# Ron Conway at Startup School 2013 > `[00:00:00]` Morning. `[00:00:00]` 早上好。 > `[00:00:01]` Mike Mike works. `[00:00:01]` 迈克工作。 > `[00:00:03]` Okay well thanks for coming along. `[00:00:03]` 好的，谢谢你能来。 > Delighted to have you here. 很高兴你能来。 > We\'re going to jump right into things I wanted to talk about Twitter first because Jack Dorsey is coming here later and they\'re going public they\'re doing so well. 我们将直接进入我想首先谈论 Twitter 的事情，因为杰克·多尔西(JackDorsey)稍后会来这里，他们要上市了，他们做得很好。 > I want you to take me back to when you first invested in what you signed on and how you first invested. 我要你带我回到你第一次投资于你的签约和你第一次投资的时候。 > `[00:00:24]` Sure. `[00:00:24]` 当然。 > I got to know Evan Williams because back in 1998 we invested in Google and so we knew Google from the early days and Google acquired blogger from Evan that\'s the company that Evan founded. 我之所以了解埃文·威廉姆斯，是因为在 1998 年我们投资了谷歌，所以我们从早期就认识了谷歌，谷歌从埃文那里收购了博主-埃文就是埃文创建的公司。 > And so I got to know Evan through that and then over time Evan left Google and went to start an incubator called obvious core and Odeo was one of the companies that that was incubated it ObviousCorp. 于是我认识了埃文，后来埃文离开了谷歌，创办了一个名为“显而易见的核心”的孵化器，Odeo 就是其中一家孵化它的公司。 > and Odeo was in the podcasting space which was very interesting to people at the time. Odeo 在播客的空间里，当时人们对此非常感兴趣。 > And I invested in Odeo Odeo ended up not doing well the podcasting space did not blossom and. 我投资了 Odeo，结果做得不好，播客空间没有开花。 > Have To his credit felt so bad about Odeo going out of business. 他对 Odeo 破产感到很难过。 > It was second startup. 这是第二家创业公司。 > He gave all the investors their money back which was pretty amazing and I said you don\'t need to do this. 他把钱还给了所有的投资者，真是太棒了，我说你不需要这么做。 > You know investors are big people who know that you can lose money 40 percent of all of our startups go out of business completely we don\'t get a nickel out of them. 你知道，投资者都是大人物，他们知道你可能会亏本，我们所有的初创公司中，有 40%会完全倒闭，我们不会从他们那里得到一分钱。 > I said you\'re just in that bucket. 我说你就在那个桶里。 > Don\'t worry about it he said no I feel so bad. 别担心，他说不，我觉得很难过。 > I want to pay the investors back and I said fine. 我想还投资者钱，我说好的。 > But whatever you do next I\'m investing 75 k in that and the next startup was Twitter. 但无论你下一步做什么，我都会投资 75，000 美元，下一家创业公司就是 Twitter。 > And so you lucked out there. 所以你很幸运。 > `[00:02:04]` What was it about there that made you say you know I\'m in the next one just count me. `[00:02:04]` 是什么让你说你知道我在下一个，只要算上我。 > Well `[00:02:09]` it was that he had such amazing human feelings about feeling bad about going out of business. 嗯，`[00:02:09]` 他有着如此令人惊奇的人类感情，因为他对停业感到不快。 > And I tried to help sell ODEIO we tried to get ODEIO to a soft landing and I can\'t remember maybe we did but he he felt bad about it and I said wow what what a great person. 我试图帮助销售 ODEIO，我们试图让 ODEIO 实现软着陆，我不记得我们做了什么，但他对此感到很难过，我说：哇，真是个了不起的人。 > You know at SFE age we invest in the people first. 你知道，在 SFE 时代，我们首先投资于人民。 > And when you have somebody do something is impressive is that. 当你让别人做某事时，令人印象深刻的是。 > You want to invest in the next to an end. 你想在最后的时候投资。 > When they said Twitter I said. 他们说推特的时候我说。 > Hey I don\'t care what it does here\'s the money. 嘿，我不管它做什么，这是钱。 > `[00:02:50]` So when he said Okay Ron here\'s what we\'re doing here is what you\'re investing in. `[00:02:50]` 所以当他说好的，罗恩，这就是我们在这里做的，这就是你所投资的。 > What did you think. 你怎么想的。 > `[00:02:56]` Well he was nice enough to say you should go talk to Jack Dorsey because Jack you know Twitter came out of the mind of Jack Dorsey and so have said hey one of our partners at obvious corp is Jack and he has he has this product vision for Twitter. `[00:02:56]` 他说你应该去和杰克·多尔西谈谈，因为杰克-你知道的-Twitter 是从杰克·多尔西的脑海中冒出来的，所以他说，嘿，我们公司的合伙人之一就是杰克，他对 Twitter 有一个产品愿景。 > And this is going to be the next company that we all spend a lot of time on. 这将是下一家我们都花了很多时间的公司。 > There were other companies in obvious corp as well. 显而易见的公司中也有其他公司。 > But Twitter was the one they took the spotlight off of ODEIO put it on Twitter and I went and had lunch with Jack over in South Park in San Francisco and I just said hey I\'m investing. 但 Twitter 是他们把注意力从 ODEIO 转移到 Twitter 上的那个人，我和 Jack 一起去旧金山的南方公园吃午餐，我只是说我在投资。 > Tell me what it is. 告诉我是什么。 > And. 和 > `[00:03:36]` What did what did you think when he said here\'s what it is 140 characters. `[00:03:36]` 当他说这是 140 个字时，你是怎么想的？ > Well reaction my reaction was hey great let\'s see if it works and. 嗯，反应，我的反应很好，让我们看看它是否有效。 > `[00:03:48]` And with any product. `[00:03:48]` 和任何产品。 > It\'s do the users like it. 它是用户喜欢的。 > So if the product takes off it\'s a good product. 因此，如果该产品起飞，它是一个很好的产品。 > And like Facebook and Snapchat so many of these others it started taking off right away. 就像 Facebook 和 Snapchat 一样，许多其他网站也开始迅速起飞。 > And the big problem Twitter had was keeping up with the growth the fail whale became more prominent than the bird. Twitter 的最大问题是跟上增长，失败的鲸鱼比鸟更加突出。 > `[00:04:14]` Speaking of Snapchat and Pinterest and all in Facebook you invested in all of these early before they were big I\'d love for you to remember back to what the founders were like or what you thought about the product. `[00:04:14]` 说到 Snapchat 和 Pinterest，以及 Facebook 上的所有这些，我希望你能回想起创始人是什么样的，或者你对这个产品的看法。 > Way back when they started I guess snapchat is newer but the other two were there. 早在他们开始的时候，我想 Snapchat 是比较新的，但是其他的两个在那里。 > `[00:04:33]` So Facebook Twitter page Pinterest. `[00:04:33]` 那么 Facebook 推特页面 Pinterest。 > So while I feel like we\'ve talked about Twitter Facebook so Facebook I started with Sean Parker because we invested in Napster than we were the first investors in Plaxo. 因此，当我觉得我们谈论了 Twitter、Facebook 和 Facebook 时，我从肖恩·帕克(SeanParker)开始，因为我们投资于 Napster，而不是柏拉图的第一批投资者。 > That was Sean Parker second company. 那是肖恩·帕克第二家公司。 > And so when Sean became the president of Facebook he came to me and said hey you know come and mentor me and Mark. 所以，当肖恩成为 Facebook 的总裁时，他来找我说嗨，你知道的，来指导我和马克。 > And I said Great. 我说的很好。 > And so the first time I met. 所以我第一次见面。 > Mark and Sean. 马克和肖恩。 > Funny enough it was just a few weeks after they had moved to California and the Facebook metrics were were already like this going straight up just just like Twitter. 有趣的是，就在他们搬到加州几周后，Facebook 的指标已经像推特一样直线上升。 > A few years later and you never argue with the metrics so the amazing thing about Zuck is is the vision and confidence that he had. 几年后，你从来没有和指标争论过，所以 Zuck 令人惊奇的地方在于他的远见和自信。 > Not arrogance but confidence that this thing is going to keep growing. 不是傲慢，而是对这件事会持续增长的信心。 > And at the end of the first meeting I said hey how many users is this thing going to have in a couple of years. 在第一次会议结束时，我说，嘿，这个东西几年后会有多少用户。 > And he looked me in the eye and said 300 million. 他看着我的眼睛说了 3 亿。 > And it ends up he was off by 700 million because Facebook has over a billion users today. 最后，他的收入减少了 7 亿，因为 Facebook 现在拥有超过 10 亿的用户。 > But he was thinking big then. 但他当时的想法很大。 > `[00:06:00]` I feel like you with Facebook. `[00:06:00]` 我觉得你和 Facebook 在一起。 > I know you\'ve told me that you\'re a little bit skeptical about the social networking thing at first. 我知道你告诉我你一开始对社交网络有点怀疑。 > But you must have seen something special in Mark. 但你一定在马克身上看到了什么特别的东西。 > `[00:06:12]` Well what what what what what got me excited at Facebook was the growth you know the user adoption and engagement the amount of time that people were spending on the site. `[00:06:12]` 在 Facebook 上让我兴奋的是用户的成长，用户的接受和参与，人们在网站上花费的时间。 > So even though I\'m not a big Facebook user myself even today you never argue with the users. 因此，即使我本人并不是 Facebook 的大用户，即使在今天，你也从未与用户争论过。 > And Facebook was picking up users you know very very quickly. 脸谱网很快就找到了你认识的用户。 > So if you look at. 所以如果你看看。 > You know we invest in people first so Facebook I was investing in Sean Parker\'s reputation and then learning about Mark with Twitter. 你知道，我们首先投资于人，所以我在 Facebook 上投资肖恩·帕克(SeanParker)的名声，然后在 Twitter 上了解马克的情况。 > It was I was investing in Ev and learning about Jack. 这是我投资电动汽车和了解杰克。 > And then fast forward till you know a year ago we see snapchat now with Snapchat. 然后快速前进，直到一年前，我们看到 Snapchat 现在与 Snapchat。 > I can see the pattern recognition you know so Facebook Twitter you have Instagram in there even though we didn\'t invest and then you have snapchat. 我可以看到你知道的模式识别，所以 Facebook，Twitter，你有 Instagram，即使我们没有投资，然后你有 Snapchat。 > So Snapchat is one that we said wow this is probably going to be a big gap because there is this phenomenon happening right now. 所以 Snapchat 是我们说的，哇，这可能会是一个很大的差距，因为现在正在发生这种现象。 > We\'re human. 我们是人类。 > Where were applications and social apps in particular are changing the way people behave and how they communicate with each other. 应用程序，特别是社交应用程序，正在改变人们的行为方式和彼此之间的沟通方式。 > Facebook Twitter and Snapchat and Instagram prove that. Facebook、Twitter、Snapchat 和 Instagram 都证明了这一点。 > And so there\'s a huge opportunity for more companies in this space. 因此，对于更多的公司来说，这是一个巨大的机会。 > `[00:07:41]` Any idea what this will be. `[00:07:41]` 任何知道这将是什么的人。 > `[00:07:43]` I don\'t because I\'m not a founder but I\'m sure people out there have ideas on what what is the next social app. `[00:07:43]` 我不是因为我不是创始人，但我确信外面的人对下一个社交应用程序有自己的想法。 > Because social apps are changing the way people communicate. 因为社交应用正在改变人们的沟通方式。 > Facebook adding photos was huge. Facebook 添加照片的规模很大。 > People started communicating with photos. 人们开始用照片交流。 > And now you have Snapchat which is really just photo messaging. 现在你有了 Snapchat，它实际上只是照片信息。 > I mean who would have predicted that even three years ago. 我是说，即使在三年前，谁也会预测到这一点。 > `[00:08:12]` Do you think the Founders knew they were going to just explode like they did because all all of these stories have that in common. `[00:08:12]` 你认为创建者知道他们会像他们一样爆炸，因为所有这些故事都有相同之处。 > Can\'t argue with that. 对此，我是无可辩驳的。 > The user growth. 用户的增长。 > `[00:08:21]` Well there are a lot of companies though that didn\'t explode in these spaces. `[00:08:21]` 虽然有很多公司在这些空间里没有爆炸。 > But but I think every founder thinks their company is going to explode. 但我认为每个创始人都认为他们的公司会爆炸。 > The founders whose company don\'t explode and they keep iterating until it does. 创始人的公司不会爆炸，他们会不断地迭代，直到公司爆发。 > Ah ah ah ah really unsung heroes. 啊，真是无名英雄。 > `[00:08:41]` That\'s a good segway actually and Silbermann of Pinterest was here last year and I loved his story because it was a really long road for them both with users and with getting investments. `[00:08:41]` 这是一个很好的片段，Pinterest 的 Silbermann 去年也在这里，我很喜欢他的故事，因为这对他们来说是一条很长的路，不管是用户还是获得投资。 > Do you remember when you first met. 你还记得你们第一次见面的时候吗。 > And what made you think they were good. 是什么让你觉得他们很棒。 > `[00:08:56]` Yes. `[00:08:56]` 是的。 > Bend\'s Ben and Pinterest is a great example of a founder where it didn\'t explode right away like Twitter Facebook or Instagram. 弯曲的 BenandPinterest 是创始人的一个很好的例子，它没有像 Twitter、Facebook 或 Instagram 那样马上爆炸。 > Ben Silverman had to keep iterating for a year and a half which we heard about when he spoke last year. 本·西尔弗曼(BenSilverman)不得不在一年半的时间里不断迭代，这是我们去年在他讲话时听到的。 > But here\'s a guy who is very persistent and stayed close to his users. 但是这里有一个人，他非常执着，并且一直和他的用户保持着亲密的关系。 > He had focus groups mainly with groups of women that he that he would bring together in a coffee shop. 他有重点小组，主要与妇女团体，他将聚集在一家咖啡店。 > And then he would call them the next day to make sure they were still using the product and keep getting feedback. 然后他会在第二天打电话给他们，确保他们还在使用该产品，并不断得到反馈。 > In iterating until the product took off. 直到产品起飞。 > In the case of Pinterest you didn\'t discover the product at SPV angel we meet once a week for four hours I chair that meeting because lots of people think I\'m not involved in NSV angel or some thing because I\'m involved in philanthropy and civic engagement. 在 Pinterest 的例子中，你没有发现 SPV 天使的产品，我们每周见面一次，持续四个小时，我主持那个会议，因为很多人认为我没有参与 NSV 天使，或者其他的事情，因为我参与了慈善事业和公民参与。 > But but no 80 percent of my time is still spent on investing and helping companies. 但我没有 80%的时间花在投资和帮助公司上。 > But I\'m not the picker the rest of our team or pickers and a couple of years ago David Lee and Kevin Carter said Hey Ron listen up. 但是我不是挑选者，而是我们球队的其他人，或者是挑选者。几年前，大卫·李和凯文·卡特说，嘿，罗恩，听着。 > This is an app that we think is going places Pinterest and Pinterest is in its infancy and we co-invest Rashaan officier on the east coast and there is nothing like a woman\'s intuition. 我们认为这是一个应用程序，我们认为 Pinterest 和 Pinterest 还处于起步阶段，我们在东海岸共同投资 Rashaan 的官员，没有什么比女人的直觉更好了。 > Shana Fisher was barking in our ear as well saying hey this app is really really cool. 沙娜·费舍尔也在我们耳边咆哮着说，嘿，这个应用程序真的很酷。 > It\'s where people pin their aspirations and so so I didn\'t discover Pinterest the S V Angel team and Shana Fisher discovered it. 这是人们把自己的愿望寄托在那里的地方，所以我没有发现 Pinterest、SV 天使队和 ShanaFisher 发现了它。 > But I went to meet Ben and what I saw was a very unusual entrepreneur because a lot of you all typewriters are outspoken and aggressive. 但我去见了本，我看到的是一位不同寻常的企业家，因为你们中的很多人-打字机-直言不讳，咄咄逼人。 > So entrepreneurs are type A or. 所以企业家是 A 型或者。 > Or you\'re in the Ben Silverman category a very shy soft spoken but very cerebral and thoughtful. 或者你是本·西尔弗曼一类的人，很害羞，说话柔和，但很有头脑，很体贴。 > And so the first time I met Ben was it was in Mountain View and I think we chasing an allocation for the next round. 所以我第一次见到本是在山景城，我想我们在追求下一轮的分配。 > So saying hey Ben what can I do to help you which is how ASV Angel operates. 所以说，嘿，本，我能做些什么来帮助你，这就是 ASV 天使的运作方式。 > We just go to the entrepreneur and say give us a hard project and fix it. 我们只是去找企业家说，给我们一个艰难的项目，并修复它。 > And all startups have hard projects so bent gave me a few projects and off we went. 所有的初创公司都有艰难的项目，所以我们放弃了一些项目。 > But what I noticed about him is he\'s a founder that actually has a calming effect. 但我注意到的是，他是一个真正有镇静作用的创始人。 > So there\'s a lot of founders who. 所以有很多创始人。 > At the Friday. 在星期五。 > Team meetings wind up their team in the case of Ben Silverman. 在本·西尔弗曼的案子中，团队会议结束了他们的团队。 > He winds up the team in a cerebrally way by actually making everybody calm. 他以一种大脑的方式结束了团队，实际上让每个人都平静下来。 > `[00:11:59]` And I noticed that it\'s now it\'s very cool. `[00:11:59]` 我注意到现在很酷。 > `[00:12:02]` It\'s amazing. `[00:12:02]` 太棒了。 > And his rifle focused on the product. 他的步枪集中在产品上。 > And entrepreneurs like Zach and Jack Dorsey and Ben Silverman are successful because they didn\'t care about the outside world. 像扎克、杰克·多尔西和本·西尔弗曼这样的企业家之所以成功，是因为他们不关心外部世界。 > All they cared about. 他们关心的都是。 > In the early days and today as well it is is the product the best it can be. 在早期和今天，它是最好的产品。 > And our users loving it. 我们的用户也很喜欢。 > And I don\'t want to do a press interview. 我不想接受媒体采访。 > I don\'t want to be distracted. 我不想分心。 > I just want to keep building a great product and those end up being becoming great. 我只想继续创造一个伟大的产品，而这些最终会变得很棒。 > `[00:12:38]` Big companies. `[00:12:38]` 大公司。 > Are you able to tell us any of the hard projects that he asked you to do with the but were they all really has to be on three things here. 你能告诉我们他让你做的任何困难的事情吗，但是如果他们真的必须在这里做三件事。 > `[00:12:51]` You know with Pinterest lots of introductions. `[00:12:51]` 你知道 Pinterest 有很多介绍。 > Hey let me introduce you around at Apple. 嘿，让我在苹果向你介绍一下。 > Let me introduce you around at various companies where they didn\'t have relationships and that can bootstrap growth. 让我向你介绍一下不同的公司，在那里他们没有关系，而且可以引导公司的发展。 > If if the iPhone is your first platform and we can help get you in front of people at Apple because Apple respects your judgment that that will help a company grow. 如果 iPhone 是你的第一个平台，我们可以帮助你在苹果的人们面前，因为苹果尊重你的判断力，这将有助于公司的发展。 > `[00:13:24]` I ask because I actually have sort of inside knowledge on all of the hard problems or most of the hard problems that Ron has helped the Y Combinator startups fix. `[00:13:24]` 我问你，是因为我对罗恩帮助 Y 组合创业公司解决的所有困难问题或大部分困难问题都有一些内在的了解。 > And most of them can\'t even be told well and most don\'t ask you to solve our problem. 而且他们中的大多数人甚至不能很好地被告知，而且大多数人也不要求你解决我们的问题。 > `[00:13:38]` Most are MAFF to do with with funding. `[00:13:38]` 大多数是与资金有关的 MAFF。 > So most of the a lot of the hard projects are funding or in a lot of cases emeny transactions were where we don\'t publicize the activity. 所以大部分困难的项目都是资助的，或者在很多情况下，Emeny 交易是我们不宣传活动的地方。 > But but with Pinterest we\'ve with all of our companies in general we always help with a series A round. 但是，有了 Pinterest，我们和我们所有的公司都在一起，我们总是在一系列的 A 轮中提供帮助。 > And then if the company wants it with the on going rounds of financing as well we probably can\'t get into that one even though there is a great one from a hotel room. 然后，如果公司也想要这一轮融资的话，我们很可能无法进入这一轮，尽管酒店房间里有一家很棒的公司。 > Yes. 是 > With with Air B and B that that one\'s been discussed. 关于 B 和 B 空气，这一问题已经讨论过了。 > `[00:14:15]` What are they. `[00:14:15]` 他们是什么？ > Okay well let\'s talk about fundraising because I did have a question for you on that. 好吧，那我们谈谈筹款吧，因为我有个问题要问你。 > I mean it jumped to that quickly. 我是说它跳得那么快。 > What do you see with the founders what are the biggest mistakes that founders make in fundraising and what are some of the best qualities of people showing their fundraising. 你对创始人的看法是什么，创始人在筹款中犯的最大的错误是什么，以及展示他们筹款的人的一些最好的品质是什么。 > `[00:14:35]` Well I guess the biggest mistake I see with founders and fundraising is founders are not focusing enough on finding the investor who can add the most value. `[00:14:35]` 嗯，我想我在创始人身上看到的最大的错误就是创始人没有足够的精力去寻找能增加最大价值的投资者。 > `[00:14:49]` A lot of founders are worried and concerned about valuation and delusion. `[00:14:49]` 许多创始人对估价和妄想感到担忧和担忧。 > And I think valuation in dilution is secondary to if you can bring in a top tier investor who adds value to this space that you\'re in that\'s worth that\'s worth millions and millions. 我认为，估值稀释是次要的，如果你能引进一个顶级投资者，谁增加了价值，你在这个空间价值数百万美元。 > To your valuation you know in the case of Air B and B that a host of investors trying to invest this is you know it\'s heresy because we had the negotiation in a hotel room when we should have had it where Brian Chesky was staying which is at an Air B and B host location. 对于你的估值，你知道，在 B 和 B 航空的案例中，很多投资者试图投资，你知道这是异端邪说，因为我们在酒店房间里进行了谈判，而当时我们应该有布莱恩·切斯基(Brian Chesky)住在 B 航空公司和 B 航空公司所在地的地方。 > But but what Brian Chesky got that night was oh no we should go with the investor who adds the most value. 但那天晚上布莱恩·切斯基得到的是，哦，不，我们应该和增加价值最多的投资者一起去。 > So Andriessen Horowitz invested a multi billion dollar valuation but there were other investors who even wanted to pay more. 因此 AndriessenHorowitz 投资了数十亿美元的估值，但还有其他投资者甚至希望支付更多。 > And I said to Brian that night hey I think Jeff Jordan at Andreessen Horowitz could do a lot for this company and Brian Chesky for the next year. 那天晚上，我对布莱恩说，嘿，我认为安德森-霍洛维茨公司的杰夫·乔丹(JeffJordan)可以为这家公司做很多事情，而布赖恩·切斯基(BrianChesky) > Every conversation we had which is often he started with thank you and I go What are you thanking me for. 我们的每一次谈话，他经常以谢谢开始，我走了，你在感谢我什么。 > Thank you for Andriessen Horowitz and Jeff Jordan because Jeff did this this and this today to pick the right investor and not pick a value added investor. 感谢 Andriessen Horowitz 和 Jeff Jordan，因为 Jeff 今天这么做是为了选择正确的投资者，而不是选择增值投资者。 > `[00:16:21]` The other thing is keep the process moving quickly for sure. `[00:16:21]` 另一件事是确保进程快速进行。 > Get one term sheet a sap. 得到一份学期表。 > So you have a forcing function because investors really don\'t like making decisions as quickly as an entrepreneur needs them to make a decision. 所以你有一个强迫的功能，因为投资者真的不喜欢像企业家需要他们做决定那样快地做出决定。 > So if you can get a forcing function which is basically a term sheet out of anyone then you can truthfully call the other investors and I can call them on your behalf and say we have a term sheet we\'re going to accept in 24 hours. 所以，如果你能得到一个强迫函数，它基本上是任何人的一个术语表，那么你可以如实地给其他投资者打电话，我可以代表你打电话给他们，说我们在 24 小时内会接受一个条款表。 > Do you have a term sheet. 你有学期表吗。 > You better hurry up and submit it. 你最好快点把它交出来。 > `[00:16:56]` And we did this during the year BMB financing. `[00:16:56]` 我们在 BMB 融资的一年里做到了这一点。 > There was all kinds of disarray and we just said Hey today\'s the day everyone submit your term sheet by 5:00 or you\'re not in the running but if you get one term sheet you can do that. 有各种各样的混乱，我们刚才说，嘿，今天，每个人都在 5 点之前提交你的学期报告，或者你没有在竞选，但如果你得到一个学期表，你可以做到这一点。 > So so keep the pace so don\'t lose momentum. 所以，保持节奏，不要失去动力。 > And then once you get any inkling of an agreement send an email that commits the investor to that agreement. 然后，一旦你对协议有了任何了解，就发送一封电子邮件，让投资者遵守协议。 > Very very important. 非常重要。 > `[00:17:25]` So you\'re not being annoying to follow. `[00:17:25]` 这样你就不会很烦人了。 > `[00:17:28]` Yeah `[00:17:28]` it\'s just a short e-mail just confirming dot dot dot. `[00:17:28]` 是的`[00:17:28]` 这只是一封简短的电子邮件，只是确认点。 > You know and it\'s just confirming that that well in the case of some commitment I am delighted that you committed to invest at 100 million valuation. 你知道，而且它只是证实了这一点，在某些承诺的情况下，我很高兴你承诺以 1 亿美元的估值进行投资。 > My lawyer\'s going to call you tomorrow. 我的律师明天会给你打电话。 > `[00:17:45]` Then it\'s in writing that that investor has committed. `[00:17:45]` 那么投资者承诺的是书面形式。 > Have you seen over the years we have seen memories many many transactions that fail because somebody doesn\'t remember what they said Think of it happens even more on our emanate transactions. 你有没有见过，多年来，我们看到了很多交易失败的记忆，因为有人不记得他们说了什么，在我们的发散交易中发生得更多。 > You know if we\'re trying to get a company a soft landing and we get the soft landing committed those are the ones that people will try and wiggle out of and a soft landing is when someone gets acquired early on. 你知道，如果我们试图让一家公司实现软着陆，而我们又得到了软着陆的承诺，那么人们就会努力摆脱这些软着陆，而软着陆则是在人们很早就被收购的时候。 > `[00:18:20]` Yeah. `[00:18:20]` 是的。 > `[00:18:20]` Basically where hey this is not going to be the next Facebook let\'s but we have a great product. `[00:18:20]` 基本上这不是下一个 Facebook，而是我们有一个很棒的产品。 > Let\'s take that product and make it part of Facebook. 让我们把这个产品变成 Facebook 的一部分吧。 > And when you put Facebook user base with it you know we can fulfill the dream of the product. 当你把 Facebook 的用户基础放在一起的时候，你就知道我们可以实现这个产品的梦想。 > `[00:18:38]` And that\'s where we see people not confirming and getting into trouble. `[00:18:38]` 那就是我们看到人们不确认和陷入麻烦的地方。 > `[00:18:41]` Yeah. `[00:18:41]` 是的。 > Correct because there\'s there\'s optionality on transactions like that. 正确，因为这样的交易是有选择性的。 > And in the case of the company the startup needs that transaction to happen so they don\'t end up with the pressure ofPhil. 就公司而言，初创公司需要完成这笔交易，这样他们就不会受到菲尔的压力。 > `[00:18:56]` Yeah. `[00:18:56]` 是的。 > `[00:18:56]` You don\'t have a whole lot of leverage but I imagine you how you get that area I guess we help out a lot to dig down a little bit in founders again. `[00:18:56]` 你并没有太多的影响力，但我想你是如何得到这个领域的，我想我们可以帮助你在创始人身上再挖一点东西。 > But what are the promising signs that you see when you meet all these people. 但是当你遇到这些人的时候，你看到了什么有希望的迹象呢？ > `[00:19:14]` Well I think product focus is really really important and I didn\'t realize this probably to the last of an angel investing since 1994 only an Internet software companies and then we invest in people we invest buy in tuition but it\'s in the last five years that I\'ve really looked for I\'ve found founder qualities that say that their rifle focused on the product the quality of the product. `[00:19:14]` 我认为专注于产品是非常重要的，我没有意识到这可能是 1994 年以来最后一次天使投资-只有一家互联网软件公司-然后我们投资于我们在学费上投资的人，但在过去的五年里，我发现创立者的品质表明他们的步枪专注于产品的质量-产品的质量。 > You know Ben Silverman Jack Dorsey. 你认识本·西尔弗曼·杰克·多西。 > It\'s just crucial. 这很关键。 > So when when we see that that they don\'t want to be distracted because they just want to focus on the product and we have lots of bloggers and press people who call us and say hey get Ben Silverman to talk to me. 所以，当我们看到他们不想分心，因为他们只想专注于产品，我们有很多博客和媒体的人打电话给我们说嗨，让 BenSilverman 和我谈谈。 > And Ben Silverman. 还有本·西尔弗曼。 > No no no. 不不不。 > Eventually you say hey why don\'t we talk to this guy from Fortune. 最后你说，嘿，为什么我们不和“财富”杂志的这个家伙谈谈呢？ > Because I\'d rather work on the product. 因为我宁愿在产品上工作。 > I\'d rather get a million more happy users than talk to somebody at Fortune magazine. 我宁愿拥有更多快乐的用户，也不愿与“财富”杂志的某个人交谈。 > That\'s a great entrepreneur. 那是个伟大的企业家。 > It\'s on the way to building a big company. 它正在建设一家大公司的路上。 > The other factor that we look for is decisiveness. 我们寻找的另一个因素是果断。 > It is so important to make decisions and keep momentum in growing your company. 在你的公司成长过程中，做决定和保持动力是非常重要的。 > And you know founders make lots of decisions about the product. 你知道，创始人对这个产品做了很多决定。 > You know let\'s change this on the product and we\'ll get better metrics. 您知道，让我们在产品上改变这一点，我们将得到更好的度量。 > You need to use the same skillset for building your team and deleting from your team. 您需要使用相同的技能集来构建您的团队和删除您的团队。 > You need to hire fast and you need to fire fast because if there\'s deadwood in your company everyone in the company already knows it. 你需要快速招聘，你需要快速解雇，因为如果你的公司里有死胡同，公司里的每个人都已经知道了。 > If you know it everybody else knows it and you can actually make morale go up if you make a decision that hey. 如果你知道的话，其他人都知道，如果你做出这样的决定，你就能鼓舞士气。 > That person\'s not working out even if they\'re a co-founder. 即使他们是创始人之一，这个人也不能正常工作。 > You\'ve got to make those decisions. 你必须做出那些决定。 > `[00:21:17]` And imagine you see people struggle with that a lot because it\'s hard to. `[00:21:17]` 想象一下，你看到很多人都在挣扎，因为这很难。 > `[00:21:20]` Yes sire confounded and that\'s why I\'m talking about it. `[00:21:20]` 是的，陛下，这就是我谈论它的原因。 > You got to be decisive yeah you have to have a clear vision. 你必须果断，是的，你必须有一个清晰的视野。 > When I\'m talking to an entrepreneur I\'m saying are other people going to work for him when. 当我和一位企业家交谈时，我说的是其他人会在什么时候为他工作。 > He or she tries to hire somebody. 他或她试图雇佣一个人。 > Are you a team builder or are you a leader. 你是团队建设者还是领导者。 > So even though these companies are young and only have five people. 因此，即使这些公司还很年轻，只有五人。 > When I\'m talking to an entrepreneur I\'m saying wow can can this person manage a thousand people and there are types of people were where I\'d nod to myself and say yeah that person can manage a thousand people. 当我和一位企业家交谈时，我会说，哇，这个人能管理一千个人吗？有些类型的人我会向自己点头，说是的，那个人能管理一千个人。 > `[00:22:00]` What if someone when they\'re first starting really can\'t manage a thousand people. `[00:22:00]` 如果一个人第一次开始的时候真的不能管理一千个人，那该怎么办呢？ > Are you able to say this person can grow or have you seen examples of people who\'ve grown into that role. 你能说这个人可以成长吗？或者你见过那些已经成长为这个角色的人的例子。 > Well yeah I think I think in the early early days of Twitter. 嗯，是的，我想在 Twitter 的早期。 > I think Jack Dorsey had trouble managing and Jack Dorsey. 我认为杰克·多尔西在管理和杰克·多尔西方面都有困难。 > `[00:22:23]` Thought about his shortcomings and went and made Twitter better then left Twitter invented square you know how obvious plugging a a credit card reader in to you know the earplug of an iPhone. `[00:22:23]` 考虑到他的缺点，他走了，让推特变得更好，而不是离开推特发明的正方形，你知道把信用卡读卡器插在里面有多明显-你知道 iPhone 的耳塞。 > I got the very first demo of square from Jack. 我从杰克那里得到了正方形的第一个演示。 > And watched him build square flawlessly hiring a management team that did that if he has a deficiency. 并看着他完美地打造了广场，聘请了一支管理团队，如果他有缺陷的话，就会这样做。 > He makes sure to hire somebody really powerful in that area. 他一定会雇佣那个地区真正有权势的人。 > So recognizing the deficiency and then building your team around that with everyone recognizing what everyone\'s deficiencies are. 因此，认识到不足，然后围绕这一点建立团队，让每个人都认识到每个人的缺点。 > Yeah that\'s growing and maturing. 是的，那是在成长和成熟。 > `[00:23:17]` You know while you\'re building these great companies they think we have time for two more questions. `[00:23:17]` 你知道，当你建立这些伟大的公司时，他们认为我们还有时间再问两个问题。 > `[00:23:23]` I know it went so quickly I think even tell me if these are good because we\'re going to end on a high note. `[00:23:00]` 我知道事情进展得如此之快，我想甚至告诉我这些是否好，因为我们将以高调结束。 > You\'ve been doing this for like 20 years. 你这么干已经有 20 年了。 > What has changed and what has been the same since when you first started now. 自从你刚开始的时候，什么已经改变了，什么是一样的。 > `[00:23:36]` Well a lot of things have changed. `[00:23:36]` 很多事情都变了。 > If you think back to when I started my first company Alto\'s computer in 1979 in order to I know this is unbelievable but it\'s important for this group to know it in 1979 to get your company funded. 如果你回想一下，1979 年我创办了我的第一家公司 Alto 的电脑，为了让我知道这是令人难以置信的，但对于这个团队来说，在 1979 年了解它以获得贵公司的资金是很重要的。 > You had to be growing you had to be doubling every year and you had to be at least 20 percent pre-tax profitable. 你必须成长，你必须每年翻一番，而且你必须至少有 20%的税前利润。 > `[00:24:05]` So investors basically would only invest if you are already successful. `[00:24:05]` 所以投资者基本上只会在你已经成功的情况下进行投资。 > So it wasn\'t really venture capital. 所以这不是真正的风险投资。 > If you go today just the cost of starting a company is tiny and there\'s lots of people willing to take risk in invest. 如果你今天去，创办一家公司的成本很低，而且有很多人愿意冒险投资。 > So the climate for starting a company is significantly better today. 所以今天创业的环境要好得多。 > The other thing is mobile. 另一件事是移动的。 > Watching King the Internet convert from. 观看国王的互联网转换。 > The web to mobile. 网络到移动。 > You know this. 你知道的。 > This thing is not a phone that\'s in your pocket it\'s a computer. 这东西不是你口袋里的手机，而是一台电脑。 > And what we have some of these social apps that are running on the phone first. 我们有一些社交应用程序是先在手机上运行的。 > It\'s so so so different from everyone writing for the web. 这和为网络写作的每个人都有很大的不同。 > Now everyone\'s working on mobile apps. 现在每个人都在开发移动应用程序。 > Companies are moving to cities. 公司正在迁往城市。 > I think that\'s really interesting too. 我觉得这也很有趣。 > There\'s this migration especially of the social companies to cities. 尤其是社会公司向城市的迁移。 > Another phenomenon is you know you go back you know when Google started in 1998 the algorithm was the intellectual property. 另一个现象是，你知道你回去，你知道，当谷歌在 1998 年成立时，算法是知识产权。 > Today it\'s the user design and the user interface that leverages an application. 今天，利用应用程序的是用户设计和用户界面。 > So the world has shifted from algorithm IP to design and user interface IP being the most important. 因此，世界已经从算法 IP 转向了设计，用户界面 IP 是最重要的。 > `[00:25:34]` Does that mean lots of lots of big big changes. `[00:25:34]` 那是否意味着有很大的变化？ > `[00:25:38]` What about last question in all these years what have you been surprised by. `[00:25:38]` 这么多年来你最后一个问题是什么？你感到惊讶的是什么？ > The biggest surprise and satisfaction for me is watching entrepreneurs mature at the speed of light. 对我来说，最大的惊喜和满足感是看着企业家以光速成熟。 > `[00:25:55]` When they have to. `[00:25:55]` 必要的时候。 > So if you pick Larry Page at Google Jack Dorsey Zuckerberg Ben Silverman. 所以如果你选择谷歌的拉里·佩奇，杰克·多尔西·扎克伯格本·西尔弗曼。 > These companies take off those founders have got to mature. 这些公司的腾飞那些创始人已经成熟了。 > Manage thousands of people and keep their product focus and all four of those examples they met the expectations. 管理成千上万的人，并保持他们的产品重点，所有这些例子，他们都达到了预期。 > But think about what happens when they go home at night. 但是想想他们晚上回家后会发生什么。 > You know their companies are hiring 10 people a day and they\'re force to mature and adapt to that growth. 你知道，他们的公司每天雇佣 10 名员工，他们强迫自己成熟并适应这种增长。 > And these entrepreneurs are doing it. 这些企业家正在做这件事。 > And watching that happen and helping them do it is the most satisfying thing you\'ll ever do. 看着这一切发生并帮助他们做这件事是你所做过的最令人满意的事情。 > Which is why I\'m not retired. 所以我才没退休。 > `[00:26:49]` Well awesome thank you so much for. `[00:26:49]` 哦，太棒了，谢谢你。