# Ian Hogarth > `[00:00:03]` Now we\'re going to move on to the next speaker which is Ian Hogarth of Songkick. `[00:00:03]` 现在，我们要转到下一位演讲者，即 Songkick 的 Ian Hogarth。 > He\'s the co-founder and CEO Y Combinator funded Songkick in 2007 and a fun fact it\'s actually through Ian that I found out about Y Combinator all that time ago. 他是联合创始人兼首席执行官 Y Combinator 在 2007 年资助了宋健，一个有趣的事实是，我在很久以前就发现了 Y Combinator，实际上是通过 Ian 发现的。 > So if you don\'t know Songkick is the simplest way to find out when your favorite artists are coming to town. 因此，如果你不知道，宋踢是最简单的方式，以了解什么时候你最喜欢的艺术家来镇上。 > And now the second most trafficked concert service in the world with over 10 million unique fans visiting every month. 现在是世界上第二大被贩卖的音乐会服务，每个月都有超过 1000 万的独特歌迷来访。 > So welcome in. 欢迎加入。 > `[00:00:47]` Co. `[00:00:47]` 公司 > So yeah I mean Hogarth. 所以我是说霍加思。 > And I\'m one of the two three cofounders of Songkick. 我是松克三位联合创始人之一。 > So this is a Michelle and I\'m usually the one out talking there. 所以这是一个米歇尔，我通常是那个在外面说话的人。 > There they\'re even more responsible than I am for any of the stuff I\'m about to explain to you that we\'ve learned along the way. 在那里，他们比我对我要向你们解释的任何事情都更负责任，我们在路上学到了这些东西。 > So we started in 2007 and we were in the summer 2007 y c batch. 所以我们从 2007 年开始，我们是在 2007 年夏天开始的。 > Yeah. 嗯 > The easiest way to find shows. 找到节目最简单的方法。 > If you\'ve ever experienced the sort of frustration of finding out about a show you\'d like to have gone to the day after it happens. 如果你曾经经历过这样的挫折，因为你发现了一个节目，你会希望在它发生的第二天就去。 > That\'s the sort of the problem that Songkick is trying to solve. 这就是松克想要解决的问题。 > The average user who starts using Songkick goes to twice many concerns afterwards so it\'s all about making it easier to go to shows were backed by some great facies index and Secoya and I guess we sort of see there being three main music apps on your phone. 普通用户开始使用松果舞之后会引起两倍的关注，所以这一切都是为了让你更容易去看节目，它得到了一些不错的相索引和 Secoya 的支持，我想我们在你的手机上看到了三个主要的音乐应用程序。 > There\'ll be a on demand streaming app like Spotify a radio app like Pandora and a conscious app like Songkick. 将会有一个随需应变的流媒体应用，比如 Spotify，一个像 Pandora 的广播应用程序，还有一个有意识的应用程序，比如宋楚克。 > `[00:01:43]` And the average artist makes about 70 per cent of their income from touring so we hope we can be relevant to artists as well as fans. `[00:01:43]` 平均每个艺术家 70%的收入来自于巡回演出，所以我们希望我们能和艺术家以及歌迷们保持联系。 > `[00:01:51]` So one thing that happens when you build the same company for seven years is you get to watch waves of startups succeed and fail around you and it kind of rewires your intuition about startups. `[00:01:51]` 当你创建同一家公司七年的时候，有一件事发生在你周围，你可以看到一波又一波的创业成功和失败，它在某种程度上重新连接了你对初创企业的直觉。 > And I guess I did like it too watching the first season of 24 after watching all eight seasons in a row. 我想我也很喜欢看 24 赛季的第一季，连续看了八个赛季。 > I remember being really terrified by this compact the song that launched when we we\'re just getting started and they grew to millions of users in a pretty short space of time and was being so scared like how that how are we ever going to do anything about that. 我记得当我们刚开始的时候，这首歌真的被这首歌吓了一跳，他们在很短的时间内就增加到了数百万的用户，并且被吓到了-我们该怎么做呢？ > And what happened though is over time the distribution platform that they built their product on kind of like moved underneath them and they disappeared. 然而，随着时间的推移，他们建立起他们的产品的分销平台就像是在他们的下面移动，然后他们就消失了。 > And that really resets your sense of what to be scared by. 这真的会让你重新意识到害怕什么。 > Similarly though you\'ll see startups that are kind of just seemed to have it all figured out and they become the talk of the town and you know that will really surprise you. 同样地，你也会看到一些初创公司，它们似乎都已经解决了，它们成了全镇的热门话题，你知道这会让你大吃一惊。 > You\'ll be like great. 你会很棒的。 > They\'re an awesome company and they get out you suddenly read about them having 100 million dollar valuation. 他们是一家很棒的公司，你突然读到他们有 1 亿美元的估值。 > What will surprise you is exponential value creation. 令你惊讶的是指数价值创造。 > So you know that starts up that was suddenly valued at a hundred dollars. 所以，你知道，在一开始的时候，它突然被估价为一百美元。 > The next year you read on tech crunch they\'re valued at a billion dollars and you\'re like whoa OK. 第二年，你读到关于科技危机的文章时，他们的估值为 10 亿美元，你会觉得哇哦，好吧。 > Well we\'ve got a really good year coming we\'re going really hard. 嗯，我们有一个非常好的一年即将到来，我们将非常努力。 > It\'s going to get better. 会好起来的。 > And then the next year they go from a billion dollars to ten billion dollars. 第二年，他们从 10 亿美元增加到 100 亿美元。 > And that just completely resets your sense of what is possible. 这就完全让你重新意识到什么是可能的。 > I think some of the people have spoken today are perfect examples of that crazy exponential curve you can get into. 我认为今天有些人的发言是你可以进入的疯狂指数曲线的完美例子。 > So to put this all in perspective if I go back to the summer of 2007 there were 22 companies in our way see batch a lot lot less than it is now. 因此，从整体上看，如果我回到 2007 年夏天，就会有 22 家公司挡着我们的路，看到的批数比现在要少得多。 > And I believe most most of the others ended up getting shot down or acquired for relatively small amounts of money. 我相信其他大多数人最终都会被击落，或者用相对较少的钱买到。 > And when you see that play out it really makes you internalize how hard it is. 当你看到这场比赛的时候，它真的让你内化了它有多难。 > And. 和 > You know I remember getting to Boston that summer and just being really intimidated by everybody I mean people were technically more brilliant than us. 你知道，我记得那年夏天我去了波士顿，被每个人吓到了，我的意思是人们在技术上比我们更聪明。 > There were people who were way more charismatic and better at present their products and asks people with stronger product vision and pretty much everybody was more experienced at building Internet companies than we were. 有些人现在的产品更有魅力，更好，他们要求产品眼光更强的人，而且几乎每个人在建立互联网公司方面都比我们更有经验。 > Michelle and I. 米歇尔和我。 > One of the startups in our batched I remember being intimidated by was discuss that. 我记得在我们分批的一家初创公司中，有一家被吓到了，那就是讨论这个问题。 > They\'re like an awesome pair of founders and it is plausible that Sonka can discuss may end up being 10 to 100 x more valuable. 他们就像一对了不起的创始人，桑卡可以讨论的可能最终是价值的 10 到 100 倍。 > Than startups from our batch that were shut down or had an early exit which on the face of it seems like we know we must have figured some things out. 我们的批次中的初创企业被关闭或提前退出，表面上看，我们似乎知道我们一定已经解决了一些问题。 > There must be something to be learned from our path the marketetc. 我们必须从市场营销的道路上学到一些东西。 > But the other company that really endured small batch is. 但另一家真正忍受小批量生产的公司是。 > Dropbox. Dropbox > Which is likely worth 100 x more than both of us at this point. 这很可能比我们两个人都高出 100 倍。 > I\'m not all emotional about valuations of money it\'s impact and I do think the valuation is often a pretty good pretty good indicator of that. 我对货币的估值并不完全感情用事，它的影响，我确实认为估值通常是一个很好的指标。 > What\'s more remarkable still is that Drew and Arash are two of the most humble down to earth founders I know. 更值得注意的是，Drew 和 Arash 是我所认识的两位最卑微的创始人。 > So kind of amazing. 真是太棒了。 > I think what\'s maybe more inspiring still is although Dropbox is an incredible company. 我认为，尽管 Dropbox 是一家令人难以置信的公司，但更鼓舞人心的仍然是。 > It\'s quite possible that one person in this room creates something that\'s 10x more valuable than Dropbox which is kind of nuts when you think about it. 很有可能，这个房间里的一个人创造的东西比 Dropbox 高出 10 倍，当你想到这件事时，你会觉得有点疯狂。 > So I guess hopefully you take this all as a disclaimer for the advice that follows. 因此，我想，希望您把这一切作为对以下建议的免责声明。 > If you really want to know the mysteries of the startup universe go talk to during a rush. 如果你真的想知道创业世界的奥秘，那就赶紧去谈谈吧。 > Also I\'m most interested in consumer stuff so most this advice applies to that so having a caveat that I probably have about 100 x less insights than most people who have spoken Startup School in the past. 另外，我对消费者的东西最感兴趣，所以大部分的建议都适用于这一点，所以我有一个警告，我的洞察力可能比大多数过去说过创业学校的人少 100 倍。 > I thought about what I would like someone to explain to me in retrospect. 回想起来，我想找个人向我解释一下。 > So first of all doing a music startup is a pretty good way to get beat down. 因此，首先，做一个音乐初创企业是一个很好的方式被击败。 > Secondly understand as much of the game as possible before you start to play it. 第二，在你开始玩游戏之前，尽可能多地了解它。 > And finally you know nurture your resilience so you don\'t give up. 最后，你知道要培养你的韧性，这样你才不会放弃。 > So on online music. 在线音乐就是这样。 > Being an excellent way to get beat up. 是个被揍的好方法。 > Here are some exceptional founders who have all to a greater and lesser extent taken a beating from following their passion into music starts up Dalton Caldwell who\'s spoken here before Sean Parker Jeff Ralston Dave Goldberg who\'s now the CEO of Survey Monkey David Pachmann is an amazing founder. 以下是一些杰出的创始人，他们在不同程度上都从追随自己的激情进入音乐事业中受到了打击，创立了道尔顿·考德威尔(Dalton Calwell)，他在肖恩·帕克(Sean Parker)、杰夫·拉斯顿(Jeff Ralston)、戴夫·戈德伯格(Dave Goldberg)之前在这里发言，他现在是“调查猴子” > Ali Partovi it some it seems to be a relatively well trodden path. 阿里帕托维，它有些，它似乎是一条相对较好的被践踏的道路。 > And I was thinking about it on the cycle over here that the founders of the most successful business to come out of out of you know start a business come to Europe. 我在想，在这里的循环中，最成功的企业的创始人-你知道，创业-来到欧洲。 > Skype actually did two different music startups in Khazar and an audio. Skype 实际上在 Khazar 创建了两家不同的音乐初创公司和一家音频公司。 > So I then realized that Dalton had basically given that talk. 于是我意识到道尔顿基本上是说了这番话。 > So I\'m not going to rehash rehashes if I say you can find it on YouTube. 所以，如果我说你可以在 YouTube 上找到它，我就不会再重提它了。 > It\'s hilarious hilarious. 这太搞笑了。 > Listen what I will give you is a slightly more reductive take on building startups in entertainment related industries. 听着，我要给你的是一个关于建立娱乐相关行业的初创公司的更简单的做法。 > `[00:07:14]` Film TV arts music. `[00:07:14]` 电影电视艺术音乐。 > `[00:07:17]` So if you\'re going to build a startup in one of those domains. `[00:07:17]` 如果你要在其中一个域中创建一个启动程序。 > Here is what I. 这里是我。 > Here\'s the advice I would give you and I have some advice for how this translates into other markets so first of all everybody thinks they\'re more into music film than they actually are. 这是我给你的建议，我有一些关于如何将它转化到其他市场的建议，所以首先，每个人都认为他们对音乐电影的投入比实际情况要多。 > So there was a pretty fascinating study that Zillow puts out around the subprime crisis. 因此，在次贷危机期间，齐洛进行了一项非常引人入胜的研究。 > Where are they. 他们在哪。 > They surveyed homeowners and they asked them what was going to happen to the value of homes over the next six months. 他们调查了房主，并问他们在接下来的六个月里房屋价值会发生什么变化。 > And the majority of people said value of homes is going to go way down. 大多数人说，房屋的价值会大幅下降。 > And then they ask those same people. 然后他们问同样的人。 > What do you think is going to happen the value of your home and everyone\'s like oh my home\'s going to stay the same or go up. 你认为你的家的价值会发生什么，每个人都会觉得，噢，我的家会保持原样或者上升。 > And it\'s kind of the same I think with entertainment and I think it\'s part of the sort of like sort of blind spot the founder sometimes have with the space. 这和我对娱乐的看法是一样的，我认为这也是创始人有时对空间的盲点的一部分。 > Actually most people aren\'t a much narrower set of kind of creative works than they realize. 实际上，大多数人并不比他们意识到的范围更窄。 > And so a small number of creators drive most activity and revenue for these industries. 因此，少数创作者为这些行业提供了大部分活动和收入。 > Now the next interesting thing about these industries is ninety nine point nine 9 9 9 9 9 9 percent of creators end up struggling for a very long time without success. 现在，关于这些行业的下一个有趣的事情是，99 9 9 9%的创作者最终挣扎了很长一段时间，但没有成功。 > And so when they do break out they\'re very happy to transfer rights for their work to somebody who is going to give them some financial stability whether it\'s a label or a concert promoter or a studio. 因此，当他们真的爆发的时候，他们非常乐意把他们的作品的权利转让给那些会给他们一些经济稳定的人，不管他们是一家唱片公司，还是一家音乐会的发起人，还是一家录音室。 > You know it might be tempting to sort of label that as selling out or something like that but having had friends who you know spent the last ten years sleeping on couches to try and make their their their career as an artist\'s work. 你知道，这可能是一种诱人的标签，比如卖出去之类的东西，但你认识的朋友过去十年都睡在沙发上，尝试着成为一名艺术家的作品。 > It\'s just about getting stable and paying off your debts. 这只是为了稳定和还清你的债务。 > And unlike tech where you can be a sick engineer builder starts up totally fails. 和技术不同的是，你可以成为一个生病的工程师，建筑商的启动完全失败。 > Go get a great job at Google. 去谷歌找份好工作吧。 > You know if you\'re a musician and your career doesn\'t succeed you can\'t just go and join Radiohead. 你知道，如果你是一名音乐家，而你的事业不能成功，你不能只是去加入电台。 > So have to have that sympathy. 所以必须得到这种同情。 > So this transference of rights from the creators to these middlemen leads to a pretty small number of companies owning all the rights for these these these verticals. 因此，这种权利从创作者转移到这些中间商，导致少数公司拥有这些垂直产品的所有权利。 > `[00:09:23]` So ironically as the entertainment industry lurches from one model to the next actually gets even more consolidated. `[00:09:23]` 具有讽刺意味的是，随着娱乐业从一种模式走向另一种模式，它实际上得到了更大的整合。 > So for example you know music moving fromC.D to Empey 3s to streaming. 例如，你知道音乐从 C.D 到 Empey3s 到流媒体。 > Because the companies who represent the rights are like. 因为代表这些权利的公司就像。 > We\'re going to get killed if we don\'t consolidate further under the apartments of justiceetc. 如果我们不进一步合并到法院的公寓里，我们就会被杀。 > say okay you can merge. 说好你可以合并。 > So for example during the last ten years the world\'s largest record label was allowed to get even bigger by acquiring EMI. 例如，在过去的十年里，世界上最大的唱片公司被允许通过收购百代而变得更大。 > So Universal Music Group now represents 40 percent of the rights in the recorded music markets in value. 所以环球音乐集团现在唱片市场上占到了 40%的权利。 > Similarly you know and to a greater extent the world\'s largest concert promoter Live Nation was allowed to work merge with the world\'s largest ticket vendor. 同样，你也知道，在更大程度上，世界上最大的演唱会发起人 LiveNation 被允许与世界上最大的门票供应商合并。 > So know it actually consolidation to me seems to be an increasing trend rather than a decreasing one. 所以我知道，事实上，巩固对我来说似乎是一个越来越大的趋势，而不是一个减少的趋势。 > And you know don\'t don\'t sort of delude yourself that you know other creative verticals don\'t have rights. 你知道，不要自欺欺人，你知道其他创造性的垂直产品没有权利。 > Typically there is some kind of rate structure whether it\'s similar to copyright whether it\'s in ticketing or merchandise or visual art or film. 通常存在某种费率结构，无论是与版权相似，还是在票务、商品、视觉艺术或电影中。 > So that level of rights consolidation means it\'s basically really really hard for a startup to transform the entertainment industry without you know buy in and support from those rights holders which basically means waiting till they\'re ready to embrace you and there\'s lots of different tactics for waiting things out but that in my opinion is one of the main reasons for the success of Spotify now versus the nightmare that Daughton went through. 因此，这种程度的权利整合意味着，初创企业要想在没有你知道的情况下改变娱乐业是非常困难的，收购和支持这些权利持有者基本上意味着要等到他们准备好拥抱你时，才会有很多不同的策略来等待，但在我看来，这是 Spotify 现在成功的主要原因之一，而不是 Daughton 所经历的噩梦。 > There is a caveat which is much larger technology companies can just do it a scale of leverage they have forced things force things to happen faster. 有一个警告，这是大得多的技术公司可以这样做，一个规模的杠杆，他们强迫事情发生得更快。 > So Google saved YouTube like label annihilation and eight years later owns the largest free streaming music service on the planet or the way Apple created digital download markets and that\'s it. 因此，谷歌拯救了 YouTube，就像标签毁灭一样。八年后，谷歌拥有了全球最大的免费流媒体音乐服务，或者苹果创造数字下载市场的方式，仅此而已。 > That\'s one caveat. 这是一个警告。 > So the biggest question you need to ask yourself. 所以你需要问自己的最大问题。 > You want to build a company in that same industry is why will the industry be willing to embrace you. 你想要在同一个行业建立一家公司，这就是为什么这个行业愿意拥抱你。 > How are you solving a problem for them. 你是如何为他们解决问题的。 > You need to understand their problems as well as you understand the consumer\'s problems so I guess if if PGE said kill Hollywood I would say help Hollywood grow Hollywood or fail. 你需要理解他们的问题，也要理解消费者的问题，所以我想如果 PGE 说杀了好莱坞，我会说是帮助好莱坞成长，还是失败。 > So the broader point here which is hopefully useful if you\'re not thinking about doing an entertainment startup is that the level of consolidation in your industry massively changes how you build your startup. 因此，如果你不考虑做一家娱乐初创公司，那么更广泛的观点是，如果你不考虑做一家娱乐初创公司，那么你希望这是有用的，那就是你所在行业的整合程度会极大地改变你创建初创企业的方式。 > If it\'s highly consolidated you pretty much have to find a way of partnering with incumbency. 如果它是高度巩固的，你几乎必须找到一种与现任者合作的方式。 > If it\'s much more fragmented say vacation rentals or private hire there cause you know you\'re probably best off just going for stock and competing with the existing incumbents. 如果它更加零碎，比如度假租赁或私人租赁，因为你知道你最好还是去买股票，和现有的现任员工竞争。 > So I thought I thought you know one of the things that most I most admire about Patrick\'s done with stripe is the way that they worked with the banks rather than being like you know kill Bank of America or something. 所以我认为你知道我最欣赏帕特里克用条纹做的事情之一就是他们与银行的合作方式，而不是像你所知道的杀死美国银行之类的。 > So the second thing I want to share with you guys today is the importance of understanding the startup game before you try and play it. 所以，我今天想和大家分享的第二件事是，在你尝试玩创业游戏之前，了解它的重要性。 > So this is another TV show The Wire a great a great moment when the game of chess is being explained. 这是另一档电视节目“电线”，这是一个很棒的时刻，下棋的游戏正在被解释。 > I don\'t think startups are particularly rational game to play. 我不认为初创公司是特别理性的游戏。 > If your if your goal is financial success particularly in consumer startups there is a level of randomness. 如果你的目标是财务上的成功，特别是在消费初创企业，那就有一定程度的随机性。 > And so if you\'re someone who\'s good at building things you\'re probably going to make more money by going and joining one of the hit companies of our era. 因此，如果你是一个擅长制造东西的人，你很可能会通过加入我们这个时代最受欢迎的公司而赚更多的钱。 > Or you know for example I remember reading that the first hundred or multiple hundred employees at Facebook made more money from Facebook than the average success founder of a successful startup. 或者你知道，举个例子，我记得我读到，Facebook 的前 100 名或数百名员工从 Facebook 赚的钱比一家成功创业公司的创始人的平均收入还要多。 > Or finding a way to kind of be involved in multiple startups. 或者找到一种参与多家初创公司的方法。 > You know this is one way of doing that but there may be new structures emerge. 你知道，这是一种方法，但可能会出现新的结构。 > And you know just a cursory overview of portfolio theory will teach you that you know if the market has a high degree of randomness probably not a good thing to put all your eggs in one basket. 你知道，仅仅粗略地概述投资组合理论就会告诉你，如果市场具有高度的随机性，那么把所有的鸡蛋放在一个篮子里可能不是件好事。 > There\'s this brilliant sequel Matt Cohler who I think is sort of the perfect Bayesian agent here. 有一个精彩的续集马特科勒，我认为他是一个完美的贝叶斯代理人在这里。 > He he joined linked in very early on moved to Facebook very early on and then became a top Asyut benchmark. 他很早就加入了社交网站，很早就搬到了 Facebook，然后成为了 Asyut 的顶级基准。 > So I think the main reason to try and build a startup is actually a pretty irrational one. 所以我认为尝试创业的主要原因其实是一个相当不合理的原因。 > You\'re just really motivated to solve a problem a very specific problem and the satisfaction of building something to solve that problem it kind of justifies five to 10 years of of of stress and a good likelihood of failure. 你真的很有动力去解决一个问题，一个非常具体的问题，以及为解决这个问题而建立一些东西的满足感-它有理由承受 5 到 10 年的压力，并且很有可能失败。 > A bunch of which will be kind of random and out of your control. 其中一堆会是随机的，你无法控制。 > So if I haven\'t deterred you through that positive little positive message then here are the rules of the startup game as I see them. 因此，如果我没有通过积极的、积极的信息来阻止你，那么下面就是我所看到的创业游戏的规则。 > So there are three engines that I think determine a startup success. 因此，我认为有三个引擎决定了创业的成功。 > This insight came to us about three years into Songkick life from this incredibly brilliant guy called Sean Ellis who is surprisingly not well known but I would track down his blog he\'s just incredibly insightful about what it takes to make something work. 这个洞察力来自于宋踢生活的三年左右，他来自一个名叫肖恩·埃利斯(SeanEllis)的非常聪明的家伙，他出奇地不为人所知，但我会追踪他的博客，他对如何使某些事情奏效非常有洞察力。 > So if I define a a new variable unicorn that\'s. 所以如果我定义一个新的变量独角兽\‘s。 > Your level of unicorn this will be roughly your gratification engine the power of your growth engine to the power of your economic engine and you become like a full unicorn Allah BMB Dropbox Google if you get all three right and every engine that fails will reduce your unicorn ness by an order of magnitude. 您的独角兽水平，这将大致是您的满足引擎，您的增长引擎的力量，你的经济引擎的力量，你会变成一个完整的独角兽真主 BMB Dropbox 谷歌，如果你得到所有三个正确和每一个引擎失败将减少您的独角兽一个数量级。 > So. 所以 > If we take the gratification engine that\'s been expressed a much less nerdy terms by Y Combinator as make something people want. 如果我们以满足感引擎为例，YCombinator 用它来表达一个不那么书呆子的术语，作为人们想要的东西。 > In our case that was a pretty brutal experience. 在我们的例子中，这是一次相当残酷的经历。 > We launched Songkick by combining some scrapers for ticket sites with downloadable plugin for your for your Mac that would once you downloaded it scanned the excel file that contained information about what music you listen to and at the end of all of that you get a list of concerts in your area based on the music you listen to. 我们通过将一些票务站点的刮刀器和 Mac 的可下载插件结合起来，启动了松踢，一旦你下载了它，就会扫描 Excel 文件，其中包含了你所听的音乐的信息，在所有这些信息的最后，你会根据你所听的音乐在你所在的地区获得一张音乐会列表。 > And it was a pretty crappy first time use is a screenshot of early on the return on the kind of 5 minutes of your life that it took you to sign up and install the plugin. 这是一个相当糟糕的第一次使用是一个屏幕截图，在你的生命的 5 分钟的回报，它花了你注册和安装插件。 > Was this person has this stuff shows and some people were willing to do that and they liked it. 这个人有这样的表演，有些人愿意这样做，他们很喜欢。 > But the amount of friction involved was way too high for most regular people. 但对大多数普通人来说，摩擦的数量太高了。 > So for a long time you know you\'re kind of going around why isn\'t it working why more people using it. 所以很长一段时间，你都知道你在四处奔波，为什么它不起作用，为什么会有更多的人使用它。 > And we felt like the main reason people weren\'t kind of adopting our products in larger numbers was that it didn\'t do enough. 我们觉得人们不愿意大量使用我们的产品的主要原因是他们做得不够。 > And we added a pretty massive array of additional features that resulted in very little additional usage. 我们还添加了大量的附加功能，结果很少有额外的使用。 > The turning point came when my co-founder Michelle inspired by Shawn that I started running these surveys. 当我的共同创始人米歇尔在肖恩的启发下开始进行这些调查时，转折点就来了。 > They really dug deep into why the users that loved our product loved it and why the ones who were kind of like Matt didn\'t find it. 他们深入研究了为什么喜欢我们的产品的用户喜欢我们的产品，以及为什么那些像 Matt 一样的人没有找到它。 > Didn\'t find it very compelling and the bottom line was that our simple idea of personalized concert alerts and never missing a show was actually a very gratifying experience. 没有发现它很有说服力，底线是，我们简单的想法，个性化的音乐会提醒，从来没有错过一个节目，实际上是一个非常令人欣慰的经历。 > Like people found shows they would never have gone to and they. 就像人们发现的那样，他们永远也不会去，他们。 > Had life changing experiences and we get we would get these e-mails that said oh my god I just went to four shows and there were some of the best nights I\'ve had this year. 如果我们经历了改变生活的经历，我们就会收到这样的电子邮件：哦，天哪，我刚去看了四场演出，还有一些我今年过得最好的夜晚。 > Thank you. 谢谢。 > But too few users were getting to it and we just need to radically improve the you know how easy it was to get that gratified experience. 但是用户太少了，我们只需要从根本上改进，你知道，获得这种满意的体验是多么的容易。 > And that became easier when new streaming services emerged and API has emerged for mobile devices so you could get your taste faster. 随着新的流媒体服务的出现和移动设备 API 的出现，这变得更容易了，这样你就可以更快地尝到你的口味了。 > And we also needed to have better underlying Consett data. 我们还需要有更好的基础 Consett 数据。 > And that was a really big lesson for me. 这对我来说是很重要的一课。 > I think engineers startup people they cherish the idea of 80 20 or MVP but once you find something that works. 我认为工程师们在创业时很珍惜 80，20 或 MVP 的想法，但一旦你找到了有用的东西。 > The key is to do the 2080 where you do this grindingly incremental work that gets the last 20 percent of value but takes 80 percent of your time. 关键是完成 2080 年，在 2080 年中，您要做的是进行这一非常出色的增量工作，这将获得最后 20%的价值，但需要您 80%的时间。 > And for us that I think that really ended up being around data getting more and more high quality timely comprehensive trusted Consett data which is you know relatively hard problem to solve so that we will become the trusted authority for a fan. 而对我们来说，我认为这真的是围绕着数据，得到越来越多的高质量、及时、全面的可信 Consett 数据，这是你知道的比较难解决的问题，这样我们才能成为一个粉丝的可信权威。 > And you know when you talk to users you\'d really feel it you know they\'d be they\'d they\'d suddenly realize your data hadn\'t you had like every small show in their city and the trust level would go up and they become more evangelical about the service or you know you wouldn\'t have those problems where someone said you know I was waiting for you to tell me this show was happening you didn\'t you fail me I\'m not using products ever again. 你知道，当你和用户交谈时，你会真的感觉到，他们会突然意识到你的数据没有像他们城市里的每一个小节目那样，信任程度会提高，他们会对服务更有信心，或者你知道如果有人说你在等你告诉我这个节目，你就不会有问题了。发生了你没让我失望我再也不使用产品了。 > So data. 所以数据。 > We were always told us commodity you don\'t bother with it. 我们总是被告知商品你不用费心。 > It turned out to actually be really the linchpin around around kind of solving this gratification engine. 它实际上是解决这个满足感引擎的关键。 > So you know your gratification and you\'ll have many many levels of refinement that kind of compound on each other whether it\'s the messaging when someone\'s arrives at the site. 所以，你知道你的满足感，你会有很多层次的精致，这种复合在对方身上，不管是当某人到达网站时的信息。 > The core experience the onboarding flows various different conversion rates and you should probably never stop trying to increase its. 核心经验，入职流动，各种不同的转换率，你可能永远不应该停止尝试增加它。 > The next engine is your growth engine how new users discover your products. 下一个引擎是你的增长引擎，新用户如何发现你的产品。 > I guess the first big point here is that your growth engine has no chance of really starting unless you have a great gratifying experience. 我想这里的第一个要点是，除非你有一个令人欣慰的经历，否则你的成长引擎就没有机会真正开始了。 > And I\'ll talk about that more in a minute but I think there\'s sort of four main ways of driving substantial growth with consumer products. 我稍后会更多地讨论这个问题，但我认为有四种主要的方式来推动消费品的大幅增长。 > Word of mouth or viral growth for example WhatsApp or Snapchat or. 口碑或病毒的增长，例如 WhatsApp 或 Snapchat 或。 > Kickstarter. 基克斯特。 > And typically you know one of the most compelling ways to do that is through building a communications app. 通常情况下，你知道最引人注目的方法之一是通过构建一个通信应用程序。 > Paid acquisition. 付费收购。 > So for example Groupon ambient being Zingo when you have a compelling economic model you don\'t should spend money to buy users or subsidize something about the experience that would normally pay for. 例如，Groupon 环境是 Zingo，当你有一个引人注目的经济模式时，你就不应该花钱购买用户，也不应该为那些通常需要付费的体验提供补贴。 > A CEO. 首席执行官。 > So Yelp or Wikipedia or rap genius and then kind of API widget distribution. 所以 Yelp 或者 Wikipedia 或者 RAP 天才然后是 API 小部件发行版。 > So YouTube soundcloud Twitter. YouTube SoundCloud 推特。 > And these aren\'t mutually exclusive. 这些并不是互相排斥的。 > So for example Yelp has a killer mobile app and they get tons of word of mouth growth in addition to our. 举个例子，Yelp 有一款极具杀伤力的移动应用程序，除了我们的应用程序外，他们还获得了大量的口碑增长。 > Or you know you probably didn\'t think of it of ABM as a company that it grew through spending money because they\'ve done many other aspects of growth right. 或者你知道，你可能不认为 ABM 是一家通过花钱成长起来的公司，因为他们做了很多其他方面的增长。 > They\'ve got a killer killer product with word of mouth. 他们有一种口耳相传的杀手产品。 > Word of mouth. 口碑。 > That allowed them to spend money on optimizing a referral program similar to what Dropbox did. 这使得他们可以花钱优化一个类似 Dropbox 的推荐程序。 > They did an amazing job of PR very early on and throughout most companies life. 在大多数公司生命的早期和整个过程中，他们都做了出色的公关工作。 > And they also did really creative stuff like. 他们也做了一些很有创意的事情。 > Like the Craigslist stuff that sort of become famous. 就像 Craigslist 之类的东西会出名。 > So it\'s not mutually exclusive for Songkick. 因此，这并不是互相排斥的宋踢。 > There were a bunch of different drivers of growth. 有许多不同的增长驱动因素。 > So the first big insight that really like I clicked was that there was no canonical page on the Internet for concert or for a tour similar to how there was a count on a whole page of restaurants and Yelp or Kanako page for a movie or director in MTV and you know when you build enough kind of value and in a compelling differentiated data to be the kind of Michael Page you get all these other beneficial effects kicking in. 所以，真正像我所点击的第一个大洞察力是，在互联网上没有用于音乐会或巡演的规范页面，就像在一整页餐馆和 Yelp 或 Kanako 页面上为 MTV 中的电影或导演所做的统计一样，你知道什么时候你建立了足够的价值，在一个引人注目的差异化数据中，你知道就像迈克尔·佩奇，你会得到所有其他有益的效果。 > Whether it\'s Social referrals or ASIO or the industry linking to you or you know the ability to do distribution API partnerships and that core insights when we got it humming led to a lot of growth success. 无论是社交推荐，还是 ASIO，还是与你联系的行业，或者你都知道做分发 API 伙伴关系的能力，以及当我们得到它时的核心洞察力，它带来了巨大的增长成功。 > So you know we would do these partnerships. 所以你知道我们会合作的。 > But like Spotify and Soundcloud and Youtube we started to optimize our site so that Google could discover the content we had better. 但就像 Spotify、SoundCloud 和 YouTube 一样，我们开始优化我们的网站，以便谷歌能够发现我们更好的内容。 > We started to build products for artists so they could link to Songkick more easily. 我们开始为艺术家们制作产品，这样他们就可以更容易地链接到松踢。 > The second big kind of growth factor came from mobile and word of mouth and you know in my opinion know the mobile app stores are reward a gratifying user experience more than any other distribution platform in history. 第二大增长因素来自手机和口碑，在我看来，手机应用商店比历史上任何其他分销平台都更能奖励用户的满意体验。 > And so in that case really I think most the greatest came from making the product more useful easier to get into more more compelling. 因此，在这种情况下，我认为最伟大的是让产品更有用，更容易进入更引人注目的领域。 > So we\'ve benefited from three of these channels not paid because we\'ve not had an economic model that would allow us to to spend money to acquire users. 因此，我们从三个没有付费的渠道中受益，因为我们没有一个经济模式，可以让我们花钱来获取用户。 > So finally the economic engine so that\'s how you make money from your users. 最后是经济引擎，这就是你从用户那里赚钱的方式。 > You may not become a sustainable company. 你可能不会成为一家可持续发展的公司。 > I can\'t say as much about that for us because it\'s still a work in progress and it\'s the reason one of the reasons we\'re not in the pantheon of unicorns yet. 我不能对我们说那么多，因为它还在进行中，这也是为什么我们还没有进入独角兽的万神殿的原因之一。 > Initially we bootstrapped revenue by setting up these affiliate deals with ticketing companies so that when we found someone to show we\'d link to the ticketing company and they give us a small cut for the transaction we generated so kind of similar to kayak or TripAdvisor and that\'s taken us to a revenue run rate of millions of dollars but it won\'t take us to a revenue run rate of hundreds of millions of dollars. 最初，我们通过与票务公司建立附属公司的交易来提升收入，这样当我们找到人来展示我们与票务公司的链接时，他们会给我们一个与皮艇或 TripAdvisor 类似的交易的小部分，这会让我们获得数百万美元的收入运营率，但这不会给我们带来数亿美元的收入运营率。 > And I think it\'s always been a you know it\'s always been clear what the kind of the optimal revenue model for us would be which is just you know you discover the show and you buy the ticket at the same time from us. 我认为它一直是一个，你知道的，它一直是清楚的，什么样的最佳收入模式，对我们来说，就是你知道你发现了节目，你同时从我们购买门票。 > But that requires on us being at a scalable to access inventory which going back to what I was saying earlier about supply side consolidation and need to partner with the industry that requires finding economic alignment with the people who currently hold the rights. 但这要求我们有一个可伸缩的库存，这可以追溯到我早些时候所说的供应侧整合，并需要与行业合作，这需要找到与目前拥有这些权利的人在经济上的一致。 > So it\'s a work in progress but it\'s quite exciting in London and we actually have 25 percent of all the contests in London you can now buy tickets to in a few taps through your Songkick. 这是一项正在进行中的工作，但在伦敦是相当令人兴奋的，我们实际上有 25%的比赛在伦敦，你现在可以买到门票，在几个水龙头，通过你的歌踢。 > So we\'re you know it\'s quite exciting watching that develop for us. 所以，你知道，对我们来说，观看这些节目是非常令人兴奋的。 > Finally there\'s the team that you build and retain to solve all these problems. 最后，你需要建立和保留一个团队来解决所有这些问题。 > This is our team pushing a bus up a hill when it broke down on the way to a festival which is probably a reasonable method metaphor for a kind of startup life. 这是我们的团队推着一辆公共汽车上山，当它在去节日的路上抛锚了，这可能是一种合理的方法来比喻一种创业生活。 > So each of these things I just talked about gratification growth revenue and team they are all dependent on each other. 所以，我刚才提到的每一件事，包括满足、增长、收入和团队，都是相互依赖的。 > So if I just pressed it mathematically I\'ve got this unicorn this is gratification the power of growth the power revenue. 所以，如果我按一下数学，我就得到了这只独角兽，这就是满足，增长的力量，力量的收入。 > Gratification is dependent on your team your economic engine and your growth because you need an amazing team to build a world class product and you need you need revenue to sustainably pay for those people salaries. 满足感取决于你的团队，你的经济引擎和你的增长，因为你需要一个惊人的团队来建立一个世界级的产品，你需要收入来持续支付这些人的工资。 > And in many case having an economic model actually allows you to provide more value to your users. 在很多情况下，拥有一个经济模型实际上可以让你为你的用户提供更多的价值。 > And finally you know some products get better with more people using them so you may actually need growth to better offer a compelling experience. 最后，你知道一些产品会随着更多的人使用而变得更好，所以你可能实际上需要增长才能提供更好的体验。 > So social networks marketplacesetc. 所以社交网络、市场等等。 > So the gratification end depends on your team. 所以满足感取决于你的团队。 > The other two engines you know the next thing growth that is actually also dependent on other stuff. 另外两个引擎，你知道，接下来的事情，增长，实际上也依赖于其他东西。 > So your ability to recruit a growth team obviously is a big factor. 因此，你招募一支成长团队的能力显然是一个重要因素。 > If you have a revenue engine and economic engine you are able to access from the most powerful source of growth which is going to pay for users and a key point to make here is it\'s a lot easier to grow by spending money than not spending money. 如果你有一个收入引擎和经济引擎，你就可以从最强大的增长来源获取，这将为用户支付费用。这里要做的一个关键点是，花钱比不花钱增长容易得多。 > And if you want a simple example of that just think about the number of world class highly effective SBO people out there in the world compared the number of people who can set up an Adwords account or buy ads on Facebook. 如果你想要一个简单的例子，那就想想世界上最有效率的 SBO 用户数量，比较一下可以在 Facebook 上建立 Adword 账户或购买广告的人数。 > Most importantly if you don\'t have a great product you won\'t get the most powerful and fundamental driver word of mouth and you won\'t build all the positive stuff that happens when that\'s working. 最重要的是，如果你没有一个伟大的产品，你将不会得到最强大和最基本的口碑，你也不会建立起所有积极的东西，当它起作用时。 > So I mean just as an example of how these things are interconnected we have this with this partnership with YouTube that was very meaningful to us early on and we were on every single video page on YouTube within a few years of Songkick life and that didn\'t come about because of some like epic biz dev Interac and from bases or hustling our way there it came about because a product manager at YouTube was using Songkick and thought it was awesome and emailed support you know support email to say you know can we do a partnership can we do something here. 所以我的意思是，就像这些东西是如何相互关联的一个例子，我们和 YouTube 的这种合作关系很早就对我们很有意义，我们在宋诗生命的几年内出现在 youtube 上的每一个视频页面上，而这并不是因为一些史诗般的 biz dev Interac，从基地或者从我们的基地来的。因为 Youtube 的一位产品经理正在使用松踢，认为这很棒，并通过电子邮件提供支持，你知道，支持电子邮件，说你知道我们能不能合作，我们可以在这里做点什么。 > So they\'re very interconnected and you know you have to get all the right all the bits to work to get one of the bits to work. 所以它们是非常相互关联的，你知道，你必须得到所有正确的，所有的位元，让其中的一个位元工作。 > And you finally you know the caliber of the team that you can recruit and retain is hugely dependent on how big a problem you\'re solving and how much your team kind of feel like they\'re building something awesome. 你终于知道，你能招募和留住的团队的能力在很大程度上取决于你解决的问题有多大，以及你的团队有多大感觉他们在建设一些很棒的东西。 > And there are some kind of funny paradoxes in the startup world. 在创业世界里也有一些有趣的悖论。 > For example you know the most sophisticated best species who are most in demand are actually sometimes the best people to go to if you want to fund a really crazy hard hard hard idea. 例如，你知道最复杂的、最受欢迎的物种，如果你想为一个疯狂的、艰难的想法提供资金的话，有时也是最好的人。 > And that\'s because they may have more confidence from all the success they\'ve had to be more contrarian rather just following the herd of what whatever one all seems to be jumping on. 这是因为他们可能从所有的成功中获得了更多的信心，他们不得不更加逆向，而只是跟随一群似乎都在跳跃的东西。 > And similarly it seems to be the case that if you\'re you\'re more likely to get really amazing people to want to work on something that\'s a hard problem. 类似地，如果你更有可能得到真正令人惊叹的人，那么你就会想要解决一些棘手的问题。 > That\'s not a trivial thing to solve. 这不是一件小事。 > But great people also want career growth. 但伟人也想要职业发展。 > And if you don\'t grow fast enough it will be tough to continue to give them enough career opportunities. 如果你成长不够快，就很难继续给他们足够的职业机会。 > And then finally you know at some point you know if you want to sustainably grow your team you need a great economic engine to do that. 最后，你知道，在某个时候，你知道，如果你想要持续发展你的团队，你需要一个强大的经济引擎来做到这一点。 > So the team again depends on you know these other three things make a similar bunch of arguments about why the economic engine is dependent on the others. 所以团队再一次依赖于你知道的其他三件事，对于为什么经济引擎依赖于其他因素，会产生类似的争论。 > But hopefully you get my point. 但希望你明白我的意思。 > So Unicorn\'s is gratification the power growth the power of economic gratifications depends on everything growth everything. 所以，独角兽就是满足，动力增长，经济满足的力量，一切都取决于增长。 > Teams do everything economics and everythinga.k.a. 团队做一切经济和一切事情。 > everything is connected and you\'re watching the first season of True Detective. 一切都是有关联的，你在看“真探”的第一季。 > I\'ve labeled this point and hopefully not bored you to tears because to me it seems like one of the most important things to understand about the game. 我已经给这一点贴上了标签，希望你不会无聊到流泪，因为对我来说，这似乎是理解这场比赛最重要的事情之一。 > Of startups is it\'s all connected and you get all these key pieces working in concert to build an exceptional business. 对于初创企业来说，这一切都是相互关联的，而这些关键部分都是为了建立一个特殊的企业而协同工作的。 > And the earlier you figure out the whole system the earlier you get on the path to building the next Dropbox. 你越早计算出整个系统，你就越早走上构建下一个 Dropbox 的道路。 > I was just browsing adorers linked in what I was I was waiting to talk. 我只是在浏览那些连接在我等着说的东西上的装饰品。 > And you know she has a computer science degree and experience making products that people like. 你知道她有计算机科学学位和制作人们喜欢的产品的经验。 > She also worked. 她也工作过。 > She works at slide on all that growth stuff and she seems like she did some sort of master\'s in economics so you know all three engines there\'s there\'s an element of insight there that allows you to jump faster to something that really works holistically. 她在幻灯片上学习那些增长的东西，她好像学过经济学硕士，所以你知道，这三个引擎都有一种洞察力，可以让你更快地跳到真正有效的东西上。 > So again the earlier you figure out all three of these things the faster you get on the path of being the next Dropbox or BMB or Google. 因此，你越早弄清楚这三个问题，你就越快走上下一个 Dropbox、BMB 或 Google 的道路。 > So. 所以 > The last thing I want to talk about is that all of this takes time and is very hard and you can\'t give up. 我最不想谈的是，所有这些都需要时间，而且非常困难，你不能放弃。 > And that\'s you know that\'s that\'s that\'s I think fairly commonly given advice in startup land. 这是你知道的\我认为在初创公司的土地上通常会给出建议。 > So I wanted to give you a few things to take away about how to develop your resilience and how to keep going. 所以我想给你们一些关于如何发展你的韧性和如何继续前进的东西。 > The first thing is it usually does get better if you keep going. 第一件事是，如果你继续走下去，它通常会变得更好。 > I remember the bleakest point in Songkick life was around December 2010 and nothing felt like it was working. 我记得，2010 年 12 月左右，松踢生活中最惨淡的一点是，没有什么能让人感觉到它在起作用。 > We went into Christmas with this brutal board meeting we agreed to try a bunch of new things new year. 在这个残酷的董事会会议上，我们进入了圣诞节，我们同意在新年里尝试一些新的东西。 > And I remember just being like so miserable that whole Christmas and that was what it was. 我记得就像整个圣诞节那样悲惨，这就是我的感受。 > You know that\'s that\'s what graph looked like at that point in time. 你知道在那个时候图是什么样子的。 > You know we had some growth but we built these new features. 你知道，我们有了一些发展，但我们建立了这些新功能。 > Nothing happened. 什么都没发生。 > No one really cared about them it didn\'t really improve things and it was just really bleak outcome and how much cash we had but it wasn\'t a ton. 没有人真正关心他们，这并没有真正改善事情，只是结果很糟糕，我们有多少现金，但这并不是一吨。 > And then when things get hard I try to go back and look at our growth graph and I remember that that was the point that it felt that Bahjat just before a lot of things started to work. 当事情变得艰难的时候，我试着回去看看我们的成长图，我记得这就是在很多事情开始起作用之前，巴哈伊的感觉。 > And now you know we have 10 million people using us and the graph looks a lot better. 现在你知道，我们有 1000 万人在使用我们，这个图表看起来好多了。 > So it usually does get better if you keep moving and a founder of a startup of a great company told me once you know survival is a growth strategy. 所以，如果你继续前进的话，它通常会变得更好。一家伟大公司的创始人告诉我，一旦你知道生存是一种增长策略，它就会变得更好。 > And his was like a platform that essentially grown when everybody else gave up he just kept getting all of their users and gradually got to this crazy crazy crazy size. 他的平台就像一个平台，当其他人放弃的时候，这个平台基本上在成长，他只是不断地吸引他们所有的用户，并逐渐达到这个疯狂的规模。 > But I think the best thing about surviving is you get to see new platform shifts and changes in the market more broadly. 但我认为，生存的最好之处在于，你可以看到新的平台发生变化，市场也发生了更广泛的变化。 > So for example we\'ve experienced the shift from desktop to mobile and that\'s been a really really positive for song thing for Songkick for lots of reasons and everyone likes to talk about how new startups get built when new platforms emerge. 例如，我们经历了从桌面到移动的转变，这对歌曲来说是非常积极的，原因很多，每个人都喜欢谈论新的创业公司是如何在新平台出现的时候建立起来的。 > So for example Uber getting built on the back of Mobile. 比如，优步就建立在手机的背上。 > But things that are already working can also suddenly work a lot better. 但是那些已经在起作用的东西也会突然变得更好。 > So Shazam and Pandora were companies that were 8 and 7 years old at the time that the iPhone launched and at that point in time I think they\'ve kind of been great but not spectacular breakouts. 所以 Shazam 和 Pandora 公司在 iPhone 发布的时候已经有 8 到 7 年的历史了，在那个时候，我认为这两家公司取得了不错的突破，但并不是惊人的突破。 > And the iPhone changed out. 然后 iPhone 就变了。 > I mean I remember hearing from the Pandora guys that the iPhone doubled their growth overnight. 我是说，我记得从潘多拉一家那里听说，iPhone 在一夜之间增长了一倍。 > So platforms shift sort of expand the sets of startup visions that can finally be fully realized. 因此，平台的转变扩大了一些最终可以完全实现的创业愿景。 > So just let that be another reason to sort of push through the hard times that the environment may get better. 因此，让这成为另一个理由来推动环境改善的艰难时期。 > Another thing I would recommend doing is trying to articulate why you believe you are doing important work and I think a good way to do that is to sort of do a five wise analysis on your motivations until you get to the root cause. 我建议你做的另一件事是试图阐明为什么你认为自己在做重要的工作，我认为一个好的方法就是对你的动机进行五种明智的分析，直到找到根本原因。 > Michelle Pete and I did that a few years back and wrote them down and they got to refer to when when things get hard. 米歇尔·皮特和我在几年前就这样做了，并把他们写下来，当事情变得艰难时，他们不得不提到。 > So the whys for us were we believe that live music can change your life. 所以我们的理由是我们相信现场音乐可以改变你的生活。 > And we believe that at its best live music is this pure intimate experience between you and an artist and we believe that\'s what that\'s what music is all about. 我们相信，在它最好的现场音乐是你和一个艺术家之间这种纯粹的亲密体验，我们相信这就是音乐的意义所在。 > And we want everyone to have that experience and at present seeing live music is to nation experience because it\'s inaccessible because it takes so much effort. 我们希望每个人都有这样的体验，而目前，看现场音乐对国家来说是一种体验，因为它是无法获得的，因为它需要付出很大的努力。 > And we believe that fails artists and fans and it\'s happened because the industry has lost sight of what\'s most important which is that intimacy and connection between the two of them. 我们认为，艺术家和歌迷都失败了，这是因为这个行业已经忽略了最重要的是他们之间的亲密和联系。 > So we don\'t accept that we\'ll create a better future for live music where the online experience will be true to that feeling of being there. 因此，我们不能接受，我们将为现场音乐创造一个更美好的未来，在那里，在线体验将是真实存在的感觉。 > So when you when you\'re low if you write that down when you\'re feeling good you\'ll have something to refer back to that will kind of remind you of like the fact that this isn\'t about you know whether you\'re kind of the next cool company on tech crunch or whatever else. 所以当你情绪低落的时候，如果你在感觉良好的时候把它写下来，你会想起一些东西，这会让你想起这样一个事实：这不是关于你的，你知道你是下一个科技危机中的酷公司还是其他什么。 > It\'s it\'s about the fact that you really earnestly want to solve a problem. 它是关于一个事实，你真的很想解决一个问题。 > When you\'re really low. 当你真的很低的时候。 > Spend some time with your users the happy ones will remind you of why you\'re doing it. 花点时间和你的用户在一起-快乐的用户会提醒你为什么要这么做。 > And the unhappy disengaged ones will sort of transform this sense of abstract impending doom into this more practical feeling of there\'s something to fix. 而那些不快乐、不投入的人会把这种抽象的、即将到来的厄运转变成一种更实际的感觉，即有一些事情需要解决。 > And our product team actually ended up knocking a wall in one of our in our in our meeting room and creating a makeshift User user research lab that helps to set a regular tempo for getting users in and having your whole team watch the experience they have with your product. 我们的产品团队最终在我们的会议室里敲了一堵墙，创建了一个临时的用户研究实验室，这个实验室可以帮助你设定一个固定的用户进入速度，让你的整个团队来观察他们对你的产品的体验。 > As individuals not in kind of an aggregate Google Analytics Ziwei. 作为个人，而不是在某种程度上，谷歌分析，紫薇。 > Finally start your company with people you can count on when shit\'s going sideways. 最后，和你可以指望的人一起开始你的公司。 > I think it\'s really hard to know that about someone without a real foundation of friendship. 我觉得很难知道一个没有真正友谊基础的人。 > So I thoroughly endorse. 所以我完全赞同。 > Why is this thing about building on top of a longstanding and trusted relationship. 为什么这是建立在长期和信任的关系之上的事情。 > I\'ve been incredibly lucky to have two amazing cofounders Michelle and Pete and an amazing team of people many of whom have been here right from the start and I think you know I can\'t really imagine how you would get through some of the hard times without those relationships. 我非常幸运有两位出色的联合创始人米歇尔和皮特，以及一组非常棒的团队，他们中的许多人从一开始就在这里，我想你知道我无法想象没有这些关系你会如何度过一些艰难的时期。 > So in summary if you\'re going to do a startup in the entertainment industry or any highly consolidated industry you\'ll probably need to work with the industry more than you realize. 总之，如果你想在娱乐业或任何高度整合的行业中创业，你可能需要更多地与这个行业合作，而不是你所意识到的那样。 > So get started early on. 所以早点开始吧。 > Understand as much of the game and what drives success. 了解游戏的大部分内容，以及是什么推动了成功。 > Before you start building. 在你开始建房子之前。 > And find ways to nurture your resilience because keeping going is usually the right answer. 想办法培养你的韧性，因为坚持下去通常是正确的答案。 > Thanks. 谢谢 > Applause. 掌声。