# Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
> `[00:00:05]` Welcome back. So it\'s. An amazing morning and one of the questions I get asked a lot is how can we fund both a 10 minute meal kits and quantum computers at the same time in the secret our secret is that we we have a simple focus which is that we fund great founders. And that\'s why I\'m excited to bring out the founders of app Deko Rahamim and column and they went through Y Combinator the winter 2014 batch. About two and a half years ago they never got a lot of hype or. You know investors dumping mountains of money on them. But what they did do is month after month they keep iterating. They stayed scrappy and they\'re building a great business and in a difficult market where a lot of other companies who did raise a lot of money burn through that money and went out of business. But meanwhile they built an actual profitable business like the kind where every month they have more money in the bank account than they did the month before. So I\'m excited to bring out the founders of apt.
`[00:00:05]` 欢迎回来。所以.这是一个令人惊奇的早晨,也是我经常被问到的问题之一,那就是我们如何同时为 10 分钟的餐盒和量子计算机提供资金,而秘密是我们有一个简单的焦点,那就是我们为伟大的创始人提供资金。这就是为什么我很兴奋地推出了应用程序 DekoRahamim 和专栏的创始人,他们在 2014 年冬季完成了 YCombinator。大约两年半前,他们从来没有得到过大量的炒作。你知道投资者把大把的钱投在他们身上。但他们所做的是一个月又一个月地不断迭代。他们保持着斗志昂扬,他们正在建立一个伟大的企业,在一个困难的市场中,许多其他公司确实筹集了大量资金,烧毁了这笔钱,然后破产了。但与此同时,他们建立了一项真正有利可图的业务,比如他们每个月在银行账户中拥有的资金都比前一个月更多。所以我很兴奋能把 APT 的创办人带出来。
> `[00:01:20]` Thank you.
`[00:01:20]` 谢谢。
> `[00:01:30]` Good afternoon everybody. How are you doing. 大家下午好。你好吗
`[00:01:35]` I\'m on energy. My name is Carlo. This is my co-founder Rahamim.
> `[00:01:35]` 我是能源公司,我叫卡洛,这是我的联合创始人拉哈米姆。
`[00:01:42]` And asP.B. mentioned we are the founders of apartment Decco apartment Decco is a marketplace for buying and selling furniture. And you may not heard us heard of us before because we are currently operating in New York City in WashingtonD.C. We have a team of people would shout out. We have a team of 50 employees. We\'re going to be expanding to Philadelphia Baltimore Boston in the next few months. And as we mentioned one thing that we\'re really proud of is that we are profitable and that is something that we want to talk with you guys about today. We have kind of some things up in a car park. Clause there\'s this concept of building a real business an idea which means that if a business is profitable it makes money and that can surprisingly get lost in this Silicon ValleyV.S. world.
> `[00:01:42]` 正如 P.B.提到的,我们是 DECCO 公寓的创始人,DECCO 是一个买卖家具的市场。你以前可能没听说过我们,因为我们目前在华盛顿特区的纽约市工作,我们有一队人会大声喊出来。我们有一个 50 名员工的团队。我们将在未来几个月内扩展到费城、巴尔的摩、波士顿。正如我们提到的,我们非常自豪的是,我们是有利可图的,这是我们今天想和你们谈谈的事情。我们在停车场里有一些东西。这里有一个关于建立一个真正的企业的概念,这意味着如果一个企业是有利可图的,那么它就能赚钱,而在这个硅谷的世界里,这个想法可能会令人惊讶地迷失了方向。
`[00:02:50]` And we\'ve launched this company in winter 2014 and we\'ve had a lot of ups and downs. A lot of roller coasters in order to get to this point.
> `[00:02:50]` 我们在 2014 年冬天成立了这家公司,我们经历了很多起起落落。为了达到这个目的,我们坐了很多过山车。
`[00:02:59]` And what we want to do is share some real actual stories of the trials and tribulations of what it\'s taken in order for us to be able to get here. And we\'re really excited to do that with you guys today.
> `[00:02:59]` 我们想要做的是分享一些真实的故事,讲述为了让我们能够来到这里而经历的考验和磨难。今天,我们真的很高兴和你们一起这样做。
`[00:03:13]` So first things first let\'s get from zero to one. Many of you I\'m assuming you\'re probably looking to start a company and the idea of getting from no customers to getting that first customer.
> `[00:03:13]` 所以第一件事首先让我们从零到一。我假设你们中的许多人可能想要创办一家公司,并想从没有客户到得到第一个客户的想法。
`[00:03:29]` It\'s not so easy. That\'s me.
> `[00:03:29]` 这不是一件容易的事,那是我。
`[00:03:33]` And before starting apartment Decco I worked for L\'Oreal. I was a vice president of marketing. I had a group of a large number of employees and I was very familiar or comfortable with taking a large business and keeping that growing and keeping that sustainable.
> `[00:03:33]` 在开始公寓之前,我在欧莱雅公司工作。我是一名营销副总裁。我有一大群员工,我非常熟悉或习惯于经营一家大型企业,并保持这种业务的增长和可持续发展。
`[00:03:49]` Same for me. I also came from a corporate background I worked at Goldman Sachs for six years before leaving and go to business school. I was an engineer and ran a team of engineers before leaving Goldman. So we both have this in common where we know how to get something not from zero to one but from maybe a thousand to 2000 not from 0 1 so that\'s what\'s great about Lycee right.
> `[00:03:49]` 我也一样。我还来自高盛(GoldmanSachs)的企业背景,在离开并进入商学院之前,我曾在高盛工作过六年。在离开高盛之前,我是一名工程师,管理着一支工程师团队。所以我们都有一个共同点,那就是我们知道如何从 0 到 1 得到一些东西,但可能从 1 到 2000,而不是从 0 1,所以这就是莱西最棒的地方。
`[00:04:15]` So this is a completely different beast and a completely different animal and I honestly thought that you know I can apply these practices and that was was not true.
> `[00:04:15]` 这是一种完全不同的野兽和完全不同的动物,我真诚地认为,你知道我可以应用这些练习,但那不是真的。
`[00:04:25]` So when I got to why we had to take a lot of a lot Lycee CW by the way before it\'s put me on blast.
> `[00:04:25]` 所以,当我明白为什么我们必须采取大量的莱切 CW,顺便说一句,在它使我爆炸。
`[00:04:34]` Laughter Yeah.
> `[00:04:34]` 笑声是的。
`[00:04:36]` It\'s true a little ashamed to admit it now but when we started at Decco as a concept then I didn\'t even know why he was and we are really grateful to have an opportunity to work with them because it is what catapulted us and helped us to get from that zero to one.
> `[00:04:36]` 承认这一点确实有点惭愧,但当我们作为一个概念从 Decco 开始的时候,我甚至不知道他为什么会这样,我们真的很感激有机会和他们合作,因为这就是我们从零到一的原因。
`[00:04:53]` So the way this works is we would sit down with our partner that we work. Who was Kevin Hale. And I\'ll never forget this one of the first meetings that we had. He\'s sitting down and he\'s looking at our Web site is looking at our catalog and he\'s kind of looking through the listings that\'s on our Web site and he asks How are you guys going to listings today.
> `[00:04:53]` 这样的工作方式是,我们可以和我们的伙伴坐下来一起工作。凯文·黑尔。我永远不会忘记这是我们开的第一次会议。他坐下来看我们的网站,看我们的目录,他在浏览我们网站上的列表,他问你们今天的名单如何?。
`[00:05:14]` And we say well we email people on craigslist and we say hey listen apartment Decco because we take care of delivery.
> `[00:05:14]` 我们在 Craigslist 上给人们发电子邮件,我们说嘿,听着,DECCO 公寓,因为我们负责送货。
`[00:05:20]` We do X Y and Zeme by readers like me mostly trolling Craigslist like emailing people.
> `[00:05:20]` 我们做 XY 和泽米,读者喜欢我,主要是在 Craigslist 上乱逛,就像给人发电子邮件。
`[00:05:27]` Very very hackey.
> `[00:05:27]` 非常精彩。
`[00:05:30]` And so he\'s like okay so out of 100 people that you e-mail how many actually list maybe 10. And so he\'s like well what about the other 90.
> `[00:05:30]` 所以他很好,所以在 100 个人中,你可以用电子邮件发送多少人实际上列出了 10 人,而另外的 90 人呢?
`[00:05:44]` We don\'t know 90. And so he\'s like you need to list it for them. And I remember looking at Rahamim and I\'m like like unbeknownst to them like without like found commissionaire at all.
> `[00:05:44]` 我们不知道 90。所以他就像你需要为他们列出。我记得我看着拉哈米姆,他们对我一无所知,就像根本没有找到专员一样。
`[00:06:00]` And so he\'s like yeah he\'s like listen you\'re doing them a favor and you listen for them. And if it sells that means they\'re getting what they want they sell their item.
> `[00:06:00]` 所以他就像听我说,你在帮他们的忙,你听他们的。如果那意味着他们得到了他们想要的东西,他们就会卖掉他们的物品。
`[00:06:09]` Well OK. All right. So there we go we start listing our items listening credulous items on our site unbeknownst to the sellers and boom we start getting a transaction immediately.
> `[00:06:09]` 好吧。好的因此,我们开始列出我们的项目,在我们的网站上听取轻信的项目,不知情的卖家和繁荣,我们开始得到一笔交易立即。
`[00:06:25]` So yes. So you know we\'re high five. And then we\'re like laughter Oh shit like we have I\'m a buyer.
> `[00:06:25]` 所以是的。所以你知道我们是击掌的。然后我们就像笑声,哦,妈的,就像我们一样,我是个买家。
`[00:06:34]` How are we actually going to get this item from this person. That doesn\'t even know that it\'s on the furniture.
> `[00:06:34]` 我们怎么才能从这个人那里得到这个东西呢?那甚至不知道它在家具上。
`[00:06:40]` So it\'s yes you have to physically move it right.
> `[00:06:40]` 是的,你必须把它移到正确的位置。
`[00:06:44]` So we\'re sitting in the community area. That\'s not us.
> `[00:06:44]` 所以我们坐在社区里,那不是我们。
`[00:06:48]` But that was what we were rather large.
> `[00:06:48]` 但那是我们相当大的地方。
`[00:06:54]` But you know you get you get the you go. You get what I\'m saying. Like hardly thinking.
> `[00:06:54]` 但是你知道你得到了你该走的。你明白我的意思。就像几乎不思考。
`[00:06:59]` So we\'re there we\'re like how the hell are we going to get this item. I\'m like you know what let\'s email them and say hey I\'m the founder of Art Deco we drive and we sold it for you on our site.
> `[00:06:59]` 所以我们在那里
`[00:07:12]` Remember this is Craigslist was nine out of ten e-mails people get our spam and people are trying to you know get money wired to Nigeria. So.
> `[00:07:12]` 记住,这是 Craigslist,是十分之九的电子邮件,人们收到了我们的垃圾邮件,人们正试图把钱汇到尼日利亚。所以
`[00:07:22]` So we\'ve seen these nicely drafted letter head type e-mails and we got no responses back and so we\'re like now we have not one cell we have transactions that have come in like how the hell we\'re going to fulfill these orders. And so we\'re sitting there. My face is in my hands and I\'m like you know like let\'s just get cash and just pick it up and buy it ourselves.
> `[00:07:22]` 所以我们看到了这些起草得很好的信头式电子邮件,但我们没有回复,所以我们现在没有一个手机,我们没有一个交易,就像我们将如何履行这些命令一样。所以我们坐在那里。我的脸在我的手中,我就像你知道的,让我们去拿现金,然后自己拿起来,然后自己买就行了。
`[00:07:48]` And that\'s exactly what we did. So we have this bag of cash and we\'re going around New York City counting nightwear and we walk in.
> `[00:07:48]` 而这正是我们所做的。所以我们有一袋现金,我们要在纽约市到处数睡衣,然后我们走进来。
`[00:07:57]` We meet the seller and we\'re like here\'s your 5000 jobs for your couch. Someone will be on Tuesday to pick it up. And the response was just shock in delight from these sellers. And they just couldn\'t believe that we were just going to leave this 500 dollars and come back later and pick it up and we said oh by the way you know it if we selling other items you should actually sit on the side of Herman Decco. This hack is what got our business off the ground and to got us from zero to 1 This by the way.
> `[00:07:57]` 我们遇见了卖家,我们就像你的沙发上有 5000 份工作一样。周二会有人来接电话。他们的反应只是来自这些卖家的欣喜。他们只是不相信我们会留下这 500 美元,然后回来拿起来,我们说,哦,顺便说一句,如果我们卖别的东西,你应该坐在赫尔曼·德科的一边。这次黑客攻击使我们的业务起步,并使我们从零到 1,顺便说一句。
`[00:08:31]` This is a shocking approach. We tried a lot of different things.
> `[00:08:31]` 这是一种令人震惊的做法。我们尝试了很多不同的东西。
`[00:08:34]` Rain
> `[00:08:34]` 雨
`[00:08:34]` did not work. But this was the first thing that really got the business catapult it allowed us for us to get significant listening and to get it get the business to where it needed to be. Another thing was that we were able to get insights into our customers that we never would have had before.
> `[00:08:34]` 没有用。但这是第一件真正得到商业弹射器的事情,它让我们得到了重要的倾听,并使我们的业务达到了应有的水平。另一件事是,我们能够洞察我们的客户,这是我们以前从未拥有过的。
`[00:08:52]` So remember we\'re going to every sellers home paying them in cash going all over New York City all day long.
> `[00:08:52]` 所以请记住,我们要去每个卖家的家里,用现金支付他们,整天在整个纽约市。
`[00:08:58]` So we\'re again getting to know these customers on a very intimate level where they live their economic status. Many times they were making room for a baby. And all these things that we never would have known unless we figure it out and had a scrappy way in order to understand these customers.
> `[00:08:58]` 所以,我们再次认识了这些顾客,他们的经济状况非常亲密。很多时候,他们都在为一个婴儿腾出空间。所有这些事情,我们都不会知道,除非我们想出办法,用一种好斗的方式去理解这些顾客。
`[00:09:18]` So what would you say are the key lessons or takeaways.
> `[00:09:18]` 那么,你会说什么是关键的课程或外教呢?
`[00:09:22]` So this is our story right. This is something that we did that was a little bit out of the ordinary for us. And that made us uncomfortable but I think that that\'s the exact key takeaway is that when you\'re starting a business. First of all let\'s just scrap the advertising on Facebook and advertising on Twitter or wherever and you really need to find those scrappy free ways in order to see if your product is something that customers are responding to because it is also an opportunity for you to meet your customers and really learn what despotically to look like. Exactly. So it\'s also looking to is really just having the ability to humble yourself. For us this was. Again is coming from our backgrounds was really quite frankly very uncomfortable and you know we\'re in the street passing out flyers and run around town in a cast that just seems so ghetto.
> `[00:09:22]` 这就是我们的故事。这是我们所做的事情,对我们来说有点不寻常。这让我们感到不舒服,但我认为这才是真正的关键,那就是你创业的时候。首先,让我们放弃 Facebook 上的广告和 Twitter 上的广告,或者其他地方的广告,你真的需要找到那些乱七八糟的免费方式,看看你的产品是否是客户响应的东西,因为这也是一个机会,让你与客户见面,真正了解自己的样子。一点儿没错所以它也希望真正有能力使自己谦卑。对我们来说这是。再说一次,来自我们的背景实在是很不舒服,你知道,我们在街上分发传单,在城里跑来跑去,就像在一个犹太人聚居区一样。
`[00:10:14]` But that doesn\'t mean he does not pass out on the street. Was mostly me again.
> `[00:10:14]` 但这并不意味着他不会在街上昏倒,主要是我。
`[00:10:21]` Laughter.
> `[00:10:21]` 笑声。
`[00:10:28]` But you know these are the things that we did that really helped helped us to get from that zero to one.
> `[00:10:28]` 但是你知道,这些都是我们所做的,真正帮助我们从零到一。
`[00:10:36]` The second thing we wanted to talk to you guys about was the idea of don\'t get married to a certain parts of some of you or maybe most of you are thinking of starting a business working on a business. Have an idea that you know that you\'re thinking of working on and you might have this vision of what it needs to look like and just don\'t focus on what this grand vision is because you never know what is actually going to end up looking like. So when we first started the company our idea was hey we are just going to be a platform we are not gonna touch this furniture we are going to be the facilitator we want to be like an urban bee or an Uber. Morrison neonate touching furniture was not part of our equation so we built our platform with the idea that we\'ll plug into third party moving companies around New York City. So we worked with a lot of different companies and we would plug into their excess capacity. So whatever they had enough space they would plug in and we would use them for to fulfill orders. It worked for them probably late one point five seconds. And quickly after that we realized that they wanted their prices to continue to go up and we need to maintain our prices low. The other thing is we were just not a priority for them at all. So our quality of service continued to go down and until we had to make some quick changes. Actually there was like one Saturday where the moving company was like Listen we\'re too busy you\'re discovering all these jobs you\'re just going to cancel them last minute. And so we scrambled posted an ad on Craigslist again for a different section this time and looked for two guys to hire. Got us a van and we went and did the deliveries ourselves. It was phenomenal. So we actually had maybe three or four different customers call us that day for the first time ever just because they felt like this was the most amazing moving experience they\'ve ever had. And it was supposed to have been a light bulb moment because it\'s the first time that customers just wanted to give us feedback and comment on the incredible experience that they were getting.
> `[00:10:36]` 我们想和你们谈的第二件事是不要和你们中的某些人结婚,或者你们中的大多数人都在考虑创业。有一个你知道你在考虑去做的想法,你可能对它需要什么样子有一个愿景,只是不要关注这个宏伟的愿景是什么,因为你永远不知道最终会是什么样子。所以,当我们第一次创立公司的时候,我们的想法是,嘿,我们只是要成为一个平台,我们不会碰这个家具,我们要成为促进者,我们想成为一个城市蜜蜂或优步(Uber)。莫里森的新生儿触摸家具不是我们的等式的一部分,所以我们建立了我们的平台,我们的想法是,我们将插入第三方移动公司在纽约市周围。因此,我们与许多不同的公司合作,我们将填补他们的过剩产能。所以,不管他们有足够的空间,他们都会插进去,我们会用它们来完成订单。对他们来说可能晚了 1.5 秒。在那之后,我们很快意识到他们希望他们的价格继续上涨,我们需要保持低价格。另一件事是,我们根本就不是他们的首要任务。因此,我们的服务质量继续下降,直到我们不得不做出一些快速的改变。事实上,有一个星期六,搬家的公司好像在听我说,我们太忙了,你发现了所有的工作,你只能在最后一分钟取消这些工作。于是,我们又在 Craigslist 上发布了一则广告,希望这一次能有一个不同的版面,并寻找两个人来招聘。给我们买了辆货车我们自己去送货。太惊人了。事实上,那天我们可能有三四个不同的客户给我们打电话,仅仅是因为他们觉得这是他们经历过的最令人惊奇的感人体验。这应该是一个灯泡时刻,因为这是顾客第一次只想给我们反馈和评论他们获得的难以置信的体验。
`[00:13:00]` So just take us back.
> `[00:13:00]` 那就带我们回去吧。
`[00:13:01]` So we\'ve been doing deliveries eight nine months we had never we had never had one call from customers saying Oh I love the delivery.
> `[00:13:01]` 所以我们已经送货八个月了,我们从来没有接到顾客的电话,说我喜欢送货。
`[00:13:10]` Never ever. And then one day we had three to four. So I was like you know what let\'s just get a van and let\'s just do it ourselves.
> `[00:13:10]` 永远不要。然后有一天我们有三到四人。所以我就像你知道什么让我们只需要一辆面包车,让我们自己去做。
`[00:13:17]` And I was like No no overhead remember we need to be like Uber. We want to be a platform we don\'t want to touch anything ourselves. No physical products.
> `[00:13:17]` 我好像没有任何开销,记住,我们需要像优步那样。我们想成为一个平台,我们自己不想碰任何东西,没有实物产品。
`[00:13:26]` So we as co-founder as we well know we had different opinions and so so we met in the middle. So then the next idea was why don\'t we get man in the van type of folks so people who own their own trucks but they don\'t work for a moving company.
> `[00:13:26]` 所以我们共同创办人,因为我们知道我们有不同的意见,所以我们在中间相遇。所以接下来的想法是,为什么我们不让人在货车类型的人,这样的人谁拥有自己的卡车,但他们不工作的移动公司。
`[00:13:45]` It sounded great like they were cracking this is awesome. So that did not work at all because that\'s what we ended up.
> `[00:13:45]` 听起来很棒,好像他们在破解,这太棒了。所以这根本不起作用,因为这就是我们最终的结果。
`[00:13:59]` I wish I was kidding but I\'m not. This is a real truck that delivered our furniture in New York City. It. Is actually a photo that a customer centers. She loved our product and she loved what we\'re doing. She\'s like you guys this is just not a true representation of your brand.
> `[00:13:59]` 我真希望我在开玩笑,但我不是。这是一辆真正的卡车,在纽约市运送我们的家具。它实际上是一张顾客中心的照片。她喜欢我们的产品,她喜欢我们正在做的事情。她和你们一样,这不是你品牌的真正代表。
`[00:14:18]` We decided we\'d be a little more polished and you know our neighbors are getting scared.
> `[00:14:18]` 我们决定我们会更优雅一点,你知道我们的邻居们都很害怕。
`[00:14:25]` Anyway so so the quality was again not their brand recognition and focusing on that was not there. So you know we were fighting this idea of like hey we need to do is platform we need to be you know we don\'t want to touch furniture and we were really really fighting this and married to this idea for so long.
> `[00:14:25]` 所以质量再一次不是他们的品牌认知度,而专注于这一点是不存在的。所以你知道,我们在和这个想法作斗争,比如,我们需要做的是平台,我们需要成为,你知道,我们不想碰家具,我们真的和这个想法斗争了很长时间。
`[00:14:49]` But you know months before that we already knew that customers wanted us to deliver ourselves because we saw it happen and it worked really really well. So finally we landed on having our own trucks having our own deliver folks. And that\'s when everything changed.
> `[00:14:49]` 但是你知道几个月前,我们已经知道顾客想让我们自己送货,因为我们看到了它的发生,而且效果很好。所以我们终于有了自己的卡车,有了自己的送货人。那时一切都变了。
`[00:15:06]` That\'s me and our head of logistics. We are actually our first truck. I was very very very excited that we got around. So this was it was instrumental for our business.
> `[00:15:06]` 那是我和我们的物流主管。我们实际上是我们的第一辆卡车。我很兴奋我们能到处走动。所以这对我们的生意很有帮助。
`[00:15:20]` We were able to reduce cost increase actually control pricing for our customers make it a revenue stream and also it absolutely changed are they that dynamic of our business. So before we had our own delivery trucks word of math probably a word of mouth probably accounted for around 10 percent of our business after we changed to the model that we knew already worked months ahead of months before it countertrend 60 70 percent of our business delivery was this delightful experience that everyone before hated. Nobody was moving nobody. Everybody hates moving. Nobody wants to deal with it. And then we were just offering such a delightful experience that people loved it and told everyone about it. That was sort of like ha you know what do you call the X factor for our business. So we were really really fighting that for so long. And you know this is really one of the key things that we wanted to talk to you about.
> `[00:15:20]` 我们减少了成本的增加,实际上控制了我们的客户的价格,使之成为收入的来源,而且我们的业务的这种动态也完全改变了。所以,在我们有自己的送货卡车之前,一个口碑大概占了我们生意的 10%,因为我们已经改变了几个月前已经工作过的模型,几个月后,我们的商业交付就有 60%-70%是以前每个人都不喜欢的愉快体验。没人搬家。每个人都讨厌搬家。没人想处理这件事。然后我们提供了一种令人愉快的体验,人们喜欢它,并将它告诉了每个人。这有点像哈,你知道,我们的业务的 X 因子是什么。所以我们真的为这个斗争了这么长时间。你知道这是我们想和你谈的关键之一。
`[00:16:27]` But also this is a good idea. It worked but that doesn\'t mean that it hasn\'t come without its own hiccups.
> `[00:16:27]` 但这也是个好主意。它起了作用,但这并不意味着它不会在没有自己的打嗝的情况下出现。
`[00:16:35]` We recently our truck completely exploded one of our trucks completely exploded. True story.
> `[00:16:35]` 我们的卡车最近完全爆炸了,我们的一辆卡车完全爆炸了。真实的故事。
`[00:16:44]` So we actually have this thing where we like listen delivery guys. If there\'s an issue you e-mail us only if something crazy happens when you call and they still like they\'re like listen hey.
> `[00:16:44]` 所以我们实际上有这样的东西,我们喜欢听,送货员。如果有问题,只有当你打电话时发生了疯狂的事情,而他们仍然喜欢听着,嘿,你才会给我们发电子邮件。
`[00:16:59]` I\'ve left I left a tool in because it was Palmer they\'ll call us for that. So usually it\'s like cried wolf type of thing. So they\'re calling like what do you want. Like the vehicle exploded.
> `[00:16:59]` 我留下了一个工具,因为它是帕尔默,他们会打电话给我们。所以,通常情况下,它就像一种叫狼的东西。所以他们的叫声就像你想要的一样。就像那辆车爆炸了一样。
`[00:17:11]` We
> `[00:17:11]` 我们
`[00:17:11]` didn\'t believe it because what does that even mean. And they said This is video and we actually know it exploding. So you know again this is a great idea.
> `[00:17:11]` 不相信,因为这意味着什么。他们说这是视频,我们知道它爆炸了。所以你再次知道这是个好主意。
`[00:17:21]` It doesn\'t come when it\'s obviously challenges despite having a vehicle that exploded literally the steel the businesses that we could have.
> `[00:17:21]` 当它显然是挑战的时候,它并不会到来,尽管有一辆汽车爆炸了我们可以拥有的钢铁行业。
`[00:17:28]` Definitely.
> `[00:17:28]` 当然。
`[00:17:29]` So besides that in showing that insurance is important what are the key takeaways.
> `[00:17:29]` 除此之外,在证明保险是重要的时候,什么是关键的方法?
`[00:17:36]` Insurance is definitely very important. Really don\'t be married to this one idea. Let your customers dictate what your business should bevs. what you think it needs to be. Embrace change. You know a startup is all ever evolving so you really should be embracing that idea and learning from your customers.
> `[00:17:36]` 保险绝对是非常重要的。真的不要接受这个想法。让你的客户来决定你的企业应该是什么,而你认为它应该是什么。拥抱改变。你知道一个创业公司一直在发展,所以你真的应该接受这个想法,并向你的客户学习。
`[00:18:01]` So become default life.
> `[00:18:01]` 因此成为默认生命。
`[00:18:04]` There is an amazing essay by Paul Graham asking if you are default alive or default dead. And I would really encourage all of you guys to read it if you have. But basically the long and the short of it is what is default alive is essentially. Do you have enough money in the bank based on your current expenses to where you will not run out of money. If you have never have to raise another dollar again. So it means like are you going fast enough in order to get past your threshold of Statik or expenses. Hopefully the static worth are going up. So back in 2014 2015 we were growing really fast but our expenses were growing fast too and we were burning a lot of money and not growing fast enough in order to be default alive.
> `[00:18:04]` 保罗·格雷厄姆写了一篇很棒的文章,问你是默认活着还是默认死亡。如果你们读过,我会鼓励你们读的。但基本上,长期和短期是什么是默认活着本质上是。你是否有足够的钱在银行里,根据你目前的开支,到你不会用完钱的地方。如果你再也不用再筹集一美元的话。所以这意味着你跑得够快才能通过你的 Statik 门槛或者开支。希望静态价值正在上升。所以,早在 2014 年,我们的增长速度非常快,但我们的支出也在快速增长,我们消耗了大量资金,但增长速度不够快,以至于无法存活下来。
`[00:18:53]` For more like we know we just won it was sort of the environment. Don\'t worry about your bottom line only focus on growth growth with top line growth right.
> `[00:18:53]` 更像是我们知道我们刚刚赢了,那是一种环境。不要担心你的底线只关注增长,而最重要的是正确的增长。
`[00:19:03]` So we were saying to ourselves if we can grow fast like this and lots of companies are raising we\'ll just grow fast will grow the topline numbers will raise money. We\'ll continue to grow grass. The bottom line that\'s really a secondary component. We hit all our goals that we set for that year.
> `[00:19:03]` 所以我们对自己说,如果我们能像现在这样快速增长,而且很多公司都在筹集资金,我们就会快速增长。我们将继续种草。底线确实是次要的。我们实现了我们为那一年设定的所有目标。
`[00:19:18]` But we could not raise and we were we had around 3 to 4 months of money left in order to before we were going to die holistically.
> `[00:19:18]` 但是我们不能筹集,我们还剩下大约 3 到 4 个月的钱,这样我们才能整体地死去。
`[00:19:31]` And so this was a really you know we talk about Sartor\'s being a roller coaster and this was the part where we had a really difficult decision to make and that decision was Can Dekle stand on its own two feet without having the crutch of DC funding so that means that we had to take a look in the mirror when building a real business building a real business.
> `[00:19:31]` 所以这是一个真正的,你知道,我们谈论萨特是一个过山车,这是我们有一个非常困难的决定,这个决定是可以站在自己的两条腿,而没有 DC 的资金拐杖,所以这意味着,我们必须照镜子,建立一个真正的企业,建设一个真正的业务,建设一个真正的企业。
`[00:19:55]` So we cut our marketing to zero dollars. We weren\'t spending a dollar on marketing. We had to cut costs in various areas. We we also had to.
> `[00:19:55]` 所以我们把我们的营销削减到零美元。我们在营销上没有花一分钱,我们不得不在各个领域削减成本,我们也不得不这样做。
`[00:20:07]` Cut our marketing costs. I just generally looked at our unit economics so looked at our revenue and looked at our expenses made sure that we\'re profitable from delivery. We made sure that our unique Unicon customer acquisition cost where at that point where there was zero but there were profitable as well.
> `[00:20:07]` 削减我们的营销成本。我一般只看我们的单位经济学,所以看一下我们的收入,看看我们的开支,确保我们能从交货中获利。我们确保了我们独特的 UNICON 客户收购成本,在那个时候是零的,但也有盈利的。
`[00:20:25]` So this was a really tough decision and we had to raise prices on customers as well in areas where we were offering something at a price that was just not feasible and not realistic.
> `[00:20:25]` 所以这是一个非常艰难的决定,我们不得不提高客户的价格,在那些我们以不可行和不现实的价格提供产品的地区。
`[00:20:36]` And so that is if you had to make these decisions and say Is this something that people are willing to pay for we made those decisions for us at that time was a very difficult moment and a very nerve racking moment.
> `[00:20:36]` 也就是说,如果你必须做出这些决定,并且说,这是人们愿意为我们付出代价的事情-我们当时为我们做了那些决定-这是一个非常困难的时刻,也是一个非常紧张的时刻。
`[00:20:49]` But it was the best thing that we could have ever done because it allowed for us to be able to grow our business in a healthy way continue to grow and also become truly profitable more money and then more money going out. And this is the reason why we\'re profitable today and it puts us in a position to have much more negotiating power.
> `[00:20:49]` 但这是我们所能做的最好的事情,因为它使我们能够以一种健康的方式发展我们的业务,继续增长,并成为真正有利可图的,更多的钱,然后更多的资金流出。这就是我们今天盈利的原因,它使我们能够拥有更大的谈判能力。
`[00:21:06]` If we decide to ever decide to raise it get so what are what would you say the key takeaways are don\'t die. That\'s one.
> `[00:21:06]` 如果我们决定提高它,那么你会怎么说,关键的外卖是不要死的。
`[00:21:19]` Really understand your bottom line. That is one thing that we pore over constantly looking at literally every expense and this is really it\'s really easy to get away from as you are building a business and it\'s actually sad to kind of say that but you mentioned the rise of not many that tooth and nail very meticulously.
> `[00:21:19]` 真正理解你的底线。这是我们经常关注的一件事,我们经常关注每一项开支,而这确实是一件很容易摆脱的事情,因为你正在建立一家企业,说出这样的话实际上是很悲哀的,但你却非常仔细地提到了不多的那种东西的兴起。
`[00:21:42]` I look at our expenses every month like I call our data from our bank account and look at every single line item because we would never want to go back to that situation again and we look at that for future months as well.
> `[00:21:42]` 我每个月都会查看我们的支出情况,就像我从银行账户中打电话给我们的数据一样,并查看每一个单行项目,因为我们再也不想再回到那种情况了,我们也会在未来几个月里看到这种情况。
`[00:21:52]` And then the last thing is this unit economics. So how much of delivery cost. How much are you charging for it. The part though what you\'re charging is a commission for your business or however you Monitise does it support the things that you need to be able to grow it particularly from almost all foreign business.
> `[00:21:52]` 最后一件事就是单位经济学。那么送货的费用是多少。你要多少钱。尽管你收取的部分是你的生意的佣金,不管你做什么,它支持的东西,你需要能够发展它,特别是从几乎所有的外国企业。
`[00:22:09]` This is something that\'s needed right because you\'re actually physically moving products so there\'s a lot of expenditure that goes with that. So the last thing that we wanted to talk to you about is ignoring the noise so you know we had the slide right before with all the headlines about you know is this a bubble or you know it\'s easy to fundraise. It\'s not easy to fundraise. There\'s all these chatter out there. But we had to really learn especially what we just told you about being default alive and what we had to do for our business to learn to really completely ignore the noise because we had we need to focus on our business. So we put on our headphones and completely ignored everything that literally that\'s what we had to do. And you know there\'s like the investor noise there\'s competitors there\'s just all kinds of noise. It\'s not just what people are saying in the press. So we had this one competitor that had raised 20 times the amount of money that they had. They were growing so fast and they were all over the news.
> `[00:22:09]` 这是我们需要的东西,因为你实际上是在移动产品,所以会有大量的支出。所以我们最不想和你们谈论的是忽略噪音,所以你们知道,在所有关于你们的头条新闻之前,我们都有幻灯片,你们知道,这是一个泡泡,或者你知道这很容易筹集资金。筹款不容易。外面到处都是闲聊。但我们必须真正学习,尤其是我们刚刚告诉你的关于默认的活着,我们必须为我们的企业做什么,学会真正完全忽略噪音,因为我们需要专注于我们的业务。所以我们戴上耳机,完全忽略了所有我们必须做的事情。你知道,就像投资者的声音一样,有竞争对手,有各种各样的噪音。这不仅是人们在媒体上所说的。所以我们有一个竞争对手,他们筹集了 20 倍的资金。他们长得太快了,新闻里到处都是他们。
`[00:23:11]` They were oh my gosh everything everywhere we went through was a what about them employing hundreds of employees. Exactly.
> `[00:23:11]` 他们是,我的天啊,我们所经历的每一件事都是关于他们雇用数百名员工的情况。一点儿没错
`[00:23:18]` So it was just you know we consume so much of our energy thinking about what\'s their next move. How could this impact us. And it really distracted us it distracted us for some time from focusing on the things that really matter which are what we\'ve already discussed is what your customers want. Building a real business. Making sure that you or I continue to build that word of mouth. So ultimately they ended up folding. So all that time and energy that we expensed worrying about what they shirt what they were doing and how this would impact us didn\'t really matter. And you know ultimately for us this was a big learning and something that we really want to emphasize because there\'s just so much noise out there when you\'re building a business you really need to focus on the things that you can control yourself. You are essentially the desk you are in control of your own destiny not the Vichy funding in climate or your competitors or anything of that nature.
> `[00:23:18]` 所以你知道,我们消耗了太多的精力,思考着他们的下一步行动。这怎么会影响到我们。它真的分散了我们的注意力,它分散了我们一段时间的注意力,把注意力集中在真正重要的事情上,我们已经讨论过的就是你的客户想要的东西。建立一个真正的企业。确保你或我继续建立口碑。所以最终他们被折叠了。所以我们花了那么多时间和精力,担心他们穿什么衣服,他们在做什么,以及这会对我们产生怎样的影响,其实并不重要。你知道,对我们来说,这是一个很大的学习,也是我们真正想要强调的东西,因为当你建立一家企业时,那里有太多的噪音,你真的需要专注于那些你可以控制自己的事情。你本质上是一张桌子,你掌握着自己的命运,而不是维希在气候方面的资金,或者你的竞争对手,或者其他任何类似性质的东西。
`[00:24:23]` If you\'re building anything worthwhile you\'re going to have a better it\'s going to have someone over there now or they\'re going to be there tomorrow.
> `[00:24:23]` 如果你正在建造任何有价值的东西,你会有一个更好的东西,它现在会有人在那里,或者他们明天会在那里。
`[00:24:31]` But who decides who\'s going to last customers mostly customers and building something that people want.
> `[00:24:31]` 但是谁来决定谁会成为最后的顾客-大部分是顾客-并制造出人们想要的东西。
`[00:24:39]` Some of them absolutely yeah. I mean it just block your brain. Once you get to profitability you really in control of everything and this is why we\'re very excited about the next chapter for up echo. So this is still we\'re still very early on in our journey. We\'ve you know we\'re only two years and a half in this these are some of the lessons that we\'ve learned along the way. We\'ve heard them many times through wifie and all the way he chats but we\'ve sort of had to also learn them the hard way and we hope that you guys can take some of these lessons and apply them to whatever you work in the business or part of a company or what have you. These are lessons that you can definitely take on for the future. My father has a saying.
> `[00:24:39]` 其中有些绝对是的。我是说这只会堵住你的大脑。一旦你获得盈利能力,你就能真正掌控一切,这就是为什么我们对下一章“向上回声”感到非常兴奋的原因。所以这仍然是我们旅途中的第一步。你知道,我们只有两年半的时间,这是我们在这过程中学到的一些教训。我们通过威菲和他聊天的方式听了很多次,但我们也不得不用艰苦的方法来学习,我们希望你们能从中吸取一些教训,并把它们应用到你在一家公司或公司的任何工作中,或者你拥有的任何东西上。这些是你将来绝对可以学习的课程。我父亲有句谚语。
`[00:25:25]` My father has a saying you know better you do better.
> `[00:25:00]` 我父亲有句谚语,你更清楚你做得更好。
`[00:25:29]` And we knew better but we weren\'t doing better. And I hope that you know what you take from that is seeing some of the things the pitfalls that we\'ve had in order for you guys to grow successful companies in order to do the next great thing. So we appreciate your time. Thank you guys so much and have a great day.
`[00:25:29]` 我们知道得更清楚,但我们没有做得更好。我希望你们知道,你们从中能看到一些我们为了让你们成功地发展公司而做下一件伟大事情的陷阱。所以我们很感谢你们的时间。非常感谢你们,祝你们度过美好的一天。
- Zero to One 从0到1 | Tony翻译版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把产品做好,顾客们会来吗?
- Ch12: 人与机器
- Ch13: 展望绿色科技
- Ch14: 创始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 创业课 2012 中文笔记
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2012
- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
- David Rusenko at Startup School 2012
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
- 斯坦福 CS183b YC 创业课文字版
- 关于 Y Combinator
- 【创业百道节选】如何正确的阅读创业鸡汤
- YC 创业第一课:你真的愿意创业吗
- YC 创业第二课:团队与执行
- YC 创业第三课:与直觉对抗
- YC 创业第四课:如何积累初期用户
- YC 创业第五课:失败者才谈竞争
- YC 创业第六课:没有留存率不要谈推广
- YC 创业第七课:与你的用户谈恋爱
- YC 创业第八课:创业要学会吃力不讨好
- YC 创业第九课:投资是极端的游戏
- YC 创业第十课:企业文化决定命运
- YC 创业第11课:企业文化需培育
- YC 创业第12课:来开发企业级产品吧
- YC 创业第13课,创业者的条件
- YC 创业第14课:像个编辑一样去管理
- YC 创业第15课:换位思考
- YC 创业第16课:如何做用户调研
- YC 创业第17课:Jawbone 不是硬件公司
- YC 创业第18课:划清个人与公司的界限
- YC 创业第19课(上):销售如漏斗
- YC 创业第19课(下):与投资人的两分钟
- YC 创业第20课:不再打磨产品
- YC 创业课 2013 中文笔记
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
- 斯坦福 CS183c 闪电式扩张中文笔记
- 1: 家庭阶段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 寻找闪电蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 创业课 SV 2014 中文笔记
- Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014
- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
- Kevin Systrom at Startup School SV 2014
- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 创业课 NY 2014 中文笔记
- Apoorva Mehta at Startup School NY 2014
- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
- Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
- YC 创业课 EU 2014 中文笔记
- Adora Cheung
- Alfred Lin with Justin Kan
- Hiroki Takeuchi
- Ian Hogarth
- Introduction by Kirsty Nathoo
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
- Patrick Collison
- Paul Buchheit
- Urska Srsen
- Y Combinator Partners Q&A
- YC 创业课 2016 中文笔记
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School SV 2016
- Chad Rigetti at Startup School SV 2016
- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
- Office Hours with Kevin Hale and Qasar Younis at Startup School SV 2016
- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
- Q&A with YC Partners at Startup School SV 2016
- Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 创业课 2017 中文笔记
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 创业课 2018 中文笔记
- Sam Altman - 如何成功创业
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初创企业法律机制
- 与 Paul Graham 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 构建产品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到适合产品市场的产品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何测量产品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何获得用户和发展
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增长的公关+内容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何销售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 组建工程团队
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申请和成功
- Patrick Collison - 运营你的创业公司
- Geoff Ralston - 筹款基础
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保险箱和定价股票轮
- Aaron Harris - 如何与投资者会面并筹集资金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 亿美元之路
- PMF 后:人员、客户、销售
- 与 Oshma Garg 的对话 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 与 Aileen Lee 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 1 部分
- 与 Elizabeth Iorns 的对话 - 生物技术创始人的建议
- 与 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技术对话
- 与 Elad Gil 的对话
- 与 Werner Vogels 的对话
- YC 创业课 2019 中文笔记
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何与用户交谈
- Ali Rowghani - 如何领导
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 数字初创学校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建议
- Michael Seibel - 如何计划 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何设定关键绩效指标和目标
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初创企业分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九种商业模式和投资者想要的指标
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投资者如何衡量创业公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何启动(续集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新兴企业的成长
- Kirsty Nathoo - 创业财务陷阱以及如何避免它们
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 构建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 关于枢轴的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高转化率
- Kevin Hale - 创业定价 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排时间
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 现代创业融资
- Jared Friedman - 硬技术和生物技术创始人的建议