# Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012 > `[00:00:00]` Thank you for coming. `[00:00:00]` 谢谢你能来。 > Thank you very much for inviting so many people. 非常感谢你邀请了这么多人。 > A lot of people. 很多人。 > So maybe the start you could just tell us a little bit about what Rocketdyne is and how you got started. 所以也许你可以先告诉我们罗克迪恩是什么以及你是如何开始的。 > `[00:00:09]` OK. `[00:00:09]` 好的。 > So I found in Iraq then in 1997 as a matter of fact you know I was trying to partner with one of your find a program and you know my concept was to create what we call Internet shopping mall in Japan. 所以我在 1997 年在伊拉克发现，事实上，你知道我试图与你的一个寻找项目合作，你知道我的概念是在日本创建我们所谓的网络购物中心。 > It was very very arty RTD and we tried to do it was full for viruses that didn\'t go through. 这是非常艺术性的 RTD，我们试图这样做，这是充分的病毒，没有经过\‘。 > So we started to hire you know young graduate school students start it from initial capital of 200000 USD never raise any money from NBC just hired young guys and went public in the year 2010 started to you know by many companies. 所以我们开始雇佣，你知道，年轻的研究生院的学生从最初的 200000 美元开始，从来没有从 NBC 筹集任何资金，只是雇佣了年轻人，并且在 2010 年开始上市，你知道的，很多公司都知道。 > Now we\'re number one in e-commerce about 35 to 40 percent market share in terms of e-commerce normally online travel. 现在，我们在电子商务方面排名第一 > Number one in online banking. 网上银行的第一名。 > `[00:01:14]` Number two online brokerage and we do about 38 different businesses in Japan. `[00:01:14]` 第二大在线经纪公司，我们在日本做了大约 38 个不同的业务。 > `[00:01:22]` And we said to globalize our business so now we\'re in more than 13 countries. `[00:01:22]` 我们说要使我们的生意全球化，所以我们现在 13 个以上的国家。 > We bought the second largest area in a company called Corbeau which is doing extremely well in Europe and Canada and in Asia. 我们在一家名为 Corbeau 的公司购买了第二大区域，该公司在欧洲、加拿大和亚洲的表现非常好。 > So we\'re a little bit different Internet company in Japan and now trying to globalize our business. 所以我们在日本的互联网公司有点不同，现在我们正在努力使我们的业务全球化。 > `[00:01:52]` How is starting a company in Japan and growing a company in Japan different and Silicon Valley. `[00:01:52]` 如何在日本创办一家公司，在日本发展一家不同的硅谷的公司。 > Well you know there is no TV venture capital ecosystem. 你知道没有电视风险投资生态系统。 > `[00:02:05]` There are venture capitalists but not like you know you know a single but a type of food service. `[00:02:05]` 有风险资本家，但不像你所知道的那样，只有一种食品服务。 > They will invest but not much. 他们会投资但不多。 > They will not get involved into the management that much. 他们不会那么介入管理的。 > So just kind of providing the capital. 所以只是提供资金。 > `[00:02:27]` So how did you learn the lessons that seasoned Silicon Valley tradition traditionally help entrepreneurs with. `[00:02:27]` 那么，你是如何学到经验丰富的硅谷传统帮助企业家的呢？ > How did you learn how to run a company and grow it. 你是如何学会如何经营和成长一家公司的。 > `[00:02:35]` I don\'t know how she bases are helping these venture companies because I haven\'t never experienced the way I\'ve a game. 我不知道她是如何帮助这些风险公司的，因为我从来没有经历过这样的游戏。 > `[00:02:44]` I find it happening with my own. `[00:02:44]` 我发现它发生在我自己的身上。 > `[00:02:47]` You know the money initial capital was just 200000 USD. `[00:02:47]` 你知道最初的资金只有 200000 美元。 > But since I knew that I\'m not going to be funded a huge amount from ABC I create it sort of cash flow system so that I don\'t need to read I on NBC. 但由于我知道我不会从 ABC 获得巨额资金，所以我创建了一种现金流系统，这样我就不需要在 NBC 上读我的文章了。 > We ask our merchant to pay 500 dollars per month but we ask them to pay us six months upfront. 我们要求我们的商人每月支付 500 美元，但我们要求他们提前六个月付款。 > `[00:03:17]` So from the second months of our service at my company it was cash flow positive cash flow through every month and it was just very impressive. `[00:03:17]` 所以从我们在我公司服务的第二个月开始，我们每个月的现金流都是正的，这是非常令人印象深刻的。 > `[00:03:32]` Looking back to that first year you know when you were sort of becoming cash flow positive very quickly and figuring this out as you went. `[00:03:32]` 回顾第一年，你知道，当你很快变成现金流正的时候，你就会明白这一点。 > Are there any things that stick out that you would do differently. 有没有什么特别的事情你会以不同的方式去做。 > Well so ongoing. 还在继续。 > `[00:03:46]` We never raised any money from outside we raise later on from friends and families and we didn\'t need any money but it was kind of just you know for the friendship sake I want to make my family and my friends happy. `[00:03:46]` 我们从来没有从外面筹集过钱，后来我们从朋友和家人那里筹到了钱，我们不需要任何钱，但为了友谊，我想让我的家人和朋友开心。 > `[00:04:05]` How far along were you when you about friends and family around. `[00:04:05]` 当你谈论朋友和家人的时候，你走了多远？ > No there was like six months before we go public. 不，在我们上市前的六个月。 > `[00:04:15]` Two days before our IPO my friend must solve Softbank call me and ask me to let him in. `[00:04:15]` 在我们首次公开募股前两天，我的朋友必须解决软银的问题，打电话给我，让我让他进来。 > But I said it\'s too late. 但我说现在太晚了。 > `[00:04:27]` Well we were very patient. `[00:04:27]` 我们很有耐心。 > `[00:04:30]` To be honest we were a very patient for the first two years and tried to be create the you know Connell of our business model. `[00:04:30]` 老实说，我们在头两年非常有耐心，并试图创造我们的商业模式的“你知道的康奈尔”。 > `[00:04:42]` So we\'re not trying to compete with the modelAmazon.com or eBay. `[00:04:42]` 所以我们不想和 Amazon.com 或者 eBay 竞争。 > We\'re trying to create a great system to support medium to small sized merchant to sell their product all over Japan. 我们正在努力创建一个伟大的系统，以支持中小型商人在日本各地销售他们的产品。 > So we really tried to create an extremely strong culture of the company because I knew that I\'m going to be in this business for a long long time. 所以我们真的试着为公司创造一种非常强大的文化，因为我知道我将在这个行业工作很长一段时间。 > So we didn\'t rush really we were very patient. 所以我们并不着急，我们很有耐心。 > `[00:05:12]` Did you figure out that kernel on the first try did you get right. `[00:05:12]` 你在第一次尝试时就知道内核是正确的吗？ > The thing that made Rocketdyne what it is the first try did you have to iterate and evolve to get. 让 Rocketdyne-它是第一次尝试-的东西，你必须经过迭代和进化才能得到。 > `[00:05:19]` Well one thing we did differently from most of space e-commerce company is we try to facilitate communication between the merchants and the consumers because the way I feel is of course you know buying products Price is important. `[00:05:19]` 我们所做的与大多数太空电子商务公司不同的是，我们试图促进商家和消费者之间的沟通，因为我的感觉是，你当然知道购买产品的价格是很重要的。 > Efficiency is important but more than that in my opinion by being you know should be fun. 效率是很重要的，但在我看来更重要的是成为你知道应该是有趣的。 > And no we need to create a rich experience. 不，我们需要创造一个丰富的经验。 > So we try to be a liason between the consumer and the retailer instead of trying to compete against the retailer using the idea we want to use our technology to help small to medium size enterprise do business with consumers. 因此，我们试图成为消费者和零售商之间的负担，而不是试图与零售商竞争，使用我们希望利用我们的技术帮助中小型企业与消费者做生意的想法。 > So that was totally different idea and I was 100 percent confident my employees will really like the idea of helping small medium size companies rather than trying to destroy their business. 所以这是完全不同的想法，我百分之百地相信我的员工真的会喜欢帮助中小型公司的想法，而不是试图摧毁他们的业务。 > `[00:06:24]` So I mean as you said this is very different than anyone else was doing in e-commerce at the time really still is. `[00:06:24]` 所以我的意思是，正如你所说的，这与当时在电子商务中所做的非常不同。 > Did you know that that was going to be the model you\'re going after before you started the company was that we were you convinced that this was what you were going to do differently. 你知道吗，在你创立公司之前，你所追求的模式是，我们确信这就是你要做的不同的事情。 > `[00:06:38]` We didn\'t think about how we would do it differently but we know what we wanted to do. `[00:06:38]` 我们没有想过我们将如何做不同的事情，但我们知道我们想做什么。 > I always don\'t think about our competitors much because you know you cannot do too many things about Atabay you just need to focus on what you do to improve your service and improve customer satisfaction. 我总是不太关心我们的竞争对手，因为你知道你不能对 Atabay 做太多的事情，你只需要专注于你所做的事情来改进你的服务和提高客户满意度。 > `[00:06:57]` I think that\'s part of the nature of Japanese companies keep improving improving improving. `[00:06:57]` 我认为日本公司的部分性质在不断改进。 > `[00:07:05]` How did you grow both in the early days when you were signing up these small and medium businesses that you wanted to help and then in the later days obviously you made a lot of acquisitions that helped drive growth. `[00:07:05]` 你是如何成长的？在早期，当你注册这些你想帮助的中小型企业的时候，很明显，在后来的日子里，你进行了大量的收购，帮助了经济的增长。 > Could you just talk about how you figure out growth along the way. 你能不能谈谈你是如何计算出一路上的增长的。 > `[00:07:19]` Well first we have organic growth and we buy many companies in domestically and internationally domestically. `[00:07:19]` 首先，我们有了有机的增长，我们在国内和国际上收购了许多公司。 > We created three things one great great brand by the way we have a professional baseball ruffling egos. 我们创造了三件事，一个伟大的品牌，通过我们的方式，我们有一个职业棒球，愤怒的自我。 > And so everybody knows racketing brand even if you don\'t even use internet they know raft and brand we host a TV found tennis tournament. 所以每个人都知道球拍品牌，即使你不使用互联网，他们知道木筏和品牌，我们主持电视，发现网球赛。 > So we have an extremely strong brand too. 所以我们也有一个非常强大的品牌。 > We created the strongest Mindich award program caught up in Sipple points so we can use those points to cross-sell our services and we also created the sort of the consumer database to analyze consumer data and now about eight 80 million. 我们创建了最强大的 Mindich 奖励计划，被抓到 Sipple 积分，这样我们就可以利用这些积分交叉销售我们的服务，我们还创建了消费者数据库来分析消费者数据，现在大约有 8000 万。 > `[00:08:12]` So about 90 percent of Internet operations are member we can use our currency points to cross-sell various services through them back to the topic of acquisitions. `[00:08:12]` 因此，大约 90%的互联网运营是会员，我们可以使用我们的货币点交叉销售各种服务，通过他们回到收购的主题。 > `[00:08:27]` What do you look for when you make an acquisition and how do you integrate into the company into or 10 so that you\'re all one company together. `[00:08:27]` 当你进行收购的时候，你会寻找什么？你如何融入公司，或者 10，使你成为一家公司。 > `[00:08:34]` So there\'s two types of acquisitions we make. `[00:08:34]` 所以我们有两种类型的收购。 > One is purely geographic expansion to buy a time. 一个是纯粹的地域扩张来争取时间。 > So we bought thatBuy.com in theU.S. 所以我们在美国买了那个 Buy.com。 > played com UK prime minister in France and we try to use their presence in brand name and their presence and convert their business model to lock them model. 英国首相在法国玩过游戏，我们试着利用他们的品牌和存在来改变他们的商业模式来锁定他们的模式。 > The second type is addition to our ecosystem very chain like COBOL which is not doing as well as in other countries but they\'re very strong. 第二类是添加到我们的生态系统，像 COBOL 一样，它做得不如其他国家那么好，但它们非常强大。 > They have now more market share in Canada and in France and Japan. 它们现在加拿大、法国和日本拥有更多的市场份额。 > `[00:09:20]` So we need. `[00:09:20]` 所以我们需要。 > We knew that we need a digital books service in our sort of product line up so we know that we can use our membership to facilitate the growth of COBOL business. 我们知道，我们需要一个数字图书服务，在我们的产品线，所以我们知道，我们可以利用我们的会员，以促进 COBOL 业务的发展。 > `[00:09:39]` So there is two types geographic expansion and to buy a time and those who addition to our ecosystem. `[00:09:39]` 所以有两种类型的地域扩张，一种是为了赢得时间，另一种是为了增加我们的生态系统。 > `[00:09:47]` And then once you make these acquisitions how do you integrate them into the culture of architecture mission practice and value. `[00:09:47]` 然后一旦你进行了这些收购，你如何将它们融入建筑文化、使命、实践和价值之中。 > `[00:09:57]` So before buying a company we talk about our dream and goal and culture and talk over and over and over again before we make acquisitions. 所以，在收购一家公司之前，我们先谈谈自己的梦想、目标和文化，然后再一次又一次地谈一遍又一遍，然后再进行收购。 > If they don\'t like our culture or our practice or our mission we\'re not going to buy even if you like their service because it doesn\'t make sense to lose the founders and the management of the company. 如果他们不喜欢我们的文化、我们的实践或我们的使命，即使你喜欢他们的服务，我们也不会购买，因为失去公司的创始人和管理层是没有意义的。 > So we talk over before the closure of the deal. 所以我们在交易结束前再谈一谈。 > We talk a lot about those kind of things. 我们谈论了很多类似的事情。 > `[00:10:27]` And what\'s your success rate for acquisitions in terms of good integration on those points. `[00:10:27]` 在这些方面，你的收购成功率是多少？ > `[00:10:33]` Oh it\'s difficult. `[00:10:33]` 哦，这很难。 > `[00:10:36]` I don\'t know but there\'s still no one you know only one fada we made was we went into China partnering with supply which is the largest search engine company in China but it didn\'t work out well. `[00:10:36]` 我不知道，但仍然没有人，你知道，我们做的唯一的一件事就是，我们和中国最大的搜索引擎公司-供应公司-合作进入中国，但结果不太好。 > So you know we discussed with them and agreed that we should shut the business now and we withdrew from China yet year ago. 所以你知道，我们和他们讨论过了，并同意我们应该现在关闭业务，而且我们已经从中国撤出了一年。 > `[00:11:00]` So there is the on the you know the big Vedia I recognize at this moment even more than the sort of the cultural ideas you\'ve talked about. `[00:11:00]` 现在我认识的那个大维迪亚，比你所说的那种文化观念更重要。 > `[00:11:16]` You know one thing that I just heard again and again and that Rockton is known for having having a great culture. `[00:11:16]` 你知道我刚刚听到的一件事，那就是罗克顿以拥有伟大的文化而闻名。 > Could you talk about how you\'ve held that culture all the way through for the last 15 years as you said. 你能不能像你说的那样，在过去的 15 年里一直坚持这种文化？ > How do you think about the culture the company needs to be to be successful needs to have to be successful. 你如何看待公司需要成功的文化，需要成功才能成功。 > `[00:11:31]` So in my opinion you need to have two things. `[00:11:31]` 在我看来，你需要有两件事。 > One is of course innovation and the second part is operation and innovation is kind of not so difficult to encourage people to be innovative but at the same time if you want a scale you business you need to have a strong operation culture as well and you wanted to achieve strong operational culture. 一个当然是创新，第二个部分是运营和创新，鼓励人们创新并不难，但同时，如果你想要一个规模，你的业务，你需要有一个强大的经营文化以及你想要实现强大的经营文化。 > `[00:11:58]` You need to have sort of these shared practices and the idea is kind of the framework for managing the company may mean using more numbers and keep your eyes more. `[00:11:58]` 你需要有一些共享的实践，而这种管理公司的框架可能意味着使用更多的数字，更多地关注你的眼睛。 > Most likely the entrepreneurs who don\'t like you know just running the numbers but I think be quantitive and any frequentative is also very important. 最有可能的是，那些不喜欢你的企业家只会计算数字，但我认为量化和任何频率都是非常重要的。 > `[00:12:31]` So recently you invested in Pinterest. `[00:12:31]` 你最近投资了 Pinterest。 > Can you talk a little bit about how that came together and what you see in Pinterest and how you hope that relationship is going to evolve. 你能谈谈它是如何结合在一起的，你在 Pinterest 中看到了什么，以及你希望这种关系将如何发展。 > `[00:12:41]` Well I think Pinterest spoke or just had a phone call with him and I think he was great. `[00:12:41]` 我想 Pinterest 和他通了电话，我觉得他很棒。 > He\'s great. 他很棒。 > We like the company and I think Pinterest is very different from other social networks. 我们喜欢这家公司，我认为 Pinterest 与其他社交网络有很大不同。 > It\'s very you know graphical and appeals to the heart of your interest and has a strong influence over to buying behavior and buying the shoes of the people. 这是非常你知道图形和吸引力的核心你的兴趣，并有很强的影响力，在购买行为和购买鞋的人。 > So as an e-commerce company I think Pinterest is the best social network. 因此，作为一家电子商务公司，我认为 Pinterest 是最好的社交网络。 > So we found Pinterest and I had a meeting with Ben Dring in Cairo. 所以我们找到了 Pinterest，我和 Ben Dring 在开罗举行了一次会议。 > `[00:13:18]` And he liked me. `[00:13:18]` 他喜欢我。 > He let us in. 他让我们进去的。 > `[00:13:27]` What I think maybe you should ask them. `[00:13:27]` 我认为也许你该问他们些什么。 > `[00:13:30]` But he he still I think he had seen something different in us you know compared with otherU.S. `[00:13:30]` 但是他仍然我认为他在我们身上看到了一些与其他美国不同的东西。 > based Internet companies so if he says I will ask him what do you see as the big challenges and the opportunities in retail and e-commerce coming down over the next few years. 基于互联网公司，所以，如果他说，我会问他，你认为什么是巨大的挑战和机会零售业和电子商务在未来几年下降。 > `[00:13:50]` Of course you know I think this is to the siege stage one for e-commerce. `[00:13:50]` 你当然知道，我认为这是电子商务的第一阶段。 > Now we are seeing lots of decent content sales so they bookC.D DVD games everything will be digital and online Difford into the logistics will become more and more important. 现在我们看到了很多像样的内容销售，所以他们的书，D，DVD，游戏，一切都将数字化和线上，迪福德的物流将变得越来越重要。 > And there are lots of innovative logistics company you know using robots and automation to you know improve the efficiency and also the devices the mobile phones smartphones. 有很多创新的物流公司，你知道，使用机器人和自动化，你知道，提高效率，也提高设备，移动电话，智能手机。 > The tablet will become the major device to buy products and maybe there will be a sort of social. 平板电脑将成为购买产品的主要设备，也许还会有一种社交功能。 > I think these social shopping is still Milbury fine. 我觉得这些社交购物还是不错的。 > The strong answer to it. 对此的有力回答。 > `[00:14:46]` But I think in the future it will call for social shopping or anything else. `[00:14:46]` 但我认为，在未来，它将需要社交购物或其他任何东西。 > Are there major ways you identified the Japanese consumers behave differently than consumers anywhere else in the world. 你是否认为日本消费者的行为方式与世界上其他地方的消费者不同？ > `[00:14:57]` Well Knapton is what I call a shopper centric marketplace meaning that every shop has a very different characters and so the design and the user experience and we provide all sorts of tools for them to make fans around shop. `[00:14:57]` 我称之为以顾客为中心的市场，这意味着每一家商店都有非常不同的特征，所以设计和用户体验，我们提供了各种各样的工具，让他们在商店周围成为粉丝。 > `[00:15:21]` So I think Rapidan was very social from day one. `[00:15:21]` 所以我认为 Rapidan 从第一天起就很喜欢社交。 > We try to create a fans around shops not our own rocket and still that JP the fans around shops and all these shops as well you know professional staff and they are the sort of curator of wines or sports goods or you know groceries and so forth. 我们试着在商店周围创造一个粉丝，而不是我们自己的火箭，仍然是 JP，商店周围的粉丝，以及所有这些商店，你知道专业的工作人员，他们是葡萄酒或体育用品的策展人，或者你知道杂货等等。 > `[00:15:43]` So I think my question is if you want to buy some product do you want to ask your friend or do you want to ask the staff at the pro shop and my. 我想我的问题是，如果你想买一些产品，你想问你的朋友还是问我和专卖店的员工。 > Of course sometimes your friend is can give you a bit of advice then staff at the brushoff but most time you know I think you should ask professionals. 当然，有时你的朋友是可以给你一点建议，然后在工作人员在布鲁霍夫，但大多数时候，你知道，我认为你应该问专业人士。 > So that was our approach and I think it worked extremely well in Japan and now we\'re testing in other countries and I think it\'s it\'s working very well as well. 这就是我们的方法，我认为它在日本非常有效，现在我们正在其他国家进行测试，我认为它也非常有效。 > `[00:16:19]` Can you talk you talked a little bit about mobile and tablets but obviously in Japan that\'s become a huge way that people are probably even bigger than here where it seems like own right on the phone all the time. `[00:16:19]` 你能谈谈吗？你谈了一点关于移动和平板电脑的话题，但很明显，在日本，移动和平板电脑已经成为一种巨大的方式，人们可能比这里的人更大，在这里，人们似乎一直在打电话。 > How much are you thinking about mobile and how you\'re thinking about mobile as sort of the future of the company. 你对手机有多少想法？你认为移动是公司未来的一部分。 > `[00:16:34]` Well already 25 percent of Rockton transaction which is big. `[00:16:34]` 已经有 25%的罗克顿交易，这是很大的。 > We do about 15 billion USD or even more this year just for pure e-commerce in Japan and already 25 percent of actually is coming from mobile devices including future Volhynia smartphone. 我们今年做了大约 150 亿美元，甚至更多，仅仅是为了在日本的纯电子商务，已经有 25%的实际来自移动设备，包括未来的 Volhynia 智能手机。 > Maybe a 60 percent smartphone 40 percent feature phone and smartphone transaction is growing about 300 to 400 percent year on year. 也许 60%的智能手机，40%的功能手机和智能手机的交易比去年同期增长了 300%到 400%。 > So it will be more than 50 percent in a couple of years. 因此，在未来几年内，这一比例将超过 50%。 > `[00:17:12]` It\'s `[00:17:12]` huge. `[00:17:12]` `[00:17:12]` 太大了。 > `[00:17:14]` That is huge. `[00:17:14]` 那是巨大的。 > You said something earlier that was so interesting to me I made a note to go back to it which is that you don\'t think a lot about competition because you can\'t do much about that. 你之前说了些我很感兴趣的话，我做了个笔记，让我回顾一下，那就是你对竞争并不怎么想，因为你对此无能为力。 > One thing that I hear from startups all the time is Fearby competition. 我从初创公司一直听到的一件事是恐惧的竞争。 > So when you were starting the company and Amazon and eBay were were huge. 所以，当你开始创业的时候，亚马逊和 eBay 都是大公司。 > Was that a problem for you. 这对你来说是个问题吗。 > Did people ask you what are you going to do about Amazon and eBay. 人们有没有问过你，你打算对亚马逊和 eBay 做些什么？ > You know how are you going to beat them how you can be with them and how do you think about sort of how did you stay focused on doing your own thing and ignoring competition. 你知道如何打败他们，如何和他们在一起，你如何思考，你是如何专注于做自己的事情，忽视竞争的。 > `[00:17:46]` Well let me put it I learn from the competitors but I\'m not afraid of competitors because even if you are afraid of it doesn\'t do any good for you. 让我说一句，我向竞争对手学习，但我不怕竞争对手，因为即使你害怕它，对你也没有任何好处。 > I learned what they\'re doing and then maybe you know try to match if I have to. 我学会了他们在做什么，然后如果我需要的话，也许你可以试着去匹配。 > `[00:18:05]` But I think the the way we approach e-commerce is totally different fromAmazon.com because again we try to facilitate the transaction is medium to small margins to the larger ones to the consumers. `[00:18:05]` 但我认为我们对待电子商务的方式与 Amazon.com 完全不同，因为我们再一次试图促进交易，对于消费者来说，这是中到小的利润。 > As a consequence you know we have big brands almost old department store as big a big fashion brands almost entire Tahnee companies are using our platform. 因此，你知道，我们有大品牌，几乎是旧百货商店，大时尚品牌，几乎整个塔尼公司都在使用我们的平台。 > And that\'s a major portion of our business but approaches to how to help small to medium size merchants to do business with consumers. 这是我们业务的一个主要部分，但我们将如何帮助中小型商家与消费者做生意。 > So. 所以 > `[00:18:52]` I think we have a philosophical difference between ourselves andAmazon.com So I\'m not very afraid of them but I\'m always thinking about how we can scale. `[00:18:52]` 我认为我们和 Amazon.com 之间有一个哲学上的区别，所以我不太害怕他们，但我总是在想我们如何扩大规模。 > `[00:19:03]` Our business holding on time but the way I see what\'s so interesting here we\'re talking a little bit backstage about just sort of Japanese culture and the differences between starting a startup here and we talk about investing. `[00:19:03]` 我们的业务准时举行，但在我看来，这里很有趣的是，我们在后台谈论的只是一种日本文化，以及在这里创业和我们谈论投资的不同之处。 > Could you talk about hiring and how you hired the initial people and especially in a culture where joining a startup is not as cool as it was making it now as it is in the valley. 你能谈谈招聘以及你如何雇佣最初的员工吗？尤其是在这样一个文化中，加入一家初创公司并不像现在硅谷那样酷。 > `[00:19:32]` Well now of course it\'s different from 50 years ago when I started a company you know nobody wanted to work for small startups but now they have seen many successes and there are so many young people who want to work for the startups and ventures and so forth. `[00:19:32]` 现在，当然了，这和 50 年前我开了一家公司是不一样的。你知道，没有人想为小型创业公司工作，但现在他们已经取得了很多成功，有那么多年轻人想为创业公司工作，等等。 > `[00:19:56]` I think the way I mean hiring younger people and not to higher the mid to upper age people as much as possible because I knew that we wanted to embrace our older you know corporate culture. `[00:19:56]` 我认为我的意思是雇佣更年轻的人，而不是尽可能多地雇用中上层的人，因为我知道我们想拥抱我们的老年企业文化。 > `[00:20:16]` So it was very important for me to hire young people and educate them especially in 90 days after we went public. `[00:20:16]` 所以，在我们上市后的 90 天里，雇用和教育年轻人对我来说是非常重要的。 > We started to hire many Lobethal gray gray hair people and you know because we need that we need more professional expertise. 我们开始雇佣许多 Lobethal 白发人，你知道，因为我们需要更多的专业知识。 > And two and a half years ago we announced that we are going to convert dunnhumby Kishen language from Japanese to English. 两年半前，我们宣布，我们将把敦恩姆比·基申语从日语转换成英语。 > `[00:20:42]` And this was a big splash in the Japanese society and some CEOs that you know you know explicitly announce that we are crazy company as we are but now 70 percent of new engineers joining us are no Japanese. `[00:20:42]` 这是日本社会的一大轰动，一些 CEO 明确宣布我们是疯狂的公司，但现在加入我们的新工程师中有 70%不是日本人。 > 30 percent of the new employees are not Japanese so we had to equal mobilizing our recruitment. 30%的新员工不是日本人，所以我们不得不平等地调动我们的招聘人员。 > `[00:21:08]` Mark Zuckerberg a few years ago made a comment about hiring young people preferentially and it was all that the press talked about for two weeks so maybe you\'ll be featured a lot. 马克·扎克伯格几年前发表了一条关于优先雇用年轻人的评论，媒体在两周里一直在谈论这个问题，所以你可能会经常被报道。 > `[00:21:18]` Now I\'m talking alone. `[00:21:18]` 我现在一个人说话。 > `[00:21:22]` Why did you make that decision to make English the official language of the company. `[00:21:22]` 为什么你决定把英语作为公司的官方语言。 > Well so the thing I have done in Japan is each side to create an open culture company so we disclose almost all information to entire employees. 那么，我在日本所做的事情是，每一方都创建一个开放的文化公司，所以我们向全体员工披露了几乎所有的信息。 > So we\'re the people who is doing e-commerce know what\'s going on for our banking business. 所以，我们是从事电子商务的人，我们知道我们的银行业务正在发生什么。 > And we of course share all these expertise and platforms as much as possible you know web marketing engineering and so forth and so forth. 当然，我们也尽可能多地分享这些专业知识和平台，比如网络营销、工程等等。 > So that was our strengths. 这就是我们的优势所在。 > How common is that for Japanese companies to do to share everything openly. 日本公司公开分享一切是多么普遍。 > Well sharing the opening up is very common and we call this Yohko then meaning a horizontal transfer of expertise. 分享开放是非常普遍的，我们称之为 Yohko，意思是横向转移专业知识。 > `[00:22:12]` I think this is one of the strengths of Japanese company because it\'s not good or bad. `[00:22:12]` 我认为这是日本公司的优势之一，因为它不是好的或坏的。 > It\'s not performance oriented Nevius system. 它不是以性能为导向的 Nevius 系统。 > And I wanted to do this globally but I couldn\'t because most of the expertise is in Japan and our most of our stuff cannot communicate in English. 我想在全球范围内做这件事，但我做不到，因为大部分的专业知识都在日本，而我们大部分的知识都不能用英语进行交流。 > `[00:22:34]` So you know I was kind of a liason between our global business and Japanese business and that was getting me tired just know talking you know and being Shazli doing everything. `[00:22:34]` 所以你知道，我对我们的全球业务和日本业务有点说三道四，这让我很累，只知道说话，你知道，沙兹利什么事都做。 > And so one day I woke up and thought about everything in English. 所以有一天，我醒来，用英语思考每一件事。 > And so I stood in front of entire Simonson\'s employees and told them I\'m going to convert the. 所以我站在整个西蒙森的员工面前告诉他们我要改变。 > Show business language show adopting from Japanese to English. 从日语到英语的商务语言表演。 > `[00:23:05]` What was the reaction in that room. `[00:23:05]` 那个房间里有什么反应？ > `[00:23:06]` It was a very quiet very quiet but as told that he changed the score of employees improve almost 200 points for the last two years what\'s called an English test. `[00:23:06]` 这是一个非常安静的过程，但当他被告知，在过去两年里，他改变了员工的分数，提高了将近 200 分，这就是所谓的英语考试。 > And most of the staff can manage to communicate in English. 大多数员工都能用英语进行交流。 > They\'re afraid of going abroad or joining the international conference. 他们害怕出国或参加国际会议。 > Now we have so many people you know known Japanese foreigners in Tokyo office and now they starting to benchmark international players instead of domestic players so they changed. 现在我们有很多人，你们知道，日本人在东京办事处，现在他们开始测试国际球员，而不是国内球员，所以他们改变了。 > `[00:23:50]` That\'s great. `[00:23:50]` 那太好了。 > One last question. 最后一个问题。 > We were talking backstage and the last time that Paul and Mickey met was 16 or 17 years ago when Paul was working on the web. 我们在后台交谈，保罗和米奇最后一次见面是在 16 或 17 年前，当时保罗正在网上工作。 > So Paul loves to ask people these what was someone like the first time you met them. 所以保罗喜欢问这些人，当你第一次见到他们的时候，他们是什么样的人。 > `[00:24:06]` So finally we get asked what program is like. `[00:24:06]` 最后，我们被问到程序是什么样子的。 > `[00:24:10]` So it\'s a reading the Harvard Business School case so initially I went after I left my bank I started sort of a business consulting firm and I was looking for something new to do. `[00:24:10]` 这是在阅读哈佛商学院(Harvard Business School)的案例，所以一开始我离开银行后，我创办了一家商业咨询公司，我在寻找新的工作。 > And you know I came up with the internet shopping idea and one of my classmate hovers at school call me Mickey you needed look at this company it\'s called bio web and it\'s my friend\'s company. 你知道，我想出了一个网上购物的点子，我的一个同学在学校里闲逛，叫我米奇，你需要看看这家公司，它叫做生物网络，它是我朋友的公司。 > So I went viaWeb.com and look at me like that next day. 于是我去了 viaWeb.com，第二天就这样看着我。 > I put the economy class airplane ticket and flew over to Boston and I went for. 我把经济舱的机票寄到波士顿去了。 > And it was five people company. 是五人公司。 > And we kind of as we said we\'re going to do things together but the last minute Paul was supposed to come over to Japan at the airport. 就像我们说的那样，我们要一起做一些事情，但是最后一分钟保罗应该在机场来日本。 > He found out that his passport has expired. 他发现他的护照过期了。 > `[00:25:08]` And somehow the deal didn\'t go through. `[00:25:08]` 而这桩交易却以某种方式没有通过。 > So I feel that was really the first moment I fell. 所以我觉得那是我第一次摔倒。 > `[00:25:18]` I met the tudi strong entrepreneur and I feel the excitement and energy in Paul and he and his team. `[00:25:18]` 我遇到了图迪强大的企业家，我感受到保罗和他的团队的兴奋和活力。 > `[00:25:29]` That was great note and thank you very much. `[00:25:29]` 那是很棒的笔记，非常感谢你。 > Thank you. 谢谢。