# Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016 > `[00:00:04]` So up next needs no introduction. I\'ll give a very quick one. Reid Hoffman has been. Yeah there\'s a round of applause. Applause You know what it sounds like you know who he is. I\'ll skip the introduction. All right. For the first question. `[00:00:04]` 所以下一个不需要介绍。我会给你一个非常快的答案。里德？霍夫曼是的。是的，有一轮的掌声。掌声，你知道他是谁。我跳过介绍。好吧。第一个问题。 > `[00:00:21]` Tell us something you believe to be true that very few people agree with you on. `[00:00:21]` 告诉我们一些你认为是真的，很少有人同意你的观点。 > `[00:00:26]` Well this room actually may actually agree with us but I think this is when you count the Globe The Globe The Globe. That question always has to be indexed against the population. But I would I would say is that we have an extremely high likelihood that within the next 50 to 100 years that we create another cognitive speciese.g. a species with a similar kind of or better cognitive abilities than we do people in this room normally tend to think that\'s artificial intelligence. But actually I think it\'s a jump ball between that and a different version of the homogeneous we\'re in actually relatively interesting and unique period by which homosapiens is the only part of the homogeneous because there was Florences and Neanderthal and so forth and when you consider longer timeframe is actually 40 50000 years ago is actually not that long ago. So I think we\'re gonna do that and it\'s conditioned upon Are there particular breakthroughs inA.I. which I think there is still some invention and magic to get a truly generalisedA.I. which may or may not happen quickly if it does than is likely if it doesn\'t then the homogeneous is likely just for fun and you don\'t have to answer this if you don\'t want but given that you made the point about indexing that question against the rest of the world and then many people in this room may agree with that although I would still but most don\'t. `[00:00:26]` 这个房间实际上可能同意我们的观点，但我认为这是当你把地球计算在内的时候。这个问题必须始终与人口挂钩。但我要说的是，我们极有可能在未来 50 至 100 年内创造另一个认知物种。一种比我们更有认知能力的物种通常会认为这是人工智能。但实际上，我认为这是一个跳跃球，在这和同质的不同版本之间，我们处于一个相对有趣和独特的时期，在这个时期，同族是同质的唯一部分，因为有植物群和尼安德特人等等，当你考虑到更长的时间框架实际上是 40，50000 年前，实际上并不是很久以前。所以我认为我们要这样做，这取决于人工智能中是否有特别的突破，我认为仍然有一些发明和魔法来实现真正的通用人工智能，如果这样做的话，它可能会发生，也可能不会发生，如果不是，那么同质可能只是为了好玩，如果你不想的话，你不需要回答这个问题，但考虑到你想要的话，你不需要回答这个问题。提出了将这个问题与世界其他地方进行索引的观点，然后在座的许多人可能会同意这一点，尽管我仍然同意，但大多数人不同意。 > `[00:01:54]` What is something that you believe that very few people in this room would agree with you on. `[00:01:54]` 你认为这个房间里很少有人会同意你的观点。 > `[00:02:00]` Let\'s see in this room OK. Trying to index that I guess. `[00:02:00]` 让我们在这间屋子里看看，好的，我想索引一下。 > `[00:02:12]` Well this might be they hadn\'t thought about it. I think that one of the things that\'s actually really important for inventing products is a fairly deep sense of a theory of human nature and humanity. And so I think that anyone who is inventing the kinds of products that we typically do you should actually in fact be able to articulate a relatively robust theory about what is human nature what is humanity like now and where is it going and how does your product or service fit into that. And that may not be so much they disagree as actually. Most people I talk to can\'t articulate a particular robust theory of human nature and that\'s one of the reasons why years back as you know I started saying this thing I invest in one or more of the seven deadly sins because I was trying to get people to think about what is actually in fact a kind of common human psychology and if you\'re trying to create a mass market consumer application what are the parts of how what it is to be human that you\'re actually triggering responding to us servingetc. `[00:02:12]` 嗯，这可能是他们没有想过的。我认为，对于发明产品来说，真正重要的事情之一是对人性和人性的理论有相当深刻的理解。所以，我认为，任何发明我们通常做的产品的人，实际上应该能够阐明一个相对强大的理论，关于什么是人的本性，什么是人性，人类现在是什么样的，以及你的产品或服务是如何与之相适应的。事实上，这可能不是他们的意见分歧。与我交谈的大多数人都无法阐明一个关于人性的强有力的理论，这也是为什么多年前我开始说这句话的原因之一，我投资于七宗罪中的一宗或多宗，因为我试图让人们思考什么实际上是一种共同的人类心理，如果你想创造出一种共同的人类心理。大众市场上的消费者应用 > `[00:03:19]` That\'s a great answer that most people in this room don\'t think about that or don\'t agree it\'s important. So I want to talk about three main topics here. One is not the mistakes that people make when they start a company but the great things people do. Everyone worries about trying to avoid mistakes. That\'s not enough. You also have to do one thing really right. The second is how to raise money from Graylock and the third is how to scale up a company and when to start that. So let\'s start with the first. What are the things that you see entrepreneurs do. At the very beginning that are the opposite of mistakes that lead them to great results. `[00:03:19]` 这是一个很好的答案，这个房间里的大多数人都不考虑这个问题，或者不同意这一点很重要。所以我想在这里谈三个主要的话题。一个问题不是人们在创业时所犯的错误，而是人们所做的伟大的事情。每个人都担心如何避免错误。这还不够。你还必须做一件非常正确的事。第二个问题是如何从格雷洛克那里筹集资金，第三个问题是如何扩大公司规模，以及何时开始这样做。那么，让我们从第一个开始。你看到企业家都做些什么。在一开始，这是相反的错误，导致他们伟大的结果。 > `[00:03:56]` So I think one of the let\'s see we could spend a whole half hour entirely on this but I\'ll try to do what I gave you three questions up front so you could allocate time. Yes. So one thing is build the strongest possible network around you and every single thing you\'re doing whether it\'s hiring whether it\'s getting investors whether it\'s who you\'re talking to about your company. Obviously Y C is a opportunity to generate a really strong network. And I think specifically in terms that it\'s not just like what do you think of the idea that\'s usually a weak question How can my idea be improved if my idea were to fail or my plan were to fail or my strategies fail. Why do you think it would fail. Right. Asking those kinds of questions I think another thing is to actually think about one of the challenges is it\'s awesome that we have gotten to such a massive entrepreneurial environment here. But for example breaking through the noise is really tricky so you actually have to really test and think about whether or not your idea will be sufficient to break through the noise. And so folks who really think about like some way that they can either you know grow on a particular platform or have a particular way that they can actually get good growth into their product is you know someone that sometimes has vitality. Sometimes CEOs sometimes other things. `[00:03:56]` 所以我想其中之一我们可以花半个小时在这上面，但是我会试着做我给你的三个问题，这样你就可以分配时间了。是因此，有一件事是围绕着你和你所做的每一件事建立最强大的网络，不管是招聘，还是吸引投资者，不管你是在和谁谈论你的公司。显然，YC 是一个产生一个非常强大的网络的机会。我特别认为，如果我的想法失败了，或者我的计划失败了，或者我的策略失败了，你会怎么看待这个通常是一个薄弱的问题呢？你为什么认为它会失败。右（边），正确的问这些问题，我认为另一件事是真正思考其中一个挑战，那就是，我们在这里获得了如此庞大的创业环境，真是太棒了。但是，例如，打破噪音是非常棘手的，所以你实际上必须真正测试和思考你的想法是否足以突破噪音。所以那些真正想要用某种方式来成长的人，或者你知道，在特定的平台上成长，或者有一种特殊的方式，让他们的产品得到良好的发展，你知道，有些人有时会有活力。有时是 CEO 有时是其他事情。 > `[00:05:25]` What are the early signs that an idea or particular product may be able to break through the noise. What do you look for when you\'re evaluating not because I think that is the critical thing but it\'s so hard to to really know. `[00:05:25]` 一个想法或特定产品能够突破噪音的早期迹象是什么？当你进行评估时，你会寻找什么，而不是因为我认为这是关键的事情，但这很难真正知道。 > `[00:05:37]` Well obviously you know the obvious brain dead thing that everyone knows is once you see traction. You still have some questions How far does attraction go but that actually answers a bunch of those because you can study the actual like okay. Are people engaging or are they reengaging how did they discover it. And you can you can you can you can per thing you can deconstruct the answer to your question. The real challenging one is when you have the theories beforehand and the theories beforehand a little bit of that comes back to what I was saying in terms of a theory of human nature. You say OK why is it if it\'s viral why will the Big Rallies spread. Some of that\'s technique. But some of that\'s also it\'ll it will it will trigger a funny bone in some way and I wouldn\'t have looked at Pokémon Go and said well actually in fact this nostalgia thing will create a craze. I would have missed that. But I learned I along with lots of other people I downloaded and played with it immediately. OK how do I learn that pattern. What was the way that was fitting into people\'s identity. Why was this the thing that was creating something that literally spread through essentially what now did you get really into it. Well. Let me put this way I. It became a habitual thing that I would do during an Uber ride. I have no shame I\'ll just that I was one of those people for a couple of days like 3:00 in the morning my brothers and I would like to be out driving around Golden Gate Park trying to catch Pokemon dribble you know for me was when I got an uber pull it up and I go because you know you had advantage that someone else is driving you yelling at you can go through all the poka stops and everything else at a reasonably fast clip. And so the other thing is is is is there a principally protraction limit tuition consuming enterprise in consumer. The principal thing is there is actually an interestingly unique theory there\'s some kind of theory together with some understanding about how distribution works that you were applying. Like you say OK. I actually think people will send out the mass messages or send out emails or this will get indexed and search the falling way or people will actually in fact do the following activities which will cause it that people will discover this app site service and then that\'s a coherent theory. And that can sometimes be sufficient for doing it on the enterprise side. Actually sometimes clear mastery of traditional enterprise techniques is what matters right because actually in fact if you have a relatively high like a a good product in terms of what you could sell you can measure results you know your sales channel looks like a sales process can work effectively but those two things and the ability to pull them off are actually absolutely central to the things that you do right. The most classic problem Maju seen and I know you\'re toying with the success here but the classic problem is I\'ve got a cool idea where someone doesn\'t have a unique product and that\'s radically insufficient. You\'re making it just lucky whether or not in fact the distribution works. And these companies only grow to enough throw weight if they get to a point where they have enough distribution. So roughly speaking one of the rules of thumb that I use is if you don\'t if you don\'t see a path by which you\'re getting to 100 million a year in revenue and then have good growth after that you\'re not going to be a start. You have zero chance of being a stand alone tech company. `[00:05:37]` 很明显，大家都知道，一旦你看到牵引力，就会有明显的脑死亡。你仍然有一些问题，吸引力到底有多大，但这实际上回答了很多问题，因为你可以像好的那样研究实际的事物。人们是在参与还是重新接触他们是怎么发现的。每件事你都可以解构你的问题的答案。真正具有挑战性的是，当你事先有了理论，而理论之前，有一点点回到了我所说的人性理论。你说，好的，为什么它是病毒，为什么大集会扩散。其中一些技巧。但其中的一些也会在某种程度上引发一根有趣的骨头，我不会看“口袋妖怪围棋”说，事实上，这种怀旧的东西会引发一股热潮。我会错过的。但我知道，我和很多其他人一起，我下载并立即与它玩。好的，我如何学习这个模式。什么样的方式符合人们的身份。为什么这个东西创造了一些东西，从本质上讲，你真正进入了它。井让我这样说吧。在优步搭车的过程中，这成了我习以为常的事情。我一点也不觉得羞耻，我只想在凌晨 3：00 这样的几天里，我和我的兄弟们一起在金门公园附近开车，试图抓住口袋妖怪的运球，你知道的，当我把它拉起来的时候，我就走了，因为你知道你有其他人开车送你的优势。对你大喊大叫，你可以在一个合理的快速剪辑，通过所有的波卡停止和其他一切。因此，另一件事是，在消费者中存在着一个主要限制学费消费的企业。最重要的是，实际上有一个有趣而独特的理论就像你说的好。我实际上认为人们会发送大量信息或发送电子邮件，或者这个会被索引并搜索下落的方式，或者人们实际上会做以下的活动，这会导致人们发现这个应用站点服务，然后这是一个连贯的理论。这有时足以在企业方面做到这一点。事实上，对传统企业技术的明确掌握有时才是最重要的，因为实际上，如果你有一个相对较高的产品，比如一个好产品，你可以衡量销售结果，你知道你的销售渠道看起来像一个销售流程可以有效地工作，但这两件事和成功的能力实际上对你所做的正确的事情来说是绝对重要的。马库看到的最经典的问题-我知道你在玩弄这里的成功-但经典的问题是，我有一个很酷的想法，那就是某人没有独特的产品，这根本是不够的。不管分发是否有效，你都很幸运。而这些公司只有在达到足够的分布点时才会有足够的影响力。因此，粗略地说，我使用的经验法则之一是，如果你看不到一条年收入达到 1 亿美元的道路，那么在那之后，你就不会是一个开始了。你没有机会成为一家独立的科技公司。 > `[00:09:04]` Just continue on the maybe one more but then I do want to make sure we move on. `[00:09:04]` 也许再继续吧，但我确实想确保我们继续前进。 > `[00:09:07]` I was just thinking about so then the other things I think to do right are I think the key things are people who when when you\'re doing this as they fail fast point which is you\'re looking for the earliest possible proof to whether or not you\'re on the right track. It isn\'t that you\'re trying to fail but you actually hunting for the quickest and and and sometimes even argument evidence like for example when I was literally had the idea falling down I was going around and my friends going OK why won\'t this work. And the common pattern I was hearing is because in a network there is no value to you have a million people so no one\'s going to invite for the first million people. `[00:09:07]` 我只是在想，那么我认为应该做的其他事情是，我认为关键的事情是当你做这件事的时候，当他们失败的时候，快速点，那就是，你在寻找尽可能早的证据来证明你是否在正确的轨道上。这并不是说你试图失败，而是你实际上是在寻找最快的、有时甚至是争论的证据，比如，当我真的有了这样的想法时，我就到处乱跑，而我的朋友们也很好，为什么不做这个工作呢？我听到的常见模式是，在一个网络中，有一百万人是没有价值的，所以没有人会邀请第一个百万人。 > `[00:09:52]` And the fact that I was that I knew that that was the thing that test that was the thing that I was essentially working on from day one to get to the minimum viable product in order to do that. `[00:09:52]` 而事实上，我知道这是测试的东西，这是我从第一天起就一直在研究的东西，为了达到这个目的，我得到了最低限度的可行产品。 > `[00:10:01]` Do you think that people give up too early related to that or at least they\'re looking at the wrong metrics. One of the things I see great founders do really well is not give up too early and it sounds simple but in this kind of culture of you know try something if it doesn\'t work fail fast stop. I do think you can lose a lot of great companies. `[00:10:01]` 你认为人们放弃得太早吗？或者至少他们在考虑错误的衡量标准。我看到伟大的创始人做得很好的一件事就是不要太早放弃，这听起来很简单，但在这种文化中，你知道，如果失败了，就试一试吧。我确实认为，你可能会失去许多伟大的公司。 > `[00:10:25]` So definitely you can and it isn\'t to try to pick. Like for example when I\'m talking entrepreneur the first time one of the things I test for is kind of what I what I call flexible persistence which is they\'ll both listen and hear the things I\'m saying. Questions and they will adopt. `[00:10:25]` 所以你当然可以，而且也不能尝试挑选。例如，当我第一次谈论企业家时，我所测试的其中一件事是我所说的“灵活坚持”，那就是他们都会听和听我说的话。问题就会被采纳。 > `[00:10:45]` But think about it they\'ll respond they may be willing to consider that alter but then they also have conviction in their point of view. They have a theory of humanity a theory of distribution a theory of product that they go look I\'ve really thought through it and I think some really good stuff here and this is why it is. And if you don\'t have both you will almost certainly fail. And part of that is people\'s I\'ll just pivot my way there and learn or know have a deeply thought theory about what you\'re heading for And So Plan B frequently is not. Oh now I\'m doing something entirely different. Usually plans B or slight variations in tests. Will you do list your hypotheses about what it is you think you\'re going to. Why you you\'re going to win at the startup game. Then you start testing them part of a plan B is say well maybe hypothesis 3 isn\'t right but 3 prime is right and I can just shift a little bit of what I\'m doing this way and then it can work. And so like for example like one of the thoughts that we had very early and linked in is even though we made a very heavy debt on individuals as would we need to shift to enterprise and companies and groups as a possibility to make it work. It turned out that we needed to do that but that was okay as a Plan B. And I think that staying persistent ultimately really try it. You want to we\'re three points reducing your confidence before you really decide to pivot. `[00:10:45]` 但是想想看，他们会回应的，他们可能愿意考虑改变，但他们的观点也有信心。他们有一个人性的理论，一个分配的理论，一个他们去看的产品理论，我已经仔细考虑过了，我认为这里有一些非常好的东西，这就是为什么。如果你没有两者，你几乎肯定会失败。这其中的一部分是，我会把我的方向转向那里，学习或者知道一个关于你要去的东西的深思理论，所以 B 计划经常不是。哦，现在我正在做一件完全不同的事情。通常计划 B 或轻微的变化在测试。你会列出你的假设吗？你认为你会做什么？为什么你会在创业游戏中获胜。然后你开始测试他们，B 计划的一部分是，假设 3 不对，但 3 素数是对的，我可以稍微改变一下我这样做的方式，然后它就能工作了。例如，就像我们很早就想到的一个想法，即使我们欠了个人很重的债，我们也需要转移到企业、公司和团体，作为一种可能，让它发挥作用。事实证明，我们需要这样做，但作为 B 计划，这是可以的。我认为，坚持到底是真正的尝试。你想让我们在你真正决定转向之前降低你的信心。 > `[00:12:07]` So in the interest of time let\'s move on to raising money. If I want to come raise money from Graylock. What can I do to be successful. What what is step one. And what is the last time before the check and everything in between. `[00:12:07]` 所以为了时间的考虑，让我们继续筹集资金吧。如果我想从格雷洛克那里筹到钱，我能做些什么才能成功。第一步是什么。支票之前的最后一次是什么，中间的一切都是什么。 > `[00:12:20]` So first and this is this is true for you know all top tier viss is much stronger off getting a referral right now. Y Combinator though. Well it\'s can be a referral from one of the partners combinators Y Combinator. But it\'s it\'s the here\'s why you should pay attention this. I probably get somewhere between 30 and 50 unsolicited decks in my email every working day. Right. And so it\'s kind of like okay. `[00:12:20]` 所以首先，这是事实，因为你知道，所有的顶级签证都比现在得到推荐要强得多。不过是组合器。嗯，它可以是一个合作伙伴组合子 Y 组合子的推荐信。但这就是你为什么要注意这个问题的原因。我可能每个工作日都会收到 30 到 50 件未经邀请的邮件。是的。所以这是一种很好的选择。 > `[00:12:50]` How many of us have you ever wondered. None that I\'m aware of. I mean sometimes what so the intro is really important. It was really important. Then who who counts as a good intro to you counts is a good intro is someone that I that I know and trust and respect. Right. So you have to guess that to some degree. But you know and here I\'ll throw you under the bus. Sam counts right. So that\'s one. `[00:12:50]` 你们中有多少人曾想过。据我所知没有。我的意思是，有时候什么，所以介绍是非常重要的。真的很重要。那么，对你来说，谁是一个好的介绍，谁就是一个好的介绍，是一个我认识、信任和尊重的人。右（边），正确的所以你必须在某种程度上猜到这一点。但是你知道，我会把你扔到公共汽车下面。萨姆数得对。那就是其中之一。 > `[00:13:21]` And the second is you know look again think of there\'s tons and tons of startups and your average every venture capital it looks at like 600 deals a year and funds between zero and two of them which means you\'re looking for something that is a little like your opening question you\'re looking for something is seriously unique right. You\'re looking for something that says look it doesn\'t have to be the only thing in its field although then it heads a bunch of things in its field why will this one be the one that will break through. Why will this one be the one that creates interesting company. But it\'s. No. OK. And so that\'s part of the reason why what I suggest to people who want to come talk to us is to say well what\'s the thing that either has suddenly opened up or the thing that makes your thing going to be very big when you when you realized there are thousands of startups now which is great but you know given you can fun between 0 2 and so for example in one of the ones I did the beginning of the year one called convoy which is essentially Uber for regional trucking. And actually that one took a bunch of work for me because there were a bunch of people doing that. Right. And I had to look through to see which one was the one to do because we can only do one. And what did that founder do to convince you that that was the one. Well first came in through through a great referral which is Hoddy Nyali Partovi right. Who had who had done a whole bunch of work and had chosen us. Second is in the discussion of literally in the very first discussion I got a very good sense that the that the Founders Dan and Grant understood the game in front of them they understood what the issues were they had thought about. Like for them when I pushed them about what the comparisons and thoughts with Uber were what was unique about this space why actually in fact this is a very different network than that a new were network. `[00:13:21]` 第二件事是，你要知道，再想想这里有无数的初创公司，平均每一笔风险投资每年大概有 600 笔交易，基金在 0 到 2 笔之间，这意味着你在寻找一些有点像你的开场白的东西，你在寻找一些非常独特的东西，对吧？你正在寻找的东西，看，它不一定是唯一的东西，在它的领域，虽然它领导了许多事情在其领域，为什么这个将是一个突破。为什么这个人会创造一个有趣的公司。但是.否好的这也是为什么我建议那些想来和我们交谈的人的原因之一，那就是，当你意识到现在有成千上万家初创公司的时候，你想说的是什么东西突然打开了，或者让你的事情变得很大，这是很棒的，但是你知道，你可以在 0 到 2 之间找到乐趣。举个例子，在今年年初我做过的一次，一个叫车队的车队，本质上是用于区域卡车运输的优步(Uber)。事实上，那个人为我做了大量的工作，因为有一群人这样做。右（边），正确的我必须看清楚哪一个是应该做的，因为我们只能做一个。那个创始人是怎么说服你的嗯，首先是通过一个伟大的推荐，这是霍迪尼亚利帕托维的权利。他做了大量的工作并选择了我们。第二，在第一次的讨论中，我有一个很好的感觉，开国元勋丹和格兰特在他们面前理解游戏，他们明白他们所想的是什么问题。对他们来说，当我问他们优步和优步的比较和想法是什么，这个空间的独特之处，为什么事实上，这是一个非常不同的网络，而不是一个新的网络。 > `[00:15:22]` What the challenges might be and they had actually thought about all of it doesn\'t mean that perfect answers it doesn\'t change but they had thought about it the way they were developing their product was in line with that thinking and they had a story and this is one of things that super important is like what is what. It\'s not to say you say I\'m like What\'s uncredible you say I\'m guaranteed to be successful I\'m coming in as a seed Series A and I\'m guaranteed to be successful and that either says to me that you\'re crazy because you don\'t actually understand the risk or you\'re lying to me. And both of those are not great outcomes from the viewpoint of a partnership. And so it\'s much better to say here in fact what I see the game in me here\'s what I think the risks are. Here\'s how I\'m addressing the risk. Here\'s how we\'re measuring and this is how I\'m doing. And by the way have confidence that I\'m going to succeed. Great. Perfect. So that ability to understand what the game is in front of you because then you\'ll you\'ll pass it the right way. I think it\'s very important to have an ability to have structured conversations early. It doesn\'t necessarily mean you have to have a deck some conversations. I have literally just Here\'s my set of beliefs that make me believe this Sharpe\'s a good idea. It\'s like a list of the investment theses the kinds of things that would say why it is this would be you know five to seven years from now this would be Air B and B this would be something that you would go oh my gosh this is a world changing company. Do you recommend the deck. `[00:15:22]` 挑战可能是什么-他们实际上已经想过了所有的挑战-并不意味着完美的答案不会改变，但他们对它的思考方式与他们开发产品的方式是一致的，他们有一个故事，这是非常重要的事情之一，就像什么是什么。这并不是说你说我是不可信的，你说我肯定会成功，我是作为种子系列 A 而来的，我保证会成功，这不是对我说你疯了，因为你并不真正理解风险，或者你在骗我。从伙伴关系的角度来看，这两者都不是很好的结果。所以在这里说更好，事实上，我在这里看到的就是我认为的风险。这是我如何应对风险的方法。这是我们测量的方法，我就是这样做的。顺便说一句，相信我会成功的。太棒了完美。所以你有能力理解你面前的游戏，因为这样你就能正确地通过它。我认为有能力尽早进行结构化的对话是非常重要的。这不一定意味着你必须进行一些对话。我的信念让我相信这个夏普是个好主意。这就像一张投资论文的清单，你知道为什么会这样，从现在开始，这将是 B 航空公司，这将是你要去做的事情，哦，天哪，这是一家正在改变世界的公司。你推荐甲板吗。 > `[00:16:55]` Wreck deck as a sort of PowerPoint. Yep. Generally speaking I think it\'s good to have at least a lightweight one and that\'s lightweight like 10 or 15 sides some basic. `[00:16:55]` 甲板作为 PowerPoint 的一种形式。是的。一般来说，我认为至少有一个轻量级的，这是好的，这是轻量级的，像 10 或 15 面，一些基本的。 > `[00:17:10]` Could `[00:17:10]` > `[00:17:10]` you just go quickly through that what what you expect to see in those slides. Like one of the main five or six critical topics. So I presume you guys point people to the linked in Series B deck that I published. We have but maybe not this audience so republished as linked in Series B deck and it\'s online and you should check it out. `[00:17:10]` 你很快就能在幻灯片上看到你期望看到的东西。就像五六个关键话题中的一个。所以我想你们应该把人们引向我出版的 B 系列的链接。我们有，但可能不是这样的观众，所以重新出版的链接在 B 系列甲板和它是在线的，你应该看看它。 > `[00:17:28]` So `[00:17:28]` > `[00:17:28]` this is roughly speaking you should open with. Here\'s my here\'s here the hypotheses that back the investment thesis and that should be probably no more than seven bullets. Usually it\'s more than three but something that could be aid if it had to be. And then your slides are the backdrop of those bullets. Why is it you think you\'ll win at that. Right so for example you know there is actually a space for professional networks separate from a social one. It will stall this thing and people\'s lives you know that sort of thing is the kinds of things that are in it and they can get distributed through reality and we can we can solve the viral problem. Then I think you need to have something about like OK what\'s the mature business. It\'s a sketch look like it doesn\'t mean like oh here\'s my fake Excel revenue projections which anyone with a brain knows you can make these things look like anything but it\'s like. It\'s it\'s it\'s a oh we\'ll charging people like this. This is why the product will be good this is why we\'ll have good margins while we\'ll have a defensible position. This is why we\'ll be a big size and this is what we\'ll be growing right. And so for example that was one of the reasons why the pitch was really good from beginning is like well we\'re eBay for space and we\'re starting with travel and travel itself is huge and this is what the dynamics work in terms of opening up liquidity between host and traveler. Okay I get it right. That was one of the pitches little 2 minutes and you\'re like okay understand. And by the way you understood the risk then to the risk were like well Aschenbach people aren\'t used to this in opening your house and reserve trust and safety issue and is there a regulation issue and you know all these things but those are then these are known risks than working against to claim zero competition is usually not credible. Usually it\'s here\'s why The competition has a very different angle of attack than I do and this is why my angle of attack would work. And then you know kind of more or less like for example an early stage consumer companies why it is I think this is going to work. `[00:17:28]` 这大概是你该说的。这是我的，这是支持投资理论的假设，而这应该不超过七颗子弹。通常情况下，它会超过三个，但如果有必要的话，它是可以得到帮助的。然后你的幻灯片就是子弹的背景。为什么你认为你会赢。是的，例如，你知道，职业网络实际上有一个空间，与社交网络是分开的。它会拖住这件事，人们的生活-你知道，这类事情就是它里面的那种东西-他们可以通过现实得到分配，我们可以解决病毒的问题。那么，我认为你需要一些东西，比如好的，什么是成熟的业务。这是一个草图，看起来不像，哦，这是我伪造的 Excel 收入预测，任何有头脑的人都知道你可以让这些东西看起来像任何东西，但它是一样的。我们会像这样向人收费。这就是为什么我们的产品将是好的，这就是为什么我们将有良好的利润率，而我们将有一个辩护的立场。这就是为什么我们将成为一个大的规模，这就是我们将成长的方向。举个例子，这就是为什么从一开始就很好的原因之一，就像我们是太空的 eBay，我们从旅行开始，旅行本身是巨大的，这就是在开放主机和旅行者之间的流动性方面的动力作用。好吧我弄好了。那是其中的一个投球，2 分钟，你就会感觉很好，明白吗。顺便说一句，你理解了风险，那么对风险的理解就像阿申巴赫，人们在打开你的房子、保留信任和安全问题上不习惯这样做，是否存在监管问题，而且你知道所有这些事情，但这些都是已知的风险，而不是声称零竞争通常是不可信的。通常情况下，这就是为什么竞争对手的进攻角度和我完全不同，这也是为什么我的进攻角度会起作用的原因。然后你就会知道，这多少有点像早期的消费公司，为什么我认为这会奏效。 > `[00:19:37]` And then can you give us a little bit of sense of how you think about terms what terms are important to venture firm to an entrepreneur and what a series they might look like. `[00:19:37]` 然后，你能给我们一点感觉吗？你如何看待术语-什么条件对创业公司很重要，以及它们可能是什么样的系列。 > `[00:19:47]` So to a venture firm part of the key thing is there\'s a big difference in Angels and ventures. Angel can invest in a wide variety of things they don\'t actually commit to doing that much. They do commit to doing a little bit of help but not that much help venture folks commit to. I\'m with the company more or less until it gets to port or not. I can only do really. It\'s very rare that you can do that a firm can do ones that are competitive so I can only do one of the space and I\'m going to throw a bunch of resources behind it. You know Andreessen Horowitz we other folks have like great recruiting practices a number of things like that as a way of doing it like a Graylock Our thing is we help people in companies find an engineer. Every other every alternative day during the year and that\'s you know that\'s a pretty good flow. And so typically the best way to do it is very clean. Terms have have either one or at most two leads two leads tends to be more on the enterprise side than the consumer. Somebody who is really going to roll up their sleeves and work with you. That usually gets for venture to a certain percentage typically. And it\'s actually not it\'s not an artificial number. Most targeted to 20 percent or greater ownership because when they look at when they do their models of what their baskets of ownership are on exits if they have north of 20 percent then they can make fun multiples work. And so that\'s the reason why that\'s the target. `[00:19:47]` 所以对一家风投公司来说，关键的部分是天使和冒险有很大的区别。安琪尔可以在各种各样的事情上进行投资，他们实际上并没有承诺做那么多事情。他们确实致力于做一点帮助，但没有那么多的帮助，风险投资者承诺。我或多或少地和这家公司在一起，直到它到达港口。我只能做真的。这是非常罕见的，你可以这样做，一家公司能做的是有竞争力的，所以我只能做一个空间，我将投入大量的资源在它背后。你知道，安德烈森·霍洛维茨，我们其他人都喜欢很棒的招聘实践，有很多这样的做法，就像格雷洛克一样，我们的问题是帮助公司里的人找到一名工程师。一年中的每一天，每隔一天，你都知道这是一种很好的流动。因此，通常情况下，最好的方法是非常干净。术语要么有一个，要么最多有两个线索，往往更多的是企业一方，而不是消费者。一个真正要卷起袖子和你一起工作的人。通常情况下，风险投资会达到一定的比例。它实际上不是，它不是一个人工数字。大多数目标是 20%或更高的所有权，因为当他们看到他们的模型时，他们的所有权篮子在出口，如果他们有 20%以北，那么他们可以使有趣的倍数工作。这就是为什么那是目标。 > `[00:21:20]` What is a venture from as the 500 million dollar fund. What is the return on that fund that the firm would like to hit to be really great. Typically you would want to have two and a half billion dollars a return. GROSS So five bucks. GROSS That\'s before the GPS TAKE THEIR Carrion\'s. `[00:21:20]` 作为 5 亿美元的基金，什么是风险投资？那笔基金的回报是什么，那家公司希望得到什么回报才是真正伟大的。通常情况下，你想要获得 25 亿美元的回报。真恶心，那么五块钱。在全球定位系统带走他们的卡介子之前真恶心。 > `[00:21:37]` Yes that\'s that\'s a reasonable fund that isn\'t the you know 10 plus X fund that you know all the top tier firms have hit at some point. There are funds where you get that but that\'s they. Oh that was a credible fund. `[00:21:37]` 是的，这是一只合理的基金，不是你所知道的 10+X 基金，你知道所有顶级公司在某个时候都遇到过这种情况。有些基金你可以从那里得到，但那就是它们。哦，那是一只可靠的基金。 > `[00:21:52]` So now I want to move on to the last topic. When you\'ve done things well you\'ve made a good company you\'ve got a product people like you\'ve raised a series A and now you transition to scale up. You\'ve popularized that term. What does that mean and how do you know when it\'s time to do it. `[00:21:52]` 现在我想转到最后一个话题。当你做得很好，你就成了一家好公司，你有了一个像你一样的产品人，你提出了一个系列 A，现在你开始逐步扩大规模。你推广了这个术语。这意味着什么，你怎么知道什么时候该这么做了。 > `[00:22:09]` So we taught a class that\'s online. You can find it at Graylock and some other places I think on iTunes called Blits scaling. `[00:22:09]` 所以我们教了一个在线的课，你可以在 Graylock 和一些我认为是在 iTunes 上的叫做 BlitScaling 的地方找到它。 > `[00:22:18]` Sam was our opener was because we were essentially actually building on the class that Salmons Helfand one or two years earlier. 山姆是我们的开场白，因为我们实际上是建立在萨蒙斯·赫尔芬德(SalmonsHelfand)一、两年前的课堂上。 `[00:22:26]` I can\'t remember exactly what it was and the key thing is first mover means first to scale and most often both within the consumer Enterprise the first the scale is the person who wins who owns the market who sets the terms who gets the best advantages from the capital market who gets the best advantages and tablet market is known to customersetc. It isn\'t necessarily the first out of the gate it\'s the first to scale. And so what that means pretty logically is your question would be is you know typically a comfort for investors entrepreneurs that say well let\'s completely resolve product market fit and then scale and if you can do that and because you\'re doing it sufficiently by yourself. You don\'t have aggressive competitors. Great. That\'s that\'s the right way to do it. You can always understand here my decision was working. My engagement model is working. I have a revenue model that at least is basically works and maybe can be improved. And now what I\'m just doing is figuring out how to how to accelerate that as much as possible. More often than not in Silicon Valley you\'ve got part of that story right. But you have intense enough competition that you have to make a decision at a scale sooner than that. And part of calling it blet scaling like one of the key things that if you actually look around at part of what\'s happened the last 20 years is that actually in fact startups will spend a bunch of capital at less efficiency than you would typically think because like perfect operational efficiency we know exactly what our model is rolling it out in order to get to scale fast. And obviously Uber is the canonical modern example of this and the decision to do that is partially a question of both kind of offense and defense authentic in terms of what I really need to establish myself. I need to get a critical mass in the network in order to have the network effects as kind of like early LinkedIn although we we eat that out in terms of an end. We didn\'t actually blitz to the first million. We kind of compounded until we got there so we were doing the other strategy because there was no one doing our strategy all credibly close to us so we could take on or defensive which is you\'re worried that someone else is going to get there first. And so you actually have to put on the afterburners and then try to adjust as you go. And that\'s the combination of offensive and defensive reason is part of the decision that you\'re making about what about how and when to do it. Now the other thing that\'s kind of classic and this is you know kind of a line that probably you haven\'t seen that\'s in the new draft of the book has built the scale which is when you begin to look at each different key element that can make your business scale quickly. It\'s like customer acquisition revenue model support model servicing model how in each of these things growing your company how in each of these things can you actually in fact get to a global scale relatively quickly. Now it doesn\'t make sense to obsess with that before you have when you have zero idea product market. It\'s only but it is important to start thinking about it because the thing that makes the really big businesses are the ones that can scale which direction do you see more entrepreneurs making this mistake in 2016. > `[00:22:26]` 我记不起到底是什么，关键是先动意味着先扩大规模，最常见的是，在消费企业中，第一个规模是拥有市场的人，谁拥有市场，谁从资本市场获得最佳优势，谁从平板电脑市场获得最佳优势，谁就知道谁是顾客。它不一定是第一个走出大门，它是第一个规模。因此，从逻辑上讲，这意味着你的问题是，你知道，对于投资者来说，通常是一种安慰，企业家们说，让我们完全解决产品市场的问题，然后扩大规模，如果你能做到这一点，而且因为你自己做得够充分的话。你没有咄咄逼人的竞争对手。太棒了那是正确的方法。你总能明白我的决定是有效的。我的订婚模型起作用了。我有一个收入模式，至少基本上是可行的，也许还可以改进。现在我所做的就是想办法尽可能加快速度。通常情况下，在硅谷，你对这个故事的一部分是正确的。但你有足够激烈的竞争，你必须做出一个比这更快的规模的决定。称它为 BLET 的一个关键因素是，如果你环顾过去 20 年发生的一些事情，实际上，初创企业会以比你通常想象的更低的效率花费大量的资本，因为像完美的运营效率一样，我们确切地知道我们的模型是如何推出的，目的是为了快速扩大规模。很明显，优步是一个典型的现代例子，做出这样的决定在一定程度上是一个进攻和防御的问题，就我真正需要的是什么来证明自己。我需要在网络中获得一个临界质量，这样才能像 LinkedIn 早期那样产生网络效果，尽管我们在结束的时候就把它吃光了。我们实际上并没有对第一个百万人进行闪电战。我们有点复杂，直到我们到达那里，所以我们做了另一种策略，因为没有人做我们的策略完全可信地接近我们，所以我们可以采取或防御性的，也就是说，你担心其他人会首先到达那里。因此，你实际上需要加装燃烧器，然后试着调整一下。这是进攻性和防御性的结合，这是你决定如何去做和什么时候去做的决定的一部分。还有一件事是很经典的-你知道的-你可能还没有在这本书的新草稿中看到-它已经建立了规模，当你开始研究每一个不同的关键因素时，你就可以迅速地扩大你的业务规模了。这就像客户获取收入模型，支持模型服务模式，如何在每一件事情中成长你的公司，在每一件事情中，你实际上能相对迅速地达到一个全球规模。现在，当你没有概念产品市场的时候，在你有了这个想法之前，对它的纠缠是没有意义的。这是唯一的，但开始思考这一点很重要，因为真正让大企业发展起来的是那些能够向哪个方向发展的企业，你会看到更多的企业家在 2016 年犯了这个错误。 `[00:25:38]` Are they waiting too long to start scaling or are they doing it too quickly. > `[00:25:38]` 他们是等待太久才开始缩放，还是做得太快了。 `[00:25:44]` It\'s both it\'s not. I don\'t think it\'s kind of like oh they\'re all like both mistakes are made. And you know the wait too long is kind of the question of I\'d like to prove it out more. I\'m not really that worried about competition. I\'d like to get complete certainty about about what I\'m doing. The going too fast is I haven\'t I haven\'t tested some key elements that are really important and then I get way over my skis and it\'s hard to correct because at that point for example you\'ve got investor expectations you raised a bunch of capital. You need to pivot. It\'s actually difficult to set back to etc. > `[00:25:44]` 两者都不是。我不认为这有点像哦，它们都像是犯了两个错误。你知道，等待太久是一个问题，我想更多地证明这一点。我不太担心竞争。我想完全肯定我在做什么。速度太快了，我还没有测试过一些非常重要的关键因素，然后我从滑雪板上走了出来，这很难纠正，因为在那个时候，你已经得到了投资者的期望，你筹集了大量资金。你需要转向。它实际上很难回到等等。 `[00:26:27]` Have you found any successful way to do that. If you do get ahead of your skis because you\'re scared of a competitor but you find out the product is not quite working yet and you do need to pull back but you\'ve already raised this mega around on huge projections have you ever seen a way to make that work. > `[00:26:27]` 你找到了什么成功的方法吗？如果你真的因为害怕竞争对手而抢先滑雪板，但你发现这个产品还没有完全发挥作用，你确实需要撤退，但你已经在巨大的预测中扬起了这一巨大的力量-你有没有见过一种办法让它发挥作用。 `[00:26:44]` One doesn\'t immediately come to mind although the advice that I would give would be this is one of the reasons why fundraising is not just a capital thing it\'s a partnership question and if you actually have a good partnership with the folks and you\'re kind of saying look we\'re sharing risk or sharing analysis like for example when you\'ve got the when you\'ve raised money you\'re not saying oh it\'s guaranteed it\'s perfect it\'s all it\'s all in the bag and it\'s all happening because then by the way very naturally your partners get very grumpy with you right when it\'s not that. But look we\'re trying this. We have we have good confidence at work but not perfect. We\'re going to be a good partner with you. And then if you have that then it\'s easy enough to go back and say look we need to really pivot and we do something different I\'m sure there are examples but it\'s not it\'s not immediately apparent to me. > `[00:26:44]` 虽然我会给出的建议是，这是筹款不仅仅是一个资本问题的原因之一，但如果你真的和人们有着良好的伙伴关系，你会说，我们在分担风险或分享分析，比如当你筹集到资金的时候，你会说我们是在分担风险或分担分析。说，哦，这是肯定的，它是完美的，它都在袋子里，一切都在发生，因为顺便说一句，你的伴侣很自然地会和你在一起，当事情不是这样的时候。但听着我们正在尝试。我们对工作有很好的信心，但并不完美。我们会成为你的好搭档。如果你有这个，那就很容易回去说，看，我们需要真正的转向，我们做一些不同的事情，我确定有一些例子，但这对我来说不是很明显。 `[00:27:29]` It\'s hard for me to think of one to one of the things that I have seen our companies struggle with the most when it comes to scaling quickly is how to identify enough good people to hire and related to that how to keep the culture as you double in size in a short period of time and then again and again and again. So to that joint question of how do you identify really good people and how do you bring them together in a way that preserves the company culture that got you here in the first place. Can you share with us about that. > `[00:27:29]` 当我看到我们的公司在快速扩张的时候，我很难想到一比一的事情，那就是如何找到足够多的优秀人才来招聘，并与之相关，因为在短时间内，当你一次又一次地翻倍的时候，如何保持企业的文化。因此，对于这个共同的问题，你如何识别真正优秀的人，以及如何将他们聚集在一起，以一种保护公司文化的方式-最初的公司文化-把你带到了这里。你能和我们分享这件事吗。 `[00:28:00]` So I\'ll start with the culture and then I\'ll go to the hiring so culture part of the really key thing in culture is to and this is actually like I interviewed Reed Hastings about that scaling. He\'s actually a very good culture person. Part of the how he created the Netflix stack and how they got to thinking about it was actually in fact fairly key and that was kind of in the vein of they were discovering that they\'d hire really good people who are still players but weren\'t cultural fits and they would bounce out. And so the reason they codified the deck and published it was to make sure they weren\'t going to have that churn problem. You understand this is what we stand for. Now part of the reason why codifying it is useful is because part of how you scale a culture is that everyone is keeping each other accountable it\'s not hierarch hierarchical it\'s not just oh whatever the two or three founders say or one of the three founders say that\'s that\'s it. And whatever changes. It\'s no this is who we are. This is how we play. This is what we\'re doing and we\'re all holding each other accountable and so for example one of the big ones for Reed Hastings was and is is not a family where sports team. Right. And so it\'s not lifetime loyalty it\'s we\'re all performing. And when you\'re doing your your your kind of reviews of your team if you wouldn\'t fight to keep the person you don\'t just go Oh they\'re out there they\'re perfectly good but you wouldn\'t fight to keep them. You give them a severance package and you move on because that\'s what your target is in terms of what you\'re doing. And then there\'s other elements of culture like Do you really value design. Do we really value an ability to you know like for example in Illington cases the individual members first not the people who are paying us money. It\'s each individual member and that\'s an important part of the kind of culture and how we talk about like how we make product decisions. So that\'s the cultural part. Then the hiring part. One of the key things you can get. You have to correct for some downsides of this. But obviously using your network is super important because you get trusted connections and that can sometimes be you know a little too a little too much all the same. Like one of the problems is sometimes you your bad on diversity because of this is like oh well you know we\'re a bunch of men so we get a bunch of other men and it\'s like no no actually diversity makes you stronger so you should be doing that. So networks can have that bias problem that you have to you have to correct for systemically but you can still use the networks hunting. Make sure you get the appropriate diversity of skills and perspectives and awareness and you\'re in your company. Then the next thing is reference checking. And to give you a specific example of something that I do is usually what I\'m considering somebody if I can if I know a couple people who know this person even before I decide to reach out connection I\'ll frequently do a very light reference check because reference checks tell you a lot more. Everyone is very good at and most people are very good at seeming very coherent and reasonable in a in a in a couple of interactions. The real thing you want is how does the person work over weeks and months and years right in the trenches and references are very good for that and of course references from people you trust or people they trust is part of the right way to do that and the way that I frequently do that as I\'ll send a note to people saying Sam right I\'m one to 10. And the reason you want to 10 is because the weak answer is usually 7 and a half. That\'s kind of the oh I want to say bad things about Sam but I\'m not going to. And it\'s an e-mail and it\'s totally fine. And what you\'re looking for is a combinations of eight and nine. And when I get a 10 I are you alright backside. Oh really like Sam\'s one of the best people you ever worked with. Right just to make sure that this is you know this is kind of real. And then when you have a blend of them that can give you a sense of whether or not I should dig in more of this person. So networks referencing pre referencing and and then definitely doing deep referencing. Now one of the last things I\'d actually say in hiring is this is this is one of the ones that I find particularly entertaining is actually spend a bunch of time with the person. So if you\'re at the level of importance and hierarchy in the company like don\'t think two or three interviews and you\'re done when you\'re hiring. Look for example when I was hiring Jeff I spent probably about 40 hours with Jeff in discussion before we got to OK this is going to work. In addition all that referencing it was super important and important to get right in executives it can easily be 20 hours right. Sometimes it can be 10 to 15 because it\'s like OK. Do I do I get a sense of how we play together. Not just the references and e-mails. But but but how are problem solving techniques. Are our values the way that we the things we want to accomplish. Are they sufficiently alignedetc. > `[00:28:00]` 所以我将从文化开始，然后我会去招聘，所以文化的一部分，在文化中真正关键的是，这就像我采访了里德·黑斯廷斯(Reed Hastings)。他实际上是个很好的文化人。他创建 Netflix 栈的方式之一，以及他们是如何思考这一问题的，实际上是相当关键的，这在某种程度上是他们发现，他们会雇佣真正优秀的人，他们仍然是玩家，但他们不适合文化，他们会反弹过来。所以，他们把甲板编成法典并出版的原因是为了确保他们不会有这种搅动的问题。你知道这就是我们所主张的。现在，编纂它有用的部分原因是，你如何衡量一种文化的一部分原因是，每个人都在相互问责，这不是等级制度，而不仅仅是，不管两位或三位创始人说什么，或者三位创始人中的一位都这么说。不管发生什么变化。不，这是我们的身份。我们就是这样玩的。这就是我们正在做的事情，我们都在互相问责，因此，举个例子，里德·黑斯廷斯的一个大家族曾经是，现在也不是运动队的大家庭。右（边），正确的所以这不是一辈子的忠诚，而是我们都在表演。当你在对你的团队做评论的时候，如果你不为留住你不想去的人而战，哦，他们在外面，他们很棒，但你不会为留住他们而奋斗。你给他们一个遣散费，然后你继续前进，因为你的目标就是你所做的事情。还有其他文化元素，比如你真的很重视设计。你知道，我们真的重视一种能力吗？比如，在伊利顿的情况下，首先是个人成员，而不是付钱给我们的人。这是每一个成员，这是文化的一个重要组成部分，也是我们谈论产品决策的方式。这就是文化的部分。然后是雇佣部分。你能得到的关键之一。你必须纠正这件事的一些缺点。但是很明显，使用你的网络是非常重要的，因为你得到了可信的连接，有时候你知道的太多了。就像问题之一，有时候你对多样性不好，因为你知道，我们是一群男人，所以我们得到了一群其他的男人，而事实上，多样性并没有让你变得更强大，所以你应该这么做。因此，网络可能存在偏见问题，你必须系统地加以纠正，但你仍然可以使用网络搜索。确保你获得了适当的技能、观点和意识的多样性，你就在你的公司里了。接下来是引用检查。给你一个我所做的事情的具体例子，如果可以的话，我通常会考虑某个人，如果我认识几个认识这个人的人，甚至在我决定建立联系之前，我就会经常做一个非常简单的参考检查，因为推荐信检查会告诉你更多。每个人都很擅长，而且大多数人都很擅长在几个互动中表现得非常连贯和合理。你真正想要的是，一个人如何在战壕里工作几周、几个月、几年，而推荐人对此很有好处，当然，你信任的人或他们信任的人的推荐信是正确做法的一部分，也是我经常这样做的方式，因为我会给人们发一封信，说我是 1 比 10 的人。你想要 10 的原因是因为薄弱的答案通常是 7 个半。这就是我想说的关于山姆的坏话，但我不会说的。这是一封电子邮件，完全没问题。你要找的是八和九的组合。当我拿到 10 分的时候，你的背部就没事了。哦，真的很像萨姆，他是你共事过的最好的人之一。只是为了确保这是你知道这是真实的。然后当你把它们混合在一起，让你感觉到我是否应该挖掘更多的这个人。因此，网络参考前参考，然后肯定做深度参考。在招聘过程中，我要说的最后一件事是，这是我觉得特别有趣的事情之一，就是花很多时间和这个人在一起。因此，如果你处于公司的重要性和等级水平，就不要去想两三次面试，你在招聘时就已经完成了。例如，当我雇用 Jeff 时，我可能花了大约 40 个小时与 Jeff 进行讨论，然后我们才确定这是可行的。此外，所有的参考，它是非常重要和重要的是，得到正确的高管，它可以很容易是 20 个小时的权利。有时候它可以是 10 到 15，因为它很好。我能感觉到我们是怎么一起玩的吗？不仅仅是推荐信和电子邮件。但是解决问题的技巧。我们的价值观就是我们想要完成的事情。他们是否有足够的身份。 `[00:33:03]` Great well thank you very much for spending the afternoon with us. Appreciate your thoughts. 太好了，非常感谢你和我们一起度过这个下午。感谢你的想法。 > `[00:33:08]` Applause. `[00:33:08]` 掌声。