# Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
> `[00:00:08]` All right. So up next we\'re going to do pitch practice.
`[00:00:08]` 好的。所以接下来我们要做投球练习。
> `[00:00:14]` This is something that we invented by accident a couple of years ago. One of our speakers had to cancel at the last minute. So we just threw together this idea. Let\'s bring up some startups. This is NYC. We\'ve never done it on stage before but the idea was you know a lot of people they\'ve gone through I see it\'s coming up to demo day and actually they\'ve never had a real experience like pitching investor just like cold\'s someone who doesn\'t know anything about them. So he got this idea hey let\'s just try it out you know have a founder come up give their pitch and just to warn you they\'re usually like pretty rough. That\'s kind of the point of it. And then we have a partner in this case Ali Sam. Come pitch the business. And hopefully he does a smoother job. We\'ll see a few things to keep in mind this will be a little bit like the office hours except not at all helpful and laughter. Probably maybe a little bit more brutal. So just to kind of give you some context like as a seed investor something you have to keep in mind is that the median start up is ultimately worth about zero dollars and probably 95 percent of startups are a bad investment. So you kind of get in a mode where you\'re just the default no right. It\'s a very it\'s a little bit cold because you know people are pouring out their hearts and their print all their dreams into it.
`[00:00:14]` 这是我们几年前偶然发明的东西。我们的一位发言者不得不在最后一刻取消发言。所以我们就把这个想法。让我们提出一些创业。这里是纽约。我们以前从未在舞台上做过这件事,但我们的想法是,你认识很多他们经历过的人,我看到他们即将进入演示日,而实际上,他们从来没有真正的经历过像投手那样的投资者,就像一个对他们一无所知的人。所以他有了这个想法,嘿,让我们试试看,你知道,有个创办人上来,发表他们的演讲,只是为了警告你,他们通常都很粗鲁。这就是它的意义所在。在这个案子里我们有个搭档阿里·萨姆。来推销生意吧。希望他能做得更顺利。我们会看到一些事情要记住,这将是有点像办公时间,除了一点帮助和笑声。可能会更残忍一些。因此,为了给你一些背景,比如作为一个种子投资者,你必须记住的是,创业的中位数最终价值在零美元左右,而且可能 95%的初创企业都是糟糕的投资。所以你进入了一种模式,你只是默认的,没有权利。这是一个非常-有点冷-因为你知道人们正在倾吐他们的心,把他们所有的梦想都印在里面。
> `[00:01:49]` But you know nine times out of a thousand probably no where way around.
`[00:01:49]` 但是你知道一千次中有九次可能没有路可走。
> `[00:01:58]` Is always if you have to say no a lot. So when you see a business where you\'re looking for is like why are you the exception. Right. So it\'s not good enough just to be like oh that sounds like a nice business. I have to think like wow this is that one business that one that I\'ve been saying no for months. But today I\'m going to say yes. So just to just to kind of frame it for you. All right.
`[00:01:58]` 总是当你不得不说不太多的时候。所以,当你看到一个你在寻找的企业时,你为什么会是个例外。右(边),正确的所以它不够好,仅仅是像哦,这听起来是一个不错的生意。我不得不这样想,哇,这是我几个月来一直拒绝的一项业务。但今天我会说是的。所以我想给你画个框架。好的
> `[00:02:21]` First up let\'s let\'s get a round of applause.
`[00:02:21]` 首先,让我们热烈鼓掌。
> `[00:02:36]` Also just for context I don\'t know anything. So. I\'m not actually pretending that I didn\'t bother to learn anything. So this is I\'m hearing about the business for the first time.
`[00:02:36]` 也只是为了上下文,我什么都不知道。所以。我并不是假装我什么都没学到。所以这是我第一次听说这件事。
> `[00:02:46]` So I trying to get a larger introduce yourself.
`[00:02:46]` 所以我试着做一个更大的自我介绍。
> `[00:02:51]` So I\'m Jana I\'m from ship IMAX and we help agricultural energy and mining companies hire ships and just to be clear I\'m not talking about containers. I\'m talking about four ships.
`[00:02:51]` 所以我是 Jana I‘是来自 IMAX 号船,我们帮助农业、能源和采矿公司租用船只,我要说的是,我不是在谈论集装箱,我指的是四艘船。
> `[00:03:07]` Okay so you do something with ships.
`[00:03:07]` 好吧,你用船做点什么吧。
> `[00:03:10]` I that part. So this is like if I need to go rent it\'s like a rental like I need it to go rent.
`[00:03:10]` 我那部分。所以这就像我要去租一样,就像我需要它去租一样。
> `[00:03:18]` So you are a commodity trader. You need to shift 50000 tonnes of coal from South Africa to Rotterdam and you come to us find the ship.
`[00:03:18]` 所以你是一个商品交易者。你需要把 50000 吨煤从南非运到鹿特丹,然后你来找我们找到那艘船。
> `[00:03:27]` I see. So I took a position on coal in South Africa and then I had to get it someplace else. And what would I do today.
`[00:03:27]` 我明白了。所以我对南非的煤炭采取了立场,然后我不得不把它搬到别的地方去。我今天会做什么。
> `[00:03:37]` I don\'t know anything about this business today you\'d pick up your phone and your email and you would call five to 10 brokers and say hey I need to move this stuff I see.
`[00:03:37]` 我今天对这件事一无所知,你会拿起你的电话和电子邮件,然后打电话给 5-10 个经纪人,说嗨,我要把我看到的东西搬走。
> `[00:03:48]` So this is like a marketplace where right now those brokers and they what do they take a big cut and then you\'re going to like what\'s the value proposition for me as a trader.
`[00:03:48]` 所以这就像一个市场,现在那些经纪人-他们拿什么大的股票,然后你就会喜欢我作为一个交易者的价值主张。
> `[00:03:57]` So think about this. And today you\'re speaking to all these different brokers and they can take you three to 24 hours to get some indications back it can take you up to two weeks and touch you. But that ship will ship Max. We use satellite technology and navigation to cover every ship on Earth and we can tell you what ship can make it in time and fit the specifications and is open in seconds.
`[00:03:57]` 想想看。今天,你和所有这些不同的经纪人交谈,他们可以花你 3 到 24 小时的时间才能得到一些指示
> `[00:04:24]` OK. So is the idea that it\'s just easier for me or do I get a better price. Like what. What closes the deal.
`[00:04:24]` 好的。我的想法是这样对我来说更容易,或者我能得到一个更好的价格。比如什么。什么能完成交易。
> `[00:04:31]` So does this two things when you think about trading one it\'s like a very binary thing as a commodity trader and you need to know what you\'re delivered prices to the customer. Otherwise someone else can come come and get that deal instead of you and I both myself and my co-founder have lost multimillion pound deals for not getting freight fast enough. And the second proposition is ready service. Would you rather. Speak to five brokers and receive thousands of e-mails per deal or would you rather say this is my shit.
`[00:04:31]` 当你考虑交易一件事情时,这两件事都是这样的,这就像一个非常二元的商品交易者,你需要知道你被交付给客户的价格是多少。否则,就会有其他人来代替你得到这笔交易,我本人和我的共同创始人都因为运货不够快而损失了数百万英镑的交易。第二个命题是现成的服务。你愿意。与五位经纪人交谈,每笔交易都会收到数千封电子邮件,或者你宁愿说这是我的狗屎。
> `[00:05:05]` Let\'s go.
`[00:05:05]` 我们走吧。
> `[00:05:08]` The letter sounds great. I\'m not in that position so you have a lot of traction. I mean are you what your growth rate. So we launched about.
`[00:05:08]` 这封信听起来很棒。我不是那个位置,所以你有很大的吸引力。我的意思是你的增长率。所以我们开始了。
> `[00:05:18]` Beta about seven weeks ago and since then what we\'re trying to do is talk to these charterers these traders and to see if they would talk to us and give us requests. And to date we\'ve had about4.5 million lithographs and last week was a great win for us because we signed one of the largest energy trading companies in well Jeffrey 150 million tons of products annually.
`[00:05:18]` 贝塔大约在 7 周前,从那时起,我们要做的就是和这些租船人-这些交易员-谈谈,看看他们是否愿意和我们谈谈,向我们提出要求。到目前为止,我们已经有了大约 450 万张平版印刷,上周对我们来说是一个巨大的胜利,因为我们每年在杰弗里签署了一家最大的能源贸易公司-杰弗里-1.5 亿吨的产品。
> `[00:05:45]` What does that represent for you. How much revenue are you going to make off of it.
`[00:05:45]` 这对你意味着什么?你打算从中赚多少钱。
> `[00:05:48]` So it is we\'re still competing with other brokers right now. The revenue potential was 15 million annually so we\'re now receiving those recrossed to compete on a deal by deal basis to be faster and better.
`[00:05:48]` 所以我们现在还在和其他经纪人竞争,每年的收入潜力是 1500 万,所以我们现在接受那些通过交易来竞争的人,以求更快更好。
> `[00:06:00]` So from their perspective you\'re just another broker is that right. Yeah. You don\'t even know that you\'re like a tech company. They\'re just like a new broker. Is that good or bad for you.
`[00:06:00]` 所以从他们的角度来看,你只是另一个经纪人是对的。是的。你甚至不知道你像一家科技公司。他们就像一个新的经纪人。这对你是好是坏。
> `[00:06:10]` So what kind of edging our way in. So the way I\'ve started this conversation is saying like hey goals to make this much much faster. Like help us get there. And so they\'re giving us a go. They want smarter intelligence and the smaller companies want better access to the market. And so today we\'re just saying yes it\'s no perfect out of the box right now but give us a go. We\'re not worse than the other broker.
`[00:06:10]` 那么,我们的道路是什么样的?因此,我开始这段对话的方式是说“嘿,目标”,让我们走得更快。比如帮助我们实现目标。因此,他们给了我们一次机会。他们想要更聪明的智力,而规模较小的公司希望更好地进入市场。因此,今天我们只是说“是的”
> `[00:06:38]` Have they used you yet or did they just say we\'ll think about you know Yeah they they they giving us her crusties company ships have you shipped.
`[00:06:38]` 他们有没有利用过你,或者他们只是说我们会想一想,你知道,是的,他们给了我们她的危险,公司的船,你已经发运了。
> `[00:06:46]` We haven\'t shown them right now. We\'ve basically been getting Nizer crest which was our first test to see Will they give them to us because that\'s actually quite a big deal because they\'re telling you market information. And does that mean that they\'re sending you the request but then they\'re going with a different broker right now basically what our problem has been is that we need a bit more funding to get more men on the ground to help fulfill these requests. Because right now some of the larger brokers have better intelligence. And so we\'re starting kind of from zero and each time we\'re kind of getting closer and closer to actually tracking that tail and beating the brokers.
`[00:06:46]` 我们现在还没有给他们看。我们基本上已经得到了 NizerCrest,这是我们第一次测试他们是否会给我们,因为这实际上是一个相当大的问题,因为他们告诉你市场信息。这是否意味着他们会向你发出请求,但现在他们会与另一家经纪人合作-基本上,我们的问题是,我们需要更多的资金来让更多的人在实地帮助满足这些要求。因为现在一些较大的经纪人有更好的情报。所以我们从零开始,每一次我们都越来越接近于跟踪这条尾巴,打败经纪人。
> `[00:07:29]` So you haven\'t actually won any deals yet. Not yet. How soon will you win the deal.
`[00:07:29]` 所以你还没有真正赢得任何交易。还没有。你要多久才能赢得这笔交易?
> `[00:07:34]` I think next week we\'ll talk next week.
`[00:07:34]` 我想下周我们将在下周谈。
> `[00:07:39]` So how much will that deal be worth assuming you do get this deal next week. And that should be worth ten thousand dollars in what will be your costs behind that like pure profit for you.
`[00:07:39]` 那么,如果你下周得到这笔交易的话,这笔交易值多少钱呢?这应该值一万美元,你的成本就像你的纯利一样。
> `[00:07:51]` And that\'s like pure profit. So is ICOS is just like the men the people.
`[00:07:51]` 那就像纯粹的利润,ICOS 也是如此,就像人们一样。
> `[00:07:57]` Now why is this. Why is this going to be like a hundred billion dollar company.
`[00:07:57]` 现在为什么会这样。为什么这会像一家价值千亿美元的公司。
> `[00:08:03]` So it\'s a huge market and so today like the amount that these traders spend on brokerage fees today is about three billion dollars a year at current market lower rates and the largest company today is a company called coxswains who make 240 million GBP per annum and I mean to me that also means you have some really formidable competitors like are they really just a roll over and let you take their business.
`[00:08:03]` 所以这是一个巨大的市场,所以今天,就像今天这些交易员在经纪费用上的花费一样,以当前市场较低的利率计算,每年大约有 30 亿美元。今天最大的公司是一家名为 Coxswans 的公司,年收入 2.4 亿英镑,我的意思是,这也意味着你有一些非常强大的竞争对手,比如,他们真的只是翻身,让你接手他们的业务。
> `[00:08:39]` When
`[00:08:39]`
> `[00:08:40]` are you going to run over.
`[00:08:40]` 你要跑过去吗?
> `[00:08:43]` I think what\'s kind of what\'s interesting that\'s happening is that the problem with these big guys like they are superior to the small brokers right. They have more intelligence and they can SABIC a clients better. But who they can\'t serve as the little guys. And and they can\'t sell them because it\'s so monumental although their processes.
`[00:08:43]` 我认为有趣的是,这些像他们这样的大人物的问题比小经纪人更好。他们有更多的智慧,他们可以更好地为 SABIC 客户服务。但是他们不能充当小人物。而且他们不能出售他们,因为他们的过程是如此巨大的,尽管他们的过程是如此巨大的。
> `[00:09:05]` So that\'s basically you\'re thinking you\'re coming at the bottom of the market where there\'s totally neglected. Yes. Is that where you\'re going after right now is that this first customers is that at the bottom of the market.
`[00:09:05]` 那基本上是你认为你在市场的底部,那里完全被忽视了。是的,你现在要追求的是,这个第一批顾客就是市场底部的那个人吗?。
> `[00:09:15]` No we Izen been starting the bottom market but actually a lot of the big guys want to talk to us too because of these superior intelligence that we can actually leverage free data.
`[00:09:15]` 不,我们一直在启动底部市场,但实际上很多大人物也想和我们交谈,因为我们可以利用这些优越的情报来利用免费数据。
> `[00:09:25]` But I mean if there is this bottom of market that\'s totally neglected why not because you haven\'t done any ships yet. Right. Why not just go find some these guys who are super neglected.
`[00:09:25]` 但我的意思是,如果市场的底部完全被忽视了,为什么不呢?因为你还没有做过任何船。对。为什么不直接去找那些被极度忽视的家伙。
> `[00:09:35]` No we we\'re all working with those as.
`[00:09:35]` 不,我们都和那些人一起工作。
> `[00:09:39]` So is this it seems like I see a lot of startups where they\'re basically high level pitch is there\'s these brokers that make a lot of money.
`[00:09:39]` 那么,我似乎看到了很多初创公司,它们基本上都是高水平的,这些经纪人赚了很多钱。
> `[00:09:48]` And we\'re going to cut them out with technology and take all the money.
`[00:09:48]` 我们要用科技把他们剪掉,把所有的钱都拿走。
> `[00:09:52]` But just as a general form like the most obvious for me and familiar to most of us is like the real estate market right like Redfin or someone who\'s going to come in and just blow away the brokers. But so far it seems like I\'ve seen any of those markets. It seems like the brokers are very good at holding on to their position.
`[00:09:52]` 但就像我最明显、我们大多数人都熟悉的一种一般形式一样,就像房地产市场一样,就像雷德芬那样,或者某个即将进入市场的人,只会把经纪人吹走。但到目前为止,我似乎看到了任何这样的市场。似乎这些经纪人非常善于保住自己的位置。
> `[00:10:11]` So the key thing in this market. I mean there\'s one thing to say that we still have brokers so we\'re not a pure technology play where enabling all brokers to be much smarter than anyone else. And the cool thing about this market is that intelligence is the main driver. Traders were warned that brokers with deals based on intelligence because you need that intelligence to keep getting good right. So if you can build a platform that is the only thing that can and aggregate and digest this like explosion of information at scale and you\'re the only person that can speak to these small companies and the big companies and mine all that data to actually sell people and more effectively than anyone else.
`[00:10:11]` 所以这个市场的关键是。我的意思是,有一件事可以说,我们仍然有经纪人,所以我们不是一个纯粹的技术游戏,让所有经纪人都比任何人都聪明得多。这个市场最酷的一点是,智力是主要的驱动力。交易员们被警告说,经纪人的交易是基于情报的,因为你需要这些情报才能保持良好的状态。因此,如果你能建立一个平台,它是唯一能像大规模信息爆炸一样聚集和消化的东西,那么你是唯一一个能够与这些小公司和大公司交谈的人,并且能够挖掘所有这些数据,真正地销售人员,比其他任何人都更有效。
> `[00:10:55]` OK. So supposing I do believe all of that and that there is going to be this one tech company that just manages to displace all of the brokers. Why should I believe it\'s you.
`[00:10:55]` 好的。因此,假设我相信所有这一切,而且将有一家科技公司设法取代所有的经纪人。我为什么要相信那是你。
> `[00:11:08]` So 18 combines like a few things one stock that experience not only growing businesses to very experienced brokers on team as well as people have been on the trading side of this market as well as deep technical talent. And I think you need all those things and this is very difficult people and people in this industry generally don\'t know anything about technology. It\'s very old industry and people who understand technology and generally don\'t understand like the niche things that you need to care about when shipping 50000 tonnes worth of commodities have you shipped a lot of commodities.
`[00:11:08]` 所以,18 结合了一些东西,一只股票不仅经历了不断增长的业务,团队中非常有经验的经纪人,以及在这个市场交易方面的人,以及深层次的技术人才。我认为你需要所有这些东西-这是非常困难的-这个行业的人和这个行业的人通常对技术一无所知。这是一个很古老的行业,也是那些了解技术的人,他们一般不理解那些你需要关心的利基东西,当你运输价值 50000 吨的商品时,你会运送大量的商品。
> `[00:11:46]` A few Hawash. So it was more my co-founder than me on acquaintance\'s and he was shipping. I don\'t know thousands tens of thousands of tons of fertilizer.
`[00:11:46]` 一些哈瓦什。所以这更多的是我的共同创始人,而不是我的熟人,他在运输。我不知道成千上万吨的肥料。
> `[00:12:01]` People are signaling to me does that mean it\'s time. All right I think I think next time. Thank you very much.
`[00:12:01]` 人们在给我发信号,这是不是意味着时间到了。好吧,我想下次吧。非常感谢。
> `[00:12:08]` Claude All right.
`[00:12:08]` 克劳德,好的。
> `[00:12:16]` So I have. This is the first time I met Jenna and heard about the business. So I\'m going to try to pitch it but I will probably get all the numbers and secret plans for the future wrong. Hopefully we\'ll still be illustrative and helpful and I\'m going to treat this like I would treat a meeting with an angel investor that I was trying to get to write me a check. So hey Paul I\'m Sam Sharemax. So I\'ll tell you about what we do and maybe I can start with kind of who we are so we are building a marketplace for shipping shipping is still 9 percent of world GDP. It\'s one of the biggest markets. People don\'t think about and it hasn\'t moved forward much with technology. So it\'s still if you need to ship something you call around you call a broker who then knows a bunch of ships. They try to find one somewhere in the world that can take what you need and and then you pay them in and they ship it for you. Everyone thinks that the market has become really efficient because they\'ve read the box and they know about containers and they think they\'re like This is a solve problem. But still more than half of all cargo doesn\'t get shipped that way and it is still there\'s been no winner that\'s emerged for a Uber like shipping experience where basically you click a button. You say I need to ship from here to here. You get a rate you get a boat and it goes. So that\'s where a building and the standard broker fees are like 15 percent. And so we think this is a really large market. I\'d be happy to tell you about more details of our approach. But is this something that at a high level seems interesting to you.
`[00:12:16]` 所以我有。这是我第一次见到珍娜,也是我第一次听说这件事。所以我会试着推销它,但是我可能会把所有的数字和未来的秘密计划都搞错了。希望我们仍能起到说明性和帮助作用,我将把这件事当作我与天使投资者的会面,而我正试图给我写一张支票。保罗我是萨姆·谢尔麦克斯。所以我会告诉你们我们在做什么,也许我可以从我们是谁开始,所以我们正在建设一个航运市场,仍然是世界 GDP 的 9%。这是最大的市场之一。人们没有思考,科技也没有取得多大进展。所以,如果你需要把你叫什么的东西运到附近,你就叫经纪人,他知道一堆船。他们试图在世界上的某个地方找到一个可以带走你所需要的东西,然后你付钱给他们,然后他们为你运送。每个人都认为市场已经变得非常有效率,因为他们已经阅读了盒子,他们知道容器,他们认为这是一个解决问题的方法。但仍有一半以上的货物不是以这种方式运输的,而且优步(Uber)也不是赢家,就像你点击一个按钮的航运体验一样。你说我得把船从这里运到这里。你得到一个价格,你得到一艘船,然后它就去了。这就是一栋大楼和标准经纪人的费用大约是 15%的地方。所以我们认为这是一个非常大的市场。我很乐意告诉你我们方法的更多细节。但这是否是你感兴趣的高层次的东西呢?
> `[00:13:45]` Yeah if you can make a lot of money it is. It is interesting. Well I\'d love to tell you why.
`[00:13:45]` 是的,如果你能赚很多钱的话。很有趣。我想告诉你原因。
> `[00:13:51]` We\'re going to make a lot of money. Not only is this a giant market you know shipping broker fees on cargo shipping is 150 billion dollar a year market. But there is a natural monopoly in that. Like any other marketplace the the people that have cargo want to go where they can get the cheapest rate and the most options. And if people have boats want to go where the most people that needs them and shipped out. And so even though no one has brought software to this industry yet and it\'s been the sort of network of people calling brokers calling around to ships they know why haven\'t one of these existing brokers just eaten up the market. 我们会赚很多钱的。这不仅是一个巨大的市场,你知道,货运代理收费是每年 1500 亿美元的市场。但这是一种自然垄断。和任何其他市场一样,有货的人想去的地方,他们可以得到最便宜的价格和最多的选择。如果人们有船,想去最需要他们的地方,然后把船运出去。因此,尽管还没有人为这个行业带来软件,而且这是一种叫经纪人来找船的人网络,他们知道为什么这些现有的经纪人没有吞噬市场。
`[00:14:28]` Well why do it. Why does any industry not adopt software. I think there\'s a great quote I heard recently that it is harder for existing companies to get good technology people than it is for technology people to learn about other industries. And this is why startups have an opportunity.
> `[00:14:28]` 那么为什么要这样做呢?为什么任何行业都不采用软件。我认为最近我听到了一句很棒的话:现有的公司要想吸引到优秀的技术人才,要比技术人员了解其他行业要困难得多,这就是为什么初创企业有机会。
`[00:14:43]` This is why is that the only way that you can eat the industry that is that. I mean it\'s just naturally fragmented. If you don\'t have software is that is that your theory. https://tmt.ap-beijing.tencentcloudapi.com/?Action=TextTranslate&Nonce=1234&ProjectId=1257710951&Region=ap-beijing&SecretId=AKIDPqCXo8hXckompwwu7EB4sWzTvJXboBh2&Source=en&SourceText=%5C%5B00%3A14%3A43%5C%5D+This+is+why+is+that+the+only+way+that+you+can+eat+the+industry+that+is+that.+I+mean+it%5C%27s+just+naturally+fragmented.+If+you+don%5C%27t+have+software+is+that+is+that+your+theory.&Target=zh&Timestamp=1538788518&Version=2018-03-21&Signature=YCp8a60uUZBZcP1BHQ6ymNPeHxo=
> `[00:14:51]` Well yeah I think it\'s like any other industry it\'s like Airbnb and b couldn\'t work without software you just had people call around and find vacation homes they happened to be free or you had to call taxi companies before Uber and find a cab that was free. The magic of software is just that any of these industries can become centralized on one platform that gives everybody a central experience. And in these large markets these platforms tend to be winner take all the winner take most and create super valuable companies.
`[00:14:51]` 是的,我认为这和其他任何行业一样,就像 Airbnb 和 b 没有软件就不能工作,你只是让人们打电话来找他们碰巧免费的度假屋,或者在 Uber 之前给出租车公司打电话,找一辆免费的出租车。软件的神奇之处在于,这些行业中的任何一个都可以集中在一个平台上,为每个人提供一个中心体验。而在这些大市场上,这些平台往往是赢家,把所有赢家都拿走,并创造出最有价值的公司。
> `[00:15:17]` So my theory with these kinds of businesses is always just that time like tech people go out and they so we\'re going to change everything but then they show up and the customer says I\'ve been doing it this way for the last 30 years I do it till I\'m dead. Like how do I know they\'re actually going to adopt your new approach.
`[00:15:17]` 所以我对这类企业的理论是,就像技术人员外出,他们会改变一切,但他们出现了,顾客说我在过去 30 年里一直这样做,直到我死了。比如,我怎么知道他们真的会采用你的新方法呢?。
> `[00:15:35]` One of the secrets that we\'ve learned as we\'ve been working on this business is we\'re very new. We\'re only seven weeks old. We stuff a lot of things left to figure left to figure out. But one of the things that we\'ve learned is most people are either all humans or all software and that approach doesn\'t work. And what you need is the combination you need humans aided by software. This is just like LB2 or how PayPal dealt with fraud and this is what customers want. So we\'re actually going to have a bunch of brokers that customers can talk to on the phone like they\'re used to but we\'ll give them software that makes them 100 times or a thousand times more efficient. But you\'re totally right. And the reason other people have failed doing this is they don\'t understand this and they just have a pure software platform and it really is the combination of humans and software together that makes this store work with customers that have been doing it for a long time but have the advantages of a software company in scale. So is this working right now to have a lot of customers. So are super early. We haven\'t been able to raise any money yet. We\'re only seven weeks old in that seven weeks. We\'ve been able to get 50 people that have sent us jobs. We don\'t yet have enough infrastructure in place to fulfill those but we expect to actually book three boats next week and we\'ll make our first 10000 dollars of revenue. And we think we have a path from that just over the next few months on our existing contacts and when we know come in well we know is coming in our pipeline to get to 100000 dollars in revenue and that\'s not GMV or anything like that that\'s actual profit that we\'re going to keep. We have nearly 100 percent margin on that. And then what are your expenses. Well as I said I think one of the key insights here is that we\'re going to be humans and software together we\'re gonna be brokers and a platform. So our biggest expense by far will be paying the brokers salary and commission but again I wasn\'t joking when I said I think we can make them 100 times more efficient with software. You would not believe how broken the industry is today would it would pain you to watch out one of these brokers works. So we think there\'s still substantial economics for us there.
`[00:15:35]` 我们在从事这项工作时学到的一个秘密是,我们是非常新的。我们才七周大。我们还有很多事情要解决。但我们学到的一件事是,大多数人都是人,或者是所有的软件,而这种方法是行不通的。你所需要的是你需要人类的结合,并借助软件。这就像 lb 2 或者 PayPal 如何处理欺诈,这就是客户想要的。因此,我们实际上会有一群经纪人,客户可以像他们习惯的那样通过电话与他们交谈,但我们会给他们软件,使他们的效率提高 100 倍或上千倍。但你是完全正确的。而其他人之所以没能做到这一点,是因为他们不理解这一点,他们只是拥有一个纯粹的软件平台,而正是人和软件的结合才使得这家商店与客户合作,这些客户已经做了很长时间,但在规模上拥有软件公司的优势。所以,这对很多客户来说是有效的。超早也是。我们还没能筹集到任何资金。在那七个星期里,我们只有七周大。我们已经找到了 50 个人给我们送了工作。我们还没有足够的基础设施来完成这些任务,但我们预计下周预定三艘船,我们将获得我们的第一笔 10000 美元的收入。我们认为,在接下来的几个月里,我们有一条从现有联系中走出来的道路,当我们意识到这一点时,我们就知道,我们的目标是获得 100000 美元的收入,而这不是 gmv,也不是我们将保持的实际利润。我们在这方面的利润率几乎是百分之百。那你的开销是多少。正如我所说的,我认为这里的一个关键洞见是,我们将成为人类和软件的结合体,我们将成为经纪人和平台。因此,到目前为止,我们最大的支出将是支付经纪人的工资和佣金,但当我说我们可以用软件提高 100 倍的效率时,我再次没有开玩笑。你不会相信这个行业今天有多坏,如果你注意其中一个经纪人的工作,你会感到痛苦吗?因此,我们认为,对我们来说,仍然存在着实质性的经济问题。
> `[00:17:29]` How big does this get ultimately. Where do you see the business in like 5 in 10 years.
`[00:17:29]` 这到底有多大?你在 10 年内看到的生意在哪里?
> `[00:17:35]` Well the charter market alone the broker market alone is about 150 billion dollars and that grows. No that\'s not in the market share there. That\'s their markup at the shipping markets in the trillions. Again one of the largest drivers of world GDP. But you know like we\'re pretty ambitious. We think this is a big market and there is a natural monopoly it could get pretty big.
`[00:17:35]` 单是租船市场,单是经纪人市场就有大约 1500 亿美元,而且还在增长。不,那不是市场份额。这是他们在航运市场的数万亿美元的利润。再次成为全球 GDP 的最大驱动因素之一。但你知道,我们很有野心。我们认为这是一个大市场,有一个自然垄断-它可能会变得相当大。
> `[00:17:57]` We\'re very early but why. Why should I mean assuming I do believe that story like well why do I believe it\'s you and not some other some other people software.
`[00:17:57]` 我们现在还早,但为什么呢?为什么我要假设我相信这个故事,为什么我相信它是你,而不是其他人的软件。
> `[00:18:08]` So we ourselves used to have to do this a lot and we understand a lot of the things that most people don\'t. We\'re commodities traders. We\'ve shipped huge amounts of goods and we\'ve learned these nonobvious things like the most important thing for a commodity trader is not the price but the speed and the certainty. So it\'s really important to know if you\'re going to trade on a razor thin margin that you can have a ship on a particular day at a particular cost before you buy the coal or whatever. And that\'s just one example I could give you of many. But we\'ve been doing this our whole lives. We really know about this and we\'re software people.
`[00:18:08]` 所以我们自己过去不得不做很多这样的事情,我们理解了很多大多数人不知道的事情。我们是大宗商品交易商。我们已经运送了大量的货物,并且我们学到了这些不明显的东西,比如对一个大宗商品交易者来说,最重要的不是价格,而是速度和确定性。因此,真正重要的是要知道,如果你要以极薄的保证金进行交易,在购买煤炭或其他东西之前,你可以在某一天以特定的成本购买一艘船。这只是我能给你举的一个例子。但我们这辈子都在这么做。我们真的知道这件事,我们是软件人。
> `[00:18:43]` That\'s great. Lower. We\'re out of time.
`[00:18:43]` 太好了,太低了,我们没时间了。
> `[00:18:45]` So really quickly I\'d love to have you as an investor don\'t you want to rush your process but how should we follow up what are the next steps how do you think about this.
`[00:18:45]` 这么快,我很想让你成为一个投资者,你不想赶着你的过程,但是我们应该如何跟进接下来的步骤-你怎么看待这件事?
> `[00:18:54]` You know Asia like tech just kind of turned out it for a little while and may come up with some extra questions so just drop me an e-mail and include whatever other info that would be helpful.
`[00:18:54]` 你知道,亚洲就像科技一样,在一段时间内,可能会提出一些额外的问题,所以只要给我发一封电子邮件,包括任何其他有用的信息就行了。
> `[00:19:04]` Okay I\'ll send you an email I\'m going to follow up with you in a week or two and see if anything else. Yeah just just feel free to ping me. All right. Thank you Paul. Great thanks.
`[00:19:04]` 好的,我会在一两周后给你发一封电子邮件,看看还有什么别的。好的,随便给我打电话。好的。谢谢你,保罗。太好了。
> `[00:19:11]` Applause should we talk about it a little bit.
`[00:19:11]` 掌声,我们应该稍微谈谈它。
> `[00:19:19]` Yeah yeah. A short quick quick recap.
`[00:19:19]` 是的。简短的快速回顾。
> `[00:19:22]` I mean so this is one where it\'s a business that I don\'t know anything about. So there is there has to be like a pretty strong educational component to start with. And so it definitely help especially that you\'re able to give like some high level overview and especially like trying to understand just like the fundamentals of like what drives the business.
`[00:19:22]` 我的意思是,这是一个我不知道的行业。因此,首先必须有一个相当强大的教育成分。所以,尤其是你能够给出一些高水平的概述,尤其是努力理解推动企业发展的基本原理,这肯定会有所帮助。
> `[00:19:46]` Because for me like by default assumption about the world is that 99 percent of people want to just keep doing the same thing that they do day after day unless they have no choice.
`[00:19:46]` 因为对我来说,就像对世界的默认假设一样,99%的人想继续做他们日复一日的事情,除非他们别无选择。
> `[00:19:58]` And so like change happens when people are like pushed and so like the commodities trader with the margins where it\'s like he is going to lose money if he doesn\'t get the right ship or whatever like that makes sense right. Because it actually becomes like a competitive thing where the people who adopt the technology will defeat those who don\'t.
`[00:19:58]` 当人们像被推的一样,就像大宗商品交易员那样,如果他没有得到正确的船或任何其他合理的东西,他就会赔钱。因为它实际上变成了一种竞争的东西,采用这种技术的人会打败那些不这样做的人。
> `[00:20:17]` Right.
`[00:20:17]` 对。
> `[00:20:19]` That\'s one thing at the end. Don\'t leave a meeting without some plan for a follow up. It\'s like really good to just say like can I e-mail you should we meet again. What are your thoughts. I always have to ask it. You shouldn\'t just say I like can I have a check. After first meeting that really annoys me I think and always even more people look at us. But it is always good to ask for a follow.
`[00:20:19]` 这是最后的一回事。不要在没有后续计划的情况下离开会议。我可以给你发电子邮件吗?我们应该再见面。你的想法是什么。我总是要问这个问题。你不应该只说我喜欢,我可以要一张支票吗?第一次见面真的让我很烦,我想,而且总是有更多的人看我们。但是要求一个追随者总是很好的。
> `[00:20:40]` You were really good by the way.
`[00:20:40]` 顺便说一句,你真的很棒。
> `[00:20:42]` Good job it\'s a it\'s a tough it\'s tough to pitch up applause applause.
`[00:20:42]` 干得好,很难赢得掌声。
> `[00:20:49]` All right. We would normally talk about this for longer but we\'re running a little bit over so we\'ll move on to the next one.
`[00:20:49]` 好的。我们通常会讨论这个问题更长的时间,但是我们的讨论有点过了,所以我们将继续讨论下一个问题。
> `[00:20:54]` Thank you very much Mike never mind. Laughter.
`[00:20:54]` 非常感谢迈克。笑声。
> `[00:21:13]` Hello. Hello.
`[00:21:13]` 你好。你好。
> `[00:21:17]` Good to see you. How\'s everybody.
`[00:21:17]` 很高兴见到你。大家都好吗。
> `[00:21:24]` So hi. Hi.
`[00:21:24]` 你好。嗨
> `[00:21:29]` My name is Kelly Thomas Drake and I am the president and founder of my purple folder my purple folder is a hip a compliant global healthcare app that provides consumers easy access.
`[00:21:29]` 我叫凯利·托马斯·德雷克(Kelly Thomas Drake),我是我的紫色文件夹的总裁和创始人,这是一个符合要求的全球医疗应用程序,为消费者提供方便的访问。
> `[00:21:46]` One Stop Shop leveraging and connect insisting patient data while also delivering hospitals and physicians decreased administrative costs associated with patient care and improved patient experience.
`[00:21:46]` 一站式商店利用和连接坚持病人的数据,同时提供医院和医生,降低了与病人护理相关的行政费用,改善了病人的经验。
> `[00:22:01]` So is this like the EMR thing.
`[00:22:01]` 所以这就像电子病历一样。
> `[00:22:05]` Is this my health record. It\'s actually all of them combined in one.
`[00:22:05]` 这是我的健康记录。实际上他们都是一体的。
> `[00:22:12]` I\'m having trouble wrap my head around. So is this is this something that I as a patient want. Or is it something for doctors. Who\'s the customer.
`[00:22:12]` 我的脑子有点问题。这是我作为病人想要的东西吗?还是给医生用的。顾客是谁?
> `[00:22:20]` So the actual end user is the patient the caregiver which is their family member and it\'s called my purple folder because I kept everything in a purple accordion folder.
`[00:22:20]` 所以真正的最终用户是病人,照顾者,是他们的家庭成员,它叫做我的紫色文件夹,因为我把所有东西都放在一个紫色手风琴文件夹里。
> `[00:22:34]` When I was going through this with my grandmother.
`[00:22:34]` 当我和祖母一起经历这件事的时候。
> `[00:22:36]` OK. So this is a place that I keep all of my medical records essentially.
`[00:22:36]` 好的。所以这是我保存所有医疗记录的地方。
> `[00:22:41]` So essentially if you\'re from the Bay Area and you have a clipper pass and you can go from fairy to BART to Muni to all of these different transportation systems with one pass. That\'s what my purple folder is.
`[00:22:41]` 如果你是从海湾地区来的,你可以从仙女到 BART 再到 Muni,所有这些不同的交通系统只要一次就可以了。这就是我的紫色文件夹。
> `[00:22:57]` So he says too abstract for me so I mean I\'ve been to hospitals and things like like what is the problem that it solves for me is the problem that I have to move my medical records out. 所以他说的对我来说太抽象了,所以我的意思是我去过医院,对我来说,它解决的问题是,我必须把我的医疗记录移出去。
`[00:23:07]` I\'m still trying to figure out is this for my medical records or is it something other than medical records.
> `[00:23:07]` 我还在努力弄清楚这是我的医疗记录还是其他什么东西,而不是医疗记录。
`[00:23:11]` So I\'d like to tell you that answer through a story basically. So as of 2011 a federal piece of legislation was passed called meaningful use which made an already antiquated system more disjointed. So my mother as of late was diagnosed with breast cancer she is better now she\'s in remission. However she went from having one patient portal on one hospital campus to seven because of hospital health care systems being so federally compliant that they forgot about you and me. The patient the caregiver the human. So this is a Go-Between no matter what patient portal no matter what hospital healthcare system no matter what city state country. This is global access coordinated all at the top of my at my purple folder the patient care easy button.
> `[00:23:11]` 所以我想通过一个故事告诉你们这个答案。因此,截至 2011 年,一项名为“有意义的利用”的联邦立法被通过,这使得已经过时的制度更加脱节。因此,我母亲最近被诊断患有乳腺癌,现在病情好转了。然而,她从一个医院校园里的一个病人门户变成了七个,因为医院的医疗系统非常符合联邦法规,以至于他们忘记了你和我。病人,照顾者,人类。因此,不管是什么病人门户,无论哪个医院的医疗系统,无论哪个城市、州、国家,这都是相互联系的。这是全球访问协调,所有在我的顶部,在我的紫色文件夹,病人护理容易按钮。
`[00:24:07]` So it\'s my medical records.
> `[00:24:07]` 所以这是我的医疗记录。
`[00:24:10]` Laughter is that right. Is it just yes or no. Is it my medical records. Yes. In addition to some things. OK.
> `[00:24:10]` 笑声是对的。只是或不是。是我的医疗记录。是除了一些东西。好的
`[00:24:19]` What else is it.
> `[00:24:19]` 还有什么。
`[00:24:20]` So it\'s my medical records and medical records it chair health care legal records.
> `[00:24:20]` 所以这是我的医疗记录和医疗记录,它是卫生保健法律记录的主席。
`[00:24:26]` So like my my what do you call it.
> `[00:24:26]` 就像我的一样,你叫它什么?
`[00:24:29]` If I had a DNR some hate it would be in there is that so I keep my will in there or other advanced medical directives advance directives medical power returning durable power of attorney. We have a universal HYP agreement because I also feel that when you\'re caught like a deer in the headlights and thrust a clipboard you shouldn\'t have to answer legal questions. Then you should have figured out already.
> `[00:24:29]` 如果我有一个 DNR,会有一些恨在那里,所以我保留我的意志在那里或其他先进的医疗指令,预先指示,医疗权力,恢复持久的授权。我们达成了一项普遍的 HYP 协议,因为我还觉得当你被发现时,就像头灯下的鹿一样,推着一个剪贴板,你不应该回答法律问题。那你就应该知道了。
`[00:24:55]` I see so I\'ve got all that. So once I have this I walk into the doctor\'s office and I say hey good news I\'ve got my Purple folder here and the doctor says that\'s awesome. Or dich.
> `[00:24:55]` 我明白了,所以我知道了。所以,一旦我拿到这个,我走进医生的办公室,我说,嘿,好消息,我这里有我的紫色文件夹,医生说那太棒了。或者说“巫妖精”。
`[00:25:09]` Like does it work if the hospital or medical facility I go to does not yet have your software or do they have to be like do you need to sell all the medical offices before it works for me as a patient.
> `[00:25:09]` 就像我去的医院或医疗机构还没有你的软件一样,或者它们必须像你需要出售所有的医疗办公室,然后它才能为我的病人工作。
`[00:25:21]` Absolutely not. The way that we do it is we the environment is right for doing the digitized version of what I did for my grandmother and what I\'ve learned as of late. So and what we\'ve developed so we leverage and connect existing patient data.
> `[00:25:21]` 绝对不是。我们这样做的方式是我们的环境是正确的,我为我的祖母做的事情和最近我学到的东西的数字化版本。所以,我们已经开发了什么,所以我们利用和连接现有的病人数据。
`[00:25:34]` We connect to the backend EMR systems so that you the new care provider says Oh well I don\'t have that yet.
> `[00:25:34]` 我们连接到后端的 EMR 系统,这样你这个新的护理提供者就会说,哦,我还没有。
`[00:25:43]` We send it through geo location technology. You receive a double of seven encrypted link and you put it in your system as you like. Okay great. Well we\'re all out of time. But thank you very much. Thank you.
> `[00:25:43]` 我们通过地理定位技术发送它。你收到一个双倍的七加密链接,你把它放在你的系统,你喜欢。好吧太好了。嗯,我们都没时间了。但是非常感谢。谢谢。
`[00:25:57]` Explorer before I start we have a little surprise we found PBS Kids Thomas and Camilla backstage.
> `[00:25:57]` 在我开始之前,我们有一个小小的惊喜,我们在后台发现了 PBS 的孩子托马斯和卡米拉。
`[00:26:08]` They want to say hello to all of you. You could give them a round of applause.
> `[00:26:08]` 他们想向你们所有人问好。你可以给他们一轮掌声。
`[00:26:15]` Why see winter 2024. We\'re excited. Thanks for coming in.
> `[00:26:15]` 为什么看到 2024 年冬天。我们很兴奋。谢谢你能来。
`[00:26:25]` All right. So we\'ll do the same thing again. I know very little about this business.
> `[00:26:25]` 好的。所以我们再做一次。我对这件事知之甚少。
`[00:26:31]` All the numbers will be as close to my memory as I can remember or think from what I\'ve read earlier but they\'ll be made up. All right. Hey Paul I\'m from my purple folder. Hi. So healthcare in theU.S. is horrible. We spend nineteen point five percent of our GDP on it and we have the lowest satisfaction of any developed nation. And you might wonder why that is. Do you have any idea. You have lots of ideas. Well I would actually love to hear before we jump in.
> `[00:26:31]` 所有的数字都将尽可能接近我的记忆,就像我从先前读到的东西中回忆或思考的那样,但它们都会被编造出来。好的嘿,保罗,我是从我的紫色文件夹来的。嗨因此,美国的医疗保健是可怕的。我们把国内生产总值的百分之十九点五花在这上面,我们的满意度是所有发达国家中最低的。你可能会想为什么。你知不知道。你有很多想法。在我们跳进去之前我很想听听。
`[00:26:57]` What do you think is the single biggest driver I mean I think there\'s no underlying economic model other than driving the costs higher. Fundamentally right. Right. Make more money by driving costs up.
> `[00:26:57]` 你认为唯一最大的驱动力是什么?我的意思是,除了推高成本之外,我认为没有其他潜在的经济模式。从根本上说是正确的。是的。通过推高成本来赚更多的钱。
`[00:27:09]` So we think the same thing. You have this like runaway growth because there\'s just no incentive to do anything but charge more. Do more tests do more procedures and the patience out of control. So our whole goal is to put health care back in the hands of the patient so they have a sense of what\'s going on and see everything in one place as we\'ve had this explosion patients have data on six or seven different systems. They have prescriptions they have appointments they have communication with doctors. Most people can\'t use all the systems or one. And so we\'ve just tried to make one consumer portal for all your medical records and any other medical data you have if you have this. You can actually understand your care or family members care and actually have a much better experience and hopefully over time drive the cost way down in the process. We become one central repository for all patient health data that actually works.
> `[00:27:09]` 所以我们也这么想。这就像失控的增长,因为除了收取更高的费用之外,没有任何动机去做任何事情。做更多的测试,做更多的程序和失去控制的耐心。因此,我们的整个目标是把医疗服务交还给病人,这样他们就能感觉到发生了什么,并且看到了一个地方的一切,因为我们已经让这个爆炸的病人掌握了六七个不同系统的数据。他们有处方,他们有预约,他们和医生有沟通。大多数人不能使用所有的系统或一个。所以我们试着为你所有的医疗记录和任何其他的医疗数据建立一个消费者门户,如果你有这个的话。你可以理解你的照顾或家庭成员的关心,实际上有一个更好的经验,并希望随着时间的推移,降低成本的过程中。我们成为所有实际工作的病人健康数据的中央存储库。
`[00:27:56]` So basically as a patient I just this just has all of my medical records in there that I can yeah.
> `[00:27:56]` 基本上,作为一个病人,我只是把我所有的医疗记录都放在里面,我可以这样做。
`[00:28:02]` So we make that work magically we connect with every system we don\'t have to do any deal with them. We just use the API that they have to have or secure email whatever they have. But we make it work so that as a patient you just say you know I need to connect to these systems or your doctor can send you invites and then you can do everything in one app.
> `[00:28:02]` 所以我们神奇地把它连接到每个我们不需要做任何处理的系统上。我们只需要使用他们必须拥有的 API 或者确保电子邮件的安全。但是我们让它正常工作,这样作为一个病人,你就可以说你知道我需要连接到这些系统,或者你的医生可以发送邀请,然后你可以在一个应用程序中完成所有事情。
`[00:28:20]` I see now I. Is this something you sell to the patients search of the doctors. Who\'s the customer here.
> `[00:28:20]` 我现在明白了。这是你卖给病人找医生的东西吗?这里的顾客是谁?
`[00:28:27]` Today we\'re going to sell to patients. It\'s really hard as you may know to try to sell things to doctors and hospitals. But we have we have customers with you know their hair on fire this burning problem of not being able to manage their health care or the health but what is the thing that actually drives somewhat like what is the moment where like my hair is on fire. 今天我们要卖给病人。你可能知道向医生和医院推销东西是很困难的。但是我们的顾客知道他们的头发着火了,这个棘手的问题是不能管理他们的医疗保健或健康,但是什么东西实际上有点像我头发着火的那一刻。
> `[00:28:45]` Well one particular scary story from a friend of mine was a missed message about a potential cancer screen.
`[00:28:45]` 一个来自我朋友的特别可怕的故事是一个关于潜在癌症屏幕的漏掉的信息。
> `[00:28:52]` But it\'s usually something like that someone gets really sick or something bad happens because of a lack of information and communication.
`[00:28:52]` 但是由于缺乏信息和沟通,人们通常会生病或发生一些不好的事情。
> `[00:28:58]` And so the pitch to me as a consumer is that this brings together all of my information just so that I can like peruse my medical records. Like what am I doing with it.
`[00:28:58]` 因此,作为一个消费者,我要强调的是,这汇集了我所有的信息,这样我就可以仔细阅读我的医疗记录了。就像我在用它做什么。
> `[00:29:09]` Well it\'s so that you can get better care like that. The issue that many people are taking care of a sick parent or grandparent have run into the issue where they don\'t know what to do. You know the patient doesn\'t remember something or the family member doesn\'t remember something. And the idea is like these are complicated things you\'d really like to have a single set of information that says here\'s when you need to take these medications here are these test results. You have to go in to get this test. This doctor said this thing wants you to tell tells other doctor it really is just about you know better care and people are willing to pay an unlimited amount of money if they can get that actually to be good. Are they paying you an unlimited amount of money right now. So we\'ve just started charging we unlike most health care companies don\'t want to drive the cost of health care up and up and up. We kind of hate it when people say oh I\'m a medical device for you know seven dollars and charge 22000 because insurance will pay me. That\'s not who we want to be. So we\'re only going to charge ninety nine dollars a year per patient although over time we\'ll become such a power. How many customers do you have at that price. This is made up we have 150 so far and we\'re growing at 12 percent per week.
`[00:29:09]` 好吧,这样你才能得到更好的照顾。许多人在照顾生病的父母或祖父母的问题上遇到了他们不知道该做什么的问题。你知道病人什么都不记得,或者家人什么都不记得。他们的想法是,这些都是复杂的事情,你非常希望有一组信息,上面写着当你需要服用这些药物的时候,这是这些测试结果。你得进去做这个测试。这位医生说,这件事想让你告诉其他医生,这真的是关于你知道更好的照顾,人们愿意支付无限的钱,如果他们能得到实际上是好的。他们现在给你的钱是无限的吗。因此,我们才刚刚开始收费,不像大多数医疗公司那样,不想让医疗费用不断上涨。当人们说“我是一台医疗设备”时,我们有点讨厌,因为保险会支付我的费用,所以你知道 7 美元并收取 22000 美元。那不是我们想成为的人。因此,我们每年只向每位病人收取 99 美元的费用,尽管随着时间的推移,我们将成为一种强大的力量。按这个价格你们有多少顾客。这是虚构的,到目前为止,我们有 150 人,每周增长 12%。
> `[00:30:10]` All right well I\'m all out of time.
`[00:30:00]` 好吧,我没时间了。
> `[00:30:12]` But I think you want to invest. You want to learn more what you how do you think about. Yeah you know it\'s.
`[00:30:12]` 但我认为你想投资。你想知道更多你是怎么想的。是的,你知道的。
> `[00:30:19]` It\'s definitely an area that I\'m interested in but I think I need to learn more about the products and maybe you can send me all the financials from there.
`[00:30:00]` 这绝对是我感兴趣的一个领域,但我认为我需要更多地了解这些产品,也许你可以把所有的财务报告都寄给我。
> `[00:30:28]` Okay great. Thanks. Thanks.
`[00:30:28]` 很好。谢谢谢谢
> `[00:30:36]` I probably butchered that sorry. I don\'t believe you did. All right. I\'ll hop back down the aisle and saying my my business to everybody. All right.
`[00:30:36]` 我可能杀了他。我不相信你做了。好吧。我会跳到过道上跟大家说我的事。好吧。
> `[00:30:46]` So this is a tricky one because like we spent a lot of time with me just trying to wrap my head around what it is and to be totally honest I\'m still not entirely sure.
`[00:30:46]` 所以这是个棘手的问题,因为我们花了很多时间和我在一起,只是想把我的想法想清楚,老实说,我还是不太确定。
> `[00:30:56]` I think it\'s basically a thing that brings together all of my medical records right.
`[00:30:56]` 我认为这基本上是把我所有的医疗记录汇集在一起的一件事。
> `[00:31:01]` And this is a really common thing where Starfighter say nutted out. It\'s that like a thousand other things but it\'s really important especially at an early stage that you be able to be focused. So you know if you can say yes it\'s that but here\'s the part that\'s really exciting is it grows bigger. But I need to be able to wrap my head around it otherwise it\'s almost like it\'s like a Christmas tree. You want to hang the ornaments off but without the tree like it\'s just ornaments smashing on the floor. So like I need to have that that like concrete framework in my head first.
`[00:31:01]` 这是一件很常见的事,星际战士说是疯了。这就像其他的事情一样,但是它真的很重要,特别是在早期阶段,你能够集中精力。所以你知道,如果你说是的话,就是这样,但这里最令人兴奋的部分是,它变得更大了。但是我需要能够把我的头绕在它周围,否则它就像一棵圣诞树。你想把装饰物挂掉,但没有树,像它一样,只是装饰在地板上。所以我需要先在我的脑子里有一个具体的框架。
> `[00:31:34]` So like the first thing I ran into is just like unsure what the product is.
`[00:31:34]` 就像我遇到的第一件事,就像不确定产品是什么一样。
> `[00:31:39]` Me too. It\'s always so tempting to try to tell this sort of grandiose and exciting story but if you can\'t if the person you\'re pitching can\'t understand what you actually do today in the first 30 seconds the pitch is unlikely to get better from there. And so just like saying in plain language just what the product actually does what a user can do who your customer is what they pay you for what your product does. It\'s super important.
`[00:31:39]` 我也是。试着讲述这种宏大而令人兴奋的故事总是很诱人的,但是如果你不能,如果你的投手不能理解你今天在前 30 秒里到底做了什么,那么球场就不太可能变得更好了。所以,就像用简单的语言说,产品到底做了什么,用户能做什么,你的客户能做什么,他们为你的产品付出了什么。这非常重要。
> `[00:32:04]` In fact this is once you\'re NYC. This is the first thing that we work on. So it\'s not easy like it takes the companies NYC usually about a month to get it right. So every time we meet with them in regular office hours or especially we have a thing called group office hours. The very first thing that each company has to do is give me either one line description and usually at the start of the batch it\'s all incomprehensible. And so it\'s something that you know it\'s normal that that you have that because almost every company we fund customer like I have.
`[00:32:04]` 事实上,这是你在纽约的时候。这是我们工作的第一件事。所以,这不是一件容易的事,因为纽约的公司通常需要一个月的时间才能把事情做好。所以每次我们在正常的办公时间和他们见面,特别是我们有一个叫做小组办公时间的东西。每家公司要做的第一件事就是给我一条线的描述,通常在批次开始的时候,这一切都是无法理解的。所以你知道这是很正常的,因为几乎每一家我们资助客户的公司都像我一样。
> `[00:32:37]` That sounds like a disease. It\'s learning how to easily curable. Yeah. Learning learning how to really reduce things to their essentials is super important but not always easy.
`[00:32:37]` 听起来像是一种疾病。它是学习如何容易治愈。是的。学习如何真正地把事情简化为他们的必需品是非常重要的,但并不总是容易的。
> `[00:32:49]` That is the number one skill of pitching to to practice. All right. I think we\'re way out of time. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you.
`[00:32:49]` 这是投球练习的第一技巧。好的我想我们没时间了。是的。谢谢。
- Zero to One 从0到1 | Tony翻译版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把产品做好,顾客们会来吗?
- Ch12: 人与机器
- Ch13: 展望绿色科技
- Ch14: 创始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 创业课 2012 中文笔记
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- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
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- 关于 Y Combinator
- 【创业百道节选】如何正确的阅读创业鸡汤
- YC 创业第一课:你真的愿意创业吗
- YC 创业第二课:团队与执行
- YC 创业第三课:与直觉对抗
- YC 创业第四课:如何积累初期用户
- YC 创业第五课:失败者才谈竞争
- YC 创业第六课:没有留存率不要谈推广
- YC 创业第七课:与你的用户谈恋爱
- YC 创业第八课:创业要学会吃力不讨好
- YC 创业第九课:投资是极端的游戏
- YC 创业第十课:企业文化决定命运
- YC 创业第11课:企业文化需培育
- YC 创业第12课:来开发企业级产品吧
- YC 创业第13课,创业者的条件
- YC 创业第14课:像个编辑一样去管理
- YC 创业第15课:换位思考
- YC 创业第16课:如何做用户调研
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- YC 创业第18课:划清个人与公司的界限
- YC 创业第19课(上):销售如漏斗
- YC 创业第19课(下):与投资人的两分钟
- YC 创业第20课:不再打磨产品
- YC 创业课 2013 中文笔记
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
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- 1: 家庭阶段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 寻找闪电蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 创业课 SV 2014 中文笔记
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- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
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- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 创业课 NY 2014 中文笔记
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- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
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- YC 创业课 EU 2014 中文笔记
- Adora Cheung
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- YC 创业课 2016 中文笔记
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- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
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- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
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- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 创业课 2017 中文笔记
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 创业课 2018 中文笔记
- Sam Altman - 如何成功创业
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初创企业法律机制
- 与 Paul Graham 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 构建产品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到适合产品市场的产品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何测量产品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何获得用户和发展
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增长的公关+内容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何销售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 组建工程团队
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申请和成功
- Patrick Collison - 运营你的创业公司
- Geoff Ralston - 筹款基础
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保险箱和定价股票轮
- Aaron Harris - 如何与投资者会面并筹集资金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 亿美元之路
- PMF 后:人员、客户、销售
- 与 Oshma Garg 的对话 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 与 Aileen Lee 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 1 部分
- 与 Elizabeth Iorns 的对话 - 生物技术创始人的建议
- 与 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技术对话
- 与 Elad Gil 的对话
- 与 Werner Vogels 的对话
- YC 创业课 2019 中文笔记
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何与用户交谈
- Ali Rowghani - 如何领导
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 数字初创学校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建议
- Michael Seibel - 如何计划 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何设定关键绩效指标和目标
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初创企业分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九种商业模式和投资者想要的指标
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投资者如何衡量创业公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何启动(续集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新兴企业的成长
- Kirsty Nathoo - 创业财务陷阱以及如何避免它们
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 构建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 关于枢轴的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高转化率
- Kevin Hale - 创业定价 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排时间
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 现代创业融资
- Jared Friedman - 硬技术和生物技术创始人的建议