# Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:02]` Thank you for coming. `[00:00:02]` 谢谢你能来。 > Thank hope. 谢谢希望。 > Not much talking at all but I\'m going to just ask you sort of a strange thing. 一点也不说话，但我只想问你一件奇怪的事。 > I want you to sort of go through the chronology of the early days. 我想让你看看早年的年表。 > Yeah. 嗯 > And talk about you really did have a lot of close calls and I\'d love for you to talk about them and how you got through them and said What do we call them the other day. 说到你真的有很多亲密的电话，我很想让你谈谈它们，以及你是如何度过它们的，并说我们前几天怎么称呼它们的。 > `[00:00:24]` Not near death experiences but defibrillator. `[00:00:24]` 不是接近死亡的经历，而是除颤器。 > `[00:00:27]` Did you meet her. `[00:00:27]` 你见过她吗。 > She had to resuscitate. 她必须复苏。 > `[00:00:30]` Yeah. `[00:00:30]` 是的。 > And I\'ve literally never heard of so many so I\'d love for you to give us a little story because it was back in 1999 when we started the company. 我从来没有听说过这么多，所以我很想让你给我们一个小故事，因为那是在 1999 年我们创办公司的时候。 > `[00:00:39]` It was 1989. `[00:00:39]` 那是 1989 年。 > `[00:00:40]` I mean a lot of people don\'t know this but when we started we would sort of started working on the ideas and sort of 97 98 and 4 for lack of a better way to describe it we were trying to build Siri for mobile devices. `[00:00:40]` 我的意思是，很多人不知道这一点，但当我们开始的时候，我们会开始研究这些想法，比如 97，98 和 4，因为没有更好的方法来描述它，我们试图为移动设备构建 Siri。 > We\'ve been inspired by Palm and Nokia and all these folks that were sort of at the front of this this mobile device revolution and we thought why wouldn\'t it be great if you could talk to your phone. 我们的灵感来自 Palm 和 Nokia，以及所有这些处于移动设备革命前沿的人，我们想，如果你能和你的手机交谈，那就太棒了。 > And that would sort of transform the user interface experience and all that. 这会改变用户界面体验等等。 > So we started with this kind of customer problem. 所以我们从这样的客户问题开始。 > And that\'s always when we\'ve been good and when we stayed away when we stray away from trying to solve the customer problem we sort of fall down. 当我们一直很好的时候，当我们偏离解决客户问题的迷途时，我们就会陷入困境。 > There\'s been a few those along the way. 沿途有几个。 > But you know and so very early on we were we were trying. 但你知道，这么早我们就在努力。 > We said okay voice would be a great way to interact with this. 我们说好的声音将是一个很好的方式与这个互动。 > How do we make basically Siri this voice interaction layer on top of the operating system and will we set out to do that we realize everything we want to do is reach recognition wasn\'t going to work. 我们如何使 Siri 这个语音交互层建立在操作系统之上，并且我们将开始这样做-我们意识到，我们想做的一切都是获得认可是行不通的。 > And at the same time we sort of started to try to go raise money for this idea of a new way to interact with your device. 与此同时，我们也开始努力筹集资金，以一种新的方式与你的设备进行互动。 > And you know I see now it was harder for us to raise our first half a million dollars than it was for us to raise our first 200 million dollars. 你知道，我知道，现在我们要筹集我们的前 50 万美元要比我们筹集我们最初的 2 亿美元要困难得多。 > And it is because in those days people weren\'t in the valley they weren\'t so focused on mobile they certainly weren\'t thinking about mobile voice and we really needed to prove that we had everyone thought Yes there absolutely has to be a better way to interact with your device but what\'s your hook what\'s your advantage. 这是因为在那些日子里，人们不是在硅谷，他们不那么专注于移动，他们当然不考虑移动语音，我们真的需要证明我们每个人都认为，是的，绝对必须有一个更好的方式来与你的设备交互，但你的钩子是什么，你的优势是什么。 > What\'s that kind of breakthrough and where we ended up doing is inventing this noise cancellation technology that turned out to be the biggest breakthrough in mobile audio in 30 years and it was a sort of serendipitous back thing that we stumbled upon mostly because we were trying to solve this problem. 这种突破和我们最终所做的是发明了这种噪音消除技术，这是 30 年来移动音频领域最大的突破，这是我们偶然发现的一件事，主要是因为我们试图解决这个问题。 > And then when we did that we said wait this is bigger than making speech recognition work you get to the core of what people do on their phones which is talk at the time. 然后当我们这样做的时候，我们说，等等，这比让语音识别工作更重要-你进入了人们在他们的手机上所做的事情的核心，也就是当时的谈话。 > Now we do lots of other things on our phones but in those days it was it was a lot about talking mostly about talking. 现在我们在手机上做了很多其他的事情，但是在那些日子里，很多事情都是关于聊天的。 > And so then we thought OK great. 所以我们觉得很好。 > You know a is going to want this there. 你知道 A 会想要这个的。 > Everyone that ever heard the demo where we do theseA.B tests with weed whackers and blenders and all this stuff and we still go on with their homes. 每一个曾经听过演示的人，我们用除草机和搅拌机做这些测试，还有所有这些东西，我们仍然继续他们的家。 > Wow I want to have my device as we said on this journey we started talking to all the handset manufacturers who were big at that time sort of Nokia and a role in the Korean guys Sony Ericsson Ericsson actually. 哇，我想要我的设备，就像我们在这段旅程中所说的，我们开始与当时规模较大的所有手机制造商进行交谈，比如诺基亚，以及在韩国人索尼爱立信(Sony Ericsson)中扮演的角色。 > `[00:03:07]` And it was a real wakeup call. `[00:03:07]` 这是一个真正的唤醒电话。 > No one actually wanted to see this technology. 实际上没有人想看这项技术。 > Yeah it\'s a neat demo. 是的，这是一个整洁的演示。 > `[00:03:13]` We think it\'s cool they love the demo but they love the demo but they didn\'t want to integrate the technology was too expensive to add additional microphones. `[00:03:13]` 我们认为他们喜欢这个演示很酷，但是他们不想集成这个技术太贵了，不能再增加麦克风了。 > `[00:03:21]` I was with somebody from Apple the other day who was telling me they now have six microphones I think in in an iPhone. `[00:03:21]` 前几天，我和一个苹果公司的人在一起，他告诉我，他们现在有六部麦克风，我想是在一部 iPhone 里。 > And at the time we were just trying to convince people to put an extra one in to support our technology. 当时我们只是想说服人们多放一个来支持我们的技术。 > It was just like wow I can imagine we would have been able to do audio quality with that. 就像哇，我可以想象我们可以用它来做音频质量。 > But you know again we we were struggling to get our technology into that into that form factor in handset manufacturers were just sort of concerned about pennies so they didn\'t want to integrate what we had. 但你知道，我们还在努力使我们的技术进入这种形式，手机制造商只是有点担心便士，所以他们不想整合我们所拥有的东西。 > So that\'s how we were struggling with you know how do we fund this how do we take the next level. 这就是我们是如何挣扎的，你知道，我们如何为这个项目提供资金，如何达到下一个水平。 > We know we had something pretty breakthrough and what did we do and so along came darba. 我们知道我们有了很大的突破，我们做了什么，于是达尔巴就来了。 > And that was a great thing for us. 这对我们来说是件很棒的事。 > `[00:04:05]` The Defense Department and the government government agency were a good deal. `[00:04:05]` 国防部和政府机构是一笔不错的交易。 > We never thought we would do sort of work for the military industrial complex. 我们从未想过我们会为军事工业综合体做一些工作。 > What they wanted they wanted us to make our noise cancellation algorithms. 他们想让我们做我们的噪音消除算法。 > `[00:04:18]` The foundation of their battlefield technology. `[00:04:18]` 他们战场技术的基础。 > And so we thought well great we have this kind of rough science how do we take that and productize it and use these government grants to really sort of work through all the issues and take that science into a form that could be delivered in a product. 所以我们认为很好，我们有这样一种粗糙的科学-我们如何利用它并生产它，并利用这些政府拨款来真正解决所有的问题，并将科学转化为一种可以在产品中实现的形式。 > And that was great. 那真是太棒了。 > You know it sort of kept the lights on. 你知道它能让灯一直亮着。 > We were it engineers we I think we were after Dolby and Macromedia one of the earliest technology companies will technology companies in San Francisco moved up to San Francisco in 1999. 我们是工程师，我想我们是在追逐杜比和宏媒体，这是最早的科技公司之一，旧金山的科技公司将于 1999 年搬到旧金山。 > In those days there just weren\'t a lot of startups in the city. 在那些日子里，城里没有多少初创公司。 > And it\'s funny now because I love it you walk around. 现在很有趣因为我喜欢你到处走动。 > You know we\'re on the same block as Zynga and MBB and Pinterest. 你知道我们和 Zynga、MBB 和 Pinterest 在同一个街区。 > Then we see a shared office with their baby and it\'s just it\'s so fun that there\'s this vibrant community there now it\'s Francisco wasn\'t like that. 然后我们看到一个和他们的孩子共享的办公室，这太有趣了，以至于有了一个充满活力的社区，现在的弗朗西斯科就不像这样了。 > `[00:05:06]` Yeah I think to remind people we\'re talking 15 years at all cost. `[00:05:06]` 是的，我想提醒人们，我们谈的是 15 年，不惜一切代价。 > It\'s like filling donee. 就像填饱了甜甜圈。 > But you know before I phones. 但你知道在我打电话之前。 > So. 所以 > So I want everyone to go back in their mine and we\'ll have these people were probably in grade school. 所以我希望每个人都回到他们的矿井里，我们会让这些人可能在上小学。 > `[00:05:22]` Totally. `[00:05:22]` 完全。 > Let\'s hope they\'re all born. 希望他们都出生了。 > So then what happened you get this right. 那么发生了什么你说得对。 > We get to start up a grant. 我们可以启动一笔赠款。 > `[00:05:29]` And the other thing that was really tough is it\'s so again also farseeing because so many of the ideas that were being kicked around in 1999 and I remember Larry and Serguei were like our teachers in computer science and Marissa was my you know we lived in the same freshman dorm ish is now on the job on board and so it was this crazy time in Stanford and Silicon Valley and all these interesting ideas and people. `[00:05:29]` 而另一件非常艰难的事情是，它又一次很有远见，因为 1999 年发生的许多想法-我记得拉里和塞尔盖-就像我们的计算机科学老师，而玛丽莎是我的，你知道，我们住在同一个新生宿舍里，现在船上工作，所以这是一个疯狂的时期。斯坦福和硅谷以及所有这些有趣的想法和人。 > But you had this huge run up everything all the infrastructure being laid out for the internet as it stands today and all these ideas like there was a lot of delivery services like insta card. 但你有这么大的增长，所有的基础设施都在为互联网建设，就像今天的情况一样，所有这些想法，比如有很多的递送服务，比如 insta 卡。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > But none of them survived. 但他们都没活下来。 > And you know there were there were online specific e-commerce things for niches none of these things survived and they were just sort of too early there needed to be a lot either you know better internet connectivity more distribution of it whatever it was there was just there was just too early and so the ideas weren\'t bad they were just sort of ahead of their time. 你也知道，有专门的在线电子商务，这些东西都没有幸存下来，它们只是太早了，需要有更好的互联网连接，更好的分布，不管是什么，都太早了，所以这些想法并不坏，它们只是有点超前于他们的时代。 > And I think that\'s another important lesson that we learned is that you\'ve got to stay your course through that. 我认为这是我们学到的另一个重要的教训，那就是你必须坚持你的路线。 > We thought mobile was going to be a big thing. 我们以为手机会是件大事。 > We thought that Palm devices would converge with smartphones. 我们认为 Palm 设备将与智能手机融合。 > They ended up doing it sort of ten years after we thought they would. 在我们认为他们会这样做的十年后，他们最终还是这么做了。 > But they ended up doing that. 但他们最终还是这么做了。 > And so the early lesson we learned is if you believe in what you think is right and what you think is going to happen to customer experiences into the way people are going to interact with technology then stay that course and put yourself in a position to do that. 因此，我们早期学到的教训是，如果你相信你认为正确的东西，你认为会发生在客户体验中的事情，那么人们就会与技术互动，然后保持这一过程，让自己处于这样的地位。 > That was the sort of first thing with darba we went to a really unconventional source of capital right where were you who had DARPAs funding at that time. 这是 DARPA 的第一件事，我们去了一个非常非传统的资金来源，你当时在哪里得到了 DARPA 的资金。 > Very very very few of you I just found out recently that Inktomi did too. 你们中很少有人我最近才发现 Inktomi 也这么做了。 > You know it\'s not something that remembers Inktomi. 你知道这不是什么能记住墨水的东西。 > No they powered a lot of the infrastructure our internet the younger. 不，他们为很多基础设施提供动力，我们的互联网更年轻。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > So anyways when I haven\'t had a drop of funding is again that the whole technology industry had sort of cratered and it was impossible to raise money and I\'m a risk we used to go up announcing Sanyal road looking for money and people would say to us what\'s wrong with everyone who went to Stanford from 1983 to 2000 because of losses. 因此，不管怎么说，当我还没有得到一点资金的时候，整个科技行业都有了一些裂痕，筹资是不可能的，我是一个风险，我们过去常常去宣布三洋之路，寻找资金，人们会对我们说，1983 年到 2000 年每一个因亏损而去斯坦福的人都有什么问题。 > Billions of dollars. 数十亿美元。 > Go get jobs. 去找工作吧。 > We don\'t want to see you here. 我们不想在这里见到你。 > I mean it\'s funny because I still run into some of these people like you now. 我是说，这很有趣，因为我现在还会碰到像你这样的人。 > `[00:07:47]` It\'s different. `[00:07:47]` 这不一样。 > They don\'t tell me you\'ll get a job that they used to but you know. 他们不告诉我你会得到他们以前的工作，但你知道。 > `[00:07:52]` And so again it\'s interesting how the sort of time to change it was not a happy fun place full of new ideas and then the vibrancy wasn\'t there. `[00:07:52]` 所以再一次有趣的是，改变它的时间并不是一个充满新想法的快乐的地方，然后它的活力就不在那里了。 > There was a really bad feeling around. 周围有一种很不好的感觉。 > And so we had to figure out a way to keep going through that to believe that hey mobiles going to be a big thing. 因此，我们必须想出一种方法来继续进行下去，这样我们才能相信，移动电话将会是一件大事。 > And at the time the Valley wasn\'t the center of the mobile universe. 在那个时候，山谷并不是流动宇宙的中心。 > It is now for sure. 现在是肯定的了。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And so how did you get through it. 那你是怎么熬过来的。 > `[00:08:17]` You got since we had the type funding but that couldn\'t have lasted forever didn\'t last long. `[00:08:17]` 自从我们有了这种类型的资金，你就得到了，但这不可能永远持续下去，不会持续太久。 > They couldn\'t it didn\'t really allow us to scale. 他们不能让我们扩大规模。 > `[00:08:23]` Yeah huge way but it did allow us to kind of prioritize productize improve out what we had done and the next thing we did is we said okay how do we get this in a forum or a product that\'s going to go reach lots of people. `[00:08:23]` 是的，很大的一种方式，但是它确实让我们有了优先的工作，改进了我们已经做的事情，接下来我们说，好的，我们如何在一个论坛或一个产品上得到这个，这个会影响到很多人。 > And we\'ve been in sort of licensing discussion because we wanted to be like Dolby we said you know anyone that has an audio problem we could be in the front end it will be kind of like Intel inside or Adobeetc. 我们一直在进行某种许可讨论，因为我们想成为杜比，我们说过，任何有音频问题的人，我们都有可能处于前端，就像英特尔内部或阿多比等等。 > and because of various economic constraints for these very for these guys and focusing on profits that no one wanted to pay us much to license our technology and the time we\'ve been talking to the big headset manufacturers drunk\'s and Jabra and we thought wow the technology we have in this space is really disruptive. 而且，由于这些人在经济上受到的种种限制，他们把注意力集中在利润上，没有人愿意花很多钱来授权我们的技术，以及我们和大型耳机制造商-醉鬼和贾布拉-交谈的时间，我们认为，哇，我们在这个领域拥有的技术是非常具有破坏性的。 > There hasn\'t been sort of a computing proposition there and we can really transform what\'s Sebel there. 这里还没有一个计算命题，我们可以真正地改变 Sebel 的概念。 > And so we\'ve we\'ve been offered some deals from those guys we backed out and said you know we\'re going to go the course ourselves and we\'re going to go make our own hardware device. 所以我们从那些我们退出的家伙那里得到了一些交易，他们说我们要自己去做，我们也要自己做硬件设备。 > Wow. 哇 > So this is in kind of late 0 2. 所以这差不多是 0.2。 > And we thought we we can do this better and that\'s why we have hardware backgrounds at all. 我们认为我们可以做得更好，这就是为什么我们有硬件背景。 > `[00:09:28]` You know I\'d studied mechanical engineering as hairiness before there was a D school so we were kind of in the schools. `[00:09:28]` 你知道我在 D 学校之前学过机械工程，所以我们在学校里。 > `[00:09:33]` We knew a little bit about it and some electricals was we knew a little bit about how to make things better enough to be dangerous enough to think that we could do it. `[00:09:33]` 我们对这件事有一点了解，有些电子产品是，我们知道如何使事情变得更好，使之变得足够危险，以至于我们认为我们能做到这一点。 > But knowing what I know now it\'s totally insane that we did it right. 但是知道我现在所知道的，我们做得对是完全疯狂的。 > `[00:09:48]` And I can\'t believe that anyway. `[00:09:48]` 无论如何，我都不敢相信。 > That\'s so. 的确如此。 > I can\'t believe that people thought we might actually be able to do it right. 我不敢相信人们认为我们可能真的能做得对。 > And and so you know again long story short we kind of together some parts and were able to raise some capital to go build the horror device. 所以，你知道，长话短说，我们在一起，一些部分，能够筹集一些资金，去建造恐怖装置。 > `[00:10:05]` Now again in those days building consumer hardware as a start up was totally insane. `[00:10:05]` 现在，再一次，在那些日子里，建立消费硬件作为一种开始是完全疯狂的。 > I think you know we did a study at that time the only other sort of venture funded consumer hardware company. 我想你知道，当时我们做了一项研究，这是唯一家风险投资的消费硬件公司。 > There\'s two had been apple right whenever that was in the late 70s and then palm. 在 70 年代末的时候，有两个苹果，然后是棕榈树。 > `[00:10:28]` Oh my God. `[00:10:28]` 哦，我的天啊。 > And Pompe didn\'t really stay around very long it became part ofU.S. 庞普并没有真正停留很久，它成为了美国的一部分。 > Robotics even before they launched the company. 机器人技术甚至在公司成立之前就已经开始了。 > And so there had been no examples. 所以没有任何例子。 > If you look and say OK this is something that we took the cycle built the product scale the build distribution got it out and then there was there was an exit so there was no sort of pattern that people could point to in talking to anybody I mean there was big failures I go in some of these when Bill Campbell\'s vote with that joint or these guys. 如果你看一看，然后说，好的，这是我们采取的周期，建立了产品的规模，产品的发行，得到了它，然后有一个出口，所以没有一种模式，人们可以指出在与任何人交谈，我的意思是，有重大的失败，当比尔坎贝尔投票给那个联席或这些家伙。 > And so just convincing people that we knew it was going to take to do that was really really hard and I remember when we raised venture capital in 2003 it was like when the only deals the firm at the time it Don. 因此，让人们相信，我们知道要这么做是非常困难的。我记得我们在 2003 年筹集风险资本的时候，当时唯一的一笔交易就是“唐”(Don)。 > And it was insane to go build the stuff and then we set about going to build our first kind of consumer heads and that\'s when we started really think about design. 去建造这些东西是很疯狂的，然后我们开始建造我们的第一种消费头脑，那就是我们真正开始思考设计的时候。 > And before that you know in the valley design was a sort of thing that once you had a little momentum you might put like a cool case on something or a different color or whatever and if you wonder peel the women you made it pink and and is saw what people thought of design. 在此之前，你知道，在山谷里，设计是一种东西，一旦你有了一点动力，你可能会把一个酷的盒子放在什么东西上，或者换一种颜色，或者其他什么东西，如果你想要剥掉那些女人的皮，你就会把它变成粉红色，然后看到人们对设计的 > The only other company that was really sort of saying that there is this intersection of technology design was Apple in 0 1 0 2 really with the iPod at a mass scale. 唯一家真正在说技术设计的交叉点的公司是苹果公司(Apple in 0.0 2)，它与 iPod 的规模相当大。 > And so for us we were fortunate to have such a great you know kind of tip of the arrow in apples are going in cutting down the path in front of us. 所以对我们来说，我们很幸运，我们有这样一个伟大的人，你知道，苹果里的箭尖正在切断我们前面的小径。 > And again so long story short we we put these elements together and we we realize how hard it was to take these complex algorithms and to figure out all of the little details you needed to think about in order to make this product great. 长话短说，我们把这些元素组合在一起，我们意识到，要想把这些复杂的算法和所有你需要考虑的细节搞清楚，要想使这个产品更好，是多么困难。 > And you know sometimes I sort of sit and wonder. 你知道，有时候我会坐下来想知道。 > We make lots of products and I\'ve been fortunate ship tens of millions of things. 我们生产了很多产品，我有幸运送了数以千万计的东西。 > But I look at you know Tesla makes cars and I think about all the details that we have to think about to get it right and I can\'t imagine how you can sort of process all of that all the time from you know there\'s just a million different things that can go wrong that you have to think about when you build a car. 但是我看你知道特斯拉制造汽车，我想出了我们必须考虑的所有细节，我无法想象你怎么能一直在处理这些事情，因为你知道，当你制造一辆汽车时，只有无数不同的东西会出错。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And it\'s it\'s not dissimilar when you build these very complex consumer products where you\'ve got software interacting with hardware and now talking to the cloud and how do these things work. 当你构建这些非常复杂的消费产品时，你会发现软件与硬件交互，现在与云对话，以及这些东西是如何工作的。 > There\'s very little patience people have for things not working anyway so kind of flash forward. 人们对不起作用的事情没有耐心，所以就像向前看一样。 > We ended up launching our first consumer product which was a headset and it was it. 最后，我们推出了我们的第一款消费产品，那就是耳机。 > And there was sort of a precursor where I knew that we might be going wrong on this. 有一种前兆，我知道我们在这件事上可能出了问题。 > This first product and I had the first time I was fortune of means Steve Jobs was in mid 2004 right before on Walton carers conference because we were going on stage to debut our product and it had been set up to meet him is the god of consumer electronics right. 这是我第一次获得财富，史蒂夫·乔布斯在 2004 年年中的沃尔顿护理员大会上，因为我们将要登台亮相我们的产品，它是为了满足他而设的，是消费电子权利之神。 > `[00:13:17]` And I once saw him and it was for 45 minutes of absolute just I\'m not united Scriba we just got killed. `[00:13:17]` 我曾经见过他，那是 45 分钟的绝对时间，只是我不团结，斯克里巴，我们刚刚被杀了。 > Absolutely killed on every single decision every single edge every single technology decision the crazy part is I knew everything that he said was right and we had known that deep in our hearts and we didn\'t because we were trying to meet a timetable and because we were trying to you know not run out of money and ship the thing on time we sort of made all these tradeoffs and we compromised a lot of things that we know it\'s knew better on. 在每一个决定中，每一个单一的决定，每一个技术的决定，疯狂的部分是，我知道他所说的一切都是正确的，而我们内心深处就知道，我们并不是因为我们试图遵守时间表，而是因为我们在努力，你知道，没有耗尽资金，准时发货，我们做到了这一切。权衡，我们妥协了很多事情，我们知道它是更好的。 > And for me it was a really galvanizing moment because I remember that hey you know this guy who\'s really good at this is telling me that that was wrong and we shouldn\'t compromise on what we know is true right. 对我来说，这是一个振奋人心的时刻，因为我记得，嘿，你知道，这个人非常擅长这一点，他告诉我这是错误的，我们不应该在我们所知道的真正正确的事情上妥协。 > `[00:14:07]` Was the first one is like shit we should have gone with our got sort of harsh but valuable feedback. `[00:14:07]` 是第一个，我们应该带着我们得到的严厉但有价值的反馈而去。 > Totally okay. 完全没问题。 > `[00:14:14]` It was unemotional but like brutal just really really really brutal. `[00:14:00]` 这不是情绪化的，而是残忍的，非常残忍的。 > You know just cutting like go down the only place I remember we were talking about like this thing was crazy and if anyone\'s ever certainly played on in this audience remembers it. 你知道，就像下去一样，我记得我们谈论的唯一的地方，就像这件事是疯狂的，如果有谁在这个观众中演奏过，那就记住了。 > But it was a big head said and it connected to a clip on your belt and then it plugged into your phone and we were arguing about the clip and the guy at the time that we had hired was like Oh no. 但是它是一个大脑袋，它连接到你皮带上的一个夹子上，然后插到你的手机上，我们在争论那个剪辑，而我们雇佣的那个家伙就像哦，不。 > But you will clip this through your belt and Steve was like the only place they will ever clip that is in your mind. 但是你会把它从你的腰带里剪下来，史蒂夫就像他们在你脑子里唯一的地方。 > `[00:14:47]` And he was right. `[00:14:47]` 他是对的。 > `[00:14:48]` He was right. `[00:14:48]` 他是对的。 > We probably saw more units sitting here right now than we did of that first brought it because it shipped it got all this great buzz. 我们可能看到更多的单位坐在这里，现在比我们做的第一次带来它，因为它发运，它得到了这么大的轰动。 > We were products of the year and time magazine sort of and we saw five of them because it was because it had all these problems. 我们是年度和“时代”杂志的产品，我们看到了其中的五个，因为这是因为它有所有这些问题。 > We knew that it was this cool technology that was this really interesting intersection of wait we didn\'t stay true to the kind of customer experience and the problem that we\'re trying to solve for the user. 我们知道，正是这种很酷的技术，才是等待的真正有趣的交集，我们没有忠实于客户体验和我们试图为用户解决的问题。 > We compromise all these things to meet all these schedule criteria. 我们妥协所有这些事情，以满足所有这些时间表的标准。 > Funny and are real constraints. 有趣而且是真正的约束。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > `[00:15:21]` And when you follow your instinct didn\'t follow the gut that gut instinct we knew better and that was the hardest thing about my conversation with Steve and I did Sinnamon e-mail after that saying you were right on everything. `[00:15:21]` 当你跟随你的直觉的时候，你的直觉并没有跟随我们更清楚的直觉，这是我和史蒂夫的谈话中最难的事情，在那之后，我写了一封信纳蒙的电子邮件，说你是对的。 > I appreciate that you actually took the time to be honest with me because few people are. 我很感激你真的花时间对我说实话，因为很少有人这样做。 > In. 在……里面 > And it was it was sort of he was always like that with us. 对我们来说，他一直都是这样的。 > And then we launched several other products with Apple like the Jambox and up and all those things we had a great relationship with our company and continue to but we learned a lot from my experience. 然后，我们与苹果推出了其他几款产品，比如 Jambox 和 UP，以及所有这些我们与我们公司有着良好关系的东西，而且还在继续，但我们从我的经验中学到了很多。 > So going a little bit further on what happened. 所以对发生的事情再深入一点。 > We have launched this thing was totally stillborn didn\'t sell any. 我们已经推出了这东西，完全是死胎，一点也不卖。 > We ran out of money. 我们没钱了。 > And now it was like oh my god what do we do. 现在我的天哪，我们该怎么办？ > And again very long story short people at the time they were supporting us are investors sort of lost faith and they shut the company down. 同样，长话短说，当他们支持我们的时候，他们是投资者，失去了信心，他们关闭了公司。 > People don\'t realize it\'s like almost shut down. 人们没有意识到这几乎是关闭了。 > All the employees were laid off. 所有的雇员都被解雇了。 > They literally chained the doors and they chain the doors in the chains locks the whole thing. 他们用链子把门拴起来，把门锁在锁链上，把整个东西锁上。 > `[00:16:24]` I have a letter of says everyone we don\'t see any value in this thing with many all the employees it was gone right. `[00:16:24]` 我有一封信说，我们不认为这件事有什么价值，因为它的许多雇员都走了。 > Because in those days as entrepreneurs and founders it\'s a lot more friendly now than it used to be from investors like you actually get to control your company. 因为在那些时候，作为企业家和创始人，现在的公司比以前的投资者友好得多，因为你实际上可以控制你的公司。 > `[00:16:38]` Actually we were kicked off the board we weren\'t sure kicked off the board account password we didn\'t have a say in these kinds of competition it was like thanks very much for your ideas. `[00:16:38]` 事实上，我们被踢出了董事会，我们不确定是否取消了董事会账户密码，我们在这种竞争中没有发言权，这就像非常感谢你的想法。 > We\'ll take it from here. 我们从这里开始吧。 > `[00:16:48]` So well that\'s changed a lot. `[00:16:48]` 太好了，变化很大。 > So what shows up in their chains their chains of doors. 所以在他们的锁链里出现了什么。 > `[00:16:53]` But the thing that I had in my Cofan really had as we still believed that we had created something special. `[00:16:53]` 但是我在我的 Cofan 中所拥有的东西，因为我们仍然相信我们创造了一些特别的东西。 > We still believed in the mission and we still believe that we could improve people\'s lives and that we could allow them to communicate better and that we could sort of push this step forward. 我们仍然相信这一使命，我们仍然相信我们可以改善人们的生活，我们可以让他们更好地交流，我们可以推动这一步向前迈进。 > And so what we ended up doing is we\'re kind of wrestling back from those investors. 因此，我们最终所做的是，我们在某种程度上是那些投资者的反击。 > I think it\'s a good plan. 我觉得这是个好计划。 > We had 60 grand in the bank 600 grand dad. 我们在银行里有 6 万块爸爸。 > We took another good Darboe contract and we focused it and said What are all those mistakes that we made that we knew better on. 我们又签了一份好的 Darboe 合同，我们集中精力，说出了我们所犯的错误，我们更清楚这些错误是什么。 > And often failure is the best teacher that you can have right. 失败往往是你能拥有的最好的老师。 > Because you learn so much more because you think about every single angle of 540 degrees you look at again and again and again and you look at what went wrong and why did that happen. 因为你学到的更多，因为你想到了每一个 540 度的角度，你再看一遍，你看到了哪里出了问题，为什么会这样。 > `[00:17:39]` Are you using a pen at this point. `[00:17:39]` 你现在用的是钢笔吗？ > `[00:17:41]` Are your investors still in voir where they just sort of go they said Just go take it away or go to the board last time just go do whatever. `[00:17:41]` 你的投资者还在准备什么吗？他们说，去拿去吧，或者上次去董事会，做什么都行。 > Okay. 好的。 > It wasn\'t even they were. 他们都不是。 > It wasn\'t even a considered decision was good you\'re starting with a blank slate blank slate. 这甚至不是一个经过深思熟虑的决定是好的，你是从一个空白的板子开始的。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > `[00:17:56]` And we had this cool technology that had all this promise and people resonated with it when they got in so we figured out that it had to get into the right package of the right form or the right way that people could access it and interact with it. `[00:17:56]` 我们有这样一种很酷的技术，它有着所有的承诺，当人们加入的时候，人们对它产生了共鸣，所以我们发现它必须进入正确的形式或正确的方式，人们可以访问它并与它交互。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And so we had failed on what I think about sort of is all what design is all about which is the attention to the right details and resolving those details to make the best possible experience for the customer. 所以我们在我的想法上失败了-设计是什么-关注正确的细节，解决这些细节，为客户提供尽可能好的体验。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And we\'ve missed that. 我们已经错过了。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And we\'ve missed it in a big way and it nearly put us out. 我们在很大程度上错过了它，它几乎把我们淘汰了。 > And so again you know we focus for the next two years we work for no salaries kept Darpas sort kept the lights on as did our friends and families. 因此，你知道，接下来的两年里，我们将精力集中在无薪工作上，让达帕斯继续工作，就像我们的朋友和家人一样，让灯一直亮着。 > And then we focused on our first headset and that was when we started to think about wearable computing actually. 然后我们把注意力集中在我们的第一款耳机上，那时我们开始考虑可穿戴计算。 > And it\'s funny because now everyone talks about wearables everyday people every hour I get a question about wearables and where is it going and what\'s happening. 这很有趣，因为现在每个人每天都在谈论可穿戴设备，我每小时都有一个关于可穿戴设备的问题。 > That\'s when we start to think about these things in your body that have all this computing power how are they going to try to services and all that stuff Sony as we plowed through that those two years of probably another you know two days of crazy stories. 就在那时，我们开始思考那些在你身体里有这么多计算能力的东西 > `[00:19:00]` Can you talk at all about the shipping. `[00:19:00]` 你能谈谈航运吗？ > `[00:19:03]` You love the Celesio we went through two years no salaries. `[00:19:03]` 你爱西莱西奥，我们经历了两年，没有薪水。 > We had you know Vienneau and David Weiden from Kosal ventures it helped us get a deal with AT&T to launch are you know kind of next generation Bluetooth headset and everything is lined up. 我们有来自科索沃风险投资公司的 Vienneau 和 DavidWeiden，他们帮助我们与 AT&T 公司达成了一项协议，推出了下一代蓝牙耳机，一切都安排好了。 > `[00:19:20]` We have big customer we still can raise much capital to get it off the ground. `[00:19:20]` 我们有很大的客户，我们仍然可以筹集大量的资金来实现这一目标。 > It was tough but Venona and David sort of solemn promise that kind of just advising us to see what would happen. 这是艰难的，但维诺娜和大卫的庄严承诺，只是建议我们看看会发生什么。 > And we were trying to launch it was late in December. 我们正试图在 12 月晚些时候推出它。 > We had product in a dock in New York and the manufacturer wouldn\'t release it to us because we didn\'t have any money in the bank. 我们在纽约的一个码头上有产品，制造商不愿意把它给我们，因为我们银行里没有钱。 > We literally had like twenty seven hundred dollars in the bank and we had to figure out how to get those products released out ofU.S. 我们银行里有大约 2700 美元，我们得想办法把这些产品从美国出口出去。 > Customs they could deliver to AT&T Cingular. 海关可以送到 AT&T Cingular。 > `[00:19:53]` It\'s time to get into stores which are like Chris Chris Christmas and anyone that\'s launching your product like December 21st is not a good time entreprise for Christmas. `[00:19:53]` 是时候进入像克里斯·耶诞节这样的商店了，任何像 12 月 21 日这样发布你产品的人都不是圣诞节的好时机。 > It\'s kind of too late. 现在已经太晚了。 > So that was a whole nother story so we convince you to still take it in. 所以这是另一个故事，所以我们说服你仍然接受它。 > And then one of our earliest Angels is guys Chris Birch an awesome. 我们最早的天使之一是克里斯·伯奇，一个很棒的人。 > They gave us a letter of credit to unlock and I had to go to JFK to go flying the Customs people and figure out what the harmonized code was for this type of product and get them to release the stuff so it could get in to stores and Mossberg wrote about in the journal and it sold out in a few hours. 他们给了我们一张信用证来解锁，我不得不去肯尼迪机场，让海关人员飞过去，弄清楚这类产品的统一代码是什么，然后让他们发布这些东西，这样它就可以进入商店了，Mossberg 在杂志上写到，几个小时内就卖完了。 > Wow. 哇 > `[00:20:33]` I think we went from zero to 70 million in revenue in the first year. `[00:20:33]` 我认为我们第一年的收入从零降到了 7000 万。 > So that\'s the thing that I learned that I hope people take away is when you actually go focus on ruthlessly what those things are that you\'re trying to solve those problems. 这就是我学到的东西，我希望人们拿走的是当你真正去无情地专注于那些你试图解决这些问题的东西。 > You can transform your business like that. 你可以这样改变你的生意。 > The other stuff sort of you\'ve got to figure it out it\'s not easy but that\'s the core thing. 其他的东西，你必须弄清楚，这并不容易，但这是核心的事情。 > Right. 对啊。 > And if you don\'t do it everything gets really bad. 如果你不这么做，一切都会变得很糟糕。 > And if you do then you can build from there and things transform overnight like that. 如果你这样做了，你就可以从那里建立起来，事情就会像这样在一夜之间发生变化。 > `[00:21:03]` So literally it was like this it was like overnight overnight overnight. `[00:21:03]` 所以从字面上说，就像在一夜之间一样。 > `[00:21:06]` Then what happened then we had to go build a business we had to scale we had to build a team we weren\'t fortunate in that situation where you know we would raised a bunch of money built out our team made the product. `[00:21:06]` 然后发生了什么，我们必须去建立一个企业，我们必须扩大规模，我们必须建立一个团队，我们不是幸运的，在那种情况下，你知道我们会筹集到大量资金，我们的团队制造了这个产品。 > It was a success that we could scale from that we had no infrastructure right so we went 070 million with a consumer hardware product with like at that moment in the beginning of December of 0 or sorry beginning of January 07 we had 16 people. 这是一个成功，我们可以扩大，我们没有基础设施的权利，所以我们购买了 07 亿的消费硬件产品，就像在 012 月初的那个时刻，或者在 07 年 1 月初，我们有 16 个人。 > So we scaled that Ellisville revenue grew to like 22. 所以我们把 Ellisville 的收入增加到 22。 > And that\'s when you know the node and Marken Banten Benowitz American resellers cloud guys all kind of came in and we started to build the company and then you know we had this sort of streaming 2000 a business was growing growing growing and then all of a sudden you know you had the big meltdown of 2008 where Lehman Brothers exploded and we found ourselves with a million units on backorder and all of a sudden those orders just got canceled and we had like 70 million or 50 or 70 million dollars worth of inventory in China we had to go then learn to work that down and we spent a lot of 2009 working that down to zero did a big deal costs go to move it. 那就是当你知道节点和 Marken Banten Benowitz 美国经销商云中人的时候，我们开始建立公司，然后你知道我们有这样的流 2000 业务在增长，然后突然你知道你经历了 2008 年的大崩溃，雷曼兄弟爆发了，我们发现我们有一百万。这些订单突然被取消了，我们在中国有大约七千万或者五千万到七千万美元的库存，我们不得不学习如何降低库存，我们花了很多时间把它降到零，花费了很大的成本来转移它。 > `[00:22:17]` So it was just you know all of these bumps and bruises and again we experience it in in the fall of 2011. `[00:22:17]` 只是你知道所有这些颠簸和瘀伤，我们在 2011 年秋天又经历了一次。 > You know we had I had announced this product on stage this foray using all the stuff we learned about sensors and headsets and now translate it to health and it was this massive problem. 你知道，我已经在舞台上宣布了这个产品，这个尝试使用了我们学到的关于传感器和耳机的所有东西，现在我们把它转化为健康，这是一个巨大的问题。 > I literally debut the thing on stage at TED and we\'re like a billion media impressions around it. 我真的在 TED 的舞台上首次登台，我们就像一个十亿的媒体印象围绕着它。 > `[00:22:42]` And it was the most hype product. `[00:22:42]` 它是最炒作的产品。 > I still think it was the fastest selling third party product in the history of Apple Retail that fall and it was going out there and all of a sudden we were starting to hear issues of them breaking at scale and we didn\'t we couldn\'t even get units back to figure out what was wrong fast enough. 我仍然认为，这是苹果零售史上销量最快的第三方产品，当时它正在上市，突然间，我们开始听到它们的规模缩小的问题，我们甚至没能让手机尽快找到出问题的地方。 > And here was this sort of incredibly hyped product. 这是一种令人难以置信的炒作产品。 > We had to try. 我们得试一试。 > We were thinking about levitating in that category even before we had learned how to crawl let alone walk. 我们甚至还没有学会爬行，更不用说走路了。 > And you know all this hype and you don\'t even know what to do with respect to the consumer. 你知道所有这些炒作，你甚至不知道该如何对待消费者。 > I think we\'re fortunate because we\'ve been through some hard times. 我认为我们很幸运，因为我们经历了一些困难时期。 > So there is a DNA in the organization that we could sort of take a step back and say you know what. 组织中有一个 DNA，我们可以退一步说，你知道吗。 > Like let\'s just try to figure out what\'s happening first principle as it\'s make sure we take care of the customer make sure our users are happy that you know the first question I ask is are we doing any physical harm to people. 比如，让我们试着弄清楚到底发生了什么，第一条原则是确保我们照顾客户，确保我们的用户高兴，你知道，我问的第一个问题是，我们是否对人们造成了身体伤害。 > Anything wrong is it like hurting people. 有什么不对就像伤害别人一样。 > Not okay. 不太好。 > What\'s happening. 发生了什么\。 > Fire is catching fire is burning people\'s risk. 火灾正在燃烧着人们的风险。 > That happened one of our competitors. 我们的竞争对手之一。 > Not good. 不太好。 > So you know you know I think that you got to sort of go from there. 所以你知道，我认为你应该从那里开始。 > We had been fortunate that we\'ve been through hard times it was never the sort of straight shot of success. 我们很幸运，我们经历过困难时期，这从来不是成功的直接机会。 > And I often tell people like look the problems that you see appearance when you\'re five people with you know a you know tens of thousands of dollars in the bank versus when you\'re you know worth billions in market value and hundreds of millions of dollars in big channels because they are no less existential or nerve racking. 我经常告诉人们，当你是五个人的时候，你会看到你所看到的问题，你知道银行里有数万美元，而你知道，你知道价值数十亿的市值，在大渠道里有数亿美元的价值，因为它们同样是存在主义和神经质的折磨。 > They\'re just a different scales. 他们只是一个不同的尺度。 > And so if you learn to sort of persevere through those things and you focus on the things that matter you\'ll carry those skills with you through the whole journey. 因此，如果你学会了坚持这些事情，并且专注于那些重要的事情，你将在整个旅程中随身携带这些技能。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And don\'t forget those lessons of of what it was like to be on the ground with you know kicked your teeth kicked in and they saw their blood and how you go through it and then what we ended up doing with up is we we figured out that we had an issue. 别忘了那些教训，你知道，踢你的牙齿，他们看到了他们的血，然后我们做了最后的事情，我们发现我们有了问题。 > And I sat down and wrote a letter and said to people that I\'m sorry we made a mistake and we screwed up and give you your money back and keep the product. 我坐下来，写了一封信，对人们说，我很抱歉我们犯了一个错误，我们搞砸了，把钱还给了你，并保留了产品。 > And you know we\'ll take you through it and we\'re gonna go fix this stuff and we back in. 你知道，我们会带你度过难关的，我们要去修理这些东西，然后再回去。 > And when we came back consumers embraced us and you know people I was surprised because the reaction the letter went from I was getting death threats on Twitter to literally my life to you know some people saying wow like that\'s the example of how you treat customers and all we were we weren\'t trying to think about that we were just like what\'s the right thing to do. 当我们回来的时候，消费者拥抱了我们，你知道的人，我很惊讶，因为这封信从我在 Twitter 上收到的死亡威胁到我的生活，你知道，有些人说，哇，就像你对待顾客的例子，我们没有试着去想，我们只是想做正确的事情。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > `[00:25:15]` So I feel like I\'d tell people never to start a competitor to a job or any of your products like the toughest founder he\'s been through. `[00:25:15]` 所以我觉得我会告诉人们，不要像他所经历过的最强硬的创始人那样，开始竞争一份工作或你的任何产品。 > So my bed never survive. 所以我的床再也活不下去了。 > So we have a couple more minutes. 所以我们还有几分钟时间。 > I know there\'s so much I wanted to get through. 我知道我很想通过。 > `[00:25:29]` Hopefully that was the good news. 希望这是个好消息。 > `[00:25:31]` We talked about some of the Near Death fans that I love. `[00:25:31]` 我们谈论了一些我喜欢的濒临死亡的粉丝。 > You talk about how hard it is to take software and hardware and data and bring them together. 你会谈论把软件、硬件和数据结合在一起有多难。 > `[00:25:41]` So it\'s well I mean what we\'re doing now is I feel like everything over the last 14 years has been a preparation for it. `[00:25:41]` 我的意思是，我们现在所做的是，我觉得过去 14 年里的每件事都是为它做的准备。 > I feel like we\'ve been going to school where we learn how to build these great high design products. 我觉得我们已经去了学校，在那里我们学习如何制造这些伟大的高设计产品。 > And we\'ve been fortunate to be sort of recognized for it. 我们很幸运被认可了。 > And one of the things that was interesting about the first launch is we had built our own application from scratch. 第一次发布的有趣之处之一是我们从零开始构建了自己的应用程序。 > We\'d never done that before. 我们以前从没这么做过。 > You know in 2011 Begaye 2011 we didn\'t have an application team. 你知道，在 2011 年，Begaye，2011 年，我们没有一个应用团队。 > We had to build that from scratch. 我们必须从头开始建造。 > And so one of the things that the hardware defects matched was how crap our apples. 所以硬件缺陷匹配的原因之一就是我们的苹果有多烂。 > It was really bad. 真的很糟糕。 > A lot of my friends like Zork and all these little guys said What are you doing making software. 我的许多朋友，像佐克和所有这些小家伙都说，你在做什么做软件。 > We\'ve always made software just that the algorithm level for more analyst stuff but you know it was a really tough learning experience to get people who come from the application world to work with people who work in hardware and not to have them work in silos. 我们一直在制作软件，这只是更多分析师的算法水平，但你知道，要让来自应用程序世界的人与硬件工作人员一起工作，而不是让他们在筒仓工作，这是一种非常艰难的学习体验。 > And then some magical point for it all to come together you realize that doesn\'t actually work. 然后，一些神奇的观点，让所有的一切走到一起，你会意识到，这实际上是行不通的。 > And so I used a lot of 2012 the kind of rip it all down and say look it what we learn in hardware\'s you have to make stuff that people will pay you more than what it costs you to make which is a really interesting discipline because you end up being really focused on is this good enough that someone would take a dollar out and pay you for it. 所以我用了很多 2012 年的时间-把它全部撕下来，然后说，看看我们在硬件上学到的东西-你必须制造出人们付给你的东西，而不是你所花的钱-这是一门非常有趣的学科，因为你最终会真正专注于这样一个好东西-有人会拿出一美元，并为此付钱给你。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > In App development in lots of Web Volm and mobile apps people don\'t have that discipline because you don\'t everything is free and it just sort of moves quickly and so people iterate and you just figure out stuff but there isn\'t that discipline of like is it good. 在很多 Web、Volm 和移动应用程序的应用程序开发中，人们没有这种规则，因为你不是所有的东西都是免费的，它只是移动得很快，所以人们就会迭代，你就会发现一些东西，但是没有那种类似的规则，它好吗？ > Are we solving that problem. 我们能解决这个问题吗。 > Will people pay us for it. 人们会为此付出代价吗。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And so we took that sort of a sensibility from the hardware team and we kind of tried to get our software guys to think about their experiences in that way around trying to resolve it to a point where yeah we\'re making decisions and we\'re making judgments on where this is going to go and how it comes together. 所以我们从硬件团队那里获得了这种感觉，我们试着让我们的软件人员思考他们的经验，试图解决这个问题，我们正在做出决定，我们正在对这件事的走向和它是如何结合起来的做出判断。 > But then we got the speed at which the software guys could iterate sort of infuse our hardware it seems as though they tried to get the best of each of these things were and then ultimately what it is I organize it against the user problem and I said we are solving this customer problem and we were going to use these things as tools whether it be the software app or we\'re going to solve that hardware or going to solve in the cloud with data. 但是我们得到了软件人员可以迭代的速度，好像他们试图从每一件事情中得到最好的结果，最终，我针对用户问题组织了它，我说我们正在解决这个客户问题，我们将把这些东西作为工具使用，不管它是什么软件应用或者我们要解决硬件问题，或者用数据解决云中问题。 > That was another new thing for us is to build the whole data science team. 这对我们来说是另一件新的事情，那就是建立整个数据科学团队。 > I think we have a world class when we start to publish a lot of those results. 我认为，当我们开始发布大量这些结果时，我们就拥有了一个世界级的水平。 > I measured as world class because Google and Facebook and these guys are trying to recruit out of our team which I think is a sign that you\'ve arrived when the big shots are trying to steal your people. 我之所以被评为世界级，是因为谷歌和 Facebook 以及这些家伙正试图从我们的团队中招募人才，我认为这是一个迹象，表明当大人物试图窃取你的员工时，你已经到达了。 > But you know putting all those elements together and getting them all talk to each other because they speak different languages is really difficult and I think that\'s the new tip of the arrow right and I think this comes back to that advantage that we have against people who have traditionally been successful in CS CS totally different than what it was. 但你知道，把所有这些元素组合在一起，让它们彼此交流，因为它们说不同的语言是非常困难的，我认为这是箭头的新尖，我认为这又回到了我们对抗那些传统上在计算机控制领域取得成功的人的优势。 > There are a lot of these dumb boxes their boxes where the application experience and software is just as important as what you physically touch. 有很多这些愚蠢的盒子，它们的盒子里，应用程序的体验和软件和你实际接触到的东西一样重要。 > And there\'s a there\'s a melding of those lines I tell people when we think of design in mobile applications it\'s something between three dimensions and two dimensions. 当我们想到移动应用程序中的设计时，我告诉人们，这是一种介于三维和二维之间的东西。 > It\'s not like just a little visual thing you\'ve got it you\'ve got to interact with and that\'s not quite three dimensions where you can feel the button but it\'s something in between and we\'re sort of putting this piece together but again it\'s all about here\'s the problem we\'re trying to solve and how do these pieces how do you move around actually go solve that. 它不只是一个视觉的东西，你需要与它互动，这不是一个你能感觉到按钮的三维，但它是介于两者之间的东西，我们把这个东西放在一起，但这又是关于我们想要解决的问题，以及这些碎片是如何移动的，如何真正解决这个问题。 > `[00:29:12]` Well sadly we are over. `[00:29:12]` 很遗憾，我们已经结束了。 > Thank you. 谢谢。 > Congratulations on all of your hard won second half. 恭喜你下半场辛苦地赢了。 > `[00:29:19]` I\'m obsessed with my Jambox many thank you for coming today. `[00:29:19]` 我对我的占卜盒很着迷，非常感谢你今天能来。