# Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
> `[00:00:00]` Well first thanks for having me.
`[00:00:00]` 好吧,首先谢谢你邀请我。
> It\'s really exciting for me to be here in front of like so many people that all want to build cool things.
对我来说,在这里站在这么多人的面前,都想做些很酷的事情,真是太令人兴奋了。
> I was I was getting ready for the talk last night.
昨晚我在准备演讲。
> And I was going back through all the e-mails because sometimes your memory is a little bit hazy.
我翻看了所有的电子邮件,因为有时候你的记忆有点模糊。
> And I found an e-mail from March 2010 which was roughly like three and a half months after we\'d launch Pinterest and it\'s an e-mail to our advisors and our investors at the time and I thought I would read it to you.
我在 2010 年 3 月发现了一封电子邮件,大约是在我们推出 Pinterest 的三个半月后,当时它是给我们的顾问和投资者的电子邮件,我想我会读给你们听。
> So it\'s kind of like a cool blast from the past for me says Hey everyone I wanted to provide a quick update from Code Blue Labs which is a company name just to review we launched a Web site called Pinterest.
对我来说,这就像一场来自过去的酷爆,嘿,大家好,我想从 CodeBlueLabs 那里提供一个快速更新,这是一个公司名称,只是为了回顾一下,我们推出了一个名为 Pinterest 的网站。
> It\'s a tool for people to share and discover the things they love.
它是人们分享和发现他们所爱的东西的工具。
> People join Pinterest to create these collections or pin boards into follow collections created by their friends.
人们加入 Pinterest 来创建这些收藏品或将插板插入到他们的朋友创建的收藏中。
> We\'re happy to say that we\'re making good progress.
我们很高兴地说,我们正在取得良好的进展。
> Today we have almost 3000 registered users in our daily pin count is steadily increasing.
今天,我们有近 3000 注册用户在我们的日常针计数是稳步增加。
> I\'m also happy to say that we\'ve made big operational improvements.
我也很高兴地说,我们在运营上做了很大的改进。
> We\'re relocating our offices to a new building just a few blocks away.
我们要把我们的办公室搬到几个街区外的一栋新大楼里。
> The price will decrease as we are sharing it with another Y Combinator startup Shardlow.
价格将下降,因为我们正在与另一个 Y 组合创业公司 Shardlow 分享它。
> And we\'ve also gotten some free Amazon hosting credits.
我们还获得了一些免费的亚马逊托管服务。
> So.
所以
> A couple funny things about the e-mail in general.
关于电子邮件的一些有趣的事情。
> The first is that the new location in question is a dilapidated two bedroom apartment on California Avenue.
第一个问题是,新的地点是一个破旧的两居室公寓在加利福尼亚大道。
> And in fact when I told Jessica Livingston that we were moving there she said oh my god.
事实上,当我告诉杰西卡·利文斯顿我们要搬到那里时,她说,天啊。
> I thought that place was a profile and the second is the exact setup of the place.
我以为那个地方是个人资料,第二个是这个地方的确切设置。
> So we had two bedrooms one of which my co-founder Paul lived in in one of which Dave the co-founder of Chardy lived in.
所以我们有两间卧室,一间是我的共同创始人保罗住的,查迪的联合创始人戴夫住在其中一间。
> This is a picture of Dave and we worked out of the living room.
这是戴夫的照片,我们走出客厅。
> These two companies all together pretty much all day.
这两家公司几乎一整天都在一起。
> And Dave was a late night guy who\'s hackers hacker always up till 4a.m.
戴夫是个深夜黑客,他的黑客一直到凌晨 4 点。
> And so when we were having meetings with investors or with users every once in a while Dave would kind of saunter out in his towel because that was how he had to get to the shower and just sort of wave at everyone and it was really awkward.
因此,当我们每隔一段时间与投资者或用户开会时,戴夫就会在毛巾里闲逛,因为这就是他不得不去洗澡的方式,只是向每个人挥手而已,这真的很尴尬。
> And so a little bit later when we all got to go watch The Social Network we made a pact that if anyone ever made a movie about our company they would get to be played by Ryan Gosling cause Ryan Gosling is awesome abs.
后来,当我们都要去看社交网络的时候,我们达成了一个协议,如果有人拍了一部关于我们公司的电影,他们就会被瑞恩·高斯林扮演,因为瑞恩·高斯林的腹肌很棒。
> So the other thing though that\'s like a little bit more serious is if you think about it for months in three thousand accounts for consumers start up is really not very good.
因此,另一件事是,如果你在三千个账户里想上几个月,消费者开始创业,那就不是很好了。
> And I think the thing that surprised me the most in starting a company after reading about you know Facebook hits Harvard 95 percent penetration in two weeks like Instagram shoots to a million people.
我认为最让我惊讶的是,在你读到 Facebook 之后,我创办了一家公司。Facebook 在两周内达到了哈佛大学 95%的普及率,就像 Instagram 向 100 万人开枪射击一样。
> Is that it can take a really really long time to build things that are worthwhile.
就是要花很长时间才能建造出有价值的东西。
> So March 2010 we launched Pinterest where 3000 accounts.
因此,2010 年 3 月,我们推出了 Pinterest,其中有 3000 个账户。
> And that wouldn\'t be so bad if we hadn\'t started building Pinterest.
如果我们没有开始建造 Pinterest,那就不会那么糟糕了。
> Actually in November 2009 and that alone wouldn\'t have been so bad if I hadn\'t left my job to start a company.
事实上,在 2009 年 11 月,如果我没有离开我的工作去创办一家公司,光是这一点就不会那么糟糕了。
> In May 2008 a lot of people say things like running a startup is like running a marathon.
2008 年 5 月,很多人都说,经营初创企业就像跑马拉松一样。
> And I think the part of the analogy that\'s right is that it\'s long but it\'s actually really different.
我认为这个类比的一部分是正确的,它是长的,但它实际上是不同的。
> Mean I think when I think about my experience it\'s more like going on a road trip like in a car that doesn\'t have good headlights and you know very much gas and you think you\'re going to Toledo but you find out you\'re supposed to be in Miami and if you really run out of gas you might have to buy gas from someone that might just kick you out of your own driver seat.
我的意思是,当我想到我的经历时,更像是去公路旅行,就像在一辆没有好前灯的车里,你知道很多汽油,你认为你要去托莱多,但你发现你应该在迈阿密,如果你真的没油了,你可能得从一个可能把你赶出自己的驾驶座的人那里买汽油。
> And that uncertainty the fact that every single day you\'re dealing with a lot of choices and you don\'t have a lot of perfect information is for me the lesson that was hardest to learn and continues to be a real challenge in doing a startup today.
这种不确定性-每一天你都要面对很多选择,而且你没有很多完美的信息-对我来说,这是一个很难学到的教训,在今天的创业中仍然是一个真正的挑战。
> So I\'m going to talk a little bit about kind of our journey through this kind of weird process and a few the things that we learned along the way.
所以我要谈一谈我们在这个奇怪的过程中所经历的旅程,以及我们沿途学到的一些东西。
> Number one lesson making things can take a long time.
第一课做事情可能需要很长时间。
> So 2008 I was working at Google and I was an ad sense not as an engineer but working basically doing customer support taking feedback from users and feeding it back into the advertising products.
所以,2008 年,我在谷歌工作,我不是一个工程师,而是一个广告意识,我的工作基本上是做客户支持,听取用户的反馈,并将其反馈到广告产品中。
> The reason I was there was because I\'d come from WashingtonD.C.
我在那里的原因是我来自华盛顿特区。
> where I was working as a consultant and growing up even though I always looked up to anybody that made things where there was an architect or an engineer or an artist.
在那里,我是一名顾问,长大了,尽管我总是仰慕那些有建筑师、工程师或艺术家的人。
> I\'d always kind of thought that I was going to be a doctor.
我总觉得我会成为一名医生。
> And so I pursued that path which is the same path my parents pursued the same path that both my sister pursued.
于是我走了这条路,这条路和我父母走的路是一样的,我的姐姐也是这样走的。
> So when I graduated from college and decided I didn\'t want to be a doctor I was a little bit lost.
所以当我从大学毕业,决定不想当医生时,我有点不知所措。
> But even then like even other the times I thought I was going to be a doctor I had this real interest in technology I thought it was really cool.
但即使在那时候,就像其他时候一样,我认为我会成为一名医生,我对科技有着真正的兴趣,我认为它真的很酷。
> So when I was an undergrad I made a program with some friends that let you try on glasses online.
所以当我还是个大学生的时候,我和一些朋友做了一个程序,让你可以在网上试用眼镜。
> And it was appropriate because both my parents were opthamologists when I was at my consulting job inD.C.
这是恰当的,因为我在哥伦比亚特区从事咨询工作的时候,我的父母都是眼科医生。
> a good friend of mine named Altay had me help him out with his wife.
我的一个好朋友叫阿尔泰让我帮他照顾他的妻子。
> He started up what he was trying to help market bands.
他发起了他试图帮助市场乐队的活动。
> He was musician in a band.
他是乐队的音乐家。
> And even when I moved out to California I was at Google.
甚至当我搬到加利福尼亚的时候,我也在谷歌工作。
> I was working on another Web site which was a quiz Web site that let anybody play quiz questions about anything they wanted.
我在另一个网站上工作,这是一个小测验网站,任何人都可以对他们想要的任何东西进行问答。
> And the common theme through all these things was that for some reason I kept going back to the idea of building a product.
所有这些事情的共同主题是,出于某种原因,我一直回到建立一个产品的想法。
> I thought that was a really exciting thing to do but it always stalled and I always had an excuse for why it stalled.
我认为这是一件非常令人兴奋的事情,但它总是停滞,我总是有一个理由,为什么它停止。
> It wasn\'t the right market.
这不是个合适的市场。
> I needed to learn more by working at Google.
我需要通过在谷歌工作来了解更多。
> It wasn\'t the right timing but actually the dependent variable was just me right.
这不是正确的时机,但实际上因变量就只有我是对的。
> The dependent variable was that I never actually committed and put myself in a situation where I had to make it work.
因变量是,我从来没有真正投入,让自己处于一个我必须让它工作的情况下。
> And so I think for me I paid too much attention to talks where people basically build something huge on the side and they were pulled out of their job and everything was working.
所以我觉得我太注重谈话了,在那里人们基本上是在一边建造一些巨大的东西,他们被撤职了,一切都在运转。
> For me at least the act of committing to going out and going doing it turned out to be a really important thing.
至少对我来说,承诺出去做这件事是一件非常重要的事情。
> And so I don\'t know if this applies to everyone I\'ve heard of a lot of people that have successfully built things on the side and then gently transition it into a full time gig.
因此,我不知道这是否适用于我听说过的每一个人,他们成功地在一边建造了一些东西,然后轻轻地把它转变为全职工作。
> But at least in my situation for a person that really like puts his heart into whatever job is at hand.
但至少在我这种情况下,一个真正喜欢的人把他的心投入到手头的任何工作中。
> It was a really important stuff.
这是一件非常重要的事情。
> I actually remember the night that I made the call.
我还记得我打电话的那晚。
> I was sitting at dinner with my girlfriend and now my wife and I was talking about some cool idea that I think would be great how we could build it and how we could market it.
我和我的女朋友坐在一起吃晚饭,现在我和我的妻子在谈论一些很酷的想法,我认为这将是一个很好的方法,我们可以建造它,以及如何推销它。
> And she looked at me and said you know you should either do it or just just stop talking about it.
她看着我说你知道你要么做要么停止谈论。
> And it was a little bit harsh but honestly it was the best thing someone could have told me because she was absolutely right.
这是有点刺耳,但老实说,这是最好的事情,有人可以告诉我,因为她是绝对正确的。
> And I feel genuinely thankful that someone was honest enough of my life to just call me out and say make it happen or don\'t make it happen but just make your call and be happy with that call.
我由衷地感谢有人在我的生活中足够诚实地呼唤我,说“让它发生”或者“不让它发生”,而只是打你的电话,并对那个电话感到高兴。
> And so I\'m always really thankful for her giving me that advice.
所以我一直很感激她给我的建议。
> So I left in 2008 and I hooked up with one of my friends named Paul he was a great friend from college.
所以我在 2008 年离开了,我和一个叫保罗的朋友勾搭上了,他是大学里的一个很好的朋友。
> Super driven guy and we decided that the thing we were really interested in was mobile.
超级有动力的家伙,我们决定我们真正感兴趣的是移动。
> So the iPhone had come out recently in a platform may come out and so people were really excited about it and the product that we wanted to build was called toat.
因此,iPhone 最近在一个平台上发布了,因此人们对此感到非常兴奋,我们想要生产的产品叫做 toat。
> It was a shopping catalog on the phone.
是电话里的购物目录。
> And the reason I thought this would be so cool was that I got all these catalogs in the mail dumped on my doorstep and I had this brand new.
我之所以认为这很酷,是因为我把所有这些目录都寄到了我的门口,而且我有了这个全新的目录。
> Like really cool phone and I just wanted to see something running on this phone.
就像很酷的手机,我只想看到手机上有东西在运行。
> And so we got to work and we started prototyping it.
所以我们开始工作,开始制作原型。
> We did it out of savings.
我们这么做是为了储蓄。
> But there were some problems.
但也有一些问题。
> The first was that it took a really long time to get things built and approved by Apple.
第一,要花很长时间才能得到苹果公司的认可。
> A really long time back then you had no idea what it was going to get approved you had no idea it was going to happen.
很久以前,你不知道它会得到什么批准,你不知道它会发生什么。
> And second there were a lot of unsolved problems back then.
第二,当时有很多未解决的问题。
> We had sort of these grand ideas of doing all sorts of offline caching.
我们有一些伟大的想法来做各种各样的离线缓存。
> Being able to use this thing in the subway being able to eventually process payments.
能够在地铁里使用这个东西,最终能够处理付款。
> We put all those ideas into this prototype and it made me really hard to ship.
我们把所有这些想法都放在了这个原型上,这让我很难上船。
> And not surprisingly sooner or later we were in a situation where we really needed to raise some money and it was 2008 and you had to non-technical cofounders and it was a really bleak time.
不出所料,我们迟早会遇到这样一种情况:我们确实需要筹集一些资金,而那是 2008 年,你不得不与非技术联合创始人合作,这是一个非常惨淡的时期。
> There are lots of ways for investors to say no to and I\'m pretty sure that I\'ve heard all of them like I\'ve heard every single one like these are the top three.
对于投资者来说,有很多方法可以拒绝,我很确定我听到了他们所有人的声音,就像我听说过的一样,像这样的每一个人都是前三名。
> Like no one is call me back in a few months.
好像几个月后没人会再打给我一样。
> This is kind of the most painful is it\'s like you ask someone out on a date and not right now but maybe maybe in November.
这是最痛苦的,就像你现在约一个人约会,但可能在 11 月。
> Right.
右(边),正确的
> That one that one is like really really hard to hear because you\'re going to have even less money and you even have less leverage in negotiation.
一个人真的很难听出来,因为你的钱会更少,你在谈判中的影响力也会更小。
> The second is who else is in.
第二个问题是还有谁在。
> This is one that you hear all the time it\'s like it\'s not good enough for me by myself.
这是一个你总是听到的\它是不够好,我一个人。
> But if there are other people with whom money I\'d be willing to consider it.
但是如果有其他人和我一起有钱,我会愿意考虑的。
> And then there were the occasional people that were really blunt.
偶尔也会有一些人直言不讳。
> They were just like there\'s no way this is going to happen.
他们就像这样\不可能发生这种事。
> This is this is insane.
这太疯狂了。
> It\'s totally crazy.
太疯狂了。
> I remember really vividly I went to a session where I was pitching actually a whole group of investors up on Silicon Valley and it\'s really intimidating.
我真的很清楚地记得,我参加了一次会议,当时我在硅谷推销了一整群投资者,这真的很吓人。
> You\'re looking at these people build great companies and I\'m about five minutes into explaining what we\'re doing.
你会看到这些人建立了伟大的公司,而我只需五分钟就能解释我们在做什么。
> Everyone starts just like heading for the door.
每个人都像朝门口走一样。
> And I was like Man Like what.
我就像男人一样。
> What am I doing wrong.
我做错什么了。
> And I found out that they had brought a tray of free cookies.
我发现他们带了一盘免费饼干。
> And.
和
> What I was saying was interesting enough to keep them in their seats as long as they were like no cookies in the background.
我刚才说的话很有趣,只要它们不像背景中的饼干,就能把它们放在座位上。
> You know we\'ve done fundraising a few times and sometimes it\'s been easier and sometimes it\'s been really really hard.
你知道,我们做过几次筹款,有时更容易,有时真的很难。
> We\'ve done it where we\'ve flown to all the coasts we\'ve tracked down everyone in our alumni directory whether they were tech investors or not investors.
我们做到了,我们飞到了所有海岸,我们追踪到校友目录中的每一个人,不管他们是科技投资者还是非投资者。
> We\'ve done it a bunch and I think I\'ve learned like three important lessons that I think any entrepreneur should should know if they are starting the kind of company they think will need funding.
我们已经做了很多,我想我已经学到了三个重要的教训,我认为任何企业家都应该知道,如果他们正在创办一家他们认为需要资金的公司。
> The first is that even rich people.
首先,即使是富人。
> Are subject to free cookies.
都有免费曲奇。
> Like even even though you\'re really rich you\'re probably still the kind of person that is influenced by free.
就像你真的很富有一样,你可能仍然是那种受自由影响的人。
> And that lesson is actually something really important that said investors are just people .
事实上,这一教训是非常重要的,因为投资者只是人。
> Investors are just regular people that happen to have other people\'s money or their own money that they\'re willing to put forward.
投资者只是普通的人,他们碰巧有别人的钱或他们自己的钱,他们愿意提出来。
> `[00:09:57]` And even though they have a really good opinion on things they might be wrong.
`[00:09:57]` 尽管他们对事情有很好的看法,但他们可能是错的。
> And that was something it was really hard for me to swallow because I really looked up to all these people you know the second lesson is that if you really need money and they have money and they know they\'re the only person that can give you the money you don\'t really have any leverage whatsoever.
这是我很难接受的,因为我真的很尊敬这些人,你知道,第二个教训是,如果你真的需要钱,他们有钱,他们知道他们是唯一一个能给你钱的人,你真的没有任何影响力。
> You have zero leverage and that puts you in a really tough spot.
你的杠杆率为零,这让你陷入了一个非常艰难的境地。
> You can\'t really negotiate its 2008.
你不能真正谈判 2008 年。
> They know it\'s 2008 sirup it\'s kind of crappy nobody really uses it.
他们知道这是 2008 年,它是一种垃圾,没有人真正使用它。
> There\'s nothing you can do unless you hack that system right unless you somehow turn the tables and give them a reason that you should have the leverage and those reasons generally are fear of losing the deal right.
除非你正确地破解了这个系统,否则你什么也做不了,除非你以某种方式扭转局面,给他们一个你应该拥有杠杆的理由,而这些原因通常是担心交易失败。
> Or the belief that this thing is just going to be so big that whether you give them money or not you\'re just going to be wildly successful.
或者相信这东西会很大,不管你给不给他们钱,你都会非常成功。
> Number two is a hard case for us to sell.
二号对我们来说是个很难卖的案子。
> So we sell for number one and that was a really important thing.
所以,我们以第一名的价格出售,这是一件非常重要的事情。
> And the very last thing I learned and this was something that was especially true when you\'re kind of driving up Sanho road which I don\'t know if you guys have been too far would look like the Emerald City but it kind of looks like a ski lodge with no mountain.
我学到的最后一件事-这是一件特别真实的事情-当你开车上 Sanho 公路的时候-我不知道你们是不是走得太远了-看起来像翡翠城,但看起来就像一个没有山的滑雪小屋。
> It\'s just very like normal buildings.
就像普通的建筑。
> The final thing I learned is that people are going to give you all kinds of advice and I think it\'s really easy to take that advice because you walk into a room and there\'s like Google\'s first stock certificate.
我学到的最后一件事是,人们会给你各种各样的建议,我认为接受这个建议真的很容易,因为你走进一个房间,那里就像谷歌的第一张股票证书。
> And you know there is like invented Yahoo.
你也知道雅虎就像被发明了一样。
> Like his people are really really really smart.
好像他的人真的很聪明。
> But if you look at the returns on venture capital it\'s pretty shaky.
但如果你看一下风险投资的回报,就会发现它相当不稳定。
> Like we\'re in a pretty high volatility industry.
就像我们处在一个波动率很高的行业。
> And one thing that we always told ourselves and one thing that I really really believe is that fundamentally the Future is Unwritten like you knew they would be done right.
我们一直对自己说的一件事,还有一件事,我真的相信,从根本上说,未来是不成文的,就像你所知道的那样,他们会做好的。
> And so people can tell you that you should be more technical they can tell you that you\'re in the wrong market they can tell you all of these things and those things might be true and you should assess them for yourself but you shouldn\'t take it on face because they could be wrong.
所以人们可以告诉你,你应该更专业,他们可以告诉你,你在错误的市场,他们可以告诉你所有这些事情,这些事情可能是真的,你应该自己评估,但你不应该当面接受,因为它们可能是错误的。
> And in the back of your head you have to remember something that for all the millions of dollars.
在你的脑后,你必须记住那些花了数百万美元的东西。
> Venture capital investors have made for all the certificates that are on the wall there is little trophy\'s when things go IPO for all of those things.
风投投资者已经为所有挂在墙上的证书做好了准备,当所有这些事情都进行 IPO 时,几乎没有什么战利品。
> There are things that they passed on and those are the things that actually burned them up.
有些东西是他们传下来的,这些东西实际上把他们烧掉了。
> Those are the ones that haunt them at night.
这些都是晚上困扰他们的。
> And I think that if you can convince somebody that you just might be the one that\'s going to beat the odds you can be successful and it\'s a general idea that I think it\'s important whether you\'re recruiting whether you\'re raising money whether you just need to make a final push in adjusting your product.
我认为,如果你能说服某人,你可能就是那个能够成功的人,我认为重要的是,你是否在招聘,你是否在筹集资金,你是否只需要在调整产品方面做出最后的努力。
> So eventually you put money together and we\'re working back onto it.
所以最终你把钱集中在一起,我们就重新开始工作了。
> We were solving the same fundamental problem that we couldn\'t iterate and improve fast enough and we were fundraising on the East Coast.
我们正在解决相同的基本问题,我们不能迭代和改进足够快,我们在东海岸筹款。
> And while I was out there I met this really great guy named Evan Sharp.
当我在外面的时候,我遇到了一个叫埃文·夏普的很棒的人。
> Evan is a Columbia graduate student at the time who\'s studying architecture.
埃文当时是哥伦比亚大学的一名研究生,他正在学习建筑学。
> And we just hit it off and Evan and Paul and I are commiserating about this whole dilemma and we\'re just thinking I will be cool to build like what do we just want to see and really what we wanted to see was we wanted to see something out there in the world.
我们很合得来,埃文,保罗和我对整个困境表示同情,我们只是在想,我会很酷的去建造我们只想看到的东西,我们真正想看到的是,我们想看到世界上的一些东西。
> We just wanted to see somebody using something.
我们只是想看到有人在用什么东西。
> Somebody asked me once like What\'s my what\'s my big plan like what would make me really happy when we\'re starting ventures I was like cheese I just want to go somewhere and see somebody they don\'t know using something that I made and how to be kind of useful.
有一次有人问我,什么是我的大计划?我的大计划是什么?当我们开始创业时,我真的很高兴。我就像奶酪一样,只想去某个地方,看看他们不认识的人,用我做的东西做什么,怎样才能有用。
> That is what I thought was really exciting.
这就是我认为非常令人兴奋的地方。
> And so we came up with ideas for something that was web based really simple something that we would use personally and that was Pinterest.
所以我们想出了一些基于网络的想法,它非常简单,我们会亲自使用,那就是 Pinterest。
> We\'d learned a lesson from doing the iPhone app and it was that even though we had all these ideas of all these great features that were cramming in we weren\'t great at one thing.
我们从做 iPhone 应用中吸取了教训,尽管我们对所有这些优秀的功能都有很多想法,但我们并不擅长一件事。
> There wasn\'t one thing that was special about it.
这件事没有什么特别之处。
> People talk a lot about like a minimum viable product or when you should ship something.
人们谈论很多,比如最低限度可行的产品,或者什么时候你应该发货。
> And my advice is you should ship when you have one thing that you\'re proud of.
我的建议是,当你有一件事让你感到骄傲的时候,你就应该离开。
> Like one thing that is worthy of someone\'s time and I could take you a long time and it could take you not very long at all but if it\'s not worth their time to check out you\'re not going to get any good feedback on whether it\'s good or not they\'re going to see it they\'re gonna be like this is crap.
就像一件值得某人花时间的事情,我可以花你很长的时间,它可能不会花你很长的时间,但是如果你不值得他们花时间去检查,你就不会得到任何好的反馈,他们会看到它,他们会像这样的垃圾。
> Thank you for the feedback.
谢谢你的反馈。
> Start again.
重新开始。
> And we decided that the one thing we had to do really well if we were going to make a Web site about collections we had to make it look really cool.
我们决定,如果我们要制作一个关于集合的网站,我们必须做得很好,我们必须让它看起来很酷。
> We didn\'t look cool.
我们看起来不酷。
> No one is gonna make a collection because they don\'t want to show their friends because this thing that they just made looks really lame.
没有人会因为他们不想向他们的朋友展示,因为他们刚刚做的这个东西看起来真的很烂,所以他们才会做一个收藏品。
> So this is the first version of Pinterest and it didn\'t look very cool in November 2009.
所以这是 Pinterest 的第一个版本,它在 2009 年 11 月看起来不太酷。
> We started building the basic infrastructure and started really iterating on what it could look like how could you make it look really interesting.
我们开始构建基本的基础设施,并开始对它的外观进行迭代,如何使它看起来非常有趣。
> So we went through a lot of versions of this vertical grid horizontal grid both left side NAV right side NAV top nav different logos and we waited until we felt we had something that we thought was really cool and we would show it to people along the way we would show them something that we thought was a little bit of an improvement.
所以我们经历了很多版本的垂直栅格,无论是左边的 NAV,右边的 NAV 顶部导航,不同的标志,我们一直等到我们觉得我们有了一些我们认为很酷的东西,然后我们就会给人们展示一些我们认为是有一点改进的东西。
> And we finally felt ready to launch it.
我们终于准备好发射了。
> I emailed out to all my friends like all my family and I look at this really cool thing we\'re really jazzed about it and basically no one responded.
我发邮件给我所有的朋友,像我的家人,我看着这件很酷的事情,我们真的很兴奋,基本上没有人回应。
> There\'s basically no response at all 3000 accounts not active users accounts is pretty bad if you three people actively pushing it out to every single person they know every day for four months.
基本上没有反应,在所有的 3000 个帐户,没有活跃的用户帐户是相当糟糕的,如果你三个人积极地把它推给每一个人,他们每天认识的四个月。
> But there was something that was really positive and it was that the few people they used it myself amongst them actually really loved it and instead of immediately changing the product I was like maybe I can just find more people like me.
但是有一件事是非常积极的,那就是他们中的少数人-真的很喜欢它,而不是立即改变产品,我觉得也许我能找到更多像我这样的人。
> And that also fits with our current operating strategy since we don\'t have very good engineering resources.
这也符合我们目前的经营策略,因为我们没有很好的工程资源。
> So we\'re just going to market this thing and that\'s what we started to do when we started to have media offices serve for speed up in San Francisco.
所以我们只想推销这个东西,当我们开始让媒体办公室在旧金山加速的时候,这就是我们开始做的事情。
> It was a store called Rare device.
那是一家叫做稀有设备的商店。
> We did another meet up later at West Dalma so a little bit later we all tried to make it fun do fun pictures and we also marketed it online.
后来我们在西达尔玛又见面了,所以过了一会儿,我们都试着让它变得有趣,做些有趣的照片,我们还在网上推销它。
> So we had a campaign with a blogger that I had met named Victoria who is a wonderful woman and we had something called Pinit forward where everyone would create a pinboard about what home meant to them and it was organized like a chain letter like one person would introduce the next person would introduce the next person and everyone who participated would get invites to invite other people.
所以我们和一位名叫维多利亚的博主进行了一次活动,她是一个很棒的女人,我们有一个名叫 PinitForward 的项目,每个人都会制作一个关于家对他们意味着什么的卡片,它的组织方式就像一封连锁信件,就像一个人会介绍下一个人,而每个参与者都会收到邀请其他人的邀请。
> And the thing about it that really worked was we found this little group of people that were interested in the same thing and we showed them how the service could be helpful to them.
真正起作用的是,我们找到了一小群对同样的事情感兴趣的人,我们向他们展示了这项服务对他们的帮助。
> And fundamentally that\'s what Pinterest is about.
从根本上讲,这就是 Pinterest 的意义所在。
> It\'s about finding people who share common interests and those people maybe your friends they may not be your friends but we needed a different strategy for going out than all the strategies that we were reading about in terms of general social sites.
它是关于寻找那些有共同兴趣的人,那些人-也许是你的朋友-他们可能不是你的朋友,但我们需要一个与我们在一般社交网站上所读到的所有策略不同的外出策略。
> So it\'s a really really exciting moment for us.
所以这对我们来说是个令人兴奋的时刻。
> And the best moment of all was when things started to grow.
最美好的时刻是事情开始发展的时候。
> `[00:16:23]` When we went to that meet up even though we had very very few users I distinctly remember the people hadn\'t met each other before we\'re having real conversations.
`[00:16:23]` 当我们去参加那次会议时,尽管我们的用户很少,但我清楚地记得,在我们进行真正的交谈之前,这些人还没有见过面。
> They weren\'t bullshit conversations they were asking about things in their life so they never would have known if they were just following each other on Twitter or if they\'re just looking at each other\'s Facebook projects.
他们不是胡说八道,他们问的是生活中的事情,所以他们永远不会知道他们是在 Twitter 上互相跟踪,还是只是在看对方的 Facebook 项目。
> They found people there were saying hey how\'s the gardening project that you\'re working on.
他们发现那里的人在问你正在做的园艺项目怎么样。
> How is your new living room.
你的新客厅怎么样了。
> How is all that stuff going.
一切进展如何。
> And it felt like that was the kernel of something really special the idea that you could use a service online that you found out about you could go to a physical place and you could find that same person you had a genuine connection.
这感觉就像一些非常特别的东西的核心,你可以在网上使用你发现的服务,你可以去一个实体的地方,你可以找到同一个人,你有一个真正的联系。
> A lot of people in Silicon Valley didn\'t get.
硅谷的很多人没有。
> And I still don\'t know if they really get Pinterest a lot of them kind of look at it and they said well it\'s visual it\'s not organized in real time which was a big theme back then.
我仍然不知道他们是否真的得到了 Pinterest,他们中的很多人都在看它,他们说这是视觉的,它不是实时组织的,这在当时是一个很大的主题。
> It doesn\'t have a feed like it didn\'t really make sense to them why anyone would use it.
它没有一个像它那样的提要,对他们来说没有任何意义,为什么有人会使用它。
> But the fact that it made sense to someone was what really mattered to me.
但这对某人来说是有意义的,这对我来说才是最重要的。
> And I think it ties back to what I told you guys about investors.
我觉得这跟我跟你们说的关于投资者的事有关。
> A lot of people are reading tech press investors read the same hacker news articles that everyone reads there\'s now some secret special hacker news that has the real companies that you want to invest in.
很多人都在读科技新闻,投资者读的黑客新闻和每个人都读的一样-现在有一些秘密的特殊黑客新闻,有你想要投资的真正的公司。
> They\'re reading the same tech crunch articles they\'re getting the same data.
他们读的是同样的科技文章,他们得到的数据是一样的。
> It\'s incredibly democratic.
它非常民主。
> You have access to all the information they have access to and that also means that just like anyone else they may be subject to the same biases and trends in bubbles and reports that happen in the general consumer media.
你可以接触到他们所能接触到的所有信息,这也意味着,就像其他人一样,他们也可能受到同样的偏见和趋势的影响,泡沫和报告发生在一般的消费者媒体上。
> At the time we were like the polar opposite of what people wanted to see Twitter FriendFeed Facebook were these hot companies right.
当时,我们就像人们想要看到的 Twitter、FriendFeed、Facebook 等热门公司的截然相反。
> Because they were real time Google was like we need to do real time search.
因为它们是实时的,谷歌就像我们需要做实时搜索一样。
> Everything had to be a text based feed that could be accessed on your phone.
一切都必须是基于文本的提要,可以在你的手机上访问。
> And here we come in we\'re saying it\'s not real time.
现在我们进来,我们说这不是实时的。
> It\'s all visual.
都是视觉上的。
> So they're drawing their two by two matrix.
所以他们画了一个又一个矩阵。
> They\'re like this is a disaster.
他们觉得这是场灾难。
> This is like the worst thing that could happen.
这是可能发生的最糟糕的事情。
> And eventually what we can tell them eventually is we would show them real users and eventually those users where their wives or venturer users were people they knew when they were alive.
最终,我们能告诉他们的是,我们会向他们展示真正的用户,以及那些他们的妻子或冒险用户是他们在世时认识的人的用户。
> And that\'s one of became a lot easier to get things done.
这样做就容易多了。
> So where are we today.
那么我们今天在哪里。
> We live in San Francisco now.
我们现在住在旧金山。
> We\'ve just moved our office from Palo Alto sadly I love Palo Alto and we\'re building out a team of people that are really diverse.
我们刚从帕洛阿尔托搬出办公室,很遗憾,我爱帕洛阿尔托,我们正在建立一个真正多样化的团队。
> I mean I think the thing that we learned in building the service was that our problem in distribution wasn\'t engineering problem it was a community problem.
我的意思是,我认为我们在构建服务过程中学到的是,我们在分发方面的问题不是工程问题,而是社区问题。
> The problem in building the first really cool thing didn\'t happen to be anything but a design problem.
构建第一个真正酷的东西的问题不是什么,而是一个设计问题。
> And those three things just had to work together for our kind of business to succeed.
这三件事必须共同努力才能使我们的事业成功。
> When I came out to Google I thought man the only way I can get this done is if I get the most brilliant graduate student out of Stanford who doesn\'t know that he\'s invented page rank yet.
当我来到谷歌的时候,我想,人类,我唯一能做到的就是,如果我能让斯坦福大学最优秀的研究生毕业,他还不知道他已经发明了网页排名。
> Get him into a room and we\'ll just build all this really really awesome stuff.
把他送进房间,我们就建这些非常棒的东西。
> We call a company called Blue labs because all the cool companies called themselves labs.
我们称一家公司为蓝实验室,因为所有酷的公司都称自己为实验室。
> We\'re like well like oh my God we\'ve got to be labs or no one is going to want to work here because like labs companies are really cool.
我们就像,哦,天啊,我们必须是实验室,否则没有人会想在这里工作,因为实验室公司真的很酷。
> And one of the most satisfying realizations is that there are a lot of different ways to succeed.
其中一个最令人满意的认识是,成功有很多不同的方式。
> There are a lot of different companies there are companies that don\'t raise money.
有很多不同的公司,有些公司不筹集资金。
> There are companies that do raise money.
有些公司确实筹集资金。
> There are companies that go B2B their companies that are consumer and then within Consumer there are a lot of different things that are successful for the very simple reason that there are a lot of different kinds of people in the world.
有些公司是 B2B 的,他们的公司是消费者,而在消费者内部,有很多不同的东西是成功的,原因很简单,世界上有很多不同类型的人。
> And as much as people want to give you advice about exactly how you should run your startup.
就像人们想要给你的建议一样,你应该如何经营你的创业公司。
> Exactly the strategy I think you need to trust the data you trust the users that you have and you need to trust your own instincts to do what you think is going to be right for your company.
确切地说,我认为你需要相信你所拥有的数据,信任你拥有的用户,你需要相信你自己的直觉,去做你认为适合你公司的事情。
> Pinterest right now is a tool where we help people find their inspiration into some people that sounds really hokey but to me the idea that we can show people things that they want to do in their future.
Pinterest 现在是一种工具,我们可以帮助人们在一些人身上找到灵感,但对我来说,我们可以向人们展示他们未来想要做的事情。
> Help them get closer to actually doing those things whether it\'s redecorating their home or going on a vacation or buying a gift.
帮助他们更接近真正做那些事情,无论是重新装修他们的家,去度假,还是买礼物。
> And in that process inspirer someone else is a really cool thing to be working on.
在这个过程中,激励别人是一件很酷的事情。
> And it\'s not what we thought the site was going to do when we first launched it but it\'s what it\'s come to be.
当我们第一次推出这个网站的时候,它并不是我们所认为的那样,而是它开始的样子。
> And sometimes the product finds its purpose and sometimes it goes the other way around.
有时产品会发现它的目的,有时它会反过来。
> And either way is ok as long as you get to something that people really love.
任何一种方式都可以,只要你能得到人们真正喜欢的东西。
> Pinterest is a network.
Pinterest 是一个网络。
> We have millions of people that are connected through billions of objects.
我们有数以百万计的人通过数十亿的物体连接起来。
> It\'s the third largest source of referral traffic on the Internet.
它是互联网上第三大推荐流量来源。
> And so in the early days when people like we don\'t need to be a technology company.
因此,在早期,像我们这样的人不需要成为一家科技公司。
> Now we have to write all of a sudden now we need folks that can mine for data.
现在,我们必须突然编写,现在我们需要能够挖掘数据的人。
> Those people have really interesting things to do like we\'re on that road trip like we\'re heading towards the Midwest and turns out we had to veer the other way.
那些人有非常有趣的事情要做,就像我们在公路上旅行,就像我们要去中西部一样,结果我们不得不转向另一个方向。
> And I think that adaptability to change is really fundamental.
我认为适应变化是非常重要的。
> And at the same time Pinterest is a tool where people can do these things you can plan a vacation you can plan cooking and recipes you can plan holiday shopping you can plan all these things in your life.
同时,Pinterest 是一种工具,人们可以做这些事情,你可以计划一个假期,你可以计划烹饪和食谱,你可以计划假日购物,你可以计划你生活中的所有这些事情。
> And the very last thing that\'s important to me is that Pinterest is a team of talented people like I feel genuinely lucky like walk into the office and work with people that are better than me at pretty much everything I do.
对我来说,最不重要的是 Pinterest 是一个有才华的团队,就像我真的感到幸运,喜欢走进办公室,和那些在我所做的事情上都比我更好的人一起工作。
> And I think that to me even though there are a lot of stories told about entrepreneurs that toil alone.
对我来说,尽管有很多关于企业家的故事,但我认为这些故事都是独自劳作的。
> The best things in the world are made by groups of people.
世界上最好的东西是由一群人做的。
> I think when you\'re really early on in the startup you\'re really worried about oh my gosh like I can\'t give my equity to this person it\'s going to run out.
我想当你在创业初期的时候,你真的很担心哦,我的天啊,好像我不能把我的股权给这个人,它就会用完。
> But it\'s the size of the total pie right.
但这是整个派的大小。
> It\'s the size of how many people can you actually build something that\'s bigger than who they are and if you can find those people if you can find people that want to work with you on something that\'s bigger than they are.
它的大小,你能建造多少人,真正的东西比他们是谁,如果你能找到那些人,如果你能找到与你一起工作的人,比他们更大的事情。
> I think that it\'s the best investment you can make to give them ownership in what you\'re actually building.
我认为这是你能做的最好的投资,让他们拥有你真正建造的东西。
> And to me it\'s just been a really gratifying experience to know that everyone who works with us actually owns part of the fate of the company.
对我来说,每一个与我们一起工作的人实际上都拥有公司的一部分命运,这是一次非常令人欣慰的经历。
> So this is just people from around the office.
所以这只是办公室里的人。
> We obviously value collaboration that\'s kind of how the company was founded.
我们显然很重视合作,这是公司成立的一种方式。
> And so if I had two pieces of advice there are really really simple.
所以,如果我有两条建议,那是很简单的。
> The first is that you should really just build something you believe in.
首先,你真的应该建立一些你相信的东西。
> If you\'re going to go on a five year seven year tenure 15 year journey at least build something that you really really love because otherwise you\'re definitely going to burn out.
如果你要从事 5 年、7 年、15 年的工作,至少要做一些你真正喜欢的事情,否则你肯定会筋疲力尽的。
> You\'d have to be like the most mercenary person to give themselves 15 years and take all this risk if you didn\'t at least loved the idea of where you\'re going to end up.
你必须成为最唯利是图的人,给自己 15 年的时间,并承担所有这些风险,如果你至少不喜欢你将在哪里结束的想法。
> And the second is just don\'t give up.
第二个就是不要放弃。
> Don\'t let somebody talk you out of your dream.
不要让别人说服你放弃你的梦想。
> And the reason that I think Startup School is so cool is because if you look around in the room like you\'re surrounded by all these people they really want to do what you\'re doing.
我认为创业学校之所以如此酷,是因为如果你在房间里环顾四周,就像周围都是这些人,他们真的很想做你正在做的事情。
> Silicon Valley is like a weird place like people always talking about doing startups but people from all over the country they\'re from all over the world.
硅谷就像一个奇怪的地方,人们总是谈论创业,但来自全国各地的人却来自世界各地。
> In those early parts of doing a startup can actually be really lonely can just be a total bummer because you\'re toiling on this thing.
在创业的早期阶段,你可能真的很孤独,因为你正在为这件事操劳。
> No one cares about it it\'s not getting anywhere.
没有人在乎它-它什么也没做。
> And there\'s a tendency I think with a lot of people that I meet are doing startups that are like I just need to work harder.
还有一种趋势,我认为和很多我认识的人一起做创业,就好像我需要更努力地工作。
> I need to go out into the world less.
我需要减少进入这个世界。
> I need to turn on the lights less frequently maybe only to sit closer to the screen.
我需要更少地打开灯,也许只需要坐在离屏幕更近的地方。
> And I think that it\'s a really dangerous game to play.
我认为这是一个非常危险的游戏。
> There\'s a reason that I started the presentation by showing a really good friend of mine who wasn\'t working at the company I was but was still hanging out with us all the time.
我在开始演讲的时候,向我的一个真正的好朋友展示了一个理由,他不是在我所在的公司工作,而是一直和我们在一起。
> The fact that we could get a beer and talk about hey this is really tough.
事实上,我们可以喝杯啤酒,谈一谈嘿,这真的很难。
> This is a hard time.
这是个艰难的时刻。
> Made it a lot easier in wherever you live.
在你住的任何地方都更容易。
> The great thing now is that you can find those people like they may be in your neighborhood.
现在最棒的事情是,你可以找到那些人,就像他们可能在你的邻居一样。
> They may be online they maybe some hard to meet up but you can find those people somewhere.
他们可能在网上,他们可能会遇到一些困难,但你可以在某个地方找到这些人。
> And I personally think it\'s good advice to take the time to invest in those people.
我个人认为花时间投资于这些人是个好建议。
> So part of the reason I was so excited to come was to me it\'s just really exciting to be in a room full of so many people that basically want to do what I want to do.
所以我如此兴奋的部分原因是对我来说,在一个挤满了很多人的房间里做我想做的事情是非常令人兴奋的。
> I basically just want to build something bigger than myself that a lot of people in the world will find useful and to be with lots of those people just makes me happy.
我基本上只是想建立一个比我更大的东西,世界上很多人都会发现它是有用的,和很多这样的人在一起只会让我感到快乐。
> It gets me excited about doing what we do every day.
做我们每天都做的事让我很兴奋。
- Zero to One 从0到1 | Tony翻译版
- Ch1: The Challenge of the Future
- Ch2: Party like it’s 1999
- Ch3: All happy companies are different
- Ch4: The ideology of competition
- Ch6: You are not a lottery ticket
- Ch7: Follow the money
- Ch8: Secrets
- Ch9: Foundations
- Ch10: The Mechanics of Mafia
- Ch11: 如果你把产品做好,顾客们会来吗?
- Ch12: 人与机器
- Ch13: 展望绿色科技
- Ch14: 创始人的潘多拉魔盒
- YC 创业课 2012 中文笔记
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2012
- Travis Kalanick at Startup School 2012
- Tom Preston Werner at Startup School 2012
- Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012
- Joel Spolksy at Startup School 2012
- Jessica Livingston at Startup School 2012
- Hiroshi Mikitani at Startup School 2012
- David Rusenko at Startup School 2012
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School 2012
- 斯坦福 CS183b YC 创业课文字版
- 关于 Y Combinator
- 【创业百道节选】如何正确的阅读创业鸡汤
- YC 创业第一课:你真的愿意创业吗
- YC 创业第二课:团队与执行
- YC 创业第三课:与直觉对抗
- YC 创业第四课:如何积累初期用户
- YC 创业第五课:失败者才谈竞争
- YC 创业第六课:没有留存率不要谈推广
- YC 创业第七课:与你的用户谈恋爱
- YC 创业第八课:创业要学会吃力不讨好
- YC 创业第九课:投资是极端的游戏
- YC 创业第十课:企业文化决定命运
- YC 创业第11课:企业文化需培育
- YC 创业第12课:来开发企业级产品吧
- YC 创业第13课,创业者的条件
- YC 创业第14课:像个编辑一样去管理
- YC 创业第15课:换位思考
- YC 创业第16课:如何做用户调研
- YC 创业第17课:Jawbone 不是硬件公司
- YC 创业第18课:划清个人与公司的界限
- YC 创业第19课(上):销售如漏斗
- YC 创业第19课(下):与投资人的两分钟
- YC 创业第20课:不再打磨产品
- YC 创业课 2013 中文笔记
- Balaji Srinivasan at Startup School 2013
- Chase Adam at Startup School 2013
- Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013
- Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013
- Diane Greene at Startup School 2013
- Jack Dorsey at Startup School 2013
- Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013
- Nate Blecharczyk at Startup School 2013
- Office Hours at Startup School 2013 with Paul Graham and Sam Altman
- Phil Libin at Startup School 2013
- Ron Conway at Startup School 2013
- 斯坦福 CS183c 闪电式扩张中文笔记
- 1: 家庭阶段
- 2: Sam Altman
- 3: Michael Dearing
- 4: The hunt of ThunderLizards 寻找闪电蜥蜴
- 5: Tribe
- 6: Code for America
- 7: Minted
- 8: Google
- 9: Village
- 10: SurveyMonkey
- 11: Stripe
- 12: Nextdoor
- 13: YouTube
- 14: Theranos
- 15: VMware
- 16: Netflix
- 17: Yahoo
- 18: Airbnb
- 19: LinkedIn
- YC 创业课 SV 2014 中文笔记
- Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014
- Ron Conway at Startup School SV 2014
- Danae Ringelmann at Startup School SV 2014
- Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014
- Eric Migicovsky at Startup School SV 2014
- Hosain Rahman at Startup School SV 2014
- Jessica Livingston Introduces Startup School SV 2014
- Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014
- Kevin Systrom at Startup School SV 2014
- Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar at Startup School SV 2014
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014
- YC 创业课 NY 2014 中文笔记
- Apoorva Mehta at Startup School NY 2014
- Chase Adam at Startup School NY 2014
- Closing Remarks at Startup School NY 2014
- David Lee at Startup School NY 2014
- Fred Wilson Interview at Startup School NY 2014
- Introduction at Startup School NY 2014
- Kathryn Minshew at Startup School NY 2014
- Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014
- Shana Fisher at Startup School NY 2014
- Zach Sims at Startup School NY 2014
- YC 创业课 EU 2014 中文笔记
- Adora Cheung
- Alfred Lin with Justin Kan
- Hiroki Takeuchi
- Ian Hogarth
- Introduction by Kirsty Nathoo
- Office Hours with Kevin & Qasar
- Patrick Collison
- Paul Buchheit
- Urska Srsen
- Y Combinator Partners Q&A
- YC 创业课 2016 中文笔记
- Ben Silbermann at Startup School SV 2016
- Chad Rigetti at Startup School SV 2016
- MARC Andreessen at Startup School SV 2016
- Office Hours with Kevin Hale and Qasar Younis at Startup School SV 2016
- Ooshma Garg at Startup School SV 2016
- Pitch Practice with Paul Buchheit and Sam Altman at Startup School SV 2016
- Q&A with YC Partners at Startup School SV 2016
- Reham Fagiri and Kalam Dennis at Startup School SV 2016
- Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2016
- 斯坦福 CS183f YC 创业课 2017 中文笔记
- How and Why to Start A Startup
- Startup Mechanics
- How to Get Ideas and How to Measure
- How to Build a Product I
- How to Build a Product II
- How to Build a Product III
- How to Build a Product IV
- How to Invent the Future I
- How to Invent the Future II
- How to Find Product Market Fit
- How to Think About PR
- Diversity & Inclusion at Early Stage Startups
- How to Build and Manage Teams
- How to Raise Money, and How to Succeed Long-Term
- YC 创业课 2018 中文笔记
- Sam Altman - 如何成功创业
- Carolynn Levy、Jon Levy 和 Jason Kwon - 初创企业法律机制
- 与 Paul Graham 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Michael Seibel - 构建产品
- David Rusenko - 如何找到适合产品市场的产品
- Suhail Doshi - 如何测量产品
- Gustaf Alstromer - 如何获得用户和发展
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 2 部分
- Kat Manalac 和 Craig Cannon - 用于增长的公关+内容
- Tyler Bosmeny - 如何销售
- Ammon Bartram 和 Harj Taggar - 组建工程团队
- Dalton Caldwell - 如何在 Y Combinator 上申请和成功
- Patrick Collison - 运营你的创业公司
- Geoff Ralston - 筹款基础
- Kirsty Nathoo - 了解保险箱和定价股票轮
- Aaron Harris - 如何与投资者会面并筹集资金
- Paul Buchheit 的 1000 亿美元之路
- PMF 后:人员、客户、销售
- 与 Oshma Garg 的对话 - 由 Adora Cheung 主持
- 与 Aileen Lee 的对话 - 由 Geoff Ralston 主持
- Garry Tan - 初创企业设计第 1 部分
- 与 Elizabeth Iorns 的对话 - 生物技术创始人的建议
- 与 Eric Migicovsky 的硬技术对话
- 与 Elad Gil 的对话
- 与 Werner Vogels 的对话
- YC 创业课 2019 中文笔记
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路:第一部分
- Eric Migicovsky - 如何与用户交谈
- Ali Rowghani - 如何领导
- Kevin Hale 和 Adora Cheung - 数字初创学校 2019
- Geoff Ralston - 拆分建议
- Michael Seibel - 如何计划 MVP
- Adora Cheung - 如何设定关键绩效指标和目标
- Ilya Volodarsky - 初创企业分析
- Anu Hariharan - 九种商业模式和投资者想要的指标
- Anu Hariharan 和 Adora Cheung - 投资者如何衡量创业公司 Q&A
- Kat Manalac - 如何启动(续集)
- Gustaf Alstromer - 新兴企业的成长
- Kirsty Nathoo - 创业财务陷阱以及如何避免它们
- Kevin Hale - 如何一起工作
- Tim Brady - 构建文化
- Dalton Caldwell - 关于枢轴的一切
- Kevin Hale - 如何提高转化率
- Kevin Hale - 创业定价 101
- Adora Cheung - 如何安排时间
- Kevin Hale - 如何评估创业思路 2
- Carolynn Levy - 现代创业融资
- Jared Friedman - 硬技术和生物技术创始人的建议