo day and say that they were a launch company that Zach Sims they\'re presenting on demo day. 我的意思是，他们只是为了能在演示日站起来，说他们是 ZachSims 在演示日展示的一家发射公司。 > They never expected that in just three days they could go from a startup with a non launched idea and get up on stage and announce they had 200000 users which is just about the most exciting thing you can say to investors. 他们从未料到，在短短三天内，他们就能从一家没有推出创意的初创公司走出来，站起来，宣布拥有 200000 用户，这是你能对投资者说的最令人兴奋的事情了。 > The theme here is how extreme things can be. 这里的主题是什么是极端的东西。 > Just remember that no extreme ever lasts. 记住，没有任何极端会持续下去。 > Don\'t let yourself get immobilized by sadness when things go wrong. 当事情出错时，不要让自己被悲伤所束缚。 > Just keep putting one foot in front of the other and know it will get better but don\'t get complacent when things are going well. 只要把一只脚放在另一只脚前面，并知道它会变得更好，但当事情进展顺利时，不要自满。 > In reality things are never as bad or as good as they seem. 实际上，事情从来没有看上去那么糟糕或那么好。 > And by the way what makes this rollercoaster even worse is that while you\'re on it there\'s this huge audience watching everything you do. 顺便说一句，让这场过山车变得更糟的是，当你在过山车上的时候，有大量的观众在观看你所做的每一件事。 > You\'ll have trolls and reporters say outrageous things about you online so be ready for that and have a thick skin so everyone knows it. 你会有巨魔，而记者们会在网上说一些关于你的骇人听闻的事情，所以要做好准备，拥有厚厚的皮肤，让每个人都知道这一点。 > Startups are hard. 创业很难。 > Yet when we watch people do them they\'re always surprised. 然而，当我们看到人们这样做的时候，他们总是感到惊讶。 > The reason they\'re surprised is that they don\'t realize how bad these specific problems can be. 他们之所以感到惊讶，是因为他们没有意识到这些具体的问题会有多严重。 > I\'ve seen some very smart and talented people get so demoralized that they just gave up. 我见过一些非常聪明和有才华的人变得如此沮丧，以至于他们放弃了。 > Startups are not for the faint of heart. 创业并不适合那些胆小的人。 > And I realize that this is not new news but I wanted you to at least understand how their hard early on so that when you run into these specific monsters you\'ll know what to do. 我意识到这不是什么新消息，但我想让你至少明白他们的努力是多么的艰难，这样当你遇到这些特定的怪物时，你就会知道该怎么做了。 > Thank you. 谢谢。