# Emmett Shear at Startup School SV 2014 > `[00:00:03]` Larry buddy I actually work yes. `[00:00:03]` 拉里·巴迪，我确实工作过。 > `[00:00:12]` All right. `[00:00:12]` 好的。 > So this was us in 2005. 这就是 2005 年的我们。 > `[00:00:17]` We were just out of college. 我们刚从大学毕业。 > We packed ourselves into my civic and we drove up into Boston where we\'d just been accepted thankfully into the summer Founders Program. 我们把自己塞进了我的城市，然后我们开车去了波士顿，在那里，我们被录取了，谢天谢地，参加了暑期创办人项目。 > It\'s very first year our backup plan was to go live with our parents. 这是我们第一年的备用计划就是和我们的父母住在一起。 > So that was great. 那真是太棒了。 > Both Justin and I were very relieved that we could get our own place albeit a little tiny bedroom in Roxbury which is all we could afford at the time. 贾斯汀和我都松了一口气，因为我们可以找到自己的住处，尽管罗克斯伯里有一间小小的卧室，这是我们当时所能负担得起的。 > And that summer was amazing. 那个夏天太棒了。 > I still to this day don\'t quite know what they saw on us to accept us because looking back on it we knew none of the things we needed in order to succeed in startups and we missed my first slide which is a big slide this says imagine in front of you. 直到今天，我仍然不知道他们看到了什么让我们接受我们，因为回顾过去，我们不知道我们要在初创企业中取得成功所需要的任何东西，我们错过了我的第一张幻灯片，这是一张大幻灯片，上面写着：在你面前想象一下。 > Don\'t give up because that\'s the only important thing that I really had going in. 不要放弃，因为那是我真正要做的唯一重要的事情。 > When we started here was a determination not to give up because if you look back on it we kind of knew how to program. 当我们从这里开始的时候，我们决心不放弃，因为如果你回顾一下它，我们就知道如何编程了。 > We weren\'t very good. 我们不是很好。 > In retrospect we didn\'t really know what we were doing. 回想起来，我们并不真正知道自己在做什么。 > I thought that you had to use a database from Java. 我认为您必须使用 Java 的数据库。 > I didn\'t understand that that was like a separate thing and that they had nothing to do with each other. 我不明白这是另一回事，他们之间没有任何关系。 > I was we really really didn\'t know what we were doing we did not have make product decisions. 我真的不知道我们在做什么，我们没有做产品决定。 > We to raise money to hire people. 我们要筹集资金雇人。 > But it certainly did not manage people and we had basically none of the skills. 但它当然没有管理人员，我们基本上没有任何技能。 > `[00:01:29]` All we had was a desire to make it happen and an amazing support network of people who were helping us make it happen. `[00:01:29]` 我们所拥有的只是一种实现它的愿望，以及一个令人惊奇的帮助我们实现它的人的支持网络。 > And so we started our company Kigo calendar Mikiko calendar was a story in just repeated mistake and failure. 于是我们开始了我们的公司 Kigo 日历 Mikiko 日历是一个重复错误和失败的故事 > `[00:01:45]` We were we were building basically Google calendar. `[00:01:45]` 我们基本上是在建立谷歌日历。 > It wasn\'t called that at time because we were a calendar hadn\'t been released but we\'ve seen Gmail as had almost everyone else and we in about 9 other companies all had the same brilliant idea at the same time which is we should make a calendar that works like Gmail which is actually a pretty good idea. 因为我们的日历还没有发布，所以我们没有这么称呼它，但是我们看到 Gmail 和其他所有人一样，我们在其他 9 家公司同时都有同样的绝妙想法，那就是我们应该制作一个像 Gmail 那样的日历，这实际上是一个非常好的主意。 > Turns out but everyone had that same idea. 但每个人都有相同的想法。 > It probably wasn\'t a great start start at the time anyway. 无论如何，这可能不是一个好的开始。 > So not only do we have a kind of not so great idea but we couldn\'t stay focused on it for more than like five weeks in a row. 所以，我们不仅有一个不太好的主意，而且我们不能连续五个星期专注于这个问题。 > `[00:02:16]` So we had like this founder ADT we\'d go and we\'d work on Quico for about five weeks and they wouldn\'t it wouldn\'t explode overnight mysteriously for some reason and we get demoralized he would give up and we go build and launch some other product like a social network for families or a search engine for MySpace MySpace was big at the time not Facebook. `[00:02:16]` 所以我们有了这样的创始人 ADT，我们将在 Quico 上工作大约 5 周，他们不会因为某种原因在一夜之间神秘爆炸，他会放弃，我们会去建立和推出一些其他的产品，比如家庭社交网络或者 MySpace 的搜索引擎，那时 Facebook 并不是很大。 > `[00:02:36]` So just you know context and we\'ve actually had a listing called sounds app which was a imagin soundcloud but built by people who didn\'t have any idea or any vision for how to grow it from there. `[00:02:36]` 所以你只知道上下文，我们实际上有一个名为声音应用的列表，它是一个 Imagin SoundCloud，但是由那些对如何在那里成长没有任何想法和远见的人创建的。 > And we we just we we did get a really great education in prototyping products like we built in launch I think no less than 6 start of ideas in a year and a half and we kept going back to Quico when that inevitably also failed to explode. 我们确实在原型产品方面得到了很好的教育，就像我们在发布时制造的一样，我认为在一年半的时间里，至少有 6 个创意的开始，我们继续回到 Quico，而这也不可避免地失败了。 > And so we learned a lot that we learned a lot about how ADT definitely prevents you from succeeding. 所以我们学到了很多，我们学到了很多关于 ADT 是如何阻止你成功的。 > `[00:03:11]` We learned about how to program that was much better. `[00:03:11]` 我们学到了如何编写更好的程序。 > By the end of that than I was at the beginning as was Justin we hired our first employees screwed up hiring our first employees and managing them but learning experience. 到了最后，比我开始的时候，我们雇佣了第一批员工，把第一批员工的招聘和管理搞砸了，但是学习了经验。 > And then we sold them on eBay because Google Calendar been launched and we had no idea how to compete with that. 然后我们在易趣上卖了，因为谷歌日历推出了，我们不知道如何与之竞争。 > `[00:03:27]` So that takes us to the next step. `[00:03:27]` 那就带我们进入下一步。 > `[00:03:31]` So we we knew after we did that we wanted to keep doing startups. `[00:03:31]` 所以我们知道，在我们做完之后，我们想继续做初创公司。 > We\'d sold it on eBay. 我们在易趣上卖的。 > About a quarter million dollars which at the time was like a inconceivably large amount of money we didn\'t keep all of that. 当时大约有 25 万美元，这就像一笔难以想象的巨额资金，我们并没有全部保留。 > Our investors got most of it but still it was it was seemed like sort of a win. 我们的投资者得到了其中的大部分，但这似乎是一场胜利。 > And we raised more money from Y C with this basic concept that we were going to build a reality television show around Justin\'s life. 我们从 YC 那里筹到了更多的钱，我们打算围绕贾斯汀的生活建立一个真人秀节目。 > Again I\'m not sure that the decision making by Y see looking back now looks good but at the time I can\'t really understand what they were thinking so. 再说一次，我不确定 Y 做出的决定现在看起来不错，但当时我无法真正理解他们是怎么想的。 > So we knew at the time we knew two things. 所以当时我们知道两件事。 > We knew we were missing two really crucial skills in order to make a startup happen. 我们知道，为了使创业成为现实，我们缺少了两项非常关键的技能。 > We needed someone who could keep us from just like meandering to build a third startup so we brought on our friend from college Michael Seibel to be the CEO and be B-R bureau our parent sort of you know keep us product focused guys from getting NTD and leaving the project and keep us on the straight and narrow. 我们需要一个能阻止我们像蜿蜒前行的人来创建第三家初创公司，所以我们把大学里的朋友迈克尔·塞贝尔(Michael Seibel)请来担任首席执行官，成为 B-R 局-我们的母公司，你知道，让我们这些专注于产品的人远离 NTD，离开这个项目，让我们保持直截了当的态度。 > And we promised him we\'d move to New York really quick it\'d be great. 我们答应过他我们会很快搬到纽约那会很棒的。 > You should just go out to Silicon Valley for us to launch it will raise some money and move to New York and that was that was all lies. 你应该去硅谷，让我们启动它，它会筹集一些资金，然后搬到纽约，这都是谎言。 > We never moved to New York. 我们从没搬到纽约。 > I think we kind of intended to but not really. 我想我们是有意的，但不是真的。 > And so then we we brought on khyal our fourth co-founder because we needed someone who actually knew how to build hardware like we we were stopped we were smart but we were like kind of junior asked programmers at the time and definitely couldn\'t build what we thought we needed to build for justin tv to launch it to launch a live 24/7 reality TV television show. 于是，我们把第四位联合创始人 khyal 请来了，因为我们需要一个真正懂得如何制造硬件的人，就像我们被叫停了一样，我们很聪明，但我们当时就像是初级的被问到的程序员，我们肯定不能构建我们认为我们需要为 Justin TV 构建的东西来发布一个 24/7 直播的真人秀节目。 > You brought Kylen for that and this was our awesome foreperson founding team foreperson founding teams are generally a bad idea. 你带来了凯伦，这是我们令人敬畏的领队创建团队，领队创建团队一般都是个坏主意。 > Hours worked. 工作了几个小时。 > I don\'t generally recommend it but something about the way the team dynamics gelled made it function and we launched the show and it was our first time launching a show where we got the attention of the whole country. 我一般不推荐它，但是关于团队动力如何使它发挥作用，我们启动了这个节目，这是我们第一次在这个节目中引起全国的关注。 > I mean I mean not everybody but like a lot of people heard about us. 我是说，不是每个人都知道，但就像很多人听说过我们一样。 > We were on and carry on like the morning show. 我们就像早上的节目一样继续下去。 > We like we we built the thing that people outside of Silicon Valley cared about and that was really really cool and had this awesome spike of growth we had like 150000 uniques in the first month and then it turns out we have no idea what we\'re doing in terms of producing reality television. 我们喜欢建立硅谷以外的人关心的东西，这真的很酷，而且在第一个月里，我们有了 150000 个大学的惊人的增长，结果我们不知道我们在制作真人秀方面做了什么。 > We did not understand that and so we went back to what we knew about which was the technology in the platform the thing we spent the previous year and a half working on and we opened up the Justin TV platform to everyone and made it into the website. 我们不明白这一点，所以我们回到了我们所知道的平台中的技术，我们花了一年半的时间在这个平台上，我们向所有人开放了贾斯汀电视平台，并把它放到了网站上。 > You may have actually visited at some point which is a platform for anyone to broadcast live video. 你可能真的在某个时候访问过，这是一个平台，任何人都可以播放现场视频。 > `[00:06:16]` And so the one there you go. `[00:06:16]` 你去的那个。 > OK. 好的 > `[00:06:22]` So you can see just on TV being flat for a very long time as we had no idea we were doing and bumbled around with reality television show you can see that bend in the curve that\'s us figuring out oh yeah we should probably just not produce the content and let other people do it. `[00:06:22]` 所以你可以在电视上看到电视上很长一段时间是平的，因为我们不知道我们在做什么，在电视真人秀节目中胡乱转，你可以看到曲线上的弯道，我们正在琢磨，哦，是的，我们可能不应该制作内容，让其他人去做。 > It\'s really important that we didn\'t give up right so the the key thing that happened there is we had a failed project and a failed startup like it wasn\'t working. 真正重要的是，我们没有放弃，所以关键是我们有一个失败的项目和一个失败的创业，就像它不起作用一样。 > We were it was clearly going nowhere but rather than give up on it we decide okay how do we repurpose this how do we keep going. 很明显，我们是无处可去，但我们没有放弃，而是决定，好吧，我们如何重新定位这个问题，我们如何继续前进。 > We somehow managed to raise money despite the fact that it was not a good idea before we opened the platform. 尽管在打开平台之前，这不是一个好主意，但我们还是设法筹集了资金。 > People believed in us and give us an idea of our current theme here we convince people to believe in us and give us money before we actually have figured it out. 人们相信我们，给我们一个关于我们当前主题的想法，我们说服人们相信我们，在我们还没有搞清楚之前给我们钱。 > And that\'s that was really really good for us because it let us let us keep going and not give up but we would have kept going anyway as I think we would. 这对我们真的很好，因为它让我们继续前进，而不是放弃，但无论如何，我们都会像我想的那样继续前进。 > We\'re all really committed even if we hadn\'t been on the draw draw a salary which we couldn\'t. 我们都很认真，即使我们没有拿到薪水，但我们不能。 > For months in the middle we would have kept going. 在中间的几个月里，我们会一直坚持下去。 > So then it\'s great. 那就太棒了。 > We got product market fit or we sort of thought we did. 我们已经适应了产品市场，或者说我们认为我们做到了。 > We didn\'t really but we hit something we\'d like stumbled accidentally into something people really wanted and the growth sort of speaks to that. 我们并没有这样做，但我们碰到了一些我们想要的东西，意外地撞上了人们真正想要的东西，而增长也说明了这一点。 > And so then you get to this period just to give you a history you have some growth. 所以你进入这个阶段只是为了给你一个历史，你有一些成长。 > And we\'re really excited and it\'s really just heads down. 我们真的很兴奋，它真的只是头朝下。 > I\'ve never scaled anything before so this is another skill we didn\'t have I had no idea how to run a Web service that got more than 3 users at a time. 我以前从来没有缩放过任何东西，所以这是我们没有的另一项技能，我不知道如何运行一次拥有超过 3 个用户的 Web 服务。 > Another did Kyle and so we had a lot of downtime. 另一个是凯尔，所以我们有很多休息时间。 > A lot of downtime kept growing anyways and got a lot better at it. 很多停工时间一直在增长，而且做得更好。 > `[00:07:48]` Learn how to scale a web service and then the sad thing happened is we didn\'t understand what was generating our growth. `[00:07:48]` 学习如何扩展 Web 服务，但不幸的是，我们不知道是什么创造了我们的成长。 > `[00:07:59]` And so we couldn\'t cause it to keep going. `[00:07:59]` 所以我们不能让它继续前进。 > We hit some point and stopped growing and it was totally mysterious to us why this happened like we didn\'t we really. 我们到达了某个点，停止了生长，这对我们来说是完全神秘的，为什么会发生这样的事情，不是吗？ > If you\'d asked us why were you growing 3 months ago when you\'re not growing now you would not be able to tell you because we couldn\'t have told you why we started growing in the first place other than we made some changes and it seemed like it worked. 如果你问我们为什么你在 3 个月前成长，而现在你没有成长，你就不能告诉你，因为我们不可能告诉你为什么我们一开始就开始成长，除了我们做了一些改变，而且它看起来很有效。 > So we kept going we kept going for four years we realized okay well we\'re not growing it\'s 2008. 所以我们坚持了四年，我们意识到，好吧，我们没有在成长-2008 年。 > So if you cast your mind back the market has totally collapsed. 因此，如果你回心转意，市场就完全崩溃了。 > There\'s no way to raise money. 没有办法筹集资金。 > You\'re like well we better start making some money and so we worked really hard on monetizing our site. 你就像我们最好开始赚钱，所以我们非常努力地赚钱，我们的网站。 > We cut costs and we clawed our way. 我们削减了成本，然后按自己的方式行事。 > I wouldn\'t call it profitability but at least we\'d staunched the bleeding and then we kind of found ourselves stuck in this place where what do we do now like we\'ve got this thing we could stay here where do we to make it profitable. 我不认为它是盈利，但至少我们已经止住了流血，然后我们发现自己陷入了这样的境地：我们现在做什么，就像我们有了这样的东西-我们可以留在这里，让它盈利。 > We could work on it for a while. 我们可以好好研究一下。 > You know it\'s not really going anywhere. 你知道这不会有什么进展的。 > And so we had this moment real met up and we like we need to do something with this company and should have two schools of thought. 所以我们有了真正的相遇，我们喜欢和这家公司做点什么，应该有两种想法。 > One of them was mobile at the time the iPhone was new and we saw it. 其中一个是移动的，当时 iPhone 是新的，我们看到了它。 > There\'s this real opportunity to build a mobile video. 这是制作移动视频的真正机会。 > There was no good mobile video players in the space that that could be big. 在这个可能很大的空间里，没有好的移动视频播放器。 > And there is the sort of second idea run gaming which I was interested in primarily because it was the only content on Justin TV that I personally watched. 还有第二个想法，运行游戏，这是我感兴趣的，主要是因为它是我个人观看的贾斯汀电视的唯一内容。 > `[00:09:25]` And we actually said okay this time rather than just launch random features and see but I don\'t know just sort of guess whether they worked or not. `[00:09:25]` 这一次，我们实际上说好，而不是只是随机发布特性，看看，但我不知道，只是猜测它们是否起作用。 > We\'re gonna set real goals for two projects one around mobile one around gaming and we\'re going to try to hit those goals and so we set up two teams internally one led by MichaelR. 我们将为两个项目设定真正的目标，一个围绕移动项目，一个围绕游戏，我们将尝试实现这些目标，因此我们在内部建立了两个团队，一个由 MichaelR 领导。 > then CEO which turned into Socialcam on getting spun off and then a second one led by me and in partnership with Kevin Lin who is our CEO and the two of us really believed in the gaming part mostly because were big gamers and I done some handwaving math about how IPN was big so maybe we could be too. 后来，首席执行官变成了社交摄像头，在我的领导下，与我们的首席执行官凯文·林(KevinLin)合作，我们两个人真的相信游戏部分，主要是因为他们是大玩家，我做了一些关于 IPN 有多大的挥手数学，也许我们也可以这么做。 > And we looked into it and so there\'s no really content issues with this. 我们对此进行了调查，因此对此没有真正满意的问题。 > We can we can go get the gaming content it\'s not incredibly expensive the way sports would be. 我们可以，我们可以去获得游戏内容，它不像运动那样昂贵。 > And we realized that advertisers are okay with gaming. 我们意识到广告商对游戏没意见。 > Okay great. 好吧太好了。 > All the market research has done. 所有的市场调查都做了。 > Let\'s go do it. 我们去做吧。 > That basically was in fact the center of market research. 这实际上是市场研究的中心。 > And so that was this project that was codenames Earth anyone who\'s ever worked with me knows I love code names. 因此，这是一个代号为“地球”的项目，任何曾与我共事过的人都知道，我喜欢代号。 > I will code name anything. 我会给任何东西起代号。 > Code name reorgs I will code name like moving the kitchen anything I love code name so our project code named for this was Zearth. 代码名称，reorgs，我将代码名，像移动厨房，任何我喜欢的代码名称，所以我们的项目代码命名为 ZEarth。 > Which no one else in the company loves but I really loved and actually really want to launch twitch as Earth but they wouldn\'t let me. 这是公司里没有人喜欢的，但我真的很喜欢，而且真的很想像地球一样发射抽搐，但他们不让我这么做。 > So we had to go with the new name and the best thing about about the work we did then was that that was when that was when the light bulb went off. 所以我们不得不使用新的名字，而我们当时做的工作最好的地方就是灯泡熄灭的时候。 > That was when I finally should have I guess made the final step. 那时我终于应该迈出最后一步了。 > This is 5 16 years and as an entrepreneur and got the head put together all the skills I needed to actually run a company I could I could build products. 这是一个 5，16 年的时间，作为一名企业家，他把我所需要的所有技能集中在一起，真正地经营一家我可以制造产品的公司。 > I understood the engineering side. 我了解工程方面。 > I could manage. 我能应付的。 > People had spent years painfully making mistakes losing lots of employees. 多年来，人们一直在痛苦地犯错误，失去了很多员工。 > Sorry Eric sorry Tim you were learning experiences. 抱歉，埃里克，提姆，你在学习经验。 > And we we I figured out how to do hiring we\'d figured out how to scale products if we needed to. 我们 > We knew I knew about how companies might make money you might lose money. 我们知道公司是如何赚钱的-你可能会亏本。 > And what I finally could do when we were when we were here is I finally got the extra bonus skill of figuring out how to talk to users. 当我们在这里的时候，我最终能做的是，我终于获得了额外的额外技能，那就是弄清楚如何和用户交谈。 > So now you\'re all thinking I\'ve heard what you have to talk to users yay. 所以现在你们都认为我已经听到了你们要和用户交谈的内容。 > Of course I talked to users and I thought I talked to users before we did before we did switch. 当然，我和用户交谈过，在我们切换之前，我想我已经和用户谈过了。 > I was wrong. 我错了。 > I didn\'t actually understand how to talk to users and 80 percent of you when you go start your startup make the exact same mistake idea which is you go talk to some users and you\'ll think you\'ve done it right. 我真的不知道如何和用户交谈，当你开始创业的时候，80%的人都不懂，犯同样的错误，那就是你去和一些用户交谈，你会认为你做得对。 > It\'s really hard. 这真的很难。 > `[00:12:13]` It\'s something that we you know we train product managers on Monday when they come into the company something that I think is really one of the key skills for a startup founder it certainly was for me one of the missing skills. `[00:12:13]` 我们知道，当产品经理进入公司时，我们会在周一对他们进行培训-我认为这是初创公司创始人的关键技能之一-对我来说，这当然是我缺少的技能之一。 > And so we finally built things for our users. 所以我们最终为我们的用户建造了一些东西。 > It was like we\'d been we\'ve been to bumbling around the dark trying to get across the room. 就像我们曾经在黑暗中笨手笨脚地试图穿过房间一样。 > Right. 右（边），正确的 > And if you go across the room that\'s product market fit. 如果你穿过房间，那就适合你的产品市场了。 > `[00:12:36]` And so we\'d be like Aha we know it\'s that way and then we\'d go oh step on a Lego but my foot into a chair and that\'s like that was building stuff was like you can make progress that way every time you hit something you back up and you go around and you get something else you back up you go around and eventually you get closer and closer to the direction you want to go in. `[00:12:36]` 所以我们会像啊哈一样，我们知道它是那样的，然后我们就会走到乐高上，但是我的脚踩到了椅子上，那就像建筑材料一样，每次你撞到你背上的东西时，你都可以这样做，然后你得到了其他的东西，你又回来了，最后你走得更近了。更接近你想要进入的方向。 > It was like I just turned the lights for oh I see there\'s some logos there in the chairs there and I should just like walk in this path and I\'ll get across the room. 就像我刚刚把灯打开了，哦，我看到椅子上有一些标识，我应该走在这条路上，然后我会穿过房间。 > And it was really it is really a magical experience. 这真的是一次神奇的经历。 > You put all of those things 16 year accumulation of six years of experience together of basically more or less failing to do the right thing in a startup together and you finally got Twitch TV which we launched at E3 in 2011. 你把所有这些东西都放在一起 16 年积累了六年的经验，基本上都没能在初创公司一起做正确的事情，你终于得到了 TwitTV，这是我们 2011 年在 E3 上推出的。 > About nine months after the project started in about four months after I had this epiphany and this logo is not very good my designers are really very good. 大约在这个项目开始后的九个月，大约四个月后，我有了这个顿悟，这个标志不是很好，我的设计师真的很好。 > It\'s not bad when designers are unhappy with it after his he\'s not happy with it because I made him do it in 24 hours because I was like Oh right we need a logo we\'re launching in 24 hours make it. 当设计师们对它不满的时候，他就不满意了，因为我让他在 24 小时内就这么做了，因为我想，我们需要一个标志，我们要在 24 小时内发布。 > And so we didn\'t actually think he did a pretty good job for a 24 hour logo. 所以我们并不认为他在 24 小时的标识上做得很好。 > And that was the whole thing of Twitch was like we basically just threw these like two or three things together like we didn\'t do that much work compared to the amount of work we\'d done for just in TV. 这就是特维奇的全部，就像我们把这些东西放在一起，就像我们没有做那么多的工作，和我们在电视上所做的工作量相比。 > We applied it in the right places in the right directions because we finally knew what we were doing well enough to apply it apply our effort efficiently. 我们把它应用到正确的地方，在正确的方向上，因为我们最终知道我们做的足够好，能够有效地运用我们的努力。 > And that was that was twitch and actually from that point on the story gets like way more boring because we basically did the same thing over and over and over again. 那是抽搐，实际上从那一刻起，故事变得更无聊了，因为我们基本上一遍又一遍地做着同样的事情。 > We went to talk to the users we\'d ask them like what do you want and we get to know what their net is what they wanted but like what their life goals were and like their experiences they have today how they made money today what their jobs were like what they wanted to do. 我们去和用户交谈，我们会问他们你想要什么，我们知道他们的网络是什么，他们想要什么，但是喜欢他们的生活目标，喜欢他们的经历，他们今天是如何赚钱的，他们的工作是什么样的，他们想做什么。 > And we identified really importantly which users were the most important to us and that was the broadcasters we had to build a place that was amazing for people to broadcast gaming video. 我们确定了最重要的是哪些用户对我们来说是最重要的，那就是我们必须建立一个让人们能够播放游戏视频的地方。 > And we had to build a place that was amazing for gamers. 我们不得不建造一个对玩家来说很棒的地方。 > And so we would just cycle that we would talk to them we\'d go build stuff some of them would switch. 所以我们只需要循环，我们会和他们交谈，我们会去建造一些东西，他们中的一些人会转换。 > We\'d get enough leverage that through promotion that we could get more and bring more people onto the platform we started being able to do business development deals because we got bigger don\'t do business development deals or starting a company it\'s like useless you see big companies do it or even medium size start ups to it sometimes it can be quite effective later. 我们将获得足够的杠杆，通过推广，我们可以得到更多的人，让更多的人进入我们的平台，我们开始能够做商业发展交易，因为我们变得更大了，不做商业发展交易，或者创办一家公司-你看到大公司做这件事，甚至中型企业开始做这件事-有时候，它可能会非常有效。 > Don\'t don\'t imitate them. 不要模仿他们。 > It doesn\'t work early. 它不起作用。 > Every time we tried to do a business devolvement dieldrin just on TV and we didn\'t have a product that was taking off. 每次我们试图在电视上做一项业务发展活动时，我们都没有一种正在腾飞的产品。 > It was a gigantic distraction and waste of time. 这是一个巨大的分散注意力和浪费时间。 > They only it\'s only beneficial once you get later on into the process. 只有当你以后进入这个过程时，它们才是有益的。 > At any rate so you\'ve probably seen this graph before. 无论如何，你可能以前见过这张图。 > I think this graph was actually inspired by Justin TV because this is this is what it feels like doing a startup and this is what Justin TV and felt like the whole time which is this rush of excitement in the beginning is your first building something that you are really excited about this idea it\'s awesome we\'re taking it to the world this long period of like Payne where it doesn\'t work and you don\'t know what you\'re doing and you are probably screwing it up but you could probably if everyone was super skilled and knew everything you need to know from day one they might be well to enter that growth curve immediately. 我认为这张图表实际上是受到贾斯汀电视的启发，因为这就是贾斯汀电视创业的感觉，这也是贾斯汀电视的由始至终的感觉，这是你第一次建立起你真正兴奋的东西，你对这个想法感到非常兴奋，这太棒了，我们把它带到世界上，就像佩恩一样。如果它不起作用，你也不知道你在做什么，你可能搞砸了，但如果每个人都是超级熟练的，并且从第一天起就知道你需要知道的一切，那么他们很可能很快就能进入增长曲线。 > You just can\'t. 你就是不能。 > You have a massive learning experience and learning experience is specific to every startup. 你有大量的学习经验，学习经验是每个创业公司特有的。 > That\'s why I don\'t really think giving generic surfer advice usually works because even that business development advice I just gave that\'s wrong. 这就是为什么我不认为给泛型冲浪者的建议通常是有效的，因为即使是我刚才给出的商业发展建议也是错误的。 > Like some number of people that\'s that\'s actually completely the wrong advice. 就像很多人一样，这实际上是完全错误的建议。 > You should actually go do biz dev deals before you even launch your company. 实际上，你甚至应该在启动公司之前就去做 Bizdev 的交易。 > I don\'t know what stuff that would be for but there\'s got to be one out there that fits that pattern and so eventually it gets better. 我不知道这是为了什么，但必须有一个符合这种模式，所以它最终会变得更好。 > I think that\'s the real message eventually if you stick with it even if you have to change your idea even if you have to pivot. 我认为这是真正的信息，如果你坚持它，即使你必须改变你的想法，即使你必须转向。 > The coal company in a different direction if you have to start over with a new product idea entirely. 如果你必须从一个新的产品想法开始，煤炭公司就会有不同的方向。 > You get there. 你去那里。 > Eventually you get something that is actually working on it. 最终，你会得到一些实际正在做的事情。 > It\'s a reflection of you as much as it is of learning about the domain and being a domain expert is valuable. 它反映了你对这个领域的了解，作为一个领域专家是很有价值的。 > But you also have to build the skills and we know when we started just in TV we started Kigo way back in 2005. 但是你也必须建立技能，我们知道，当我们刚开始在电视，我们开始的 Kigo 早在 2005 年。 > We didn\'t have the skills and it was only through sticking with it the entire time that we built them. 我们没有这样的技能，只有在我们建造这些技能的整个过程中，我们才能坚持下去。 > So don\'t give up and if you just keep at it you will get better and even if your first startup doesn\'t work. 所以，不要放弃，如果你坚持下去，你会变得更好，即使你的第一家创业公司不起作用。 > Maybe your second one will in my case it took three tries. 也许你的第二个会在我的情况下，它需要三次尝试。 > Errantly a bit of a slow learner because the other people seem to have done it faster sometimes. 错误地说，学习速度有点慢，因为其他人有时似乎做得更快。 > But this was it was a great experience the whole time. 但这是一次很棒的经历。 > And if you don\'t love it you won\'t make it through the long period of pain that is inevitable. 如果你不爱它，你将无法度过漫长的痛苦，这是不可避免的。 > So make sure that you take care of yourself during the process make sure that you take care of your mental health your physical health while you\'re doing it because it\'s a long road. 所以，确保你在这个过程中照顾好自己，确保你的心理健康，你的身体健康，当你这么做的时候，因为这是一条漫长的道路。 > I think earlier they\'re saying it takes an average of eight years. 我想早些时候他们说这平均需要八年时间。 > It took us eight years eight and a half and that\'s normal and fucked it up. 我们花了八年半的时间，这是正常的，而且搞砸了。 > It could\'ve easily taken longer. 很容易就会花更长时间。 > The Amazon deal kind of came out of nowhere we weren\'t really looking this all the company weren\'t expecting to and so it could have been 9 years 10 years before you saw any kind of exit or end of the road on that stuff. 亚马逊的交易是从不知道的地方冒出来的，我们并没有真正看到这一切，所有公司都没有料到这一点，所以 10 年后，你才能看到任何形式的退出或道路的尽头。 > And for me it isn\'t even the end of the road home. 对我来说，这甚至不是回家路的尽头。 > Actually after eight years of this I love it. 事实上，在这八年之后，我喜欢它。 > I really like doing it. 我真的很喜欢这样做。 > And for me it\'s nothing I want to keep doing going forward indefinitely into the future. 对我来说，这对我来说没有什么意义，我不想一直做下去，直到未来。 > I really enjoy it. 我真的很享受。 > And so that\'s really the most important thing is stick with it all the way and don\'t give up. 所以这才是最重要的是坚持到底，不要放弃。 > And that\'s the most important thing. 这是最重要的。 > It\'s the only way to succeed in startups. 这是初创企业成功的唯一途径。 > `[00:18:10]` Thank you. `[00:18:10]` 谢谢。