# Diane Greene at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` Hi there. `[00:00:00]` 你好。 > I\'ve been in this auditorium once before. 我以前来过这个礼堂一次。 > I think it was before you were born. 我想是在你出生之前。 > It was 1989 and I was working for Tandem Computers which was one of the biggest companies in Silicon Valley and the very wonderful irreverent Founder CEO was holding an all hands meeting. 那是 1989 年，我为串列电脑工作，这是硅谷最大的公司之一，这位非常不敬的创始人首席执行官正在举行一次全员会议。 > And I was in the audience as a software engineer. 当时我是一名软件工程师。 > So it\'s pretty special to be here today. 所以今天来这里很特别。 > I\'ve done three startups. 我做了三次创业。 > The first one was a low band BMW streaming video company the extreme that Microsoft bought was the basis for their movie player and came out of Silicon Graphics Internet television project. 第一家是一家低频段的宝马流媒体视频公司，微软收购了这家公司，这是他们的电影播放器的基础，也是硅谷图形网络电视项目的基础。 > And then I\'m doing a startup right now which I\'m not going to talk about. 然后我现在正在做一家创业公司，我不打算谈论这个问题。 > And then the second startup I cofounded was VM in that I\'m going to try and sort of tell you a little bit about how we got going on VMware and how that company started just by way of background we founded the company in 1998. 然后我共同创立的第二家初创公司是 VM，我会试着告诉大家我们是如何使用 VMware 的，以及该公司是如何在 1998 年成立的。 > `[00:01:21]` It\'s virtualization we created sort of the virtualization industry and what it is it\'s a layer of software that sits between the hardware and the operating system kind of fakes out the operating system to think it\'s running on the hardware lets you run multiple operating systems that can be moved around on a single computer across computers and works on desktops and servers and increases efficiency makes things easier to use and so forth. `[00:01:21]` 我们创建了某种虚拟化行业，它是一层介于硬件和操作系统之间的软件，它伪造了操作系统，以为它运行在硬件上，让您可以在一台计算机上运行多个操作系统，在桌面和服务器上工作，提高效率，使用起来更容易等等。 > So that was what we did. 所以我们就是这么做的。 > I left the company in 2008. 2008 年我离开了公司。 > Our run rate was about 2 billion. 我们的运行速度大约是 20 亿。 > We grew my last quarter we had year over year growth of 54 percent. 我最后一个季度增长了，同比增长了 54%。 > About 6000 people in offices all over the world. 在世界各地的办公室里大约有 6000 人。 > `[00:02:04]` And it continues to be an even bigger company today okay. `[00:02:04]` 现在它仍然是一家更大的公司，好吗？ > `[00:02:11]` So one thing we did when we startedV.M. `[00:02:11]` 所以当我们开始工作的时候，我们做了一件事。 > where was we had a big vision. 我们在哪里有一个远大的愿景。 > `[00:02:16]` And to lessen constraints and facilitate innovation for other system builders as well as end users of computers. `[00:02:16]` 并为其他系统建设者和计算机的最终用户减少限制和促进创新。 > And we also pushed ourselves. 我们也在努力。 > We said it would be ubiquitous by the year 2000. 我们说到 2000 年它将无处不在。 > We missed by a good six years or so but we did make it ubiquitous. 我们错过了六年左右，但我们确实使它无处不在。 > `[00:02:36]` And then we we had some students leave school on us so we had a goal of getting them to get theirPh.D. `[00:02:36]` 然后我们让一些学生离开学校，所以我们的目标是让他们获得博士学位。 > and interestingly enough one of them after getting married having two kids in grade school went back to Stanford and finished his pitch. 有趣的是，其中一人在结婚后，在小学有了两个孩子，回到了斯坦福，完成了他的演讲。 > And he\'s a professor in Switzerland now. 他现在是瑞士的教授。 > `[00:02:56]` So but but we had this big vision. `[00:02:56]` 但是我们有一个远大的愿景。 > `[00:03:01]` This was our founding team minus myself I took the picture. `[00:03:01]` 这是我们的创始团队，除了我自己，我拍了这张照片。 > And it has my husband who\'s Professor of Computer Science at Stanford. 还有我的丈夫，他是斯坦福大学的计算机科学教授。 > His two of his graduate students Ed and Scott and then my husband I met at UC Berkeley and graduate school computer science and the other person came from there and then one was there employee number one. 他的两个研究生埃德和斯科特，然后我的丈夫，我在加州大学伯克利分校和研究生院，计算机科学，而另一个人来自那里，然后有一个是第一雇员。 > He was a undergraduate working on the research project. 他是研究项目的本科生。 > And I\'m proud to say that he has gone on. 我很自豪地说他还在继续。 > `[00:03:34]` Founded his own company in which Google recently bought an just for historic reasons. `[00:03:34]` 成立了自己的公司，谷歌最近出于历史原因收购了一家公司。 > `[00:03:46]` For those of you that are local. `[00:03:46]` 你们中有本地人。 > This was our first office over the cheese board in town and country shopping center. 这是我们在城镇和乡村购物中心的奶酪板上的第一个办公室。 > And I know people are paying upwards 5 6 dollars versus square foot today. 我知道今天人们花的钱比平方英尺高出 56 美元。 > We were a little luckier it was Adella 75 when we got our first office. 当我们拿到第一间办公室的时候，我们更幸运的是 75 岁的阿黛拉。 > `[00:04:03]` And one little bit of advice we didn\'t we we we made sure we had desks to sit at but we didn\'t really spend much on fixing up the office. `[00:04:03]` 还有一点建议，我们没有 > `[00:04:11]` I brought in unbelievable office manager. `[00:04:11]` 我请来了令人难以置信的办公室经理。 > She was more like the chief operating officer when we were about 10 people and that\'s when we fixed up the office. 她更像是我们 10 岁左右的首席运营官，而那就是我们设立办公室的时候。 > One other thing worth mentioning about us and our founding. 还有一件事值得一提的是我们和我们的创立者。 > Once we had decided to found the company I was I became pregnant with her second child. 一旦我们决定成立公司，我就怀上了她的第二个孩子。 > And so I wasn\'t planning to take the company all the way. 所以我并不打算一路收购这家公司。 > I said Look I\'ll get it off the ground. 我说了，我会把它从地上弄出来的。 > I know how to do a startup but I\'m just telling my second kid but it ended up you know for all the family in the audience it worked just great. 我知道如何创业，但我只是告诉我的第二个孩子，但最终，你知道，对于所有的家庭观众，它的工作非常好。 > `[00:04:48]` It actually I would have left if it wasn\'t working. `[00:04:48]` 事实上，如果它不起作用的话，我早就走了。 > My my daughter was jumping for joy when I told her I was about to do a third startup. 当我告诉我女儿我要做第三家创业公司的时候，我的女儿高兴极了。 > She\'s in high school now. 她现在上高中了。 > So it couldn\'t have been too bad for her. 所以这对她来说不算太糟。 > You just have to include them like her son\'s fifth birthday. 你只需要像她儿子的五岁生日那样把它们包括进去。 > We moved from this office to another and we rented a pickup truck which was of course his dream to get to drive a sit in our lap and drive of pickup truck. 我们从这间办公室搬到另一间办公室，租了一辆皮卡，这当然是他的梦想，那就是坐在我们的膝上，开着皮卡。 > So we really integrated the family. 所以我们真的融入了家庭。 > `[00:05:24]` OK. `[00:05:24]` 好的。 > So there were five of us funding sides. 所以我们有五个资助方。 > What we did we sell funded initially we said immediate family could put in money but no friends. 我们做了什么，我们出售的资金，最初，我们说，直系亲属可以投入资金，但没有朋友。 > We weren\'t told. 我们没有被告知。 > `[00:05:35]` I mean it took us many hours the first time I think about four hours to boot windows on Linux the first time and I was a little nervous that we were gonna get the performance down but and then once we convinced ourselves that this was really going to work. `[00:05:35]` 我的意思是，我们第一次在 Linux 上开机花了很多小时，我第一次想到在 Linux 上开机大约四个小时，我有点紧张，因为我们会降低性能，但是有一次，我们说服自己，这真的会奏效。 > We went out for angel money which very carefully chose our angels to be people that were very technically sophisticated that would understand what we were doing. 我们去寻找天使的钱，他们非常小心地选择了我们的天使，他们是技术上非常成熟的人，能够理解我们在做什么。 > So they were computer scientists it was Andy Becquerel shine. 所以他们是计算机科学家，是安迪·贝克勒尔·怀特。 > `[00:06:07]` JOHN HENNESSY And David Sheridan and because they understood it so well it only took a phone call really you know which is how a lot of angel investing I think happens. 约翰·亨尼西和大卫·谢里丹，因为他们对此非常了解，所以只需要打个电话，你知道，我认为很多天使投资都是这样发生的。 > And then once we got a little further along once we got into the market we decided you know we need a more runway we would take some more money and we do do a real outside round and we decided we were selling product at that point. 一旦我们走得更远，一旦我们进入市场，我们决定我们需要一条更多的跑道，我们会花更多的钱，我们做一个真正的户外活动，我们决定在那个时候销售产品。 > `[00:06:41]` Desktop product and so we thought well let\'s let\'s let\'s get some partners to invest in us because they\'ll be strategic. `[00:06:41]` 桌面产品，所以我们认为，让我们找一些合作伙伴来投资我们，因为他们将是战略性的。 > And so we we looked. 所以我们找了看。 > We decided that since we had we we\'re going to start down on the workstation where we\'re going to go into the server once we got into the server that would be a really difficult market to go into. 我们决定，既然有了，我们就从工作站开始，一旦我们进入服务器，就会进入服务器，这将是一个很难进入的市场。 > So let\'s get the hardware vendors to invest in us. 所以，让我们让硬件供应商投资于我们。 > So we won and then we thought well it\'s IBM Dell or HP and we thought IBM and HP could build software so they wouldn\'t be good partners in the long term perhaps but Dell we didn\'t expect. 所以我们赢了，然后我们认为这是 IBM，戴尔或惠普，我们认为 IBM 和 HP 可以开发软件，这样他们就不会成为长期的好合作伙伴，但我们没想到戴尔会这样做。 > Today they do do software but back then there was no chance they were going to do software. 今天他们做软件，但那时他们没有机会去做软件。 > And so we went to Michael Delling and convinced him to invest in us and take the lead on a round. 于是我们去找迈克尔·德林，说服他对我们进行投资，并在一轮比赛中发挥带头作用。 > And actually we were going through that round. 实际上我们正在经历这一轮。 > `[00:07:41]` This was in 2000 and it was sort of the height of the bubble and some seeds found out we were doing around some really great voices and they said what are you doing you should take our money we\'re gonna do it we\'ll give you you know and we said well we\'re gonna we decide we would keep the valuation where it was they could they they were willing to take it higher but we weren\'t and we knew we wanted to go public. `[00:07:41]` 这是在 2000 年，那是泡沫的顶峰，一些种子发现我们正在做一些非常好的声音，他们说你在做什么，我们应该拿我们的钱，我们会告诉你的，我们会决定，我们会把估值保持在他们可能的水平上我们愿意走得更高，但我们不是，我们知道我们想上市。 > We didn\'t want to ever risk a down round. 我们不想冒任何危险。 > We believed the bubble was going to burst and so we held our valuation and Nate and I kept I didn\'t tell Dell that we were doing. 我们相信泡沫会破裂，所以我们保持了估值，我和内特一直没有告诉戴尔我们在做什么。 > Looking at doing these scenes I just kept that term Shi going and we move forward with the V CS and then in April of 2000 the bubble burst and the VCR called up and said we\'re going to have to have your valuation look what\'s happened everybody\'s have their valuation now and and we were able to say no we don\'t need to do that and we close the round the next day with Dell. 在拍摄这些场景时，我只保留了“史”这个词，我们继续使用 VCS，然后在 2000 年 4 月，泡沫破裂了，录像机打电话给我们，说我们会让你的估值，看看现在发生了什么，每个人都有他们的估值，我们可以说不，我们不需要那样做，第二天我们就和戴尔关闭了。 > `[00:08:44]` It\'s just hard to keep your options open and am we wasn\'t going to say about the funding. ‘ > `[00:08:57]` Oh I couldn\'t say that. `[00:08:57]` 哦，我不能那么说。 > You know we were so I\'ll get to how we launched and how we got our first idea. 你知道，我们是这样的，所以我会讲到我们是如何启动的，我们是如何得到我们的第一个想法的。 > But I\'ll just mention that we were people were running Windows on Linux with our product. 但我只想说，我们是在 Linux 上用我们的产品运行 Windows 的人。 > And Michael Dell who was our lead investor was quoted in CNN as saying I invest in lots of Linux companies none of them are ever gonna make a profit. 美国有线电视新闻网援引迈克尔·戴尔(MichaelDell)的话说，我投资了许多 Linux 公司，其中没有一家能盈利。 > I just want to help Linux and when you\'re a entrepreneur you just don\'t like seeing that in the press. 我只是想帮助 Linux，当你是一名企业家时，你只是不喜欢在媒体上看到这种情况。 > Your company fortunately he was Rog. 你的公司很幸运他是罗格。 > The downside of non-professional investors you know but he was he was he was very helpful to us. 非专业投资者的坏处，你知道，但他对我们很有帮助。 > `[00:09:44]` So OK. `[00:09:44]` 所以好吧。 > `[00:09:45]` So we had money we had a place to live and we we were building our product and this virtualization there was a lot of very deep technology that we had to do but we had to figure out what we\'re gonna be our first. `[00:09:45]` 所以我们有了钱，我们有了一个居住的地方，我们正在建造我们的产品，我们的虚拟化有很多非常深层次的技术，我们必须做，但我们必须弄清楚，我们将成为我们的第一个。 > You know when you have a giant vision thing you want to do is find a very doable first milestone that creates value for somebody. 你知道，当你有一个巨大的愿景，你想要做的是找到一个非常可行的第一个里程碑，为某人创造价值。 > It could be another company it could be a ideally a customer but it doesn\'t have to be a customer. 它可以是另一家公司，它可以是一个理想的客户，但它不一定是一个客户。 > So what small thing could we do rather than our big vision and we thought well we had this 686 virtualization you know it would be a really great way for someone that was running Linux not you know there were a lot of developers using Linux. 那么，我们能做什么，而不是我们的远大愿景，我们认为我们有了 686 虚拟化，你知道，这对于运行 Linux 的人来说是一个很好的方法，而不是你知道，有很多开发人员在使用 Linux。 > Back then it was just starting to rise. 当时它才刚刚开始上升。 > Linus Torvalds had not quite yet been on the cover of Time though. 然而，莱纳斯·托瓦尔兹还没有上过“时代”杂志的封面。 > And so we would build a desktop product that would let you run Windows on Linux. 因此，我们将构建一个桌面产品，可以让您在 Linux 上运行 Windows。 > And that way we would weave and we could also let Linux run on Windows and we figured that way we could use the Windows device drivers and not have to build every device driver that APC needs and we wouldn\'t have to go into the server market. 这样我们就可以编织，我们也可以让 Linux 在 Windows 上运行，我们认为这样我们就可以使用 Windows 设备驱动程序，而不必构建 APC 所需的每一个设备驱动程序，我们就不必进入服务器市场。 > And we also had a rule that we couldn\'t have a dependency on anybody. 我们也有一条规则，我们不能依赖任何人。 > So we didn\'t want to require Intel Saby 6 architecture to make any concessions for us because that would give us them a lot of power over us and we couldn\'t require Microsoft to make any concessions for our software to run because they would obviously have complete control over us so we set out to build this desktop product that would run Windows on Linux or Linux on Windows but requires zero change for many operating system or chipset vendor and it had to have adequate performance as someone would want to use it. 因此，我们不想要求 Intel Saby 6 架构为我们做出任何让步，因为这将给我们很多权力，我们也不能要求微软为我们的软件运行做出任何让步，因为他们显然对我们有完全的控制权，所以我们着手构建这个在 Linux 或 Linux 上运行 Windows 的桌面产品。但是对于许多操作系统或芯片组供应商来说，这需要零更改，而且它必须有足够的性能，就像某些人想要使用的那样。 > And we set that as our first first milestone. 我们把这作为我们的第一个里程碑。 > And so we kind of got it working. 所以我们让它起作用了。 > And we said OK how do we take it to market. 我们说，好的，我们如何把它推向市场。 > We\'ll take it to market as a Linux tool so that when you want to run you know Mike back then everybody that worked in a company had to run Microsoft Outlook Microsoft Office. 我们将把它作为 Linux 工具推向市场，这样当您想要运行时，您就知道 Mike 了，那时在一家公司工作的每个人都必须运行 MicrosoftOutlookMicrosoftOffice。 > But they wanted to live in a Linux world. 但他们想生活在 Linux 世界里。 > So this was the way to do it without having to have more than one computers or having to dual boot and and so and then the Linux community would be a very technical friendly community for us. 因此，这是这样做的方式，而不必有多台计算机或双引导等，然后 Linux 社区将是一个非常技术友好的社区对我们。 > So that\'s what we did and we launched it. 这就是我们所做的，我们发射了它。 > Everybody thought we were a Linux tool we had three Linux companies come to us and try and buy us and we didn\'t know how much we could charge for that. 每个人都认为我们是一个 Linux 工具，我们有三家 Linux 公司来找我们，试图买下我们，我们不知道我们能为此收取多少钱。 > You got to price your first product. 你得给你的第一件产品定价。 > And so we said well we\'ll just put the data up there we\'ll make it fully functional free. 所以我们说，我们只需要把数据放在那里，我们就可以让它完全免费。 > Anybody can have it over the Internet but they have to. 任何人都可以在互联网上得到它，但他们必须这样做。 > It\'s only a 30 day trial and they can renew it every 30 days if they want to go through the hassle because we really weren\'t sure anybody would pay for it and then we said well if you use it commercially if you\'re using it in a company you should pay two hundred ninety nine dollars. 这只是 30 天的试用期，如果他们想解决麻烦，他们可以每 30 天续订一次，因为我们真的不确定是否有人会为此买单，然后我们说，如果你在一家公司里使用它，你应该支付 299 美元。 > And if you don\'t want to have to renew every 30 days and you\'re just a hobbyist you should pay ninety nine dollars. 如果你不想每隔 30 天续订一次，而且你只是个业余爱好者，你应该付九十九美元。 > So it was this total trust system. 所以这是一个完全的信任系统。 > We didn\'t know how it would work but we just put it up on the internet like that and we had to figure out how to spread the word. 我们不知道它将如何工作，但我们只是把它放在互联网上，我们必须想办法传播这个消息。 > You know when we launched this thing so we decided we would go to a conference that launched startups demo. 你知道，当我们推出这个东西时，我们决定去参加一个启动创业演示的会议。 > And that was a funny anecdote somebody told us we need to hire a marketing person to help us get into demo. 这是一个有趣的轶事，有人告诉我们，我们需要聘请一个营销人员，以帮助我们进入演示。 > So we hired the person well we brought the person in. 所以我们雇佣了那个人我们把那个人带进来了。 > They recommended to talk to them and they demo. 他们建议和他们谈谈，然后他们演示。 > You can either be on stage or you can just have a little you. 你要么站在舞台上，要么就拥有一点你自己。 > Everybody gets a table but you have to audition to get on stage she said you\'ll never get on stage. 每个人都有一张桌子，但你必须试镜才能登上舞台，她说你永远不会上舞台。 > And actually we couldn\'t even recruit a PR firm at the time everybody thought this was such a bad idea. 事实上，我们当时甚至无法招聘一家公关公司，当时大家都认为这是个糟糕的主意。 > But you know because this was when Webvan was out there on toys dot com was out there. 但你知道，因为这是当韦文在那里的玩具网站上，com 是在那里。 > Pet stock com was out there. 宠物店就在外面。 > So anyhow so we decided we would launch our product demo. 所以无论如何，我们决定推出我们的产品演示。 > We fired. 我们开了枪。 > We didn\'t hire this marketing person and we did it ourselves. 我们没有雇佣这个营销人员，而是我们自己雇的。 > We auditioned we had a great we had a funny audition because we had two computers we brought in. 我们试镜，我们有一个很棒的，我们有一个有趣的试镜，因为我们有两台电脑，我们带来了。 > You didn\'t really have laptops and we had one was a backup in case of thing didn\'t work. 你并没有真正的笔记本电脑，而且我们有一台是备用的，以防东西坏了。 > And I\'m sitting there with my with the two founders and the women were auditioning for. 我和两个创始人坐在一起，女人们在试镜。 > And all of a sudden the founder just froze the keyboard pinned me air and I\'m like I wonder what that was about. 突然，这位创始人冻结了键盘，把我的空气固定住了，我想知道那是怎么回事。 > They keep talking away about all the ways you could use this and then it starts working. 他们不停地谈论你用这个的所有方法，然后它就开始起作用了。 > He gets his keyboard up and it\'s working and what he did was it crashed and he won no excuse to switch computers. 他拿起键盘，键盘在工作，他做的是它崩溃了，他没有理由换电脑。 > So he pretended like he had dropped his keyboard. 所以他假装掉了键盘。 > Laughter. 笑声。 > We we we got on stage and we we actually got it was really wonderful experience. 我们登上舞台，我们得到了非常美妙的体验。 > We got a standing ovation because we did the Windows Blue Screen of Death but we hadn\'t really crashed the computer we had just crashed the virtual machine and we switched into a new window and that got a standing ovation. 我们得到了起立鼓掌，因为我们做了 WindowsBlue 屏幕的死亡，但我们没有真正的崩溃计算机，我们刚刚崩溃的虚拟机，我们切换到一个新的窗口，这得到了起立鼓掌。 > So laughter. 所以笑。 > So we did a demo. 所以我们做了个演示。 > We did Slashdot which was where all the Linux developers exchanged information we got Slashdot ad and then we decide not to spend any money on marketing but to but to get PR public relations to get press because we thought it was interesting enough and it worked. 我们做了 Slashdot，这是所有 Linux 开发人员交换信息的地方，我们得到 Slashdot 广告，然后我们决定不把任何钱花在营销上，而是让公关部门得到媒体的关注，因为我们认为这很有趣，而且效果很好。 > We got a lot of great coverage including in the Wall Street Journal. 我们得到了很多很好的报道，包括“华尔街日报”。 > Actually what happened was when we launched our beda. 实际上发生的事情是在我们发射贝达的时候。 > We were very frugal and we didn\'t have enough bandwidth. 我们非常节俭，没有足够的带宽。 > We launched it on a Sunday we had announced we would launch it on Monday. 我们在一个周日发布了它，我们已经宣布我们将在周一推出它。 > And so many people came to our site in the middle of the night to download our product that hours we ran out of bandwidth and our ISP would give a name or bandwidth thought of Madoc. 这么多人在半夜来到我们的网站下载我们的产品，以至于我们耗尽了几个小时的带宽，我们的 ISP 会给出 Madoc 的名字或带宽。 > So a kid at Cornell a sophomore at Cornell took our side and hosted it at Cornell and posted a sign don\'t sue me be anywhere I\'m keeping track of everybody that comes to your site but your site is down. 所以康奈尔大学二年级的一个孩子站在我们这边，在康奈尔举办了一次活动，并在康奈尔发布了一个告示 > And he said he hosted us until we could get back up and running again. 他说他招待了我们直到我们能重新站起来再跑。 > And he came in and turned with us after that and laughter. 然后他走了进来，然后和我们一起笑了起来。 > So that was great. 那真是太棒了。 > `[00:16:24]` So anyhow we Yeah. 无论如何，我们是对的。 > `[00:16:28]` So we got all that and we we also filed patents held to say a bit about patterns. `[00:16:28]` 所以我们得到了所有的东西，我们也申请了一些关于模式的专利。 > `[00:16:33]` We started working on patterns from day one. `[00:16:33]` 我们从第一天开始研究模式。 > When you sit in between Microsoft and Intel you sort of want to try and protect yourself with IP I have to say a little startup. 当你坐在微软和英特尔之间的时候，你想试着用 IP 来保护自己，我不得不说是一个小小的启动。 > It\'s pretty hopeless to protect yourself against a monopoly because you know they can afford giant legal bills and you can\'t. 保护自己不受垄断是非常没有希望的，因为你知道他们有能力支付巨额的法律账单，而你却付不起。 > But but we did get our patents filed. 但我们确实申请了专利。 > I can\'t say even though they were pretty rock solid patents. 我不能说，即使它们是非常可靠的专利。 > They never really helped us that much. 他们从来没有帮过我们那么多。 > But anyhow Microsoft actually bought someone that a copy does and we weren\'t going to ever sue them because we knew we were gonna beat them. 但是无论如何，微软实际上是买了一个拷贝做的人，我们不打算起诉他们，因为我们知道我们会打败他们。 > But then we when we found out Microsoft was trying to buy them we decided to sue them because certainly Microsoft wouldn\'t buy a company that was violating our rock solid patent. 但当我们发现微软试图收购他们时，我们决定起诉他们，因为微软肯定不会收购一家侵犯我们稳固专利的公司。 > But we were wrong anyhow. 但无论如何我们都错了。 > But it still took and actually ended up slowing Microsoft down because that company\'s code wasn\'t very good and Microsoft tried to use it. 但是，微软的代码不是很好，微软试图使用它，所以它还是慢了下来，最终减缓了微软的速度。 > But anyhow board when I went out to look for a board a board of directors. 但不管怎样，当我出去找董事会的时候。 > You know since we had sort of self funded and we had had the angels we just sort of had our own internal board and then we finally said well we should get some external people. 你知道，既然我们有了自筹资金，有了天使，我们就有了自己的内部董事会，然后我们终于说好了，我们应该找一些外部的人。 > And again you know we did have a lot of trepidation about wedging ourselves in between Intel and Microsoft. 再一次，你知道，我们在英特尔和微软之间有很多不安。 > And so I kind of went out and looked for surd of who I thought was the best able to help us figure out how to stand up to those guys and that Larry Sutton Senior was the managing partner of Wilson Sonsini and pretty powerful attorney business minded attorney. 所以我就出去找我认为最能帮我们找出如何对付那些家伙的人拉里·萨顿·古尔是威尔逊·索尼尼的执行合伙人，也是一位很有实力的律师，有商业头脑的律师。 > So I decided he needed to be our board member I\'d never man him. 所以我决定他必须成为我们的董事会成员，我永远不会让他成为男子汉。 > And this is sort of a philosophy I have if you have a good reason for someone to help you. 如果你有充分的理由让别人帮你的话，这就是我的哲学。 > That goes beyond the fact that there are you know rich and powerful. 这超出了你所知道的富强的事实。 > `[00:18:37]` You can generally convince them because what I did you know he had never met me. `[00:18:37]` 你通常可以说服他们，因为我所做的，你知道他从未见过我。 > I told a lawyer Wilson Sonsini that we would move to their law firm if I could have a meeting with Larry Sonsini. 我告诉一位律师威尔逊·索尼尼，如果我能和拉里·桑西尼会面，我们就会搬到他们的律师事务所去。 > So I got my meeting. 所以我去开会了。 > I sent him a bunch of materials over before I arrived about what we were doing and went into his office you know and I wasn\'t sure I wanted him on my board but he smiled at me and asked how we could help. 在我到达之前，我给他寄了一堆关于我们正在做的事情的材料，然后走进了他的办公室。我不确定我想让他加入我的董事会，但他对我微笑着，问我们怎样才能帮上忙。 > And I thought yes I want them on my board. 我想是的，我希望他们在我的董事会上。 > And he said how can I help you. 他说我能帮你什么。 > I said I really like you to join my board he said. 我说我真的很喜欢你加入我的董事会，他说。 > Oh he laughed and said he was busy getting off boards and I said Well let\'s talk about the company until we started talking and we started talking about we had had at that point quite a history with Intel around working with shall we say they were interested in our IP and we were not about to give it to them and there were some a lot of discussions going on. 哦，他笑着说，他正忙着离开董事会。我说，让我们谈谈公司，直到我们开始谈论，我们开始谈论我们与英特尔合作的历史，我们说他们对我们的知识产权感兴趣，我们不打算把它给他们，而且有很多讨论在进行。 > `[00:19:39]` And so I was talking to him about this and I was talking to him about some things that were already going on with Microsoft and he was really interested. `[00:19:39]` 所以我和他谈了这件事，我和他谈了一些微软已经发生的事情，他真的很感兴趣。 > And and then it was late Friday afternoon and I left. 然后是周五下午晚些时候，我离开了。 > He said he\'d let me know and I came in Monday morning at 7:00a.m. 他说他会通知我的，我星期一早上 7 点来。 > and they\'re on my voicemail from 6:00 in the morning with this voicemail from Larry Sonsini saying he would join our board he was just an invaluable board member because he had seen every deal in the world and you know knew how to negotiate these things. 他们在我早上 6 点的语音信箱里收到拉里·索尼尼的留言说他会加入我们的董事会他只是个无价的董事会成员因为他看过世界上的每一笔交易你知道如何谈判这些事情 > And then from there I added some other board members but I think a board can be really really helpful to you if you get the right people. 然后，我增加了一些其他的董事会成员，但我认为，如果你找到合适的人，董事会对你很有帮助。 > Let\'s see. 让我们看看。 > So we basically we launched our pride day when we started selling. 所以，当我们开始销售的时候，我们基本上启动了我们的骄傲日。 > We just sold it over the Internet. 我们只是在网上卖的。 > We supported it via e-mail and so on. 我们通过电子邮件等方式支持它。 > We\'re very frugal and we were cash neutral and we were international. 我们非常节俭，现金中立，我们是国际化的。 > We were all over the world from day one and it was pretty exciting. 我们从第一天起就走遍了世界，这是相当令人兴奋的。 > `[00:20:44]` Back in 1999 Yelle. `[00:20:44]` 早在 1999 年，Yelle。 > `[00:20:49]` So now I\'m gonna just talk a little bit about the enterprise market because it\'s sort of daunting to go into the enterprise market and in fact I remember one of our top engineers left. `[00:20:49]` 现在我只想谈一谈企业市场，因为进入企业市场有点让人望而生畏，事实上，我还记得我们的一位顶尖工程师离开了。 > He said You\'re not going to be able to get into the enterprise market. 他说你不能进入企业市场。 > This company is going to fail. 这家公司要倒闭了。 > And I remember talking to one of the better known tech bankers and he made fun of us. 我记得和一位知名的科技银行家交谈，他取笑我们。 > He said you can\'t make it in the enterprise. 他说你在企业里做不到。 > You can do these things but you really got to build up your credibility and you really got a you know played the wind shifts to get there. 你可以做这些事情，但你真的要建立你的信誉，你真的有一个，你知道，发挥风向，以达到那里。 > We decided we should go to market we couldn\'t possibly build out an enterprise sales force and we should go to market with the hardware vendors and we found a way that we could help the hardware vendors make money. 我们决定去市场，我们不可能建立一支企业销售队伍，我们应该和硬件供应商一起去市场，我们找到了一种方法来帮助硬件供应商赚钱。 > So basically IBM at the time and now IBM had invention invented virtualization back in the 60s. 所以从根本上说，当时的 IBM 和现在的 IBM 发明了虚拟化，早在 60 年代。 > It had completely died out because people thought it was something for big mainframes but they got what we were doing and IBM had some huge x 86 serversP.C. 它已经完全消失了，因为人们认为它适用于大型主机，但他们得到了我们所做的，而 IBM 拥有一些庞大的 x86serversP.C。 > servers that they were having trouble selling because nobody had a workload that was big enough to need such a big server. 因为没有人有足够大的工作量需要这么大的服务器，所以他们在销售时遇到了问题。 > `[00:22:10]` But these big servers were very high margin so they we were talking to them we were talking to HP we\'re trying to convince anybody that would listen to us and people just to give you make a point about how little people listen to us. `[00:22:10]` 但是这些大服务器的利润率很高，所以我们和他们交谈，我们和惠普交谈，我们试图说服任何愿意听我们说话的人，他们只是想让你知道，人们听我们的话有多么少。 > We were trying to talk to all the analysts like Gartner and forester and everything. 我们试图与高德纳、弗罗斯特等所有分析师进行对话。 > And one day we had one marketing guy runs into my office he goes we finally got a meeting with Forester. 有一天，我们有一个营销人员跑到我的办公室，他说，我们终于和福雷斯特开了个会。 > It at 9:00 o\'clock tomorrow morning in Boston. 明天早上 9 点在波士顿。 > And I you know we were in Palo Alto and I\'m like Okay so we get on the red eye and we go out to Boston and we come into a forest we\'re so excited to have the audience of of an analyst and the person they sent in was covering the auto industry. 我，你知道，我们在帕洛阿尔托，我很好，所以我们开始红眼睛，我们走到波士顿，我们来到一个森林，我们很兴奋有一位分析师的观众，他们派进来的人是汽车工业。 > It was just like nearly jumped at him but he didn\'t have proceeded to tell a virtualization was but anyhow so so so so finally we were trying to get these hybrid banners to work for us. 这就像几乎扑向他，但他没有继续告诉虚拟化是，但无论如何，最后我们试图让这些混合横幅为我们工作。 > And what happened was an IBM fellow comes knocking at our door. 发生的事情是一个 IBM 的人来敲我们的门。 > We hadn\'t launched our server product yet and he says I\'ve been looking at your desktop product. 我们还没有推出我们的服务器产品，他说我一直在看你的桌面产品。 > I think it would be great. 我觉得会很棒的。 > On one of our servers as a way to help sell them a very technical guy we\'d only been talking to the marketing people. 在我们的一台服务器上，作为帮助销售他们的一种方式，我们只和营销人员交谈过，这是一个非常技术性的人。 > So we said oh come into our labs and we showed it you know we had been building it from day one and it was working. 所以我们说，哦，来到我们的实验室，我们展示给它看，你知道，我们从第一天开始就在建造它，它正在工作。 > And so we got our partnership with IBM going and then we did this created this sort of artificial VMware preferred hardware vendor program and set a deadline and they put a bunch of requirements on it and all the other hardware vendors signed up by that deadline. 于是我们和 IBM 建立了合作关系，然后我们创建了这种人工 VMware 首选硬件供应商程序，并设定了一个最后期限，他们对此提出了大量的要求，所有其他硬件供应商都在最后期限前签署了协议。 > I\'m not sure they knew why they were signing up but having a deadline helps in almost everything. 我不确定他们是否知道为什么要报名，但有一个截止日期几乎对一切都有帮助。 > And and so we so we were able to start selling with with the hardware vendors and it\'s interesting sort of story how we got going with IBM. 因此，我们能够开始与硬件供应商一起销售，这是一个有趣的故事，我们是如何与 IBM 合作的。 > It\'s sort of you know startups are one lucky break after another and the name of the game is to put yourself in position to take advantage of all these lucky breaks. 你知道，创业是一次又一次的幸运休息，游戏的名称是让自己处于有利的位置，利用所有这些幸运的机会。 > And so what happened was IBM was going to resell our product but we used Linux as a way to get going you know to kind of boot and then Linux got out of the way and then the virtual R software took over. 所以，IBM 打算转售我们的产品，但是我们用 Linux 作为启动的一种方式，你知道的，然后 Linux 退出了，然后虚拟 R 软件接管了。 > You didn\'t use it anymore. 你不再使用它了。 > And IBM lawyers discovered that we had GPL Linux software in our distribution and they killed the whole deal because they were afraid it would pollute everything and all of IBM software would suddenly have to be open sourced and they didn\'t want to risk that. IBM 律师发现，我们的发行版中有 GPL Linux 软件，他们扼杀了整个交易，因为他们担心这会污染一切，所有 IBM 软件都会突然被开源，他们不想冒这个风险。 > And so we were like Oh now how are we ever gonna get anyone to help us sell our product and them. 所以我们就像哦，现在我们怎么能让别人帮我们销售我们的产品和他们呢？ > And then we had this idea and we said well what about if your resellers sold us. 然后我们有了这个想法，我们说，如果你的经销商卖给我们怎么办？ > Would that create this legal problem and they said no our resellers can sell you without it causing any problems. 这会不会造成这个法律问题，他们说，不，我们的经销商可以卖给你，而不会造成任何问题。 > So we took that to them. 所以我们把这个交给了他们。 > And what ended up happening is they were about to have their worldwide conference of all their top tier resellers in the world by the way apologies for all of you that are in consumer and don\'t care a bit about your enterprise. 最后发生的是，他们即将在世界范围内召开他们所有顶级经销商的全球会议，顺便说一句，为你们所有的消费者道歉，他们一点也不关心你们的企业。 > But it\'s sort of an interesting story. 但这是个有趣的故事。 > All these resellers it\'s just all over the world these are the best trained people that selling this kind of product. 所有这些经销商-世界各地的经销商-他们是销售这种产品的训练有素的人。 > And they invited us to the conference. 他们邀请我们参加会议。 > They let us keynote. 他们让我们做主旨发言。 > They let us run training sessions. 他们让我们进行训练。 > And after that our server market took off. 在那之后，我们的服务器市场起飞了。 > `[00:25:57]` So it was kind of a lucky break to be able to do that. `[00:25:57]` 所以这是一个幸运的休息，能够做到这一点。 > `[00:26:08]` The thing I wanted to close on and I even I couldn\'t believe it I experienced it here today I was walking around having a pizza pizza before I came inside and somebody grabbed me and said Are you the founder of GM or thank you for your product. `[00:26:08]` 我想接近的东西-我甚至不敢相信-我今天在这里经历过-我在这里走来走去，在我进来之前，有人抓住我，说你是通用汽车的创始人，还是谢谢你的产品？ > I love your product. 我喜欢你的产品。 > `[00:26:24]` And I mean that hasn\'t happened in a few years. `[00:26:24]` 我的意思是这几年没有发生过。 > So thank you. 所以谢谢你。 > But laughter. 但是笑声。 > `[00:26:30]` But anyhow that\'s really what it\'s about is bringing something to market that people absolutely love and you know makes their lives better. `[00:26:30]` 不管怎么说，这才是真正意义上的，是给市场带来了人们绝对喜欢的东西，你知道，这会让他们的生活变得更好。 > `[00:26:40]` And I just thought you know this was my favorite e-mail we ever received. `[00:26:40]` 我以为你知道这是我最喜欢的电子邮件。 > Congratulations for that. 恭喜你。 > Maybe mazing product. 也许是令人目眩的产品。 > I can\'t believe what I see. 我真不敢相信我看到了什么。 > I think it\'s the best discovery after landing on the moon. 我认为这是登月后最好的发现。 > The only thing I can\'t believe is why is it Beda other software. 我唯一不能相信的是为什么它是 Beda 其他软件。 > We knew they meant Microsoft isn\'t that stable in an end version and somebody else said from Germany I can\'t believe it. 我们知道他们的意思是微软在最终版本中没有那么稳定，还有人从德国说我无法相信。 > Your brains must be bigger than Volkswagens. 你的大脑一定比大众大。 > Laughter. 笑声。 > And then this incredible article that the Wall Street Journal did about bringing freedom of choice to the desktop. 然后这篇令人难以置信的文章“华尔街日报”为桌面带来了选择的自由。 > `[00:27:15]` It\'s things like that. `[00:27:15]` 是这样的。 > It was just such a wonderful fun experience to do you know to do to bring something so useful to people to market. 这是一次非常有趣的体验，你知道如何为市场带来一些非常有用的东西。 > `[00:27:27]` Well I thought there would be questions but I guess it\'s hard with this many people I\'d love getting questions. `[00:27:00]` 我原以为会有问题，但我想对这么多人来说，我很难得到问题。 > And I was just going to say good luck to all of you. 我只是想祝你们好运。 > That might be doing a startup I\'m doing another one too and each one is different and challenging and you know a lot of people kind of pay attention they think oh what are you doing and I\'m like I\'m just another slob trying to do a startup. 这可能是在做一家创业公司，我也在做另一家公司，每一家都是不同的，而且都很有挑战性。你知道，很多人都会注意，他们会想，哦，你在做什么，而我就像是另一个尝试创业的懒虫。 > You know we\'ll see. 你知道我们会看到的。 > But good luck to you and thank you very much. 祝你好运，非常感谢。