# MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016 > `[00:00:00]` We have a fireside chat with Mark Andriessen coming up. Mark I think he\'s right back there. They know who you are. No introductions needed. So thanks for coming back. This is your third Startup School and I think maybe you are the only person who\'s been on stage both as a founder and now as an investor. So I will go through your history. But what I\'d like you to kind of talk us through is how you came to the decision after starting a bunch of tech companies to become an investor. There are a lot of venture funds that exist so why and how different. `[00:00:00]` 我们要和 Mark Andriessen 在壁炉边聊天。马克，我想他就在后面。他们知道你是谁。不需要介绍。谢谢你回来。这是你的第三所创业学校，我想也许你是唯一一个以创始人和投资者身份登上舞台的人。所以我来看看你的历史。但我想让你告诉我们的是，你是如何在开始一群科技公司成为投资者之后做出这一决定的。有很多风险基金存在，所以为什么和有多大的不同。 > `[00:00:45]` Yeah the big thing we came up Ben and I came up in the 90s in the industry and at that point venture The good news is venture capital had professionalized and so you had these great venture firms Kleiner Perkins some Americans and others that had gotten really good at what they did. Part of the professionalization was they had tilted very strongly away from founder CEOs and terms professional CEOs. And there were good reasons for that. We can discuss but our view of the industry is that not all but many of the best companies in the industry are run by their founders for a long period of time. ‘职业化的部分原因是，他们已经非常强烈地偏离了创始人 CEO 和专业 CEO 的术语。这是有充分理由的。我们可以讨论，但我们对这个行业的看法是，除了许多业内最好的公司之外，并非所有的公司都是由创始人长期经营的。 `[00:01:16]` So IBM run by the Watson to Watson is actually father and son Hewlett Packard run by Hewlett Packard for 50 years. Many other you know many examples Microsoft or Oracle. > `[00:01:16]` 由沃森管理的 IBM 实际上是惠普的父子惠普(HewlettPackard)，经营了 50 年。还有很多你知道的例子-微软或甲骨文。 `[00:01:27]` Many others the model have just kind of drifted away from that that kind of a default mood became bring in the professional CEO. What do you mean by professional see professional CEO. So the basic thing is because there is what they want is what they would say which is what they said at one point which is oh so what are you guys going to hire a real CEO. So you know this is a general version of that answer the specific thing. When they say professional CEO generally they talk about somebody with a lot of business in a particular sales experience. So somebody who\'s very comfortable with taking something you know taking something that somebody has built Engineers had built in the lab and then taking it out into the world. And so it\'s everything raising money marketing sales finance all organization management all the things involved in building the business and the company around the product. And so we just you know we have this idea that if we want to tilt things back a little bit now we\'re not religious about the founder CEO and there are a lot of founders who don\'t actually want to be the CEO or want to partner with a great CEO. > `[00:01:27]` 许多其他人-这个模式刚刚摆脱了那种默认的情绪-变成了职业 CEO。你所谓的职业 CEO 是什么意思？所以最基本的原因是他们想要什么，他们会说什么，他们曾经说过什么，哦，你们打算雇一个真正的 CEO。所以你知道，这是一个一般的答案，具体的问题。通常，当他们说职业 CEO 时，他们谈论的是在某一特定销售经验中拥有大量业务的人。所以，有些人非常习惯于拿一些你知道的东西，拿一些已经建成的东西，工程师们在实验室里建造了一些东西，然后把它带到世界上去。因此，一切都是筹集资金、市场营销、销售资金、所有组织管理、所有与建立业务有关的事情，以及围绕产品的公司。所以我们有这样的想法，如果我们现在想让事情倒退一点，我们对创始人 CEO 就不是虔诚的，很多创始人实际上不想成为首席执行官，也不想和一位伟大的 CEO 合作。 `[00:02:29]` And then there are also founders who can\'t be the CEO and so you know there\'s sort of no I there\'s no concept of CEO tenure right. So it\'s not a guaranteed position. You do have to reform it if you don\'t perform by the way it\'s not the fees that are your problem is that your company collapses and so you know it is important performed but we did believe in the generalized model that founders are really important and the founder CEO is a good model and you can have it and so it just what we observed was there was not at that point a venture capital firm that really had developed an operating model around how to do that. And so we decided to start our firm and then we decided to really on on two things. Has been our big areas of focus for the last seven years so one is all of our general partners have built and run companies before. And so we like to talk about the importance of having people on your board who have been through the struggle. Ben in his book The Hard Thing About Hard Things he talks about the struggle being just all the stuff that goes wrong when you\'re trying to accomplish something big. I call it the ship. He\'s more polite than I am. But it\'s just all the stuff that happens. You know we could talk for hours about. Tapped somebody on board who\'s really been through it it\'s all over all of our GPE by definition fits that criteria. The other thing that we did and this is a huge part of the front for us today is we built a whole operating model around basically we call it giving the founders super powers basically the equivalent capability give a founder who\'s not operated a business before the ability to operate like a professional CEO would be able to if they just walked in the door. And a lot of that has to do with network. And so the network of all the customers that you\'re going to sell to the network to offer all the later on investors are going to raise money from the network of all the big industry companies. You have to work with the network of all the reporters that you want to get your story out the network of all the engineers that you need to recruit the network of all the executives that you need to recruit the network of all the regulators and policymakers that you need to deal with and a lot of these businesses. So we now have 85 full time professionals in the firm build and run these very large networks on behalf of the portfolio and so a founder works with us. Jeff Jeff with 200 new products described it as you plug into the matrix you just kind of instantaneously get this upgrade as a new CEO or even a even experience you just get this big upgrade or all of a sudden you\'re plugged into the world at scale and that\'s working pretty well. > `[00:02:29]` 还有一些创始人不能成为首席执行官，所以你知道，有一种不，我没有关于 CEO 任期的概念。所以这不是一个有保障的位置。如果你不按你的方式去做，你就必须改革它，问题不是你的公司倒闭了，所以你知道这是很重要的表现，但我们确实相信，创始人是非常重要的，创办人是一个很好的模型，你可以拥有它，所以我们所观察到的就是这样的。在这一点上，风险投资公司确实开发了一种围绕着如何实现这一目标的运营模式。所以我们决定开始我们的公司，然后我们决定做两件事。在过去的七年里，我们一直是我们的重点领域，所以其中之一就是我们所有的普通合作伙伴都曾经建立和经营过公司。因此，我们想谈谈让那些经历过这场斗争的人加入你们董事会的重要性。本在他的书“关于艰难的事情”中，他谈到了当你试图完成一件大事的时候，挣扎只是所有出错的事情。我叫它船。他比我更有礼貌。但这只是所有发生的事情。你知道我们可以聊上几个小时。窃听了船上的某个真正经历过这件事的人，我们所有的 GPE 都符合这一标准。我们今天所做的另一件事-这对我们来说是一个很大的一部分-我们建立了一个完整的运营模式，基本上我们称之为它，赋予创始人们同等的能力，让一个没有经营过业务的创始人能够像专业的首席执行官那样运作，如果他们只是走进大门的话。这与网络有关。所以你要把所有客户的网络卖给这个网络来提供所有的后来者，投资者将从所有大的行业公司的网络中筹集资金。你必须与所有记者的网络合作，你想要把你的故事公诸于众，所有工程师的网络，你需要招聘的所有管理人员网络，你需要招聘的所有监管者和决策者的网络，你需要处理的，以及很多这样的企业。因此，我们现在有 85 名全职的专业人士代表投资组合建立和运营这些非常大的网络，因此一位创始人与我们一起工作。杰夫用 200 种新产品描述了它，当你插入矩阵时，你只是作为一位新的首席执行官，甚至是一次经历，立即得到了升级，你只是得到了这个大的升级，或者突然间，你被大规模地插到了这个世界上，而且运行得很好。 `[00:04:41]` What did you think about this back in 2006 you done before the firm started to evolve as you as you can build firm. > `[00:04:41]` 你在 2006 年的时候对此有什么看法？在公司开始发展之前，你做了什么，因为你可以建立公司。 `[00:04:49]` Yes so that\'s all evolved and we\'ve we\'ve had a whole bunch of people join the firm that have helped us figure this out and run all these all these all these all these teams and networks for us that really helped us helps us advance our thinking but the core idea was there you know sort of a16 he was a startup and you know having done startups before we went we were big fans of thinking it through and having a differentiated strategy and so we spent about a year and a half planning this out before we started the firm and these ideas were at the core of it. > `[00:04:49]` 是的，所以我们都进化了，我们有很多人加入了这家公司，帮助我们解决了这个问题，并为我们管理了所有这些真正帮助我们推进思维的团队和网络，但核心的想法是，你知道，他是一家初创公司，而且你知道，他做过初创公司。在我们开始之前，我们都是思考这个问题并有一个差异化战略的忠实拥趸，所以我们花了大约一年半的时间来规划这个问题，然后我们才成立了这家公司，而这些想法正是公司的核心。 `[00:05:15]` So a lot of first time founders and the audience and kind of raising money as we just kind of pitch practice here is a little bit of a black box. What is the very precise way that you know it\'s a process that you use to work with companies. They get a hold of you and what actually happens after the first e-mail. > `[00:05:15]` 所以很多第一次的创办者和观众以及筹集资金的时候，我们只是在做一些投球练习，这是个小黑匣子。你所知道的最精确的方法是什么？这是你与公司合作的一个过程。他们会联系到你，在第一封电子邮件之后会发生什么。 `[00:05:33]` Yeah. So I would really separate fundraising and this has got a lot more complicated in the last few years in good ways a separate fundraising fundraising from Angel seed investors Accelerator\'s you know sort of accelerate around precede rounds seed rounds seed extension rounds post seed rounds to put all those in one basket and there and that\'s you know that\'s a process that we see wisely plugs into and Demo Day and organize around that. And you know your friends who have had a start up have been through that and so there\'s there\'s there\'s a whole art to that and that\'s that\'s a lot of what gets talked about. Then there comes a time when you engage in a different kind of fundraising. And what I would call it institutional fundraising. And I think that really starts with a formal Series A or anything equivalent to a formal series. It also applies. By the way if you\'re going to go try to raise money from you know a corporate investor whatever it is an institutional process you\'re dealing with somebody who is running a highly professionalized firm you know with real fiduciary responsibility back to their Opie\'s you know their firm lot of venture first men in business for 30 40 50 years. There\'s a way of doing things and things just get more formal. And so I think that that\'s the first really important thing to think about. And you know when we we\'re actually schizophrenic on this because we do a lot of the sea at the sea level and we\'ve tested the sea level it\'s a lot like dealing with any other state investor it\'s you know are you smart you have a really good idea of a great. And let\'s see how it goes. But when it\'s a five or 10 or 15 million dollar a round or B round then things get more serious. > `[00:05:33]` 是的。所以我真的要把筹款分开，这在过去几年里变得更加复杂了-从天使种子投资者那里单独筹集资金-你知道，在种子扩展回合之前，种子推广轮，种子回合之后，把所有的种子都放在一个篮子里，你知道，这是一个我们认为明智地插入和演示日的过程，并围绕着这个过程组织起来。你知道，你的朋友们都有过这样的经历，所以这是一门艺术，这是很多人谈论的话题。然后有一段时间，你会进行一种不同的筹资方式。我称之为机构筹资。我认为这实际上是从一个正式的系列 A 或任何等同于正式系列的东西开始的。它也适用。顺便说一句，如果你打算去筹集资金，你就会认识一个公司投资者，不管这是一个机构过程，你要和一个人打交道，他经营着一家高度专业化的公司，你知道他有真正的信托责任，回到他们的奥派那里，你知道他们的公司里有很多风险第一的人，他们在做了 30 到 40 年 50 年的生意。有一种做事的方式，事情就变得更正式了。所以我认为这是第一件真正重要的事情。你知道，当我们在这个问题上精神分裂的时候，因为我们在海平面上做了很多工作，我们测试了海平面，这就像和其他国家投资者打交道一样，你知道你聪明吗？你对一个伟大的东西有一个很好的想法。让我们看看进展如何。但是当一轮或者一轮是五千万到一千五百万美元的时候，事情就变得更严重了。 `[00:07:05]` And so when you Minteer so let\'s say I\'m raising that 10 million dollar a around a year to give you an e-mail and say hey and then I come in and what happens is is it just a series of meetings and then diligence and then you have a big check like in those game shows that show up at your house when you\'re least expecting it. > `[00:07:05]` 所以，当你减少，假设我每年筹集 1000 万美元，给你一封电子邮件，然后说嗨，然后我进来，会发生什么，只是一系列的会议，然后勤奋，然后你有一个大的支票，在那些游戏节目，在你的房子里出现，当你最不希望它出现的时候，它会发生什么呢？ `[00:07:25]` So really it really puts the spouses. > `[00:07:25]` 所以它真的把配偶。 `[00:07:30]` So the first thing is how do you actually get get in and so there\'s there\'s this there\'s actually an argument that kind of plays out on this topic in the valley which is the importance of what it called Warm referrals or warm introductions. And so the way that most of the top and venture capital firms work is basically don\'t take you seriously if you come in introduced by somebody they\'ve worked with before and they won\'t take you seriously if you don\'t and there is an argument that plays out in the valley which is that that\'s sort of unfair and unreasonable and you know what about all these you know you guys talk about all these whiners all over the world and like why can\'t they have access the way the people who are already connected can the argument in favor of the warmer first is that it\'s the it\'s the first test and it\'s the first test of the ability to basically network your way to the investor. And basically the way the investor thinks about it is if you can\'t figure out a way to network your way to a vesi firm which is of course in the business of meeting founders then you\'re unlikely to be able to network your way into hiring a great team or network your way into selling your product to customers. So actually I think that the role the former furless is is is misinterpreted. I think you see it as like it\'s the first test. And so I think it\'s a test you just want pass you don\'t want to take any chances on that. The good news is if if you\'re connected to see if you\'re connected into the valley Angel seed ecosystem that\'s a very easy test to pass. If you\'re not connected in NYC then you know the thing to do is to get to the valley right or get into the network and get it. You don\'t get it twice. > `[00:07:30]` 第一件事是，你是怎么进去的因此，大多数高层和风险投资公司的工作方式基本上都是不重视你，如果你是由以前和他们一起工作过的人介绍的，而如果你不这么做，他们就不会认真对待你，而在山谷里有一种争论，那就是这是不公平和不合理的，你知道这些你了解你自己是怎么回事。男人们谈论着世界各地所有的抱怨者，就像为什么他们不能像那些已经联系过的人一样-赞成温暖的人-首先是，这是第一次测试，也是第一次测试你是否有能力和投资者建立网络联系。基本上，投资者的想法是，如果你想不出一种方法将你的公司与一家公司建立网络，这当然是与创始人会面的业务，那么你就不太可能通过网络建立网络，雇佣一支优秀的团队，或者把你的产品销售给客户。所以实际上，我认为前者毫无生气的角色被曲解了。我想你认为这是第一次测试。所以我认为这是一个你只想通过的测试，你不想冒任何风险。好消息是，如果你与天使的种子生态系统连接在一起，那将是一个很容易通过的考验。如果你在纽约没有连接，那么你就知道要做的事情是直接到达山谷，或者进入网络并得到它。你不会得到两次的。 `[00:08:47]` Good luck if you\'re not into connected NYC. Yeah I see why he has been a huge like why he has really widened the aperture for founders to be able to plug into this process and I think in a very healthy way. So that works really well. So that\'s the first is the warmer for all. Then there\'s two theories. One is go and hide. There\'s going to. > `[00:08:47]` 如果你不喜欢连在一起的纽约，祝你好运。是的，我明白为什么他是一个巨大的人，为什么他真的扩大了创始人的范围，让他们能够加入这个过程，我认为这是非常健康的。所以，这是非常好的。所以这是第一个对所有人来说更温暖的理论。然后有两个理论。一个是去隐藏。 `[00:09:05]` And you know one theory is you\'ll hear sometimes is you know only ever talked to senior partners at the firm so don\'t waste any time with the more junior partners the younger people in the firm because they can\'t make the decision pull the trigger. The counter argument is that the senior partners at these firms make very little very few decisions from scratch the senior partners only get to invest in a few companies a year each. And they make very few of those decisions if they\'re going to make a decision on their own without any work done by the junior people in the firm it\'s probably going to be somebody they\'ve already worked with before. So it\'s actually really hard from a sort of standing start to get just a straight yes from a senior partner. So the thing that works better and the thing that I would do if I were you know 20 to 25 again I think there\'s a huge advantage to coming in with a junior people and get networked into the firm and spent a lot of time with the junior people understanding no one just like pre flighting like how is this coming across like how is this going to be received because you know they can read the minds of the senior partners. They can tell you how these things are going to receive and they can help you. And then also frankly the senior partners are different like ours look to the younger people a lot of like OK. What\'s interesting and we count on the younger people to stay very connected especially to the first time founders. So I really encourage people to actually take take the younger people in these firm seriously. So from that usually the process is a first meeting with one one one of those folks which might then lead to a second meeting with a broader group of those folks. Maybe with one or two general partners so you kind of have this kind of wind up kind of period and you\'re kind of working through it. > `[00:09:05]` 你知道，有一个理论是，你有时会听到的是，你知道你只和公司的高级合伙人交谈过，所以不要浪费时间和更年轻的合伙人-公司里的年轻人-在一起，因为他们不能决定扣动扳机。相反的论点是，这些公司的高级合伙人很少从零开始做出决定，高级合伙人每年只能投资几家公司。他们很少做出这样的决定，如果他们要自己做出决定，而公司里的初级员工却不做任何工作，那很可能是他们以前曾与之共事过的人。因此，实际上，从一种站立状态开始，从高级合伙人那里得到一个肯定的答案是非常困难的。所以，如果你再知道 20 到 25 岁的话，我会做一些更好的事情，我认为和一位初级员工一起进入公司有很大的优势，并且花了很多时间和年轻人交流，没有人能像预言家那样理解任何人，这是怎么回事呢？。因为你知道他们能读懂高级合伙人的想法。他们可以告诉你这些东西是如何接收的，他们可以帮助你。然后也坦率地说，高级合伙人和我们的不一样，看着年轻人，很多都喜欢 OK。有趣的是，我们指望年轻人能保持很好的人际关系，特别是第一次创业的人。所以我真的鼓励人们认真对待这些公司里的年轻人。因此，这个过程通常是与其中一个人的第一次会面，然后可能导致第二次与更广泛的人群会面。也许有一两位普通合伙人，所以你会有这样一段时间的结束，然后你就开始工作了。 `[00:10:29]` And we\'re talking about days weeks months. > `[00:10:29]` 我们说的是几天、几个星期、几个月。 `[00:10:31]` You know it depends in a hot environment. It\'s you know days two weeks because you see you assume that deals go down relatively quickly. And you know for the last several years I think days two weeks has been the expectation. I will tell you in the cold environments you know in 2003 you know we\'re talking six months nine months 12 months right. This is nothing but time because it was so hard for anybody to raise money for anything. You could just let these these these things play out for a long time. These days it\'s days two weeks we try to move in days to a small number of weeks. Then the big event is to then progressed through one or two or three meetings and then the way you really know you\'re making progress is if you get invited to present to the full partnership. > `[00:10:31]` 你知道它取决于炎热的环境。你知道两周后的几天，因为你认为交易的下降速度相对较快。你知道，在过去的几年里，我认为两周的时间一直是我们的期望。我会告诉你，在寒冷的环境中，你知道，在 2003 年，你知道，我们说的是 6 个月，9 个月，12 个月。这只不过是时间，因为任何人都很难为任何事情筹集资金。你可以让这些事情持续很长一段时间。这几天然后，大事件是通过一两次会议取得进展，然后你真正知道你正在取得进展的方式是，如果你被邀请参加正式的合作关系。 `[00:11:12]` And that\'s usually at most firms on Monday Monday meeting and that\'s a formal like that\'s a full on formal and that\'s like all the general partners at the firm are there like the whole firm is there. Well like sometimes we\'ll have 40 people in the room for that. > `[00:11:12]` 在周一的会议上，那通常是最多的几家公司，这是一种正式的形式，这就像公司的所有普通合伙人都在那里，就像整个公司都在那里一样。好吧，就像有时我们会有 40 人参加。 `[00:11:23]` People come in it\'s like present in the army but like we get everybody and the founder actually just presents company and yeah I did a presentation and then this gets in another debate which is like okay you know you guys like you go on and on about like creativity all this stuff. Why do you want the founder to stand up there like you know like an idiot for 50 minutes reading off a PowerPoint slides. You know like why don\'t we just like why don\'t we have a conversation why don\'t we do things casual why don\'t we. Why didn\'t you do more research upfront. Like why do we do this formal presentation. And again I think again I think that\'s misinterpreted. I think the formal presentation is another test which is as a founder if you\'re not good enough at your job as a CEO to get up and present to an investor for 60 Minutes and sell them on your thing like we\'re easy. This is the thing I thinkMr. about these firms exist to give out money like like work like we love when somebody walks in has a compelling pitch and we can give them a check. Like that\'s a successful day for us. In contrast every other pitch you\'re ever gonna make is going to be to somebody who\'s going to be much worse than us like. So customers are going to be like you know no I\'m not going to give you any money. Like is their default position right. You know engineers you\'re gonna try to recruit engineers and they\'ve got 20 other job offers. Right. > `[00:11:23]` 人们来到这里，就像军队里的礼物一样，但就像我们得到了每个人，而创办人实际上只是送了一家公司，我做了一次演示，然后进行了另一场辩论，就像好的，你们知道，你们这样的人，就像创造力一样，所有这些东西。为什么你想让创始人站在那里，就像你知道的那样，像个白痴一样，花 50 分钟阅读一张 PowerPoint 幻灯片。你知道，为什么我们不喜欢，为什么我们不交谈，为什么我们不做轻松的事情，为什么我们不。你为什么不提前做更多的研究。比如为什么我们要做这个正式的陈述。我再一次认为这是误解。我认为，正式的演示是另一个考验，如果你作为首席执行官的工作做得不够好，不能站起来向投资者展示 60 分钟，然后把它们卖给你的东西，就像我们这么简单一样。这就是我想的先生。这些公司的存在是为了像我们喜欢的工作那样提供金钱，当有人进来的时候，我们可以给他们一张支票。这对我们来说是成功的一天。相反，你所做的每一个其他的投球都会变成一个比我们更糟糕的人。所以顾客会像你知道的那样，不，我不会给你任何钱。就像他们的默认位置是对的。你知道，工程师，你会努力招聘工程师，他们得到了另外 20 份工作机会。右（边），正确的 `[00:12:29]` And so why is your pitch going to be so much better than the other 20 startups right. And so again I just I view that as like that\'s the second big test which is can you successfully execute a formal pitch. And then if that goes well then generally you go in do you know if its like super super smoking hot you could you could move to Germany very quickly after that. Usually it\'s a week or two of additional work to kind of have some more discussions. Very soon we\'ll follow up. You kind of get into the process of the venture firm really trying to make sure they understand what you do. You start to negotiate the term sheet and then at some point you have a term sheet and how many checks do you write a year. > `[00:12:29]` 那么为什么你的投球会比其他 20 家创业公司好得多呢？再一次，我认为这是第二个大考验，你能成功地执行一个正式的投球吗？如果一切顺利的话，你就可以进去了，你知道吗，如果是超级冒烟热的话，在那之后你可以很快地搬到德国去。通常需要一到两周的额外工作才能进行更多的讨论。很快我们就会跟进。你在某种程度上参与了风险投资公司的过程，试图确保他们理解你所做的事情。你开始谈判学期表，然后在某个时候，你有一个学期表，你每年要写多少张支票。 `[00:13:04]` So we see 2000 startups a year that are warm referrals and we can say yes for it at the institutional level for A\'s or B\'s we can say yes to about 20. And we\'re a pretty high scale four or eight general partners. And so we\'re and we\'re up and you know large fund size and so we operate at scale there are other Top End firms that will say yes three or four or five times a year. And so by the way like on the one hand that\'s very daunting which is like well you know like that\'s 1 percent right it\'s 1 percent of warmer for us. Basically it so that seems very daunting. > `[00:13:04]` 所以我们看到每年有 2000 家初创公司是热情的推荐人，我们可以在机构层面对 A 或 B 说是，我们可以对大约 20 家说“是”。我们是四、八个普通合伙人。因此，我们是上升的，你知道，庞大的基金规模，所以我们的规模经营，有其他顶级公司，他们会说是的，每年三、四、五次。顺便说一句，一方面，这是非常令人生畏的，就像你知道的，那是百分之一，对我们来说是百分之一的温暖。基本上，这看起来非常令人望而生畏。 `[00:13:38]` I could just tell you on the other hand it goes back to this concept of the tests like it\'s not that hard to get good at this part like. And so I just I think it\'s worth the time to really understand and get good at how to how to how to get networked and how to make that pitch. Because if you\'re good at that then like I said when it comes time to go sell your product to a customer when it comes time to go hire somebody those same skills reapply in the exact same way. And I think people people should just people should just founders should just get good at that. > `[00:13:38]` 我可以告诉你，另一方面，它可以追溯到考试的概念，就像它不那么难在这个部分取得好的效果。所以，我认为，真正理解和擅长如何建立网络，以及如何做出这样的宣传，是值得的。因为如果你对此很在行，那么就像我说的，当你是时候把你的产品卖给一个客户时，当你要去雇佣一个人的时候，同样的技能会以完全相同的方式重新应用。我认为人们应该只是创办人，应该在这方面做得更好。 `[00:14:05]` So there\'s a pretty big you know gap between kind of an average engineer and a really great engineer and there\'s at least a test of that. How do you know an investor is actually good if you\'re a founder and you\'re raising money for the first time or you haven\'t raised much money. > `[00:14:05]` 所以，你知道，一个普通工程师和一个真正伟大的工程师之间有相当大的差距，至少有一个测试。如果你是一个创始人，或者你第一次筹集资金，或者你没有筹集到多少钱，你怎么知道一个投资者实际上是好的。 `[00:14:21]` So I think I have five key ways that a founder can know whether an investor is good and they are references references references references and references. > `[00:14:21]` 所以我认为我有五个关键的方法可以让一个创办人知道一个投资者是否优秀，它们都是推荐人和推荐人。 `[00:14:29]` The third one that references references evidently important. > `[00:14:29]` 第三个引用显然很重要。 `[00:14:34]` So the good news with the valley is the super network. > `[00:14:34]` 所以山谷的好消息是超级网络。 `[00:14:37]` As a consequence of that you know people know I\'m the founder and I know I\'m going to seed fund B. What does it mean to do a reference. Well I just find people have invested before. > `[00:14:37]` 由于你知道人们知道我是创始人，我知道我要去种子基金。做一个参考是什么意思。我只是发现人们以前投资过。 `[00:14:49]` Yeah I mean there\'s sort of two different kinds of references there are so-called front door references which as you just you asked me like you know who should I talk to and I\'ll give you a list of people who I hopefully know will say good things about me sometimes I\'m wrong. Then there\'s those the backdoor references Right which which is which is which is usually where the value is which is people who have worked with the investor before other entrepreneurs or people who have been at companies that that investor has funded or by the way for that matter other investors. Right. You can reference like the way a lot of these CEOs get reference chukkas when you know the angels and see angel investors or seed investors. If you\'re in Y C the Y C partners otherwise you founders the Internet Twitter you know these discussions take place all over the place now so. So I think you just you try to. It\'s just like anything else when you\'re evaluating people as you just try to get to other people who\'ve work with them in the past. > `[00:14:49]` 是的，我的意思是，有两种不同类型的推荐信，也就是所谓的前门推荐信，就像你问我，你知道我该和谁说话一样，我会给你一张清单，列出我希望认识的人，有时我会说些好的话，我错了。还有那些后门引用的权利，这通常是价值所在，它指的是在其他企业家之前与投资者一起工作的人，或者是在投资者资助的公司工作过的人，或者是其他投资者。右（边），正确的当你认识天使，看到天使投资者或种子投资者的时候，你就可以像很多 CEO 一样去参考 Chukkas。如果你在 YC，YC 合作伙伴，否则你会创建互联网，Twitter，你知道，这些讨论现在到处都在进行。所以我觉得你只是试着。这就像你在评估别人时一样，因为你只是试图接触到过去曾与他们共事过的其他人。 `[00:15:39]` Again I think that\'s a general skill. I think that\'s a good thing to know how to do because if you can reference an investor it also means you can reference a candidate. Right. Which is really critically important. I will just tell you like in the valley like in the valley there is a way to hire great people and it involves preferences references references you just everybody who\'s got chid one list. > `[00:15:39]` 我再一次认为这是一种普通的技能。我认为这是一件很好的事情，知道如何做，因为如果你可以参考一个投资者，这也意味着你可以推荐一个候选人。右（边），正确的这是非常重要的。我只想告诉你，就像在山谷里一样，有一种方法可以雇佣伟大的人，它涉及到你的偏好，参考你，只是每个人都有一份清单。 `[00:15:59]` Let\'s have a look first reference check. What should I listen to. That is like the double talk. This is not a good investor. This is not a good. > `[00:15:59]` 让我们先看看参考证。我应该听什么。这就像双重谈话。这不是一个好的投资者。这不是一个好的。 `[00:16:06]` Oh yeah. So it\'s all it\'s all a little tells. Right. So it\'s all in the light. If somebody is good they\'re like enthusiastic they\'re going to be part of the team like this this person is great. You should take their money like if you can get them on their board you know you\'re bored or you\'re lucky if you get anything other than that right. That\'s like trouble. Right. And it\'s it\'s like the silence is like you know so what\'s the person like on board meetings. > `[00:16:06]` 哦，是的。所以这一切都说明了一点。右（边），正确的所以一切都在光明之中。如果一个人是好的，他们就像热情的一样，他们会成为团队的一员，就像这个人是伟大的。你应该接受他们的钱，就像你能让他们在董事会上一样，你知道你很无聊，或者如果你得到了别的东西，你就会很幸运。那就像麻烦一样。右（边），正确的就像沉默就像你知道的那样，在会议上那个人是什么样子的。 `[00:16:26]` And then there\'s like the silence. Then there\'s like the breath like you know it\'s like OK well you know we here we come. > `[00:16:26]` 然后是沉默，然后是呼吸，就像你知道的那样，好吧，你知道我们来了。 `[00:16:37]` Or you know the other thing is that you know a lot of people don\'t want to say bad things about people even even when nobody else is listening and so they\'ll say these lukewarm. > `[00:16:37]` 或者你知道另一件事，你知道很多人不想说关于别人的坏话，即使没有人在听，所以他们会说这些冷酷无情的话。 `[00:16:44]` My favorite is like well they\'re very punctual laughter sharp socks always on time right. Very well dressed. > `[00:16:44]` 我最喜欢的是，它们是非常准时的笑声，锋利的袜子总是准时的，穿得很好。 `[00:16:53]` You know I always write donuts. Yeah. > `[00:16:53]` 你知道我总是写甜甜圈。嗯 `[00:16:55]` So you just you got to look even for the back burner the front of references that\'s what you listen for Buddy. But the macro references even still that\'s what you listen for and even when it\'s people who you know really well they still may not actually tell you the full thing. And so you just you just want to test really carefully. I just think it\'s a it\'s an incredibly useful skill if you learn how to do it. You can basically test this out on investors and then and then when it when it does matter for investors but then what it also really matters is when you\'re hiring especially executives later on. > `[00:16:55]` 所以你只要看看，即使是次要的，参考文献的前面，这也是你在听的巴迪。但是宏引用，即使这仍然是你所关注的，即使是你真正了解的人，他们仍然可能没有告诉你全部的事情。所以你只想仔细地测试。我只是认为，如果你学会了如何去做，那是一项非常有用的技能。你基本上可以在投资者身上验证这一点，然后当它对投资者来说很重要的时候，但真正重要的是，你在以后招聘的时候，尤其是高管。 `[00:17:22]` So > `[00:17:22]` `[00:17:22]` let\'s step back a little bit. Lots of founders investors look up to you in your ideas. Who do you look up to and how do you make sure your ideas are actually like continue to be good. Yeah. > `[00:17:22]` 让我们退一步吧。许多创始人投资者在你的想法上都仰慕你。你尊敬谁？你如何确保你的想法确实是好的。是的。 `[00:17:33]` So. So I\'m a big fan of history. So there is a sort of a classic cliché in the valley which is like we don\'t respect history very much and a lot of people who visit the valley for the first time that\'s their impression because they don\'t have people who have had this experience firsthand. Vanity is like I wanna look I want to see something about I want to drive around to see Silicon Valley. It\'s like good luck with that right. Like okay there\'s a freeway. There\'s a strip mall. There\'s there\'s an office park there\'s a security guard who won\'t let me in the office park like there is no physical history here. Right. Really. And then and then in the conversations I mean we\'re all about the future like we\'re building the future and so I think there is this national tendency to assume that the past isn\'t very relevant and I actually think I should criticize a little bit. You know there\'s sort of the Elan school of thought now which is very strong in the valley which is sort of think everything through from first principles which has its huge strengths for sure but it does kind of dismiss the idea that people who came before us had anything to teach us. And my general view is that people who came before us had a harder time doing what they did than we do because the world was in a more immature state like they didn\'t have all the they didn\'t necessarily you know start off started before 50 years ago didn\'t have venture capital right. They didn\'t. There\'s a lot of things that started 20 years ago didn\'t have the internet. Things were harder in the past and so the people who were successful in the past I think were often better than we are because they had to be because it was harder and so like going in that in the past in the tech industry. And I\'ll just recommend a few books so I think that the origin of stories of companies. IBM there\'s a fantastic book about Thomas Watson senior who built IBM by Kevin Maty. And if you think that Steve Jobs is rough was rough on people he had nothing on Thomas Watson senior stuff. The book is The book has transcripts of executive staff meetings at IBM in the 1930s and 1940s. And let\'s just say he was an absolute terror and built an extraordinary company and so he\'s a real role model not terror. > `[00:17:33]` 所以。所以我是历史的忠实粉丝。所以在山谷里有一种经典的陈词滥调，那就是我们不太尊重历史，很多人第一次访问这个山谷，这是他们的印象，因为他们没有亲身经历过这种经历的人。虚荣心就像我想看，我想看一些东西，我想开车到处看看硅谷。这就像祝你好运一样。好像有条高速公路。有个条形购物中心。有个办公室公园，有个保安，他不让我进入办公室公园，就像这里没有物理历史一样。右（边），正确的真的在谈话中，我的意思是，我们都是关于未来的，就像我们在建设未来一样，所以我认为有一种全国性的倾向，认为过去与此无关，我实际上认为我应该批评一些。你知道，现在有一种伊兰学派，它在山谷里非常强大，它从第一性原理开始思考每一件事，这些原则肯定有其巨大的优势，但它确实否定了先于我们的人有任何东西可以教我们的想法。我的总体观点是，在我们之前出现的人比我们更难做他们所做的事情，因为世界处于一个更加不成熟的状态，就像他们没有拥有他们所没有的那样-你不一定知道，50 年前开始的时候，就没有风险资本了。他们没有。20 年前开始的许多事情都没有互联网。过去的情况更加艰难，所以那些过去成功的人往往比我们更好，因为他们不得不这样做，因为他们在过去的科技行业里做得更难，就像过去那样。我只想推荐几本书，所以我认为公司故事的起源。IBM 有一本很棒的书，讲述托马斯·沃森，他是凯文·马蒂创建 IBM 的。如果你认为史蒂夫·乔布斯对人很粗暴，那么他对托马斯·沃森(ThomasWatson)的高级职位一无所知。这本书有上世纪 30 年代和 40 年代 IBM 高管人员会议的成绩单。让我们简单地说，他是一个绝对的恐怖分子，建立了一家非凡的公司，因此他是一个真正的榜样，而不是恐怖。 `[00:19:24]` Be careful. This is an interpretive Bill Hewlett Packard. > `[00:19:24]` 小心。这是一部解释性的比尔·惠普(BillHewlettPackard)。 `[00:19:29]` Michael Malone wrote a great book called Bill and Dave talks about how each got built over the course of 30 or 40 years by Bill and Dave. And then I like going back further. So I like Edison. I like what was called the second industrial revolution a lot we\'re like you got electricity and you got cars so there\'s a great Edison book called The Wizard of Menlo Park. It\'s really good. There\'s a great Ford book called I invented the modern age. And if you go back and read the history of cars a hundred years ago Detroit a hundred years ago was a lot like it was a lot more like Silicon Valley today than I think people people don\'t understand. In fact Henry Henry Ford like Ford Motor Company was not his first company right. So there\'s there\'s there\'s all these very interesting back stories and then I think you can go back even further I like going back and this is not to compare us to this but just as inspiration and role models. Florence you know. The time of the murder. Leonardo da Vinci I just got this great book called Divinity\'s robots and it turns out DaVinci while he was doing everything else that he did in life. He was also designing robots. And in his you know sketch books there are fully fledged designs for like everything mechanical you know all the Boston Dynamics. He was like inventing this stuff 500 years ago didn\'t quite have that you know didn\'t quite have the technology to be able to pull it off couldn\'t quite go to couldn\'t go to a team and get the microcontroller. So he had some issues but you know he\'s an inspiration. There\'s another great book called the Lunar man about something called the Lunar Society which was in England about 250 years ago like James Watt invented the steam engine and all these other guys who were doing this kind of thing back then all worked together. They had kind of a why they think back then. And so it\'s all basically it\'s just you know what it is you\'re trying to look for OK. The world as you know points in time the world is the way it is. 迈克尔马龙写了一本伟大的书，名叫比尔和戴夫，讲述了每一本书是如何在三四十年里由比尔和戴夫建造的。然后我喜欢回到更远的地方。所以我喜欢爱迪生。我非常喜欢所谓的第二次工业革命，我们就像你有电，你有汽车，所以有一本伟大的爱迪生书，叫做“门罗公园的巫师”。真的很棒。有一本伟大的福特书叫做“我发明了现代”。如果你回顾一下一百年前的汽车历史，一百年前的底特律就像今天的硅谷，比我认为人们所不理解的更像。事实上，亨利·福特和福特汽车公司一样，也不是他的第一家公司。所以，这里有很多有趣的背景故事，然后我认为你可以追溯到更远的地方，我喜欢回到过去，这并不是要把我们和这个做比较，而是作为灵感和榜样。弗洛伦斯你知道的。谋杀的时间。莱昂纳多·达·芬奇，我刚拿到了一本伟大的书，名为“神性机器人”，结果却是达芬奇在做他一生中所做的一切。他也在设计机器人。在他的书中，你知道草图，有成熟的设计，就像所有机械一样，你知道所有波士顿动力公司。他就像在 500 年前发明了这个东西，你知道，他没有足够的技术去完成它，不可能去到一个团队去得到这个微控制器。所以他有一些问题，但你知道他是个灵感。还有一本伟大的书叫做“月球人”，它讲述的是大约 250 年前在英国的一个叫做“月球协会”的书，就像詹姆斯·瓦特发明了蒸汽机，还有其他那些在做这种事情的人，他们当时都是一起工作的。他们有某种原因让他们回想起那时候。所以这一切基本上都是，只是你知道它是什么，你想找的是什么。世界，正如你所知道的，时间点，世界就是它的样子。 > `[00:21:13]` Everybody takes it for granted and then there\'s a person or some set up usually a set of people who think no no there\'s a better and you know different and better way to do things and then just all the practical challenges involved in causing that kind of change to happen and trying to build you know whether it\'s a new thing you\'re trying to build a new movement of some kind or a new kind of art. `[00:21:13]` 每个人都认为这是理所当然的，然后就有了一个人或某个人-通常是一群认为没有更好的人某种运动或一种新的艺术。 > `[00:21:30]` And I think there\'s all kinds of lessons to be drawn from all that and extract ideas from those those people or because there is I think one of the one of the problems of being in the valley is there\'s just such an echo chamber of opinions for every opinion there is a counter opinion it is just as loudly and aggressively drummed. How do you how do you separate what is actually good advice and what is not good advice as a founder. `[00:21:30]` 我认为，从这一切中吸取各种教训，并从这些人那里汲取思想，或者因为我认为在山谷中的问题之一就是有这样一个意见的回音室，对于每一种意见，都有一种反对意见，它同样响亮而有力地鼓噪。作为创始人，你如何区分哪些是好建议，哪些不是好建议。 > `[00:21:55]` Yeah well you just can\'t you go back and guess what Tiger history is like it\'s always hard. And so we just like Henry Ford as an example like there was nothing easy about building a motor company or Thomas Edison there was nothing easy about electricity like electricity and talked about like you would think that that would be a relatively easy thing to get people to want. And it turns out there was actually a lot of effort and work involved in getting people to think that was a good idea. And so it\'s just it\'s it\'s it\'s so it\'s goes back to Ben\'s idea of the struggle. It\'s just there is so much work and effort involved there are so many false starts there are so many things that can go wrong. And I think you draw on all the different lessons and theories from then and now and you kind of view them as a metal tool kit to draw on. But I\'ll just say one of our beliefs. The band also talks about his book as there\'s there\'s no silver bullet like there\'s the temptation when you get kind of in in the show. `[00:21:55]` 是的，你不能回去猜猜老虎的历史是什么样子的，这总是很难的。所以我们就像亨利·福特一样，就像建造一家汽车公司没有什么容易，托马斯·爱迪生，电也不容易，你会认为这是一件相对容易让人们想要的事情。事实上，为了让人们认为这是个好主意，我们付出了大量的努力和工作。所以，它只是，它回到了本的思想斗争。只是有这么多的工作和努力，有这么多的错误开始，有那么多的事情可能出错。我认为，从那时到现在，你吸取了所有不同的经验和理论，你把它们看作是一种可以借鉴的金属工具包。但我只能说我们的信念之一。乐队还谈到了他的书，因为没有银弹，就像你在节目中表现出的诱惑一样。 > `[00:22:43]` It\'s always like there\'s got to be a way out of this and it\'s got to be one thing if there\'s got to be some idea already a point some piece of advice right or some way to reframe reframe the picture this way or if I could just hire this person or just get this customer or something you know it\'s going to fix everything and we always like to say there are no silver bullets. They\'re only let bullets. And so you just have to kind of do all the work and most of the work is just a grinding it\'s just you know grinding labor and there\'s just no substitute for it. `[00:22:43]` 总是有一条出路，如果必须有一个想法，一个观点，一个建议，或者某种方式来重新塑造这个形象，或者如果我能雇佣这个人，或者找个客户或者其他你知道的东西，我们总是会修好的，我们一直都是这样的。我想说没有银弹。他们只会放子弹。所以你只需要做所有的工作，大部分的工作只是磨练，只是你知道研磨的劳动，没有什么可以代替它。 > `[00:23:10]` And I think that frankly I think that comes out of the history as well so what do you think is you know we\'re we\'re kind of heading in the tail end of 2016 lots in store in the next couple two years two and a half years for the start up ecosystem and are in a lot of talk in a lot of different opinions about both in verticals and verticals handling and just to the larger community and the ecosystem. `[00:23:10]` 我认为坦率地说，我认为这也是历史上的事情，所以你认为我们在 2016 年的尾声中会有什么样的想法呢？在接下来的两年半时间里，我们都在为启动生态系统做准备，在很多方面都有不同的看法。垂直和垂直处理，只对更大的社区和生态系统。 > `[00:23:34]` Yeah so I guess you know maybe two to two schools of thought so you\'re all probably well aware. Experts have been declaring an imminent bubble and crash continuously since 2004. So we\'re now in year 13 next year will be year 14 of declarations of an imminent dot com crash redux all over again. They are these the people who predict this are getting increasingly frustrated that it hasn\'t happened and increasingly irate that we\'re all still here. You know maybe they\'re right and we\'ve just completely inflated you know dot com bubble2.0 and we\'re just it\'s just now we\'re just delaying until the inevitable crash. `[00:23:34]` 是的，所以我想你们可能知道两到两个学派，所以你们可能都很清楚。自 2004 年以来，专家们一直在宣布即将出现泡沫，并不断崩盘。因此，我们现在是在第 13 年，明年将是第 14 年，即将到来的网络崩溃重演。他们是那些预测这件事的人，他们对这件事没有发生感到越来越沮丧，对我们都还在这里越来越愤怒。你知道，也许他们是对的，我们只是完全夸大了，你知道 docom 泡沫 2.0，我们只是现在，我们只是推迟到不可避免的崩溃。 > `[00:24:13]` It\'s possible. `[00:24:13]` 这是可能的。 > `[00:24:15]` You know mean you seem skeptical and I\'m skeptical of that because the other the other the other theory right. So the other theory is we\'ve we\'ve entered a phase of the industry where you know some things are just working now and in particular right the Internet that it\'s working now which if you were here 20 years ago that was not necessarily a certain thing and like the internet works. Mobile works the smart phone works. You got one with the new Apple headphones will work. You know some stuff is just starting to work. And so you\'ve got these marvelous. You know you\'ve got this giant giant install base. `[00:24:15]` 你知道的意思是你看起来很怀疑，而我对此持怀疑态度，因为另一种理论是正确的。所以另一个理论是，我们已经进入了这个行业的一个阶段，你知道有些东西现在起作用了，尤其是互联网，它现在起作用了。如果你在 20 年前来到这里，那不一定是一件特定的事情，就像互联网一样。手机工作智能手机工作。你买了新的苹果耳机就行了。你知道有些东西才刚开始起作用。所以你有了这些了不起的东西。你知道你有这个巨大的安装基地。 > `[00:24:48]` Now people all over the world on the Internet. You\'ve got this massive growing consumer acceptance of e-commerce. You\'ve got these giant new social platforms. You\'ve got these you know all these new these new playbooks are how to build these companies. You\'ve got the rise of developer adoption of enterprise technology like a whole thing that\'s working now. And so these things are working at a very big scale. And each of these things the big things at work are all platforms to build on top of opportunities for more things to than get built right on top. And so I just think a lot of those things are working really well. So which isn\'t to say that everything\'s working right and so I think the Valley and startups will always be characterized by you know there will always be what\'s called a power locker. You\'ll always have some big successes and then you\'ll have a long tail of things that don\'t work and you\'ll have a bunch of stuff in the middle and you always get this kind of distribution of success. But you have enough things that are working at scale that are serious. And so you know I think the things that are working are working really really well. `[00:24:48]` 现在全世界的人们都在上网。你得到了越来越多的消费者对电子商务的接受。你有了这些巨大的新社交平台。你已经得到了这些，你知道，所有这些新的剧本都是如何建立这些公司的。开发人员对企业技术的采用正在兴起，就像现在起作用的整个事情一样。所以这些东西在很大的范围内起作用。每一件事情-工作中的大事-都是建立在机会之上的平台，比建立在上面的机会更多。所以我觉得很多事情都很有效。所以，这并不是说一切都正常，所以我认为硅谷和初创企业的特征将永远是这样的，你知道，总有一种叫做动力储物柜的东西。你总是会有一些巨大的成功，然后你会有一长串不起作用的事情，你会有一堆东西在中间，你总是得到这种成功的分配。但你有足够的东西在规模上工作是严肃的。所以你知道，我认为这些事情运作得很好。 > `[00:25:42]` Think in terms of do you believe in this kind of thematic of these three or four markets are these three or four spaces the next couple of years are really going to be most likely the places where some of these outlying returns are going to sit. Or are you more agnostic. `[00:25:42]` 想一想，在这三、四个市场中，你相信这样的主题吗？这三、四个市场就是这三、四个市场，未来几年，最有可能的是，其中一些离经叛道的收益所在的地方。还是你更不可知论。 > `[00:25:56]` Yeah we\'re totally schizophrenic on that point. So anybody in the field can\'t resist talking about this all the time. And by the way there is substance to it right. It\'s like there was there was a point at which you know there was a point that between you know when the iPhone came out to probably 2012 was like there\'s this point where all the mobile killer apps that are going to be on the homescreen of the iPhone we\'re going to get built. And by the way got built. There was a point where you know early earlier there was a point when the piece came out that all theP.C. killer apps are going to be built. So there are these things that happen. These new platforms get established and then there\'s this period of time where things get built on top. There\'s a bunch of candidates for that today that are very exciting so broadly I give a few examplesA.I. machine learning deep learning as one cluster of things very you know tons of activity happening in the intersection of biology healthcare and computer science. Big cluster of things happening there. Transportation right autonomous ground vehicles air vehicles actually now see vehicles different kinds different sizes shapes descriptions uses are really starting to click and you know we could probably name another another half dozen so you know we you know what part of our job is to track track those those field and try to try to figure out the best startups. Do you guys actually track those fields. Oh it\'s just a constant. It\'s just kind of the action of the firm the flow of the firm so it\'s just constantly trying to review it trying to understand trying to map a landscape to understand all the companies trying to meet all the founders. So that\'s the one and I would just say on the other hand on the other hand I would say that I don\'t think any Veazey really does that good a job predicting these things in the sense of first of all. So the big successes are so dependent on the specifics they are contingent on the specifics and so it\'s the right hander with the right idea with the right team with the right breakthrough at the right time and the right market with the right pricing model it\'s all these things have to come together and you just you never my experience is you just never know when that when that company is going to crystallize and that often happens five or ten years after you think it should and then it can often be the case that you get these companies that are breakthrough companies in fields that people thought were dead. So we had just had this company Itanium people written about now which is a security company. And it\'s in a field where I think a lot of you see sort of the opportunity to build big franchises was over and like this company is growing like unbelievably fast very very specific set of people who are really interested in the woman became available at a certain point to go after it. They\'re going after it. You knowV.M. where as another great example virtualization or popular as virtualization virtualization was a 30 year old mainframe technology. It goes back to the 1960s. Diane Greene and mental Rosenblum out of Stanford meadowlarks Stanford and Diane had a son started Vima in 1999 at a time when everybody knew that like of software was on its way out and it turned into one of the big breakthroughs Google hires like Google was like the thirty fifth search engine. `[00:25:56]` 是的，我们在这一点上完全是精神分裂症。所以这个领域的任何人都禁不住不停地谈论这件事。顺便说一句，它的实质是正确的。就像在某个时刻，你知道，当 iPhone 发布到 2012 年的时候，你就会知道，在这一点上，所有的移动杀手应用程序都将出现在 iPhone 的主屏幕上，我们将生产这些应用。顺便说一句。有一个点，你知道早些时候，有一个点，当这件事出来，所有的 P.C.杀手应用将被建立。所以有些事情是会发生的。这些新的平台被建立起来，然后在这段时间里，事情就建立在上面。今天有一群候选人非常令人兴奋，所以我举几个例子，人工智能，机器学习，深度学习，这是一群大家都知道的事情，在生物学、医疗和计算机科学的交汇处发生了大量的活动。大量的事情发生在那里。交通运输，自动地面车辆，空中车辆，现在可以看到不同的车辆，不同的尺寸，形状，描述，使用开始点击，你知道，我们可能还可以说出另外的六个，所以你知道我们的工作的一部分是跟踪这些领域，并试图找出最好的初创企业。你们真的追踪那些领域。哦，这只是一个常数。它只是公司的一种行为，公司的流程，所以它只是不断地回顾它，试图理解，试图绘制一幅地图来理解所有的公司，试图会见所有的创始人。这就是我要说的，另一方面，我想说，我不认为任何维西真的做得那么好，首先，我可以预测这些事情。因此，巨大的成功取决于具体情况，所以它是正确的投手，正确的想法，正确的团队，正确的时间，正确的市场，正确的定价模式，所有这些都必须结合在一起，你只是-我的经验是，你永远不知道什么时候才会有这样的突破。那家公司将会结晶，这通常发生在你认为应该的五到十年之后，然后你会发现，这些公司往往是那些在人们认为已经死了的领域里取得突破的公司。我们刚刚让 Itanium 公司的人写了一篇文章，这是一家保安公司。在这个领域，我想你们中的很多人都看到，建立大特许经营的机会已经结束，就像这家公司正在以难以置信的速度增长，非常具体的一组人，对这个女人真正感兴趣的人，在某一时刻就有机会去追求它。他们在追杀它。作为另一个很好的例子，虚拟化或虚拟化流行于 30 年前的大型机技术。它可以追溯到 20 世纪 60 年代。黛安·格林(Diane Greene)和精神·罗森布卢姆(Mint Rosenblum)离开了斯坦福草地云雀斯坦福大学(Stanford And Diane)。1999 年，戴安有个儿子创办了 VIMA，当时大家都知道，就像软件一样，它正在走向终结，它变成了谷歌雇佣的重大突破之一，比如谷歌就像第三十五台搜索引擎。 > `[00:28:43]` Right. `[00:28:43]` 对。 > `[00:28:44]` There\'s like 34 other search engines had come along and like we all knew for a fact that no one search didn\'t work like it would give you crappy results. Number two there was no way to make money on it like those two things we knew for sure. `[00:28:44]` 好像有 34 个搜索引擎出现了，就像我们都知道的那样，没有一个搜索不像它会给你带来糟糕的结果那样有效。第二，没有办法像我们确定的那样在这两件事上赚钱。 > `[00:28:55]` But you know as a founder that you are not to Erlick as you know we talked to a lot of founders and how do you know that your thirty fifth rather than maybe first or second date your timing is right. `[00:28:55]` 但是你知道，作为一个创办人，你不是埃利克，因为你知道，我们和很多创始人谈过，你怎么知道你的第三十五次约会，而不是第一次或第二次约会，你的时机是对的。 > `[00:29:06]` So my experience is the great founders almost always feel like you almost always feel like you\'re too late and you\'re almost always too early and you almost always feel like you\'re too late. The reason is because for you it\'s become obvious like all of you I\'m listening to this like you\'ve got some idea in your head and like as far as you\'re concerned the world should already work this way which is why you\'re pursuing it. And so to you it\'s a little bit inexplicable as to why it hasn\'t happened yet and there must be 80 other people going after the same idea. And it must be just about to happen. And I must be too late. Which is just how I felt with this tape. `[00:29:06]` 所以我的经验是，伟大的创始人几乎总是觉得你太迟了，你几乎总是太早，你几乎总是觉得你太迟了。因为对你来说，它变得很明显，就像你们所有人一样，我听着，就像你们脑子里有一些想法一样，就像你们所关心的那样，世界应该已经这样运作了，这就是你们追求它的原因。所以对你来说，这是一个有点令人费解的原因，为什么它还没有发生，肯定有 80 其他人追求同样的想法。这肯定就要发生了。我一定太迟了。这就是我对这盘带子的感受。 > `[00:29:35]` I was too late. In retrospect we weren\'t. `[00:29:35]` 我来得太晚了。回想起来我们不是。 > `[00:29:40]` The reality is you\'re almost always too early. We almost never see a qualified founder fail because they\'re too late to market. It\'s almost always closer to a relative market. And I think by the way and I don\'t say that critically I think we make when we screw up investments I think that\'s often the reason as well. I think we\'re in the exact same boat as the founder and in that degree which is we believe it\'s going to happen therefore we invest in it just it just turns out the way the history gets written as the world just wasn\'t ready yet. So I always like to point out like the iPod is like this breakthrough product in 2009 and you know Stapel my God I I these things well. `[00:29:40]` 事实是，你几乎总是太早了。我们几乎从来没有见过合格的创始人失败，因为他们太晚才能上市。它几乎总是更接近一个相对的市场。顺便说一句，我不这么说，我认为，当我们搞砸投资的时候，我认为这也常常是原因。我认为我们和创立者处于同一条船上，在某种程度上，我们相信它会发生，因此我们投资于它，就像世界还没有准备好一样，历史就是这样写的。所以我总是喜欢指出，iPod 就像 2009 年这个突破性的产品，你知道，斯塔佩尔，我的上帝，我把这些事情做得很好。 > `[00:30:10]` There was this thing called the Newton 20 years earlier in 1989 if you haven\'t heard of it. Look it up on Wikipedia. It was the iPad 20 years earlier and it was like virtually the same thing in the world just wasn\'t ready yet. The technologies were in place you didn\'t have mobile broadband you didn\'t have the high resolution screens you didn\'t have the battery technology and you just brought the thing in a market crash and burn and it convinced people for 20 years that tablet computing would never work. And then they did it again in the iPod and it worked. And so I think that in a lot of ways that\'s the biggest risk that the biggest conceptual risk we\'ll deal with is just that I think that\'s the permanent curse of the entrepreneur. `[00:30:10]` 如果你还没听说过的话，20 年前的 1989 年，有一种叫做牛顿的东西。在维基百科上查一下。那是 20 年前的 ipad，世界上几乎一样的东西还没有准备好。技术已经到位，你没有移动宽带，没有高分辨率屏幕，没有电池技术，你刚刚在市场崩溃和燃烧中带来了这个东西，这让人们相信，20 年来，平板电脑是行不通的。然后他们又在 iPod 里做了一次，它起了作用。因此，我认为，在很多方面，这是最大的风险，我们将处理的最大的概念风险，只是我认为这是企业家的永久诅咒。 > `[00:30:45]` Yeah I remember you. You\'re going to talk I see one time and you said you know if you the one way to figure out if your not too late is if what you\'re working on was being hotly covered three four years ago you\'re probably right on time because now the infrastructure and consumer behavior is not caught up to what was exciting in 2012 13. Last question you know do whatever fato whatever you lose everything and at the end of the day today are 22 years old again. What do you start with the company you would start. `[00:30:45]` 是的，我记得你。你要跟我谈一次，你说过，如果你知道，如果你不太晚的话，那就是四年前你所做的工作是否受到了热烈的关注，你很可能按时完成了，因为现在基础设施和消费者的行为还没有赶上 2012 年令人兴奋的事情。最后一个问题，你知道，做任何事情，无论你失去了什么，在今天结束今天又是 22 岁。你从你要创办的公司开始做什么？ > `[00:31:15]` So if I\'m 22 again I think what I do is I go try to find the best the the hottest company the company in the valley that\'s growing the fastest and that has a really good culture and a really good foundation for training. And so an example of that would be an urban bee. But you know there are many others by the way still Facebook. `[00:31:15]` 所以如果我再次 22 岁，我想我所做的就是去寻找最好的公司-硅谷发展最快的公司，有着非常好的文化和良好的培训基础的公司。因此，这方面的一个例子就是城市蜜蜂。但顺便说一句，还有很多人仍然是 Facebook。 > `[00:31:36]` I would go try to get a plant myself at a company where I can really learn fast forward while you\'re 25 you\'ve got you\'ve got three years that everybody is that now. `[00:31:36]` 我会亲自去一家公司买一棵植物，在你 25 岁的时候，我真的可以学到更快的东西-你现在每个人都有三年的时间了。 > `[00:31:48]` Well so I spend that time someone as I worked my butt off to establish a good reputation so that when people reference struck me read a reference like well but the other is I spend that time thinking and I really critically I spend that time building my network and the people who I know that I want to work with you know down the road. And then and then either. Yeah. Either come up with an idea or I don\'t but I would focus so much. I think it\'s very hard and I\'m deliberately avoiding your question because I think it\'s very hard to answer in the abstract. Let me answer in a different way if I were 18 and I were going to college. I would do I would really I would do computer science again in a heartbeat. And then I would either focus on cryptocurrency distributed systems and broad domain of cryptocurrency number one number two a machine learning deep learning or number three intersection of bio biology and CSIRO genomics and synthetic biology. I would personally I would do those one of those three areas. And the hard part for me would be picking between them because I think they\'re all they\'re all to me it\'s just like all three of us are going to have transformative work happen in the next 20 years is going to change a lot of how the world works. `[00:31:48]` 好吧，我把时间花在了某人身上，因为我努力工作是为了建立一个良好的声誉，所以当别人提到的时候，我会读得很好，但另一个是，我会花时间思考，我真的会花时间去建立我的关系网，以及我认识的那些我想和你一起工作的人。不管是什么。嗯要么想出一个主意，要么我不想，但我会非常专注。我认为这很难，我故意回避你的问题，因为我认为这很难用抽象的方式回答。如果我 18 岁就要上大学的话，让我用另一种方式回答。我会然后，我要么关注密码货币分布式系统和广泛的密码学领域，第一，第二，机器学习，深入学习，要么是生物学与 CSIRO 基因组学和合成生物学的第三交叉。就我个人而言，我会做这三个领域中的一个。对我来说，最难的是在他们之间选择，因为我认为他们对我来说都是，就像我们三个人在接下来的 20 年里都会发生变革一样，这将改变世界的许多运作方式。 > `[00:32:49]` Awesome. Thank you for your time. Thanks. `[00:32:49]` 太棒了。谢谢您抽时间见我谢谢 > `[00:32:52]` Bradley. `[00:32:52]` 布拉德利。