# Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
> `[00:00:00]` Next you\'re going to hear from Kathryn Minshew.
`[00:00:00]` 接下来你将听到 Kathryn Minshew 的消息。
> Catherine is the CEO and founder of the Muse.
凯瑟琳是缪斯的首席执行官和创始人。
> So the news is a job discovery tool that\'s helping one million people a month find the Korek find careers at awesome companies.
因此,这个消息是一种就业发现工具,它每月帮助 100 万人在令人敬畏的公司找到工作。
> So Kathryn has heard me say this before but one of my favorite fun facts about her is that when she was a kid she wanted to be Zorro when she grew up.
凯瑟琳以前听我这么说过,但我最喜欢的一个有趣的事实是,当她还是个孩子的时候,她长大后想成为佐罗。
> But you know she she\'s not Zorro today but she didn\'t do too shabbily before she started the muse.
但你知道,她今天不是佐罗,但在她开始沉思之前,她并没有做得太邋遢。
> Catherine worked with the Clinton Health Initiative focusing on vaccine access in Africa.
凯瑟琳与克林顿健康倡议合作,重点是在非洲获得疫苗。
> And before that she was at McKinsey and Company.
在那之前她在麦肯锡和公司工作。
> So I\'m really happy to have her here today.
所以我很高兴她今天能来。
> Welcome KATHERINE.
欢迎凯瑟琳。
> `[00:00:49]` Hi everyone.
`[00:00:49]` 大家好。
> Very very excited to be here with you a little bit today.
很高兴今天能和你在一起。
> She said I\'m Kathryn Minshew.
她说我是凯瑟琳·明休。
> I\'m the founder and CEO of a company called the muse.
我是一家叫做缪斯的公司的创始人和首席执行官。
> And we help people figure out essentially what do they want to do with their lives and how do they get there.
我们从根本上帮助人们找出他们想要做些什么,以及他们是如何到达那里的。
> So career advice free classes job opportunities and behind the scenes profiles into what is actually like to work at places like Facebook Uber gucci.
因此,职业咨询、免费课程、工作机会以及幕后的个人资料,实际上是在 Facebook、优步(Uber)、古奇(Gucci)这样的地方工作的。
> But what I want to talk to all about today is a perception issue that I think exists in the startup world and that it\'s very easy to look at companies that are two or three down years down the line.
但我今天想要谈的是一个感知问题,我认为这个问题存在于初创企业的世界里,很容易就能看到那些在未来两到三年都在下滑的公司。
> Sometimes companies that are quite a bit farther than that see everything they\'ve built this is Facebook profile of a muse you can see all the different photos video a lot of design.
有时候,比这更远的公司会看到他们建立的所有东西-这是 Facebook 的个人资料,你可以看到所有不同的照片,视频,大量的设计。
> We\'ve spent time on.
我们花了很多时间在。
> And it\'s easy to look at things like that and say wow you know people must have these brilliant ideas they\'ve sort of hit them like a flash of lightning and then instantly they start creating it\'s much much easier to show that successful growth than to talk about what often comes before which as I said is a lot of failure.
我们很容易看到这样的事情,然后说:“哇,你知道,人们一定有这些聪明的想法
> So I\'m a veteran of two companies the Musa\'s my second startup and I don\'t often talk about the first because it looked like this.
因此,我是两家公司的老手,穆萨是我的第二家初创公司,我不经常谈论第一家公司,因为它看起来像这样。
> And in case you can\'t see it that\'s nearly flat growth at around 3000 users a month over eight or nine months so it was repetitive and consistent failure.
如果你看不到,在 8 到 9 个月的时间里,用户每月大约 3000 人的增长几乎是平稳的,所以这是重复的、持续的失败。
> And I think consistently when you look at startups it\'s much easier to pretend that you\'re crushing it all the time than to show the work in progress.
我一直认为,当你看到初创公司时,假装你一直在破坏它,比展示正在进行中的工作要容易得多。
> But make no mistakes.
但不要犯错误。
> Most startups are a work in progress.
大多数初创企业都是一项正在进行中的工作。
> In fact I like to say that evolution from SOC to suck less.
事实上,我喜欢说从 SOC 进化到吸得更少。
> So I want to take you through the early kind of suck of the muse and walk you through some of the lessons we learned a couple of the like.
所以,我想带你们经历一下早期的沉思,然后带你们去学习我们学到的一些东西。
> Oh god why did we do that mistakes.
天啊,我们为什么要犯那样的错误。
> And a few things that hopefully will be helpful for you all as you go around starting businesses or building companies.
还有一些希望对你们大家都有帮助的事情,当你们开始创业或建立公司的时候。
> So the muse\'s origin story starts with me as a 3 year old wanting to be a firefighter and as casata also desperately wanted to be Zorro not realizing that that was perhaps not a viable career path.
因此,缪斯的起源故事始于我 3 岁的时候,我想成为一名消防员,而卡萨塔也非常想成为佐罗,却没有意识到这也许不是一条可行的职业道路。
> But my grandfather was a firefighter and I had a pretty clear idea of what it meant to do that.
但我祖父是一名消防员,我很清楚这意味着什么。
> And then as I got older I thought to myself well for a while I wanted to be a CIA agent or international woman of mystery for a long time as well.
后来,随着年龄的增长,我对自己的想法很好,有一段时间我也想成为一名中情局特工或国际神秘女子。
> I thought that maybe it would be a Broadway actress and so actually it\'s quite fun to be back here on the stage.
我想也许这会是个百老汇女演员,所以回到舞台上真的很有趣。
> But when I started my first job which was a management consulting job at McKinsey I knew that that wasn\'t it.
但当我开始我的第一份工作,也就是麦肯锡的管理咨询工作时,我知道那不是这样的。
> That wasn\'t what I wanted to be doing and two three four or five years.
这不是我想要做的,也不是我想要的两年、三、四、五年。
> And so I set out to figure out well what do I want to be doing with my life.
所以我开始想办法弄清楚我想用我的生活做什么。
> I asked friends and family a lot of them were in relatively traditional careers banking law.
我问朋友和家人,他们中的很多人都从事相对传统的职业,银行法。
> They didn\'t want to do those and then I went to Job boards which is where a lot of people add up and oh geez this is what I got.
他们不想这么做,然后我去了求职板,这是很多人加起来的地方,哦,天哪,这就是我得到的。
> These are the sorts of things I was seeing on a daily basis including one search on Monster.
这些都是我每天都能看到的东西,包括对怪物的一次搜索。
> I think it was for business strategy jobs that told me I should be an assistant manager at a 7-Eleven in Secaucus New Jersey.
我想是商业战略工作告诉我,我应该在新泽西州塞考斯市的 7-11 酒店担任助理经理。
> I was like thank you very much.
我就像非常感谢你。
> I took some career quizzes.
我参加了一些职业测试。
> One of them said I should be a merchant mariner.
其中一个说我应该当个商船水手。
> I think because I like to travel and I enjoy the outdoors.
我想是因为我喜欢旅游,喜欢户外活动。
> But ultimately there was really nothing that gave me any sense of what it actually meant to do different jobs and around the same time I met my co-founder.
但最终,没有什么能让我感觉到做不同的工作意味着什么,就在我遇见我的联合创始人的同时。
> One of them.
其中之一。
> Alex is here today and we started talking about some of these issues around the fact that the way people think about their career individually has changed so much.
阿莱克斯今天来到这里,我们开始谈论其中的一些问题,因为人们对自己职业生涯的思考方式已经发生了很大的变化。
> People are no longer kind of looking for a transactional.
人们不再寻找交易。
> I show up at 9 I leave at 5 you give me a paycheck.
我 9 点出现,5 点离开,你给我薪水。
> They\'re much more concerned with questions like well what is the culture of the company.
他们更关心这样的问题:公司的文化是什么?
> What will I do when I get there.
等我到了那里我该怎么办。
> How will I play a part in the company\'s growth.
我将如何在公司的成长中发挥作用?
> You can\'t get that through a lot of platforms and I wish I could say that the kind of idea for The Muse hit us like a bolt of lightning or like Athena sprinting fully formed out of the head of Zus but in reality it was much much more slow.
你不可能在很多平台上做到这一点,我希望我能说,缪斯的想法像闪电一样击中了我们,或者像雅典娜那样冲出了祖斯的脑袋,但实际上要慢得多。
> In fact this is our first website that we launched with on September 6 2011 and honestly it\'s kind of a piece of crap and when we thought it was great at the time and given that we were basically subsisting on ramen and hopes and dreams it was I think a very good effort in fact we attracted 20000 people in the first month 26000 in the second month 70000 people in the third.
事实上,这是我们在 2011 年 9 月 6 日推出的第一个网站,老实说,这是一种垃圾,当我们当时认为它很棒的时候,考虑到我们基本上依靠拉面、希望和梦想生存,我认为这是一个很好的努力,事实上,我们在第一个月吸引了 20000 人,第二个月吸引了 26000 人,第三个月吸引了 70000 人。
> So clearly we had hit some sort of chord even though obviously there was a lot a lot to be desired.
所以很明显,我们已经达到某种程度的和弦,尽管显然还有很多需要改进的地方。
> We started out with career content because when you create a marketplace where you have buyers and sellers in this case candidates and companies that want to hire them it\'s a lot easier if you can get one side of the marketplace started first.
我们从职业内容开始,因为当你创建一个有买家和卖家的市场时,应聘者和想雇用他们的公司就会容易得多,如果你能先从市场的一边起步的话,那就容易多了。
> And so we thought well if we don\'t want to have a whole bunch of jobs on their first or if we can\'t get companies to work with us.
所以我们想,如果我们不想第一次得到一大堆工作,或者我们不能让公司和我们一起工作的话。
> What\'s one way to solve that problem.
解决这个问题的一种方法是什么?
> Career content.
职业内容。
> We also started testing appetite for jobs and one of the things that I think is funny is the very first company that we ever worked with was Uber when they had maybe 50 employees.
我们还开始测试人们对工作的兴趣,我认为最有趣的是,我们第一家与优步合作的公司,当时他们可能有 50 名员工。
> They were active in two cities and they were trying to launch Chicago and we did a little test with them and it was really interesting because what it proved was people said this is a little bit hard to use.
他们活跃在两个城市,他们试图推出芝加哥,我们对他们做了一些测试,这真的很有趣,因为事实证明,人们认为这有点难用。
> The design is pretty ugly but they got to see a bit more inside.
这个设计很难看,但是他们得多看一些里面的东西。
> What was it actually like to work at Uber before they applied.
在他们申请之前,在优步工作到底是什么感觉?
> It was a pretty big success on both sides.
双方都取得了很大的成功。
> So then we really set about building word of mouth.
所以我们真的开始建立口碑了。
> We had this platform our original concept was actually geared to professional women.
我们有了这个平台,我们最初的概念实际上是面向职业女性的。
> And so we thought to ourselves all right what are the ways to get users with no money with absolutely no we had no reputations with no connections.
所以我们想,好吧,有什么方法可以让用户没有钱,绝对没有,我们没有名声,没有联系。
> The four things we found to be super effective.
我们发现的四件事非常有效。
> One was just asking for word of mouth.
一个只是想要口碑。
> So when we launched the muse I scraped my gmail for everyone that I had emailed with over the past three years.
所以,当我们推出缪斯时,我为过去三年中与我一起发过邮件的人收集了我的 Gmail。
> I took out things like Do not reply at pay pal.
我拿出了一些东西,比如不要在工资上回复。
> I took out things that were clearly someone that was either a bot or that I hadn\'t communicated with and for everyone else I sent a really nice short email that said I want to let you know we\'re launching Muze.
我拿出了一些很明显是机器人的东西,或者我没有和其他人沟通的东西。对于其他人,我发了一封非常好的短邮件,上面写着我想让你知道我们要发射 Muze 了。
> I had a one line description and I said if you want to share on social here\'s a tweet so people could literally copy paste a post because if you ask people to tweet you don\'t tell them what to tweet.
我有一句话描述,我说如果你想在社交网站上分享,这里有一条推文,这样人们就可以直接复制粘贴一条帖子,因为如果你要求人们发推,你就不会告诉他们该发什么。
> A lot of people won\'t bother and send it to so many people that Google actually shut down my account because they thought it was a spammer.
很多人都不愿意把它发送给这么多人,以至于 Google 实际上关闭了我的账户,因为他们认为它是垃圾邮件发送者。
> I think that happens anyway at about twelve hundred e-mails in one day.
我想至少在一天之内就会发生 1200 封电子邮件。
> So you don\'t actually recommend doing that.
所以你不建议这么做。
> But we asked a lot of people to help us.
但我们请了很多人来帮我们。
> We also reached out to like minded groups so since we were doing a women\'s career site I reached out to probably 6 700 groups individually small professional organizations massive industry groups and I said this is what I\'m doing and I\'d love your feedback so if you just ask people to share office it\'s it\'s almost like you\'re asking for something from them instead of saying I would love your opinion and we don\'t get a lot of great opinions and obviously a lot of people shared it and then content the content thing.
我们也接触到志同道合的群体,因此,既然我们在做一个女性职业网站,我接触到了大约 6700 个团体,个别的小型专业组织,大规模的行业团体,我说这就是我正在做的,我很喜欢你的反馈,所以如果你只要求人们分享办公室,它就像你要求他们的东西,而不是说我会爱他们。你的意见,我们没有得到很多伟大的意见,很明显,许多人分享它,然后满足的内容的东西。
> Become your best friend again.
再次成为你最好的朋友。
> When we were trying to get an audience and get awareness around what it was we were doing.
当我们试图吸引观众并了解我们在做什么的时候。
> One of the most effective things for us was creating great content on career issues because if I posted a site right now and I said I\'m looking for people who want jobs in New York and San Francisco.
对我们来说,最有效的事情之一是在职业问题上创造很好的内容,因为如果我现在发布了一个网站,我说我正在寻找想在纽约和旧金山工作的人。
> That\'s a relatively small percentage of people in this room or in the general population.
这是一个相对较小的比例,在这个房间里或在一般人口中。
> But if I say I have a really great article on how to be more effective at answering e-mail or how to master the informational interview there\'s a much wider population of people that draws it was one of the reasons I think that as we grew we were able to create our own PR and our own buzz.
但是,如果我说我有一篇关于如何更有效地回复电子邮件或如何掌握信息面试的文章,那就有更多的人参与,这也是我认为随着我们的成长,我们能够创造出自己的公关和自己的热议的原因之一。
> And then despite the fact that we were growing we entered the fundraising trough of sorrow.
然后,尽管我们在成长,我们进入了悲伤的筹资槽。
> So this is the fall of 2011 and we had this baby site on the off the ground that we were seeing about 70000 people a month coming to visit it in our first and our third month alive.
这是 2011 年的秋天,我们在地上看到了这个婴儿网站,我们每个月都能看到大约 70000 人在我们活着的第一个月和第三个月访问这个网站。
> And yet we were kind of running into the same issues over and over and over again.
然而,我们一次又一次地遇到同样的问题。
> In fact I pitched 148 people sorry 150 people in New York City.
事实上,我在纽约市向 148 人道歉,150 人道歉。
> I like to joke that I\'ve pitched every single investor in New York City at least once.
我喜欢开玩笑说,我至少在纽约市向每一个投资者推销过一次。
> I pitched 150 of them and 148 said no and 2 said maybe come back to us.
我投了其中的 150 个,148 个说没有,2 个说也许会回到我们身边。
> I like what you\'re doing and it is interested in content was very very unsexy in 2011.
我喜欢你所做的事情,它对 2011 年的内容非常不感兴趣。
> So I think there\'s a lot of ways that the themes of the investment market can affect how people are interested in what you\'re doing.
所以我认为投资市场的主题会影响人们对你所做的事情的兴趣。
> Job Search was also not actually sexy and we were also running up against some really interesting long held stereotypes.
找工作也不是很性感,我们也遇到了一些有趣的、长期持有的陈词滥调。
> So since at the time we were targeting professional women I had a lot of people say things to me like well.
所以,自从我们把目标对准职业女性以来,我有很多人对我说得很好。
> Are those women going to lose interest in your site.
那些女人会对你的网站失去兴趣吗。
> Once they turn 30 and have babies I was like No it doesn\'t actually work that way anymore.
一旦他们到了 30 岁,生了孩子,我就像不一样了。
> Thank you for your input.
谢谢你的意见。
> We had a lot of really interesting really really interesting feedback.
我们得到了很多非常有趣的反馈。
> Also had you.
还有你。
> The people people said things like well I\'m sure women in New York really care about their careers.
人们说得很好,我确信纽约的女性真的很关心她们的职业生涯。
> But once you get outside of that you know.
但一旦你走出了困境你就知道了。
> So we have to also do a little bit of of kind of telling a lot of the investors we were speaking that we weren\'t building necessarily a product for people like them.
因此,我们还得对很多投资者说,我们并不一定要为像他们这样的人打造一种产品。
> We were building a product for someone who is 27 years old living in Chicago orSt.
我们在为住在芝加哥或圣的 27 岁的人建造一种产品。
> Lewis or Boston who wants to do something different than what they\'re doing right now.
刘易斯或波士顿,他们想做一些与他们现在所做的不同的事情。
> It doesn\'t necessarily have their personal network to get there.
它不一定有他们的个人网络到达那里。
> What was interesting is the first people who gave us a 100 percent definitive yes was Y Combinator.
有趣的是,第一批给我们 100%确定答案的人是 Y 组合器(YCombinator)。
> So this is us.
这就是我们。
> On the day we interviewed we were absolute fucking terrified.
在我们采访的那天,我们他妈的吓坏了。
> We were also a little bit though I think we were a little bit of raw is the right word but by the time we did our Weiss\'s application I felt like I had been turned down by so many people.
我们也有一点,虽然我认为我们有点原始是正确的话,但当我们做了 Weiss 的申请时,我觉得我已经被很多人拒绝了。
> I really give a fuck if anyone else turned down and I think actually put in our application which is online.
如果其他人拒绝了,我真的很在乎,我想我真的把我们的应用程序放在网上了。
> If you google the muse why the application you could probably find it.
如果你在谷歌上搜索应用程序的原因,你可能会找到它。
> We publish our entire application and I think actually where the line in there which was like even if you don\'t find us and we hope you fund us.
我们发布了我们的整个应用程序,我认为实际上在哪里,在那里,就像,即使你找不到我们,我们希望你为我们提供资金。
> But even if you don\'t for us we\'re going to do exactly this and we\'re going to take over the world.
但即使你不支持我们,我们也会做到这一点,我们将接管这个世界。
> I basically told them like you know take it or leave it.
我基本上告诉他们,就像你知道,要么接受,要么离开。
> And I think that sort of attitude that we were going to make this work come hell or high water or anything really resonated and you know we were watching that really terrible.
我认为这种态度,我们会让这件事发生在地狱或高水区,或者其他任何东西上,你知道,我们看到的是非常糟糕的场面。
> I think it was a George Clooney movie the movie The Ides of March.
我想是乔治·克鲁尼的电影“三月的偶像”。
> I don\'t remember any of it.
我什么都不记得了。
> We were sitting there and my phone was on the seat between Alex and I.
我们坐在那里,我的手机在亚历克斯和我之间的座位上。
> And it lit up with the number from y c.
上面点亮了 YC 的号码。
> And you know if you if they call you you\'ve gotten in and if they e-mail you haven\'t.
如果他们打电话给你,你就会知道,如果他们给你发了电子邮件,你就没有了。
> And I went tearing out of the theater with Alex Melyssa following me and I put it on speaker.
我和亚历克斯·梅尔萨跟着我从戏院里走了出来,我把它放在扬声器上。
> Of course whenP.J.
当然当 P.J.。
> said you know we want to invite you to be in the next class.
你知道我们想邀请你参加下一堂课。
> Melissa started screaming and I\'m like you know put it back on mute.
梅丽莎开始尖叫,我就像你知道的,把它放回静音里。
> But it was really exciting.
但那真的很令人兴奋。
> And we felt like we have arrived.
我们觉得我们已经到了。
> We have been funded by we I see it.
我们已经得到了我们的资助,我看到了。
> Our troubles are over.
我们的麻烦结束了。
> And as Jack said that is never true.
就像杰克说的那样,这从来都不是真的。
> I don\'t think it\'s ever possible to say like we\'re here.
我不认为我们在这里是不可能的。
> Our troubles are completely over.
我们的麻烦完全结束了。
> In fact as soon as we got accepted to see we started thinking really big and in fact too big because our first ideas were insanely complicated.
事实上,当我们被接受的时候,我们就开始想得很大,实际上太大了,因为我们最初的想法非常复杂。
> This is a mock that we made of what we wanted the muse to look like in January 2012 right when we started Y C and it has a ton going on.
这是我们在 2012 年 1 月刚开始使用 YC 的时候,我们想让这个缪斯看起来像什么样子的模仿,而且它还在继续。
> There\'s seven different features here.
这里有七个不同的特征。
> It was going to you know pull in from all your different social networks and be optimized for your personality and a million other things.
你知道,从你所有不同的社交网络中拉进来,并对你的个性和其他事情进行优化。
> And I remember going into a meeting with PGE and a couple other partners and we were so proud and we started to kind of explain and put on the whiteboard.
我记得我和 PGE 和其他几个合作伙伴开了个会,我们很自豪,我们开始解释,然后在白板上。
> And within seconds he\'s like whoa just launch already and.
几秒钟之内,他就像哇,已经发射了。
> And that was I mean that was a big moment for us.
我是说,这对我们来说是个重要的时刻。
> He basically said this will never get off the ground.
他基本上说这永远不会离开地面。
> You will never be able to test which of these seven things people are excited.
你永远无法测试这七件事中的哪一件让人兴奋。
> Pick one.
选一个。
> Strip it down and launch and start to test Amand.
把它拆下来,发射,开始测试阿曼德。
> And so within the next 14 days we redesigned the profiles found five companies to be clients sent photographers from our network into their offices and launched on Tech Crunch February 22nd.
因此,在接下来的 14 天里,我们重新设计了这些简介,发现五家公司都是客户,将摄影师从我们的网络发送到他们的办公室,并于 2 月 22 日在 TechCrunch 上发布。
> Now it has obviously been a pretty crazy road since then.
从那以后,这显然是一条相当疯狂的道路。
> We know we were reaching about 100000 people a month when we launched.
我们知道,当我们启动的时候,我们每个月要接触到大约 100000 人。
> We\'re seeing about a million and a half a month now.
我们现在看到大约一百五十万个月了。
> We work with 200 brands which never would have happened if we had not obviously upgraded and iterated the design.
我们与 200 个品牌合作,如果我们没有明显升级和迭代设计,这是不可能发生的。
> But there\'s there\'s basically a couple of key things that I feel like we learned the hard way.
但基本上有几件关键的事情,我觉得我们是很难学到的。
> Luckily less so that I want to run through my last couple of minutes.
幸运的是,我想跑完最后几分钟。
> The first is is honoring your word and not just contracts.
第一是遵守诺言,而不仅仅是合同。
> And I was actually thinking about this in the context of the startup community people say it\'s often very very small.
实际上,我是在创业社区的背景下思考这个问题的,人们说它通常很小。
> It\'s also very informal.
这也是非常非正式的。
> And so I think it\'s very common sometimes for people to have handshake agreements on one hand.
因此,我认为,人们有时一方面有握手协议,这是非常普遍的。
> I have been the victim of handshake agreements gone terribly wrong.
我是握手协议出了大错的受害者。
> So I like to tell people when you\'re doing an agreement especially if it\'s founding a company working for a company to make sure you get things in writing.
所以,我喜欢在你签订协议的时候告诉人们,特别是如果你正在创建一家公司,为一家公司工作,以确保你得到书面的东西。
> But even if you are the one in a position of power if you are the one with the company think is incredibly important to be known as someone who will honor your word and not just the contract especially because there\'s always unexpected bumps.
但是,即使你是处于权力地位的人,如果你是公司的人,你也认为被称为将遵守你的诺言而不仅仅是合同的人是极其重要的,特别是因为总是会有意想不到的颠簸。
> So one of the examples is our first hire ever was an awesome moment.
其中一个例子是,我们的第一次招聘是一个令人敬畏的时刻。
> Adrian who\'s I think also in the audience tonight and you know she she really wanted to hire her early on but we were we were dead broke.
阿德里安,我想今晚也在观众中,你知道她很早就想雇用她,但我们已经破产了。
> We had you know we didn\'t have the money to pay our own rent.
我们让你知道我们没有钱支付我们自己的房租。
> I think we were like bartering for everything that we got.
我想我们就像在物物交换我们得到的一切。
> And so you and I talked and I was like look we can pay you like this little bit amount of money consistently and then in three or four months once we raise you we\'ll pay you back a little bit more I\'m still not a lot but I was like.
所以你和我聊了起来,我觉得我们可以像以前一样给你一点钱,然后再过三四个月,一旦我们把你养大了,我们会多还你一点钱,我还是不多,但我是这样的。
> I\'ll get you that money.
我会给你那笔钱的。
> The second bit by November 1st 2011 and October 2011 I start having stress ulcers because we are not yet in Y Combinator.
到 2011 年 11 月 1 日和 2011 年 10 月,我开始有压力溃疡,因为我们还没有进入 Y 组合器。
> We definitely do not have money and we were seeing the numbers go in the right way I knew that the business had something at its core that was very that could be successful but we certainly weren\'t there now and so I had to go to her and say this is exactly what\'s going on.
我们肯定没有钱,我们看到数字是正确的-我知道公司的核心有一些非常可能成功的东西,但我们现在肯定不在那里,所以我不得不去找她,说这就是正在发生的事情。
> If you if you want you I will honor the agreement and we can essentially kind of I\'ll figure out a way to get you the money by November 1st or if you\'re all right with it.
如果你想要你,我会遵守协议的,我们基本上可以想办法在 11 月 1 日前给你弄到钱,或者如果你同意的话。
> You know I think we\'ll have money by mid December and luckily she was all right with it.
你知道,我想我们会在十二月中旬有钱的,幸运的是她还好。
> We raised after when we got into I see we got a little bit of capital.
我们长大后,当我们进入,我看到我们有一点资金。
> We were able to sort of make everything right.
我们能把一切都做好。
> But I think having that having that reputation and making it be very core is something that I think could take you a far a long way especially when I mean shit just sometimes doesn\'t go according to plan.
但我认为拥有这样的声誉并使之成为核心是我认为可能会让你走得很远的事情,特别是当我的意思有时不符合计划的时候。
> The second that also covered with his idea that the Dun is better than perfect and that you have to start somewhere that you cannot win if you don\'t Pasko.
第二个问题也包含了他的观点,即 Dun 比完美更好,你必须先从一个如果你没有帕斯科就不可能赢的地方开始。
> And it\'s so easy especially when you have an idea and you know that some people are gonna say that idea is stupid that will never work.
这很容易,特别是当你有一个想法,而你知道有些人会说这个想法是愚蠢的,永远行不通。
> Why.
为什么
> What are you thinking about why do you just go back and get a nice job.
你在想什么?你为什么要回去找份好工作。
> I think it\'s really easy to sort of sit in the corner and polish your idea and say well some day some day.
我觉得坐在角落里磨练你的想法,总有一天会说得好。
> But ultimately I think the best ideas they need to be out in the world so they can survive the test of real customers.
但最终,我认为,他们需要的最好的想法,在世界上,这样他们才能经受住真正的客户的考验。
> There\'s is another thing that happens I think quite frequently someone will have an idea and they only tell a few people close to them.
还有另一件事发生,我认为经常有人会有一个想法,他们只告诉少数接近他们的人。
> But those are the people who love you.
但是那些爱你的人。
> If you tell your mom I\'m going to start a company aimed at you know I don\'t know.
如果你告诉你妈妈我要开一家针对你的公司,你知道我不知道。
> Being Zappos for dogs like your mom probably thinks it\'s an awesome idea.
像你妈妈这样的狗 Zappos 可能认为这是个很棒的主意。
> It may be a great idea but I don\'t think you can know that until you have real strangers who don\'t care about you who don\'t know anything about you look at it and use it.
这也许是个好主意,但我认为你不可能知道,除非你有真正的陌生人不关心你,谁不知道你的任何东西,看看它并使用它。
> And obviously it\'s about finding the people that are the use case because if you find people who are cat lovers who hate dogs like they may not get the idea.
很明显,这是为了找到用例中的人,因为如果你发现那些喜欢爱猫的人,喜欢狗的人,他们可能就不明白了。
> And that\'s totally okay.
这完全没问题。
> And the final thing is you know this is the news now that\'s news that nobody looks at the site and thinks wow that\'s going to be a world changing billion dollar company.
最后一件事是,你知道,这是现在的新闻,因为没有人看这个网站,并认为哇,那将是一个改变世界的十亿美元的公司。
> That\'s OK because we got it out there and we got just far enough to get to the next step to get to the next step and to get to a point where obviously we\'re still really far from being where I\'d like us to go but the path gets a little bit clearer every time you move down it.
这没关系,因为我们已经走到了那里,我们已经走到了足够远的地方,到了下一步,很显然,我们离我希望我们去的地方还有很远的距离,但是每次你往下走的时候,这条路就会变得更清晰一些。
> The next thing is to be insanely persistent but also very very polite.
下一件事是疯狂的坚持,但也是非常礼貌的。
> Most things in a startup you will not get by asking once in fact for a lot of the partnerships that we\'ve gotten the deals that have made a massive success for our business it was never the first time we asked for them or very very rarely was that first time someone said Oh why yes of course I\'ll give you massive amounts of traffic from my media publication.
在一家初创企业中,大多数事情你都不会得到-事实上,我们已经获得了很多合作伙伴关系-我们的业务已经取得了巨大成功-这不是我们第一次提出这样的要求,或者很少有人第一次说-哦,为什么-当然,我会从我的媒体出版物中给你大量的流量。
> It\'s often about figuring out what it is that you have even if you don\'t have much that the other party is excited about.
这往往是为了弄清楚你拥有的是什么,即使你没有其他人兴奋的东西。
> Who\'s the right person to ask.
谁是合适的人选。
> When we first launched one of the ways that we got a lot of early traffic to the news was that I noticed that Forbes had a contributor program where they would publish content from outside sources.
当我们第一次推出这条新闻的方式之一是,我注意到“福布斯”有一个撰稿人程序,他们会从外部来源发布内容。
> And so I went to Forbes and I said I want to send you I want to give you career content that we\'re going to write from the news and in exchange I want you to put at the bottom.
所以我去了“福布斯”,我说我想送你,我想给你提供我们将要从新闻中写的职业内容,作为交换,我希望你把它放在底部。
> This content was originally published on the news link link link.
该内容最初发布在新闻链接上。
> And the first person I talked to that I asked didn\'t answer my e-mail.
我问的第一个人没有回复我的电子邮件。
> And the second person that I asked about a week or two later didn\'t answer my e-mail.
而我在一两周后询问的第二个人没有回复我的电子邮件。
> The third the fourth time we found the right person.
第三次,也就是第四次,我们找到了合适的人。
> They made the deal happen.
他们达成了协议。
> And again in our first month Forbes sent around 5000 people to the news and a lot of those people stuck around because they had come for something that was very on brand and then essentially been sucked into our ecosystem.
在我们的第一个月里,“福布斯”又派了大约 5000 人来看新闻,其中很多人一直呆在那里,因为他们是为了某种非常有品牌的东西而来的,然后又被吸进了我们的生态系统。
> Similarly with with investing I think you know we we certainly more than anyone else have felt like sometimes the best way is obviously it\'s not always about being persistent with the same people but understanding that you have to figure out what is it about what you\'re doing or what you\'re asking for or what you\'re offering that is going to be most of interest to the other party and then find the right person and be very polite but very very persistent until you make it happen.
与投资类似,我想你知道,我们当然比其他人感觉到的更多,有时候最好的方式显然不是总是对同一个人坚持不懈,而是理解你必须弄清楚你在做什么,你要求什么,或者你提供什么,这才是对方最感兴趣的事情。然后找到合适的人,非常礼貌,但非常坚持不懈,直到你成功。
> This one I\'ve touched on a little bit but it is find people who share your values.
这个我已经触及了一点点,但它是找到与你的价值观相同的人。
> Otherwise it will ruin your life.
否则它会毁了你的生活。
> My first company was not only a failure because we had flat growth and a relatively uninspired product but it was also a failure because we had a essentially a business dispute between founders that cost people a lot of money that led to my life savings and those of some other people being kind of sucked away and it was ultimately relatively foreseeable because there were a couple of red flags around values issues how you treat people that the people saw and the people overlooked and I absolutely did this because when you\'re so focused on the product you\'re so focused on the vision it\'s really easy to say Oh like you know yeah we don\'t really maybe share values but it will all work out and I can absolutely say I think one of the smartest things that I\'ve ever done is make sure that very very focused on working with people both externally and internally.
我的第一家公司不仅失败了,因为我们增长平平,产品相对缺乏灵感,而且我们的失败也是因为我们的创始人之间发生了本质上的商业纠纷,花费了很多钱,导致了我和其他一些人的毕生积蓄被吸走,这最终也是可以预见的,因为我们有几个人。关于价值观的危险信号是关于你如何对待人们看到的人和被忽视的人,我绝对是这样做的,因为当你如此专注于产品时,你会很容易地说,哦,就像你知道的,我们并不是真的分享价值,但这一切都会得到解决,我绝对可以说,我认为最聪明的事情之一。我曾经做过的事情是确保非常专注于与外部和内部的人一起工作。
> And this goes to investors we\'ve turned down money from people who had very clear different value systems.
对投资者来说,我们拒绝了那些有着明显不同价值体系的人的资金。
> We had to let people go for ethics lapses but I think it keeps your core very strong and it attracts people to you who also value that in others.
我们不得不让人们去追求道德失当,但我认为它使你的核心非常强大,它吸引着那些也重视他人的人。
> Creating velocity.
创造速度。
> We talked a little bit about this before but a lot of people I think think of startups kind of like the Field of Dreams which is you know if you build it they will come.
我们以前讨论过这个问题,但是很多人,我认为创业公司有点像“梦想领域”,也就是说,你知道,如果你建造它,它们就会出现。
> But actually that is in fact not how a lot of startups work.
但事实上,许多初创企业并不是这样运作的。
> You can have an amazing product you can put it out there and if you people see it unless those are the exact 20 people that are going to be excited about what you\'re offering that are going to be the core users and they tell us and they tell others you may have something that\'s amazing but you won\'t be able to get it in front of the right people.
你可以拥有一个令人惊叹的产品,你可以把它放在那里,如果你的人看到了,除非你提供的是 20 个人,他们会对你提供的产品感到兴奋,他们会告诉我们,他们告诉我们,你可能拥有一些令人惊奇的东西,但你无法在合适的人面前得到它。
> And so I think thinking not only about what you\'re going to create how it\'ll be built what it\'s growth planning but also who is it exactly who are the right users and how do you find them.
因此,我认为,不仅仅是你想要创造什么,它将如何构建,它的增长计划是什么,它到底是谁,谁是正确的用户,你是如何找到他们的。
> How do you find the people that are going to become evangelists for your product.
你如何找到那些将要成为你产品传道者的人?
> Where are they now.
他们现在哪。
> How do you get in front of them and how do you incentivize them to talk about it in front of other people.
你如何在他们面前,以及如何激励他们在别人面前谈论这件事。
> It\'s the difference ultimately between being dead and not being dead.
这是死与不死之间的最终区别。
> In my opinion.
照我的想法
> 6 build an amazing team.
6 建立一个了不起的团队。
> So I love this picture because this in front is Doug.
所以我喜欢这张照片因为前面这张是道格。
> He\'s our director of sales.
他是我们的销售部主任。
> On his first day of work was April 1st of this past year.
他工作的第一天是去年的 4 月 1 日。
> April fools day.
愚人节。
> And so we decided to be really fun to all dress up in formal wear for his first day in the office.
所以我们决定让他在办公室的第一天穿正式的衣服很有趣。
> See how long it took him to notice.
看看他花了多长时间才注意到。
> Of course the first five people are in suits and button downs.
当然,头五个人都穿着西装和扣子。
> He\'s like looking a little confused.
他看起来有点困惑。
> Finally I think somebody walked in and like a full suit and bright blue sneakers.
最后,我想有人走了进来,喜欢上了一套完整的西装和亮蓝色的运动鞋。
> He\'s like wait a second you guys are pranking me.
他就像等一下你们在开玩笑。
> It was really funny way to kind of welcome him.
欢迎他的方式真的很有趣。
> But for us I think building especially when you\'re asking people to go above and beyond to create something and creating something that hasn\'t existed before building a company.
但对我们来说,我认为建筑,尤其是当你要求人们超越和超越去创造一些东西,创造一些在创建公司之前还没有存在的东西的时候。
> It\'s really really hard.
这真的很难。
> And you often don\'t have a lot of cash to compensate people.
而且你通常没有足够的现金来补偿人们。
> So I talk to people sometimes and they say well you know I can\'t recruit people away from Google they have so much more money than I do.
所以我有时和人们交谈,他们说,嗯,你知道,我不能从谷歌招人,他们比我有更多的钱。
> If all people wanted was money then yes they will probably be working at Google instead of your startup.
如果人们只想要钱,那么是的,他们可能会在谷歌工作,而不是你的创业公司。
> But there\'s so many things that motivate people.
但是有太多的事情可以激励人们。
> I love when recruiting to figure out especially if you\'re.
我喜欢招聘人员,特别是如果你是。
> You want to hire someone you\'re very excited.
你想雇一个你很兴奋的人。
> Figure out what motivates them.
找出他们的动机。
> Like would they be excited to speak on a panel as a representative of your company.
作为你公司的代表,他们会很兴奋地在一个小组上发言吗?
> Would they be excited if you could help them meet other people in their industry or set them up with a class or a tutorial of some sort of expertise.
如果你能帮助他们认识他们所在行业的其他人,或者为他们安排一门课程或某种专门知识的教程,他们会感到兴奋吗?
> Is there a new skill that they\'re really interested in learning that you can help them learn.
有没有一种他们真正感兴趣的新技能,你可以帮助他们学习。
> Because you\'re a small company and there\'s lots of things that need being done when you figure out what it is that motivates people other than money and then help them achieve that.
因为你是一家小公司,当你弄清楚是什么激励了人们,而不是金钱,然后帮助他们实现这一点的时候,就需要做很多事情。
> Help them achieve their professional goals.
帮助他们实现他们的职业目标。
> Think it\'s an unbelievable powerful way to build a team especially when you\'re very very strapped for cash and if you\'re looking about kind of where to find people that are classic examples you know you can post your jobs on LinkedIn or indeed the muse and ángeles are good for Startup Jobs.
你认为这是建立一个团队的一种难以置信的强大方式,尤其是当你非常缺乏资金的时候,如果你在寻找一些典型的例子,你知道你可以在 LinkedIn 上发布你的工作,或者说 Muse 和ángeles 对创业很有好处。
> I really like the dead pool.
我真的很喜欢死水池。
> We\'ve only used this once or twice but it\'s essentially keeping an eye out for on Hacker News on Tech Crunch whose startup is losing people whose startup is not doing so well.
我们只使用过一两次,但它本质上是在关注科技公司的黑客新闻,他的初创公司正在失去那些初创公司做得不太好的人。
> I remember once when we were really early and we were kind of desperate for early hires group shart got hit by a massive lawsuit and I went to link was looking everyone a group to see whether anyone seemed like they might be interesting and available.
我记得有一次,当我们真的很早的时候,我们非常渴望能得到早期的员工,但遭到了一场大官司的打击,我去联系每个人,看看是否有一个人看起来很有趣,也很容易找到他们。
> I call that lurking but it can actually be a really effective way and also getting out there and networking speaking.
我称之为潜伏,但它实际上可以是一种非常有效的方式,也可以走出去和网络说话。
> I think at least two of our awesome people on our team have come because they\'ve been in the audience.
我认为我们团队中至少有两位很棒的人来了,因为他们都在观众席上。
> When I was giving some talk brother and they\'re like it\'s pretty interesting.
当我做演讲的时候,兄弟,他们觉得很有趣。
> Maybe I\'ll investigate more in one month three months six months later.
也许一个月后我会调查更多,三个月后,六个月后。
> They join your team and the last thing I want to talk to all about today the last point I want to make is you cannot cannot believe the hype.
他们加入了你们的队伍,我今天最不想谈的就是我最后想说的一点,那就是你不能相信这种炒作。
> We\'re in an industry where it seems like everyone is raising ten million dollars on you know from Andriessen or being on the front page of Tech Crunch or succeeding in some other massive way.
我们所处的行业似乎每个人都在从 Andriessen 那里筹集到 1000 万美元,或者出现在 TechCrunch 的头版,或者以其他方式获得成功。
> But it really is the most extreme version of that cliche that you\'re comparing your day to day with everyone else\'s highlight reel.
但这确实是最极端的陈词滥调,你将你的日常生活与其他人的高亮卷轴进行比较。
> And I think that\'s why getting very close to your product and understanding your numbers and your users and what drives them to come to you what drives them to use your product and to tell their friends to come back everyday is so powerful.
我认为这就是为什么非常接近你的产品,了解你的数字和用户,以及是什么驱使他们来找你,是什么驱使他们使用你的产品,告诉他们每天回来的原因是如此的强大。
> Because when 148 investors told us No it was really tempting to think well maybe they\'re right and we\'re wrong.
因为当 148 名投资者对我们说“不”的时候,我们真的很容易想到,也许他们是对的,我们错了。
> I mean who are we.
我是说我们是谁。
> Who are we to say that we actually think there\'s something powerful here.
我们凭什么说我们真的认为这里有某种强大的东西。
> But the closer you are to your users and I think to that data the easier it is to start to see that 300 people goes to 3000 goes to 3 million and it\'s much much much harder to ignore.
但是你离你的用户越近,而且我认为对于这些数据,你就越容易看到 300 到 3000 到 300 万,这就更难被忽视了。
> And it is very very satisfying to smile at all the people who told you you couldn\'t do it.
对所有告诉你做不到的人微笑是非常令人满意的。
> So thank you so much.
所以非常感谢你。
- Zero to One 从0到1 | Tony翻译版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把产品做好,顾客们会来吗?
- Ch12: 人与机器
- Ch13: 展望绿色科技
- Ch14: 创始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 创业课 2012 中文笔记
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2012
- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
- David Rusenko at Startup School 2012
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
- 斯坦福 CS183b YC 创业课文字版
- 关于 Y Combinator
- 【创业百道节选】如何正确的阅读创业鸡汤
- YC 创业第一课:你真的愿意创业吗
- YC 创业第二课:团队与执行
- YC 创业第三课:与直觉对抗
- YC 创业第四课:如何积累初期用户
- YC 创业第五课:失败者才谈竞争
- YC 创业第六课:没有留存率不要谈推广
- YC 创业第七课:与你的用户谈恋爱
- YC 创业第八课:创业要学会吃力不讨好
- YC 创业第九课:投资是极端的游戏
- YC 创业第十课:企业文化决定命运
- YC 创业第11课:企业文化需培育
- YC 创业第12课:来开发企业级产品吧
- YC 创业第13课,创业者的条件
- YC 创业第14课:像个编辑一样去管理
- YC 创业第15课:换位思考
- YC 创业第16课:如何做用户调研
- YC 创业第17课:Jawbone 不是硬件公司
- YC 创业第18课:划清个人与公司的界限
- YC 创业第19课(上):销售如漏斗
- YC 创业第19课(下):与投资人的两分钟
- YC 创业第20课:不再打磨产品
- YC 创业课 2013 中文笔记
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
- 斯坦福 CS183c 闪电式扩张中文笔记
- 1: 家庭阶段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 寻找闪电蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 创业课 SV 2014 中文笔记
- Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014
- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
- Kevin Systrom at Startup School SV 2014
- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 创业课 NY 2014 中文笔记
- Apoorva Mehta at Startup School NY 2014
- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
- Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
- YC 创业课 EU 2014 中文笔记
- Adora Cheung
- Alfred Lin with Justin Kan
- Hiroki Takeuchi
- Ian Hogarth
- Introduction by Kirsty Nathoo
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
- Patrick Collison
- Paul Buchheit
- Urska Srsen
- Y Combinator Partners Q&A
- YC 创业课 2016 中文笔记
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School SV 2016
- Chad Rigetti at Startup School SV 2016
- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
- Office Hours with Kevin Hale and Qasar Younis at Startup School SV 2016
- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
- Q&A with YC Partners at Startup School SV 2016
- Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 创业课 2017 中文笔记
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 创业课 2018 中文笔记
- Sam Altman - 如何成功创业
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初创企业法律机制
- 与 Paul Graham 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 构建产品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到适合产品市场的产品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何测量产品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何获得用户和发展
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增长的公关+内容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何销售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 组建工程团队
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申请和成功
- Patrick Collison - 运营你的创业公司
- Geoff Ralston - 筹款基础
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保险箱和定价股票轮
- Aaron Harris - 如何与投资者会面并筹集资金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 亿美元之路
- PMF 后:人员、客户、销售
- 与 Oshma Garg 的对话 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 与 Aileen Lee 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 1 部分
- 与 Elizabeth Iorns 的对话 - 生物技术创始人的建议
- 与 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技术对话
- 与 Elad Gil 的对话
- 与 Werner Vogels 的对话
- YC 创业课 2019 中文笔记
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何与用户交谈
- Ali Rowghani - 如何领导
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 数字初创学校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建议
- Michael Seibel - 如何计划 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何设定关键绩效指标和目标
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初创企业分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九种商业模式和投资者想要的指标
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投资者如何衡量创业公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何启动(续集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新兴企业的成长
- Kirsty Nathoo - 创业财务陷阱以及如何避免它们
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 构建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 关于枢轴的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高转化率
- Kevin Hale - 创业定价 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排时间
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 现代创业融资
- Jared Friedman - 硬技术和生物技术创始人的建议